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ABSTRACT
Temporary contract migrants as a class fall between systems of responsibility: home
country, host country, and international community. The systems are separately inadequate and
basically uncoordinated, leaving migrants in a precarious situation. The situation of temporary
contract migrants is even more precarious as they cross international borders without a path to
citizenship or full enfranchisement in the political, economic, and social life of the host country.
Where citizenship and residence/employment are divided between multiple countries, the
corresponding human rights obligations are similarly divided. This division results in migrant rights
falling between different state-based systems of responsibility. Human rights can be divided
between those that are inherent in citizenship (citizenship obligation) which are the responsibility
of the sending state, those that are inherent in the physical body (presence obligation) which are
the responsibility of the receiving state, and those that fall between systems of responsibility
(involvement obligation) which require sending and receiving countries to act cooperatively.
These categories provide clear guidance in sorting out responsibilities for the rights of temporary
contract migrants and direct us towards possible avenues for reform. Once adopted, this
framework can help guide bilateral or regional agreements on a case-by-case basis. Although the
principles underlying split responsibility are universal, the required elements of cooperation are
likely to vary between different contexts. This dissertation draws on analyses and interviews
conducted with Filipino temporary contract migrants in the United Arab Emirates in order to
substantiate the argument, illustrating strategies that migrants as agents utilize to improve their
conditions, the tradeoffs that they have made in order to secure their livelihood in a global job
market, and the impact that current policy frameworks have on their lived experience.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Temporary migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) face widespread, even
systematic violations of their human rights. Conditions are particularly bad for domestic workers
and construction workers. Labor abuses at major construction projects building luxury properties,
Western-oriented museums, and branch campuses of Western universities in the UAE have
grabbed the headlines thanks to recruiting and contracting fraud and pitiful living conditions.1
Domestic workers are particularly prone to abuses of the labor law such as wage withholding and
extremely long working hours because they are not, in fact, covered by the national labor law.
While these dramatic headlines have captured most of the international attention, this does not
represent conditions for the majority of UAE workers. Attention has focused on these areas
because they are the most extreme cases, where individuals experience the most severe human
rights violations, though they represent a relatively small percentage of the UAE workforce. But
the problem is far wider. There are an estimated 7.8 million migrants in the UAE, representing
over 90 percent of that country’s population and around 85 percent of its workforce.2 This study
presents a comprehensive inquiry into the human rights situation faced by all migrant workers in
the UAE. I find that all migrant workers in the UAE are vulnerable, from domestic workers to
engineers and medical professionals. This study identifies specific aspects that are going wrong,

1
Guide to Employment Agencies: Regulation, Monitoring and Enforcement (Geneva, Switzerland: International
Labour Office, 2007), accessed February 7, 2015, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/--ifp_skills/documents/publication/wcms_118153.pdf. The Island of Happiness Revisited: A Progress Report on Institutional
Commitments to Address Abuses of Migrant Workers on Abu Dhabi's Saadiyat Island (Human Rights Watch, 2012),
accessed April 4, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uae0312webwcover_0.pdf. False Promises:
Exploitation and Forced Labour of Nepalese Migrant Workers (London, UK: Amnesty International, 2011), accessed 7
February 2015, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA31/007/2011/en/b58f0185-455d-425c-bc4fd6b7fe309524/asa310072011en.pdf.
2
Based on the UAE National Statistics Center 2009 Labor Force Survey which, in turn uses 2005 census
population data. It is worth noting that Emiratis are overwhelmingly employed in the public sector due to favorable
employment conditions; private sector employment, bound by UAE labor law, is composed of 99 percent migrant workers.
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the severity of the problems, and how they relate to each other. As important, I identify who is
responsible for addressing these concerns and propose potential solutions.
Summary, Aims and Relevance
Global migration has the potential to reduce global inequality by allowing workers to flow
to areas where they are best rewarded, yet the global flow of people is highly constrained.
National boundaries define citizenship and its attendant privileges; visa regimes categorize noncitizens, circumscribing their rights and privileges accordingly. We live in a world where
international boundaries strain to delimit and control massive inequalities.
In much of the world today there is an ongoing conversation about the proper role of
migration and migrant labor. This conversation spans migrant sending, transit, and destination
countries, and affects an increasingly large number of people. The United Nations (UN) estimates
that there were 232 million international migrants in 2013, 3.2 percent of the total global
population.3 And the flow of international migration continues to grow globally, increasing by 50
percent between 1990 and 2013.4 While governments generally seek to maintain current levels of
migration,5 receiving country populations are increasingly skeptical.
Temporary contract migration is gaining renewed interest as a possible means to allow
large migration flows yet mitigate receiving country concerns. Temporary labor migration is not a
new idea; major destination countries have dabbled in this area since the rise of immigration
regulations in the WWII era. In the United States, the Bracero Program (1942 - 1964) is often
pointed to as a cautionary tale of the potential pitfalls of temporary contract migration, from the
difficulty of creating ethical recruitment systems to the difficulty in ensuring that migrants actually

3
International Migration Report 2013 (New York, NY: United Nations, 2013): pp. 1-2, accessed May 8, 2015,
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/migration/migrationreport2013/Full_Document_final.p
df.
4

Ibid, p. 2.

5

Lina Bassarsky et al., International Migration Policies: Government Views and Priorities (New York, NY: United
Nations, 2013), accessed February 28, 2015,
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/policy/international-migration-policies-report-2013.shtml
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exit at the end of their employment/visa term.6 Despite such problems, countries from Canada to
the United Arab Emirates are increasingly reliant on temporary contract migration, posing a
growing challenge to the international community: Can states today design temporary labor
migration programs that are both politically responsible and that respect the rights of migrant
workers?
Two areas of growing concern have combined in recent years to increase the appeal of
temporary contract migration globally. First, in the post September 11th environment, migration
has raised security concerns. Immediately post-attack, fears surfaced that foreign terrorists might
enter Western countries as legal migrants or that they might slip in through illegal migration
routes. In the continuing global environment of unrest tied to religious fundamentalism, fears
remain heightened regarding the failure of migrant communities to fully integrate into host
societies. In this context, greater reliance on temporary migration can address these security
concerns, promising to reduce both illegal migration (by more closely aligning labor market
demands and migrant worker supply) and the strain of integration (by encouraging the exit of nonworkers). Second, the global economic slowdown in 2008 increased concern regarding the longterm impact of migration on domestic labor markets. Native-born workers fear that migrants may
take their jobs, especially during economic downturns and increased unemployment. Temporary
labor schemes increase labor market flexibility, allowing for the import of labor when needed but
also allowing those numbers to be easily and quickly reduced during times of economic downturn.
Major migrant sending countries also tend to view temporary labor schemes favorably. Of
course, regular migration has long been viewed as an escape valve when domestic economies
are not preforming well or unemployment is high. However, sending countries have long been
worried about the effects of emigration on local societies and economies, particularly through
brain drain. Specifically temporary migration has the potential to offer the same advantages but to
reverse some of the potential negative effects of high levels of emigration. Brain drain may be

6

David Griffith, American Guestworkers: Jamaicans and Mexicans in the U.S. Labor Market (University Park,
PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), Kindle book.
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reversed if workers who gain new skills, knowledge, and ideas abroad return and reintegrate into
the sending country labor market. Temporary migration also encourages migrants to maintain
close ties to families and communities in the home country, which may find expression in
increased remittances. Global recorded remittance flows in 2010 were an estimated $325 billion
USD (United States dollars), and these flows appear to be quite resilient in the face of economic
downturn in host countries.7 Remittances not only support family members left behind, but have
knock-on effects in the communities in which they are spent, and serve to increase national
foreign reserves. In short, sending countries view well-designed and -managed temporary
migration as a means of bolstering national development.
Individual migrants also appear to be in favor of temporary migration programs. While it is
possible, even likely, that migrants would prefer the option of regular migration, the overwhelming
response for temporary programs indicates that temporary programs are an acceptable
alternative. It is impossible to say how many temporary contract migrants there are globally, as no
comprehensive data on this question is available.8 However, if we look at indicative bilateral
programs an encouraging picture emerges. Temporary work programs granting access to Europe
and North America are oversubscribed. Even under more repressive regimes, such as the
countries of the oil-rich Gulf, competition for temporary labor opportunities is fierce. Of course the
popularity of temporary work programs among migrant workers is driven in no small measure by
poverty and relative deprivation in the home country on the one hand, and the fact that access to
rich country economies is severely restricted on the other hand. Yet this is precisely the point:
temporary schemes encourage greater access by alleviating receiving country fears, creating
increased opportunities globally.

7

Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, 2nd ed. (Washington DC: World Bank, 2011): p. 17.

8
A global figure is impossible to estimate with any accuracy: while countries report to the UN regarding overall
migration figures, they do not report specifically on temporary migration flows. Even if they did, there is contention as to
what is considered a temporary labor program and what is not. For example, most countries would not include au pair
programs but many rights activists would argue that they should be included. Even if one could collect comparable
numbers for some countries, not all make program-specific numbers available.
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In short, temporary contract migration is viewed by both sending and receiving countries,
as well as by migrants themselves, as a win-win situation. By encouraging circulation and return
migration it is hoped that a virtuous cycle of opportunities for the global poor, flexible and
inexpensive labor for receiving states, and increased development for receiving states can be
established.
Human rights groups and migrant advocate groups, however, have raised serious
concerns about the impact of these policies on individual migrant workers. Government policies
intended to ensure temporariness also entail greater restrictions on the rights and privileges of
temporary migrant workers in their host societies. Human right groups raise two types of
concerns: First, that the inability of temporary migrants to attain citizenship blocks their access to
fundamental political rights such as representation; second, that restrictions on labor mobility
(especially the inability to change jobs) place temporary workers at the mercy of potentially
unscrupulous employers, facilitating a range of abusive practices.
Yet sustained attention to the effect that temporariness has on the full set of human rights
for migrants is surprisingly scarce. The problem is not one of defining which human rights apply to
migrants; clearly migrant persons deserve the full set of human rights acknowledged by the
international community, enumerated in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) and its covenants. However, in practice the international rights framework was set
up to function within the system of nation-states. In the case of international migrants, where
citizenship and residence/employment are divided between multiple countries, the corresponding
human rights obligations are similarly divided. The situation of temporary contract migrants is
even more precarious as they cross international borders without a path to citizenship or full
enfranchisement in the political, economic, and social life of the host country. The result is that
responsibility for the rights of each temporary migrant is divided, with both origin and destination
countries bearing some obligations.
What are the consequences of temporariness for the human rights of migrant workers? In
short, migrants fall between systems of responsibility: home country, host country, and
international community. There is no international consensus that differentiation in treatment
5

between citizens and nationals is synonymous with discrimination and therefore unacceptable.
Yet the systems for the provision of rights to citizens abroad and to non‐citizens who are
territorially present are separately inadequate and lack bilateral coordination. There is little
chance for the emergence of an international regime to solve this coordination problem in the
foreseeable future. In this context, existing human rights protections, embedded in the global
states structure and a product of it, are an unsatisfactory protection.
We are left with the analytical and normative challenge of developing the best possible
distribution of human rights obligations between states under the existing human rights regime
and of determining what specific forms of cooperation are required in those cases where
responsibilities are shared between home and host countries. In terms of that challenge, human
rights can be divided into three categories: those that are inherent in citizenship, which are the
responsibility of the sending state; those that are inherent in the physical body, which are the
responsibility of the receiving state; and those that fall between systems of responsibility and
which therefore require cooperation between the relevant states.
Those categories provide clear guidance in sorting out responsibilities for the rights of
temporary contract migrants. Political rights remain the responsibility of the country of citizenship.
Rights that are inherent in the physical body become the responsibility of the country of
residence. Social and cultural rights, however, span international boundaries: migrant families are
divided between workers in one country and dependents in another; social security is complicated
by the fact that migrants’ working years are passed in a different country than that of their youth
or old age. Cooperation between sending and receiving countries is needed to address these
rights adequately. With such cooperation it is in principle possible to provide temporary contract
workers with the full set of human rights.
How can this framework be applied in practice? I do not mean to imply that providing
human rights to temporary contract workers is easy to achieve in practice. It is not. Ensuring that
human rights obligations are respected becomes much more challenging when international
boundaries are crossed. Existing human rights norms and regimes have failed to adequately
address the needs of temporary migrant workers. The division of human rights obligations which I
6

propose, applying well-established understandings of human rights to cases of temporary
migration, would provide a critical step toward developing a comprehensive rights regime for
temporary contract migrant workers. Once adopted, this framework can help guide bilateral (even
regional) agreements on a case-by-case basis. Although the principles underlying split
responsibility are universal, the required elements of cooperation, in particular, are likely to vary
between different contexts. State capacity, variations in domestic legal systems, and variations in
culture between different origin/destination country pairs are likely to effect the structures needed
in any given case in order to ensure the greatest improvements in temporary contract workers’
(TCWs) human rights.
In this dissertation, I will be applying this framework in depth to a case study of the UAEPhilippines migration corridor. The UAE is a country that relies heavily on temporary contract
labor with no thought of granting those workers permanent status. They are quite outspoken in
their intention to retain this system, but also in their insistence that migrant labor in the country
can be arranged to the advantage of all parties. The Philippines, as one of the major migration
partners of the UAE – and as an unashamed supporter of migration as a national economic
strategy – generally agrees that migration between the two countries is mutually beneficial.
But the current status quo falls miserably short of its potential. The UAE legal system
(crucially including employment and contract law) and enforcement practices patently privileges
nationals with perverse effects on the rights of migrant laborers. Extreme abuses, including
conditions of forced labor, while uncommon, often come to light. Equally concerning is the
vulnerability of the majority of UAE migrant workers to a pattern of systematic, normalized abuse
of fundamental human and labor rights. The norm in the United Arab Emirates, for example,
includes passport confiscation, long hours without overtime compensation, verbal abuse, unequal
pay with systematic disparities on the basis of nationality, and/or extremely low pay that falls
below a living wage. The ability of migrants to organize in defense of their rights is also extremely
limited; labor unions, strikes, and other forms of public protest are outlawed.
Yet the Philippines government, despite sincere and energetic efforts, is unable to bridge
this gap by extending sufficient rights protection to its citizens abroad. The ability of sending
7

countries to project protections into the transnational sphere is limited by a general lack of
cooperation or, alternatively, a deficient transnational normative framework. But the Philippines
has also struggled to provide political and social rights to its citizens abroad. While great strides
have been made in enfranchising migrant workers, the process remains cumbersome. More
concerning, the Philippines social security system is struggling to provide a minimum standard of
living to its citizens. Understanding this gap in the provision of rights, as well as illuminating
migrant strategies for coping with their precarious situation, are prerequisites for designing ethical
and effective policies that in fact provide temporary migrants with their full complement of human
rights.
There are concrete and achievable policies that can be implemented in the UAEPhilippines migration context. Perhaps the single most important policy change toward the goal of
improving the rights of TCWs in the UAE, would be to abolish the practice of labor bans. The UAE
government currently imposes a six-month ban on workers who leave their employers before the
end of their contract, imposing a significant constraint on the mobility of migrant workers. A
second important step forward would entail the Philippines getting a better hold on the legal
process through which recruitment agencies are held accountable for illegal recruitment
practices. Finally, the two countries could work together to institute a functioning and mutually
beneficial registration process for labor contracts. Both countries have attempted to impose
contract registration unilaterally with poor results; a joint system is needed. These three reforms
would represent huge strides in improving the human rights and the lived experience of
temporary contract workers in the UAE. If a decent temporary contract migration program can be
achieved in this bilateral context, the model they develop could be broadly applied.
There are significant problems and abuses in temporary migration programs. But labor
will inexorably continue to flow across borders as people search for a better life for themselves
and their families. As members of the international community, it is our task to create a global
system in which labor can flow within well-crafted and enforceable legal systems that respect the
dignity and rights of both employers and workers, citizens and migrants. The following exploration
of the UAE/Philippines case was undertaken in hopes of contributing to that goal.
8

Definition of Major Concepts
Fruitful inquiry into how best to address that challenge requires a shared understanding
of key concepts. First, we need to define temporary contract migration. What distinguishes
temporary contract migration from other forms of migration? Second, we need to look at the
specific UAE context. The region has a particular set of institutions and ideas of membership,
structured by a situation where even nationals face significant limitations on rights-based claims,
limitations which bear more strongly on migrants. Finally, we will need to examine the concept of
“temporariness.” Temporary migration in the UAE can sometimes appear quite permanent as the
UAE state, employers, and migrant workers rely on the continued renewal of temporary
admission.
Temporary Labor Migration and Temporary Contract Migration
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines temporary labor migration as
the “migration of workers who enter a foreign country for a specified limited period of time before
returning to the country of origin.”9 The length of stay is not as important as the fact that it is
explicitly temporary. In some cases, the duration of the entry permit is directly tied to the nature of
the job, such as in seasonal agriculture work; in most cases however the duration seems
arbitrary. But in all cases duration of residence is limited, defining a group of persons with fewer
rights in their country of residence.
Temporary contract migration is a subset of temporary labor migration programs.10 The
key characteristic of temporary contract migration is that employment and residence are tied to
the migrant’s employment contract. In the most generic sense, temporary contract migration can
be defined as: the movement across international boundaries of “workers with fix-term labor

9
Glossary on Migration, 2nd ed, International Migration Law (Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization
for Migration, 2011), accessed May 8, 2015,
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Glossary%202nd%20ed%20web.pdf.
10
Typologies of the larger category, temporary migration, can be found in: Martin Ruhs, "The Potential of
Temporary Migration Programmes in Future International Migration Policy," International Labour Review 145, no. 1-2
(2006). Manolo Abella, Policies and Best Practices for Management of Temporary Migration, (Turin, Italy: United Nations,
2006, accessed May 8, 2015,
http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/turin/Symposium_Turin_files/P03_SYMP_Abella.pdf.
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contracts in destination countries and commitment to return to their country of origin after
expiration of their work permit.”11 In most cases, and as is the norm in the Gulf Cooperation
Council countries, temporary contract migration schemes require the employer to sponsor the
migrant’s entry and residence, further differentiating TCWs from other labor migrants.12
There is a middle ground that is beginning to emerge in the Gulf, in which residence is
tied to continued employment but not to a specific employer or contract. The migrant must have
an initial contract in order to be eligible to receive a visa; but the visa and work permit are either
easily transferrable between employers or are not tied to a specific employer at all. For the
purposes of this dissertation, this will also be considered temporary contract migration.
Kafala
There is some confusion in the literature regarding the legal status of kafala. Many critics,
including rights-oriented intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), tend to use the term “kafala” to refer to the legal codification of the patronclient relationship between citizens/employers and migrants/workers, focusing solely on the
(many and significant) negative aspects.13 Obviously, kafala then becomes a primary concern
and target for action, rather than focusing on specific harmful laws and regulations individually.
This is problematic. It is important to note that kafala is not synonymous with labor law in the
UAE. Kafala is better understood as the underlying logic through which some basic principles of
both labor and immigration law were derived and which continue to inform any legal
modifications. Elizabeth Frantz explains it this way:
The kafala system can be understood as the set of rules, regulations, ideas and
practices underpinning the recruitment and control of migrant workers. ... The
specific rules and regulations differ from country to country, but the basic

11
“Briefing Note No. 2: Temporary Labor Migration Programs," in Global Forum on Migration and Development
(Marseille, 2011), accessed May 8, 2015,
https://www.gfmd.org/files/documents/gfmd_swiss11_Marseille_briefing%20note_no2_me_june8_en.pdf. See also:
Abella, Policies and Best Practices for Management of Temporary Migration.
12
Illiberal regimes are not the only ones to take advantage of contract migration; there are schemes in Western
democracies such as the US and Germany that allow companies to bring in foreign employees for a limited duration of
time, similar to GATS Mode 4.
13
For an example in the academic literature, see: Amrita Pande, "'The Paper That You Have in Your Hand Is
My Freedom': Migrant Domestic Work and the Sponsorship (Kafala) System in Lebanon," International Migration Review
47, no. 2 (2013).
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elements are the same. Foreign nationals must have a local sponsor, or kafeel,
who is in most cases the employer, in order to obtain residence and work
permits. During the term of service, the worker does not have the right to quit
except under specific circumstances, and in most cases cannot change jobs or
choose a new employer without the sponsor’s consent.14
In the UAE, the most significant legal principles which derive from kafala are sponsorship,
the inability to change employers without consent, and the use of labor bans as a means to
penalize breeches of contract. It should be noted that kafala also underpins some laws that
protect or benefit employees, such as requirements to provide healthcare, an end of service
“gratuity,” and the legal requirement that employers pay for employees’ to return to their country
of origin periodically and at the end of their employment. Alternatively, there are existing laws in
the UAE which contradict the logic of kafala, such as the prohibition on passport withholding. It is
a mixed bag.
Further, kafala is a concept that is not well understood, either in the UAE or outside it.
The majority of migrants that I talked to – not just Filipinos, but everyone – had not even heard of
the term, let alone understood its impact on UAE labor law.15 This makes it unlikely that migrants,
when asked about problems they face or changes they would like to see, would identify “kafala”
as a source of complaint.
In this dissertation, therefore, the term “kafala” is used only to refer to the patron-client
ethic with its overtones of patronization and legitimated control. Specific laws and regulations,
though they may be codifications of that ethic, are discussed under the rubric of labor or
immigration law. This departs from the norm in the literature on human rights abuses in the Arab
Gulf.

14
Elizabeth Frantz, "Jordan's Unfree Workforce: State-Sponsored Bonded Labour in the Arab Region," The
Journal of Development Studies, 49, no. 8 (2013): p. 16.
15
Alternatively, many people think that kafala only applies to domestic workers. It is true that household service
workers, female and male, are explicitly excluded from coverage under UAE labor law and are instead regulated by
immigration law. It is worth noting that UAE government employees are also excluded from coverage under the labor law,
although this is usually to the employee’s benefit. Again, the logic of kafala underpins key elements in both labor law and
immigration law, making it relevant to all types of workers.
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Emiratis, Citizens, and Locals
Citizenship is a relationship between an individual and the legal structure of a country.
Citizenship is what defines an individual as appropriately linked to a specific state government
which, in turn, is obligated to the individual, exchanging allegiance for his/her right to protection
and political participation. Classical political thought interpreted the state’s duty to protect in terms
of the most basic physical security (Hobbes’ one leviathan to overawe them all). However, the
modern international community has extended the state’s duty to protect to include the protection
of citizens’ human rights through such instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR).
Citizenship is not synonymous with nationalism or national identity.16 In the American
tradition (shared by some other countries), the nation as a group is defined first by allegiance and
territory - civic nationalism. In this tradition, citizenship and national identity are overlapping
terms. However, this is not the global norm. In most of the world, national identity is bound up in
race, ethnicity, religion, and/or history; nationals and citizens overlap to a lesser extent. The UAE
is an interesting case, as the country codifies the distinction between citizens and nationals.
The UAE has two layers of citizenship. Formal citizenship grants the citizens the ability to
enter and leave the country, and to hold a UAE passport. In local parlance, passport holders are
considered citizens but are not Emirati. They have the right to enter and exit at will, to reside in
the country independent of employment status, and to hold property. This is analogous to a
permanent resident category in many democratic countries.
However, the provision of social welfare and political rights is dependent on evidence of a
“true” Emirati family history, documented in the Kholasat Qaid, or Family Book. The passport
identifies you as a citizen of the UAE; but only the Kholasat Qaid identifies you as an Emirati
national:
Possessing this book, not a regular passport, is what apparently makes one a
“real Emirati.” Not having one is not too different from carrying a passport from

16

Article 15 of the UDHR protects the individual’s right to nationality.
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the United Nations. One can use the passport for travel but it doesn’t show that
you belong anywhere.17
Further, UAE parlance recognizes another unusual category: “locals.” Locals are
individuals who have lived in the UAE for long enough to consider it their natural home, yet they
may or may not have citizenship or Emirati status. Many Filipinos that I spoke with considered
anyone who wore typical Emirati style of dress to be a local. In fact, if they knew the country of
citizenship, this was often identified; so you could hear someone referred to as an “Egyptian
local” or a “Pakistani local.”
Migrants
The term “migrant” also has a distinct meaning in the UAE. Brystol-Rhys documents the
common alternative terms used for migrants in the UAE as follows:18
Table 1: Migrant Terminology in the UAE

1.
2.
3.

DEFINITION

TERM USED
BY MIGRANTS

Low- to semi-skilled, recruited by labor contractors
in the sending country and living in labor camps,
contract visa.
Low- to semi-skilled, non-Western, earning below
AED 8,000/month, individually sponsored through
the kafala system.
Semi- to skilled, either earns over AED 8,000 OR
Western (regardless of salary), individually
sponsored through the kafala system.

Laborer

TERM USED BY
UAE
NATIONALS
Worker

Worker

Worker

Expatriate

Foreigner

All three categories fit the definition of temporary contract workers (TCWs) as it is usually
presented in the academic and practitioner literature. Therefore, when the term “temporary
contract worker” or “TCW” is used, it will refer to all three categories of migrants. However, the
challenges and severity of the problems faced by the groups may be very different. Therefore, the
terms as used by migrants (given by Brystol-Rhys, above) will also be utilized as appropriate.

17
Sultan Al Qassemi, "Book That Proves Some Emiratis Are More Equal Than Others," The National, 7
February 2010.
18

Jane Bristol-Rhys, "A Lexicon of Migrants in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)," Viewpoints Special Edition:
Migration and the Gulf (Washington D.C.: Middle East Institute, 2010).
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Permanent Temporariness
The situation of migrants in the UAE is characterized in important ways both by the de
jure impermanence of their legal status on the one hand, and by the de facto permanence of their
prolonged stay in the country on the other. This situation can be termed “permanent
temporariness.”
Migrant workers’ (as well as their dependents’) legal status in the country is tied to their
employment by a specific employer. An employer must sponsor the employee’s work permit and
residence visa and, upon termination of the employment relationship for whatever reason, the
employer must cancel the work permit and residence visa, at which point the former employee
has a limited timeframe in which to exit the country, typically thirty days. As work permits and
residence visas are currently limited to two years, a migrant’s legal status in the country has, at
most, a two-year horizon. In addition, there is virtually no chance of gaining UAE citizenship, and
the UAE government has a mandatory retirement age of sixty five. In the end, everyone’s stay in
the country is temporary.
At the same time, the mandatory retirement age is the only limit that the UAE government
places on the maximum length of stay for migrant workers.19 If the worker is fortunate enough to
line up consecutive two-year employment contracts, they may stay in the UAE for decades. In
fact, there are migrants who have resided in the UAE for their entire lives. This typically happens
when a young couple has children while working in the UAE. Within the Filipino community, if the
parents have sufficient means, they may choose to raise and educate their children in the UAE,
as the country is generally considered safer and with a better quality of life. These children, in
turn, may grow up, find jobs, and stay in the UAE on their own successive employment contracts
for the majority of their working life.20 In this way, an individual may stay in the UAE for over sixty
years without ever gaining access to citizenship or permanent residency.

19
And, technically, even this can be surmounted if the individual owns and operates a business in the UAE or
works for the UAE government is a position of high importance.
20
It is possible for multiple generations to “chain” residencies together for more than the two generations
outlined above. While not unheard of in the Indian and Iranian communities, within the Filipino community such
multigenerational experiences would be extremely rare.

14

It is to be expected that when a migrant first arrives in the UAE or when they occupy a
position near the bottom of the economic spectrum, they are relatively inured to permanent
temporariness.21 They have the least invested and, at termination of their employment contract,
they are the most likely to be able to find a new job with a similar or better compensation package
as the one they currently occupy within the sixty-day timeframe established by the notice and exit
periods.22 However, as an individual becomes more established in The UAE, particularly as they
climb the career ladder and equivalent jobs become more difficult to identify and obtain, the
temporariness of their situation becomes more significant. That is, as a migrant becomes more
permanent as a resident in the UAE, they become more aware of the temporariness that lies at
the heart of their situation. The tension inherent in their situation and the rising costs of rupturing
the balance becomes a crucial factor influencing decisions as diverse as changing employers,
continuing education, investment strategies, and marriage and child-rearing.
Methods of Investigation
This work proceeds from the normative assumption that there are universal human rights,
and that the failure to fully extend those rights to any particular category of humans (women,
ethnic minorities, migrant workers, etc.) represents a wrong that needs to be redressed. The
study contributes to theory development in human rights by developing a framework of split
responsibility for human rights in cases of explicitly temporary migrants, where citizenship is
divided from physical presence. The study uses the Philippines-United Arab Emirates migration
corridor as a case study to explore illuminate the consequences of this framework. Methods are
triangulated in order to ensure the most robust conclusions possible given the existing real-world
constraints. The study utilizes the documentary record, semi-structured interviews with Filipino
migrants, and topical interviews with key informants in the Philippine embassy and in the Filipino

21
This assumes that the migrant worker is not in debt; the impact of debt on the agency of the worker and its
implications for the tenuousness of situations of permanent temporariness will be discussed in depth in Chapter Five.
22

At which point they will still need to exit the country, but with a sponsoring employer lined up return is much
quicker, easier, and cheaper.
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community in the UAE. In addition, a limited amount of participant observer information is also
included based on my three years living and working in the UAE.
This project develops a theoretical approach to the problem of divided responsibility for
the human rights of migrants. The study begins with theoretical development to determine an
appropriate division of roles and responsibilities and establish what an optimal rights-respecting
bilateral relationship would look like. To do this, the study will draw on the literature on human
rights theory and its application to temporary contract workers. There is a large body of literature
on international migration and the potential for the development of an international regime
regulating the movement of people internationally. The literature on temporary migration is
smaller but significant.
I will use a single, in-depth case study approach to establish the consistency between the
normative/ theoretical standards and the case practices. The study primarily utilizes the bilateral
relationship between the UAE and the Philippines to illustrate theoretical principles as well as to
draw real world conclusions and recommendations for action. There is a large body of literature,
academic and practitioner, illustrating the case of the Philippines. However, the literature on the
United Arab Emirates is quite limited and there is no in-depth academic study of the UAEPhilippines relationship. Gaps in the literature will be filled though interviews with key informants
in the UAE as well as interviews with Filipino migrants in Abu Dhabi and Dubai.
Case Study
Case selection was first narrowed down by three general simplifying conditions. First,
only countries with functioning central governments were considered. Countries with ongoing,
significant conflict were not considered. For example, the territory with the highest percentage of
the population living abroad is the West Bank and Gaza (68.3 percent of the population), an area
with an ambiguous state structure and a conflict with no immediate prospects of resolution.23 The
overlap between labor migration and refugee flows, though an important issue, is not one which
this dissertation proposes to address.

23
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Second, migration sending countries with populations below one million were not
considered. For example, the country with the second highest percentage of the population living
abroad, Samoa (67.3 percent of the population), had a population of just 0.2 million people in
2009.24 This exclusion is both practical, as finding representative samples of such small
populations is difficult, and theoretical. Countries with very small populations may have different
relationships within regional systems, face different constraints on state knowledge and resources
and, as such, may not be representative of major migration sending-countries.
Third, only sending countries which export labor at all skill levels are considered in order
to control for the possible effects of skill level and income on human rights and the exercise of
agency.
I was looking for a migration corridor where both sending and receiving countries meet all
three of these conditions. I first looked at major receiving countries and selected the country that
imports the highest amount of foreign labor as a percentage of population: the UAE. The UAE
has the 14th largest migrant population in the world: 3,293,264 migrants were living in the United
Arab Emirates in 2010.25 As a percentage of population, however, the UAE has arguably the
largest migrant population in the world with migrants comprising 88.5 percent of the total national
population.26 In addition, the UAE migrant population is growing, both in absolute terms and as a
percentage of population. The UN estimates that the UAE was one of only nine countries whose
total migrant population gained over one million international migrants in the period between 2000
and 2010; those nine countries accounted for 67 percent of the overall increase in the migrant
stock over those ten years and the UAE alone accounted for roughly 3 percent of the global

24

Ibid.
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International Migration Report 2009: A Global Assessment (New York, NY: United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2011): p. 2.
26
The current World Bank data places the UAE third, behind Qatar (86.5 percent) and Monaco (71.6 percent).
However, this relies on outdated census data for the UAE. In 2010 the UAE stopped relying on household-level census
data to estimate its migrant population as the widespread reliance on illegal housing arrangements by low- and
semiskilled workers skewed census data, significantly underestimating migrant populations. Newer UAE estimates instead
use administrative data on visas, births and deaths, also a flawed measure but likely to be much more accurate. Cf: Martin
Croucher, "Door-to-Door Census in UAE Is Scrapped," The National, April 6 2011.
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increase in the international migrant population.27 Finally, virtually all migrants in the UAE are
either temporary contract workers or the dependents of a TCW. As the study centers on
specifically temporary migrants where a significant element of obligation remains with the home
country, this aspect is crucial. The UAE is also openly committed to maintaining the
temporariness of its migration program, despite the fact that much of the criticism of the UAE’s
migration policies centers on those aspects which structure and enforce this temporariness.
There are also drawbacks to selecting the UAE. The most significant is the fact that the
UAE is an authoritarian political system whose human rights record with respect to even its own
citizens is poor. The UAE is not democratic and denies political representation not just to
migrants, but to its citizens as well. This is offset by the fact that those rights which are weakest
are political rights which, I argue, remain the obligation of the migrant sending country.
I then looked at the UAE’s major sending country partners: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Egypt, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Yemen, Iran, and Sudan.28 Egypt, Yemen, and Sudan are
excluded on the basis of ongoing conflict and/or state collapse. Sri Lanka is excluded as its
emigrants in the UAE are overwhelmingly low-skilled and poor; Bangladesh could also potentially
be disqualified on this basis. Of those that remain, the Philippines has the largest emigrant
population as a percentage of the domestic population.
The Philippines is one of the world’s largest countries of emigration. In terms of absolute
numbers, the Philippines was the ninth largest net emigration country in 2010 with 4,275,200
emigrants (4.6 percent of the total population) and the fourth largest recipient of remittances
($21.3 billion USD, 12 percent of GDP).29 Filipinos enter the UAE labor market at all skill-levels
and are actively sought by both the UAE government and employers as an attractive labor force.
The Philippine state is active in promoting temporary labor migration as a national development
strategy. This means that the state actively tries to keep its “overseas foreign workers” (OFWs)
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engaged in their home communities and that they are energetic in advocating for the welfare of its
citizens abroad. The Philippine state could plausibly take major steps that could provide
generalizable lessons, or even a model, for sending states in general. Finally, the Philippines has
the additional advantage that its citizens are largely bilingual Tagalog and English speakers,
facilitating interviewing.
The primary disadvantage of the Philippines as a case study is that there are some
professions in which they are little represented. There are quite a few Filipino domestic workers,
clerks, office workers, engineers, nurses, and medical professionals, among others. However,
there remain employment segments in which Filipinos are rare. In particular there do not appear
to be many Filipinos in manual labor positions in the construction industry. There are Filipinos in
construction, but they tend to be in engineering positions. There are Filipinos in manual labor, but
they tend to be in domestic positions, cleaning crews, and other positions that are more visible to
the general public. Manual labor in construction is an important segment of the UAE migrant labor
population, though. Construction and domestic work are the two segments of the UAE labor
market that garner the most global criticism for human rights abuses. The Philippines is
nonetheless the best choice. In the UAE employment patterns tend to follow a hierarchy loosely
based on nationality, in which workers from a specific nationality tend to be clustered in specific
employment roles. There are only two nationalities that break this stereotype and whose nationals
are widely employed across the spectrum: Indians and Filipinos. As a case study, India is
particularly problematic due to strong regional differences within India that affect migration and
employment patterns; this is not a concern in the Philippines case.
Semi-Structured Interviews
This study relies on interviews in order to capture the subjective factors that influence
TCWs’ decision-making, to establish motivations and preferences, and to capture the complex
impact of TCWs’ agency. Original data have been derived through field work and reflected in field
notes, and interview audio recordings. Filipino migrants in the UAE were invited to participate in
interviews in order to assess the impact of the migration system on their lived experience,
focusing on areas identified in the academic and practitioner literature as being potentially
19

detrimental to the human rights of migrants as well as programs and other measures in place to
address these areas.
Interviews were semi-structured using fifteen trigger questions, augmented with further
probes as needed. Interviews were between twenty and ninety minutes in duration. Interviewees
represented the full range of age, education, skill, and income levels. Both men and women
participated.
Interviewees were recruited from the cities of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Four main
recruitment tactics were utilized. First, the researcher partnered with the Embassy of the
Philippines in Abu Dhabi to recruit and conduct interviews. I stood by the door to the Embassy
and asked people as they exited the building if they had time for an interview. If the individual
agreed to an interview, I led them upstairs to a quiet area in a hallway where a table and chairs
were set up. This recruitment method has the major advantage of reducing selection bias. All
Filipinos in the UAE will come to the Embassy at one point or another. In person visits to the
Embassy are required to conduct all types of routine business, from obtaining the ubiquitous
Overseas Employment Certificate (OEC) to registering to vote overseas. The Embassy setting,
however, was a double-edged sword. While recruiting at the Embassy reassured some
interviewees regarding my presumed professionalism and the social and political acceptableness
of my research, it made some people uncomfortable when answering questions about the
governments of the UAE and especially the Philippines. As many interviewees fear that Embassy
officials are corrupt, recruiting on Embassy grounds may also have tarnished perceptions of me; I
was careful to emphasize that I was a student at a university in the United States, that their
responses were entirely confidential, and that they could report me to my university if they felt I
mishandled the situation in any way. Overall the advantages of recruiting in the Embassy
outweighed the disadvantages and this was the most successful method of recruitment.
Second, the Embassy also introduced me to Bayanihan Council: an umbrella group in
which all the major Filipino community and professional groups have representation. This council
is convened by the Embassy, meets on the Embassy grounds, and serves as a primary vehicle
for communication between the Embassy and the wider Filipino community. I was able to ask
20

Bayanihan members for entrée to talk to their group members. As a means of finding migrant
workers to interview, this method was not particularly successful, though it would be useful for
other reasons as described below.
Third, I utilized my personal networks to find interviewees. I asked Filipinos that I saw in
the community, from workers at the businesses I patronized to friends I knew socially, to
participate. I also asked non-Filipino friends to ask their Filipino friends if they would be willing to
participate. And all interviewees were asked to pass my card on to friends that might be willing to
participate. This type of snowballing was moderately successful in recruiting interviewees but also
likely to suffer from selection bias.
Finally, the Embassy of the Philippines in Abu Dhabi allowed me to interview some
women residents at a facility they operate for Filipinos in distress. This facility is largely occupied
by domestic workers who have absconded from their employers due to significant abuse. The
facility manager asked any women who were interested in participating to come to a specific
room at a specific time when interviews would be held. Five women, all domestic workers who
had absconded, agreed to be interviewed. This is obviously a selective recruitment technique, but
it is also the only way to access and interview the worst abused Filipino migrants in the UAE.
The extent to which the resulting group of interviewees is representative is of course
open to question. Sample-population congruence is difficult to determine, as the UAE does not
publicize statistics about its migrant population by nationality. Statistics kept by the Philippines
government are also unreliable, as not all TCWs appropriately report their employment status and
contract, especially at the lower end of the economic scale.
Since interviewing is an indirect measure of attitudes, beliefs, and actions, it presents
challenges to ensuring validity and reliability. It is true that interviewees will have biases,
acknowledged and unacknowledged, which will affect their responses. Personal attributes, origin
community background, and host community context all affect interviewees’ attitudes and beliefs
in oft unacknowledged ways. Interviewees may intentionally alter their narrative. This may
represent an effort to present or preserve a certain self-image or an effort at self-justification. It
may also represent an effort by the interviewee to tell the interviewer what she wants to hear.
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However, lying is not the norm among those who volunteer; omission of relevant facts or the
“strategic reconstruction” of events in order to present a certain rationale or logic is the more
pressing concern.30
There are several common strategies that were utilized to address these concerns. First,
confidentiality was assured and only volunteers were interviewed in order to have respondents
motivated to respond. Second, multiple questions were used to assess any given concept. Third,
possible ulterior motives were proactively addressed by the interviewer, indicating that such
motives are possible and/or common; where the interviewer normalizes these motives and does
not assume a specific position, it is more likely that the interviewee will confirm or correct. I was
attentive to the need to give neutral feedback and to probe for further information in a
nondirective manner. Finally, a large number of interviews were conducted in order to look for
areas of consensus, or to appropriately weigh conflicting claims, in order to derive the best
explanation supported by the evidence.
Alternatively, bias may be introduced in the way the interviewee perceives the interviewer
affects responses. In the UAE, nationality, race and class combine to create a unique social
hierarchy. As a white, western woman, it was often assumed that I was near the top of that
hierarchy where most Filipinos are lower on the spectrum; interviewees often initially referred to
me as “Madam.” I was careful not to reinforce this hierarchy if possible: I wore simple clothing and
introduced myself by first name and as a student.
Interviews with Experts
In addition to the interviews with migrants, I conducted interviews with key informants,
including Filipino government officials, migrant rights advocates, and gatekeepers in the Filipino
communities in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, as well as local academics. Interview questions were
tailored to the specific area of expertise of the interviewee, but with the aim of obtaining their
expert assessment of the successes and failures of temporary migration in the UAE, as well as of
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Brian C. Rathbun, "Interviewing and Qualitative Methods: Pragmatism and Practicalities," in The Oxford
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Oxford University Press, 2008).
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key government initiatives and programs. Of particular value were interviews with the Vice
Consuls and the Labor Attaché at the Embassy of the Philippines in Abu Dhabi, and the
representatives from Filipino rights advocacy groups. Local academics, while supportive, did not
have significant substantive knowledge relevant to my research.
Archival Research
This research relies on written records for information on UAE law and policy, as well as
to support arguments made in all areas. The written record, episodic and running, has been the
only means available to assess UAE government positions and actions. While I attempted to
establish contacts and interview Emirati officials or expatriate officials working in relevant offices,
all declined to be interviewed. Information on UAE policy therefore was largely obtained through
secondary sources, primarily written. Law and official policy were gathered from the Legal
Gazette, UAE public statistical data sets, UAE government websites, and to some extent, the
publications and data sets of the United Nations and its affiliated organizations.31 With regard to
the Philippines, government statistical data sets, government websites, and UN sources were
also relied on.
However, as Julie Gervais points out, archives “also have their drawbacks insofar as they
convey an institutional point of view and make the researcher reliant on managerial tropism and
la pensée d’Etat – the official discourse coming from ‘the State.’”32 They present a monolithic
front, masking internal debate, conflict, or compromises; they offer a view of the outcome of a
political process, not the process itself.
Information on informal policy and practice were obtained through UAE government
websites and via local news media. This project relied heavily on the three major newspapers in
the UAE: The National (published in Abu Dhabi), the Gulf News (published in Dubai), and the
Khaleej Times (published in Dubai). News from these sources have a significant bias. While
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media laws in the UAE have recently liberalized, they are still highly restrictive. This will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight. Here it is important to note that self-censorship is
pervasive and the local press is reluctant to publish stories that might anger UAE officials.
Contentious issues are almost always presented in the light most favorable to the government
position, with potentially critical statements often buried, if they appear at all, in the last paragraph
or two. They are little better than government news outlets and should be regarded as such.
Design
This dissertation proceeds in three broad sections. The first section establishes the
theoretical basis for the dissertation. Chapter Two poses and answers the question: who is
responsible for migrants’ human rights? It lays out the framework of divided responsibility and
traces some of the major theoretical implications. The second section presents the historical roots
of the present situation in the UAE and the Philippines. Chapter Three looks at the UAE, tracing
the political, social, and economic factors that led to the development of the widespread
importation of migrant labor. It examines how labor migration policy is actively managed in order
to encourage social and political stability, as well as economic progress. Chapter Four explores
the Philippine side of the equation, addressing why the state adopted large scale labor export as
an economic development strategy. As in the case of the UAE, the Philippines uses labor
migration policy to support political, social, and economic stability. The third section details the
current situation for the human rights of Filipino migrants in the UAE, assessing the extent to
which each state meets – or fails to meet – its responsibilities to protect specific rights. Chapters
Five through Eight each address a specific subset of rights. Chapter Five looks at issues related
to recruitment, contracting, and discrimination. Chapter Six examines factors enabling or
constraining mobility, from development in the Philippines to passport withholding in the UAE.
Chapter Seven looks at legal rights and security issues facing Filipinos in the UAE. Chapter Eight
looks at the ability of migrants in the UAE to form groups, from family units to community groups
to formal political and labor organizations. The final chapter, Chapter Nine, draws policy
implications, offering specific ways to ensure the fullest possible respect for the human rights of
Filipinos working in the UAE.
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CHAPTER TWO: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MIGRANTS’ HUMAN RIGHTS?
Introduction
This chapter explores the normative claim that the human rights of migrants should be
the shared responsibility of both the migrants’ sending and receiving states. I will explore the
basis for this claim, then consider some practical implications of divided responsibility as a
framework for the protection and provision of international migrants’ human rights. Apportioning
responsibility for rights protections is a precursor to effective leveraging of these claims to
improve the lived experience of migrants. The chapter will conclude with a closer look at how
divided responsibility can function to improve the lived experience of temporary contract migrants.
Although this issue has implications for all states, my discussion focuses on the non-democratic
context using temporary contract migration within the UAE-Philippines migration network as my
primary example. Removing the discussion from the democratic context also removes
considerations of those liberal or democratic rights which are distinct from human rights.
The argument presented here answers four questions in turn. First, which agents are
obligated to protect the human rights of temporary migrants? I argue that both sending and
receiving countries have compelling ties obligating them to act to respect, protect, and fulfill the
human rights of migrants. Once the fact of obligation is established, I ask how state agents
should act to produce more just outcomes in the current state-based international system in
which there is no reasonable prospect of an international migration regime. I propose a model of
divided responsibility in which sending countries retain “citizenship obligations” and receiving
countries retain “presence obligations.” Once these duties are appropriately apportioned,
however, a limited but significant set of human rights remain substantively unprotected due to the
transnational nature of the lives of temporary migrants. Sending and receiving countries must act
cooperatively in order to fulfill these “involvement obligations.” Third, I ask exactly what the
human rights that agents are obligated to protect are. I argue that the United Nations’ Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is the most appropriate model. Finally, I ask whether this
system of divided obligations can be exercised extraterritorially. I argue that such an extension
requires continued evolution of the norms of international sovereignty and human rights norms,
already in flux, limiting some sovereign privileges in favor of international cooperation.
Evaluating The Legal Framework: What human rights are agents obligated to protect?
The essence of a human right is threefold. 1) Human. These should be concepts that all
humans can agree should be available to all humans. 2) Rights. To say that you have a right
means that you have a special, strong claim to make; rights trump interests, for example. 3)
Obligation. Further, rights entail corresponding obligations incumbent on the representative
authority/entity to ensure the respect, protection, and fulfillment of those rights. Obligation
operationalizes human rights and without it human rights are an empty concept. Human rights
obligations are placed on humanity generally but more specifically on any individual’s state as the
representative agent and the primary building block of the current international system. However,
the enumeration of which specific rights should be included on the list of human rights is
contested.
As the discussion below will make clear, I prioritize buy-in from diverse states. The
reasons are both normative and practical. From the normative perspective, if we are claiming
human rights for humanity on the basis of membership in the human species, a wide swath of
humanity should be able to agree. There will always be outliers, but a broad consensus of the
membership group should consent to the content of human rights. From a practical perspective,
broad consensus is required in order to push states into actions that they might not otherwise
take, which are outside of narrowly conceived self-interest or which are simply not otherwise a
national priority. With regard to international migration, sending and receiving states tend to have
distinct characteristics and interests; finding common ground is difficult. Using a common
definition of human rights and a common source for their enumeration provides a base from
which discussions can begin.
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Shue would reduce the list of basic rights to only security and subsistence which, he
argues, are necessary in order to enjoy all other rights.1 He does not argue that other rights are
not important so much as that there is an issue of relative importance such that these “basic
rights” are a higher priority.2 In contrast, the current UN position is that all human rights are
“interdependent and indivisible,”3 and it lists nine international treaties as core to human rights.
But international law is quite a bit wider than that. Chetail lists forty treaties that he considers the
sources of international migration law.4 In contrast, this work relies on the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights as the basic document specifying the content of human rights, including the
human rights of migrants.
Why privilege the UDHR, then, as a single source of legally recognized human rights? I
reject the full UN system of nine fundamental treaties because I prefer to avoid a massive
expansion of human rights; such an expansion lacks global support. Human rights as they are
enumerated in the international system today are a product of a specific liberal democratic
tradition. As such, the buy-in by the rest of humanity is considerable but limited.5 This is not to
say that non-western political traditions cannot incorporate a human rights agenda; rather, such
agendas are likely to be considerably narrower than the framework established in the overlapping
system of international laws and treaties that supposedly binds all nations. Of these nine treaties,
only one has specifically to do with international migrants: the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICPMW). This
treaty has very few state parties, only forty seven, on par only with the much newer (and with

1
Shue’s theoretical work on human rights has had significant impact on how the UN and many other human
rights organizations today view the “respect, protection, and fulfillment” of human rights, which language is used in this
project.
2
Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1996).
3
“What Are Human Rights?" United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed May
7, 2012, http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx.
4
Vincent Chetail, "Sources of International Migration Law," in Foundations of International Migration Law, ed.
Brian Opeskin, Richard Perruchoud and Jillyanne Redpath-Cross (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
5
For example, Ignatieff warned against the “idolatry” of human rights by Western nations resulting in an
overextension of the rights agenda despite criticism of the concept by the Islamic world, Asia, and even segments within
the West. Michael Ignatieff et al,, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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many more signatories) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance.
Table 2: Number of state members of the core UN human rights treaties
TREATY6
UN UDHR 1948, (Universal Declaration of Human Rights)
UN ICESCR, 1966/1976 (International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights)
UN ICCPR, 1966/1976 (International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights)
UN ICERD, 1965/1969 (International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination
UN CEDAW, 1979/1981 (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women
UN CAT, 1984/1987 (Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment)
UN CRC, 1989/1980 (Convention on the Rights of the Child)
UN ICPMW, 1990/2003 (International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families)
UN CPED 2006/2010 (International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance)
UN CRPD 2006/2008 (Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities)

NUMBER of State
Signatories/Parties
193
UN member states
170 / 163
74 / 168
87 / 177
99 / 188
81 / 157
140 / 194
38 / 47
94 / 45
159 / 152

Source: United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en

In addition to the core treaties, the UN has a system of around eighty human rights
treaties dealing with topics from genocide to development. Of the wider system of overlapping UN
treaties, the only well-accepted treaty dealing specifically with international migrants is the
Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; it is also the only one to focus on
controlling migration and borders, rather than on protecting the wider rights of individual migrants.
Simply put, there is no international agreement that the expansion of greater sets of rights for
migrants is appropriate.7

6
Not included here are: and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2007/2008), and all the
optional protocols. These later treaties are sometimes included in the list of core treaties, sometimes omitted.
7
It is also worth noting the fate of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), one of the UN’s core human rights treaties. This treaty is largely a
restatement of rights already established in the other core treaties, gathering those rights in one document to make
explicit the claim that migrants should have access to the full list of human rights. Nonetheless, the ICPMW has far fewer
ratifications than any other of the UN core treaties (see Table 2 below). While there are several reasons for the lack of
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I reject further limitations, as with Shue’s argument, because I feel it goes too far in the
opposite direction, restricting acknowledged and norm-based human rights that are generally
well-accepted today. Such a restriction also lacks global support. Shue’s impulse to reduce the
list of core human rights to just those which reflect “everyone’s minimum reasonable demands
upon the rest of humanity”8 is appropriate. But he has gone too far, omitting rights that evidence
suggests are already globally accepted as human rights.
Following Donnelly’s Universal Declaration Model, I accept the United Nations’ Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as the most appropriate enumeration of human rights.9 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, enjoys widespread, global support. The
UDHR is considered a foundational document of the United Nations which defines and elaborates
on the concept of human rights which is protected in the UN Charter. As such, the UDHR has
been widely accepted by states. It was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly in
1948 (eight abstentions) and has formed the basis of the global discussion on human rights since
that time. There is no need to back away from this document as a single source of essential and
interconnected human rights.
The UDHR framework has several implications which are important for our purposes.
First, it enumerates a specific list of recognized human rights. The UN specifies seven (or nine,
depending on the source) of its treaties as “core” treaties specifying human rights. When looking
at the rights of workers, the ILO designates eight “fundamental rights conventions” and identifies
a further four migration-specific instruments and eleven instruments with containing specific

ratifications, it is generally felt that hesitation to explicitly include migrants in human rights guarantees is the primary
reason.
8

Shue, Basic Rights: p. 19.

9

I utilize a slight simplification of Donnelly’s model, which accepts as human rights all rights which as specified
in any two of the following three documents: the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR. Jack Donnelly, Universal Human
Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
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provisions on migrant workers’ rights.10 When taken as a whole, this system of overlapping
treaties and instruments creates an expansive and contentious list of “rights.”
Rather than pushing for broad ratification of the entire swath of relevant treaties and
instruments, adherence to which would likely be shallow, it would be better to retrench, to
advocate for a minimal conception of the “core,” and to focus on improving adherence with these
more manageable norms. I argue that sufficient rights are in place for migrants as human beings
protected by the UDHR. The problem lies not in expanding the menu of rights but in focusing on
their respect and application. In this vein, and for the purpose of identifying common international
standards for human rights that are generally recognized by all states and applicable to all human
beings, the UDHR provides the best base. The UDHR contains thirty articles; the enumeration of
human rights it contains is considered comprehensive for our purposes.
The second major implication of accepting the UDHR framework is the fact that there is
no recognized human right to migrate. It is an often recognized contradiction that although there
is a universal right to exit a country specified in Article 13(2) of the UDHR, the right of entry is
limited to the individual’s state of citizenship.11 The migrant sending country retains the obligation
to honor the right of return and should act to facilitate reentry. In contrast, receiving countries
have no particular responsibility to facilitate entry of potential migrants. The receiving state can
weigh its interests against those of potential migrants in determining entrance requirements. The
receiving state can come to agreements with potential migrants that limit access without
necessarily limiting their human rights.
The final major implication of the UDHR framework is that, within the UDHR framework
the obligations to protect, and fulfil human rights are appropriately linked to states. Where the
obligation to respect (to refrain from acting in such a way as to deprive an individual of their
human rights) are “held by all social actors,” the obligations to “protect, to provide, and to aid are

10
International Labour Organization, "International Standards for the Protection of Migrant Workers," accessed
February 5, 2014, http://www.ilo.org/migrant/areas/international-standards-on-labour-migration-and-protection-of-migrantworkers-rights/lang--en/index.htm.
11

“The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” Article 13(2).
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assigned almost exclusively to states.”12 The UDHR assumes that individuals “belong” to
countries or territories with political jurisdiction (Article 2). Significantly, key articles in the UDHR
are written with reference to country/nationality (Articles 2, 13, 15, 21).13 Human rights are held by
all individuals equally but those individuals are presumed to inhabit a specific position in a world
of states. The obligations to provide and protect thus fall on the state to which the individual
belongs. Human rights obligations are linked to states.
This is appropriate. Wherever one believes human rights arise from, whatever theory one
grounds human rights in, the fact remains that human rights as established and practiced in the
international community today are organized to operate within a system of sovereign nationstates. States are not the only actors on the international stage but they are privileged actors.
This idea of state obligation is crucial to the international respect of human rights. Rights alone
make moral/ethical and normative claims. But it is the institution of state obligation that gives
rights traction and force in an individual’s lived experience.
Protecting Human Rights: Which Agents are Obligated to Act to Protect the Human Rights
of Temporary Migrants?
If states, as privileged actors in the international system, are appropriately linked to
human rights obligations, we still must determine which states owe a duty to which individuals.
When the state system emerged a state’s authority extended as far as it was able to exercise
territorial control. As people were relatively stationary, territory, authority and obligation largely
coincided. The moral imperative to aid others largely stopped at the borders of the state. There
was, and to a large extent remains, a presumed territoriality of jurisdiction. With globalization the
plausibility of the idea that territorial distance lessens moral obligations has evaporated; ideas,
trade, and people all move across borders with increasing intensity; the actions of states,
corporations, and individuals around the globe are intertwined in surprising and dense networks;
and densely connected institutions have emerged and strengthened to channel these flows. As

12

Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed.

13

Article 2 is worded slightly differently: “country or territory to which a person belongs.” "The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights."
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Shue argues, humans are now causally tied to each other.14 The presumed territoriality of
jurisdiction is weakening.
Shue argues that rights impose normative duties on agents to avoid depriving individuals
of their rights (“respect”), protect individuals from deprivation (“protect”), and to aid deprived
individuals (“fulfill”).15 But the duty to fulfill begins to make distinctions between agents: agents are
only obligated to take action to fulfill the rights of individuals who are one’s “special responsibility,”
who are the victims of the failure of other (“specially” responsible) agents to protect, or who are
victims of natural disasters.16
In analyzing the impact that Shue’s thought has on human rights today, Pogge, rejects
the massive burden that this line of argument imposes on all states to intervene everywhere that
there is a failure to protect. He posits that involvement increases duty/obligation so that different
agents’ duty may have varying moral weight. Going back to the idea that today humans are
causally related to each other (more than territorially), where those causal links are particularly
strong or numerous, there is a relatively stronger moral claim to rights and the corresponding
duties.17
Most applications of this principle are concerned with our responsibilities to distant,
foreign others; for example: the obligation rich countries to aid poor countries. But migration
exposes another aspect of this breakdown in territoriality. Migration scholars are increasingly
concerned with the question of what human rights obligation a state owes to foreign citizens
within its territory, whether they be legal migrants, illegal migrants, refugees, or others. Less
studied but equally important is the question of what obligation the state has to continue to aid its
own citizens abroad.

14

Shue, Basic Rights.

15
As noted above, Shue’s framework on basic rights is the forerunner to the “respect, protect, and fulfill”
language that is used by the UN and many human rights organizations today.
16

Shue, Basic Rights.
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Thomas Pogge, "Shue on Rights and Duties," in Global Basic Rights, ed. Charles R. Beitz and Roberrt E.
Goodin (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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Following Shue I argue that the duties imposed on agents to fulfill human rights are
international, though the duty imposed on different agents may look different. Appling this to
temporary contract migration, I argue that migrants have human rights and are entitled to their full
protection irrespective of territorial location. But the transnational nature of temporary migration
means that both sending and receiving countries as agents have a “special relationship” with the
migrant, and so an obligation to ensure the protection of migrants’ human rights. Following
Pogge, I argue that involvement intensifies duties. Migration is a causal link between countries,
strengthening the duty of both sending and receiving countries to act. Further, where migration
corridors are denser, the duty to act gains in relative importance and moral weight.
So what does this “special relationship” between sending state, temporary migrant, and
receiving state look like? There are two obvious bases on which such a relationship could be
claimed: citizenship regimes or physical presence.18 For most people in the world today, these
two bases would indicate belonging to the same state, harkening back to that ‘presumed
territoriality of jurisdiction’ discussed above. However, international migrants by definition are
physically present in a state other than their state of citizenship. Migrants necessarily challenge
“belonging” for states – both the sending state, which retains citizenship ties with the migrant
despite their physical absence, and receiving state, where the migrant is physically present but
lacks citizenship status.
Citizenship = Obligation
Temporary contract workers retain the citizenship of the sending country. They are not
given a path to citizenship in the host country. One of the basic elements of a temporary labor
program is that at the end of the specified time, the migrant will leave the host country and return
to their home country. As the temporary worker retains sending country citizenship, that state
must assume that that migrant intends to maintain a substantive connection to the state of

18
The state-based nature of the UDHR precludes the idea of supranational answers such as may be found in
the cosmopolitan global citizenship literature by authors such as Sassen and Coutin. Identity or integration is often
proposed as an alternative means of basing claims of belonging. This basis is omitted here because its proponents
inevitably fall back on physical presence or duration of stay as a proxy for more intangible ties of affiliation. See for
example the work of J. H. Carens.
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citizenship, including the intent to return and take up full participation in the polity at some point in
the future.
First, some people really do want to return home. Not everyone who becomes a migrant
wants to become a citizen in their host country. Family ties, a familiar social context, even
considerations of cost (cheaper education for children or retirement costs or costs for elder care,
for example) often encourage migrants to return even after a considerable length of time abroad.
In this case, failure to assume that the migrant intends to return would deny the agency of the
migrant and their choice to retain citizenship.
Second, let’s assume that a migrant would prefer to take up citizenship abroad. This is by
no means a certain process. While an individual has the human right to change his nationality, no
state is obliged to offer nationality as a matter of human rights.19 Even where a country allows a
path for citizenship, a migrant may not be granted citizenship for a variety of reasons, from failure
to learn the local language to criminal background. They may have to return.
Third, and perhaps most likely, is the possibility that the migrant’s life plans are flexible.
As different types of bonds are strengthened and weakened in both home and host country, life
plans change. A Filipino who migrated to the United States with the hope of eventually gaining
citizenship may change his mind when he realizes that he would be required to complete a
second residency in that country before practicing as a medical doctor, finds himself working in
an alternate position for low pay, and with limited funds to enable him to travel the very long
distance to visit his remaining family in the Philippines.
Beyond the migrant’s intent, the sending state’s intentions and actions may also
strengthen their obligation to migrant citizens. Countries of citizenship often encourage migrants
abroad to retain familial and economic ties in their “home” country. Migration reduces
unemployment, especially for unskilled workers, in the sending country. Remittances by migrants
abroad to family members in the sending country are a major source of foreign reserves in the

19
This is a similar construction to the right to exit. And it is just as hotly contested in both the academic and
practitioner literature. C.f. Joseph H. Carens, ed., Immigrants and the Right to Stay (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
2010).
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developing world as well as serving as an informal social security network for the families of
migrants. The World Bank estimates that remittances in 2010 exceeded $440 billion, of which
developing countries received $325 billion.20 To encourage the remittances to keep flowing,
sending states have initiated a wide variety of programs from preferential savings plans to statesponsored business investment opportunities. Through efforts like these, the state attempts to
retain strong ties with its migrant citizens as citizens and participants in the “home” country. As
these types of programs intensify and as more citizens leave the country, the sending state’s
obligation also intensifies.
The temporary migrant citizen is clearly still a member of the polity, and a special
relationship exists between him and his home state. Yet physical absence is often viewed as a
negation of the state’s obligation to protect and provide for his human rights. Those rights are
assumed to be inherent in the physical body of the person, which is absent. The state may
acknowledge an interest in, or even a duty to, monitoring and advocating for the rights of its
citizens abroad, but the obligation corresponding to a rights claim is often absent. This is wrong.
Citizenship creates bonds of belonging in the socio-political space of the sending state, though
those bonds may be incomplete.
Physical Presence = Obligation
Many human rights are substantially, substantively tied to physical presence. There are a
large number of rights that cannot be logically divided from the human body; at minimum these
include: freedom (Art. 1); life, liberty and security of person (Art. 3); prohibition of slavery (Art. 4);
prohibition of torture (Art. 5); prohibition of arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Art. 9); movement
(Art. 13); asylum (Art. 14); thought, conscious and religion (Art. 18); expression (Art. 19);
assembly and association (Art. 20); employment (Art. 23); rest and limited working hours (Art.
24); standard of living (Art. 25). These rights in turn are strongly interdependent on a wider set of
rights which gives them substantive meaning. In order for the idea of human rights to have an
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impact in the lived experience of the individual, the country in which she is physically present
must assume the obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill these rights.
Legal entry creates a stronger obligation, as the state has consented to physical
presence. This is reflected in several rights treaties. The International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, for example, allows developing countries to determine the extent to
which economic (but not social or cultural rights) are provided to non-citizens. 21 The ICRMW,
despite its low levels of ratification, also makes distinctions between legal and undocumented
migrants, establishing additional for legal migrants. Further, the more migrants that a state allows
legal entry to, the greater becomes its need to address their human rights: increased involvement
leads to intensified obligation.
The temporary migrant clearly has substantive connection to the host country and a
special relationship exists between him and his host state. For the receiving state, limited political
belonging is inherent in the definition of migrant status – migrants are not citizens. This simple
fact dictates differentiation in treatment. The constraints placed on migrants, however, all too
often infringe on the basic human rights of those migrants. This is often dismissed on the basis
that migrants as “guests” of the receiving state agreed to conditions upon entry, that conditions in
the host country are better than in the sending country (“after all, why else would they keep
coming?”), and that migrants may exit should they object to their conditions. The fact that the
migrant did not have a “right” to enter, as opposed to being granted that opportunity through the
benevolence of the receiving state, is all too often viewed as negating the receiving state’s
obligations in large part. This is wrong. Physical presence over time creates linkages between the
migrant and the host society and state. While physically present the migrant is subject to the
receiving states laws and regulations, she creates social bonds with friends and neighbors, and
contributes to the local economy often as both a producer as well as a consumer (the ILO
estimates that of the 214 million international migrants in the world in 2010, 105 million were
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Asser Press, 2007): p. 224.

36

economically active22). Physical presence creates bonds of belonging in the socio-political space
of the receiving state, though those bonds may be incomplete.
The Divided Responsibility Framework: Going Beyond Legal Obligations
To sum up so far: temporary migrants have a special relationship with both home and
host countries. This relationship is based on citizenship in the home country and physical
presence in the host country. These special relationships mean that both home and host
countries have an obligation to protect the human rights of temporary migrant workers as
specified in the UDHR. Yet the fact that citizenship and physical presence have been divorced all
too often leads to gaps in rights protections and provisions of international migrants. The
‘presumed territoriality of jurisdiction’ has been disrupted, allowing both sending and receiving
states deny the obligation to provide the full spectrum of human rights. How can we address this
gap to ensure that temporary migrants receive full access to human rights?
Shue would have us create institutions.23 Chetail makes the case for “soft law,” which
might be understood as the beginning of an international regime.24 Indeed, there has been a lot of
discussion about the need for such a regime,25 however none has emerged capable of leading
global opinion and action.
The major IGOs concerned with the rights and welfare of migrants and migrant labor are
the UN agencies, the IOM, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Labour
Organization (ILO). These IGOs are unable either to establish and enforce the content of such a
regime definitively, or to effectively mediate the conflicting interests of sending and receiving
states and successfully coordinate their actions. The IOM lacks a normative mandate and is
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sometimes viewed as an organization “for hire” to major receiving countries.26 The unwillingness
of the IOM to challenge the status quo makes it an unlikely actor to lead in establishing a future
migration regime. The WTO has had some success in facilitating the temporary movement of
skilled workers through GATS Mode 4 but is unable to reach a similar agreement for semi- or
unskilled workers which might aid sending countries and the global poor.27 The ILO has had
relatively more success by focusing on its decent work framework which is largely compatible
with a human rights approach, though it also has had difficulties in extending this framework to
migrant workers.
If the UN system is unable to form and lead an international migration regime, there is
also a great deal of skepticism regarding the ability to create such a beast outside of the major
existing multilateral framework. Koslowski argues that migration is not amenable to a global
regime for three interrelated reasons. First, destination states have no incentive to join such a
regime as low-skilled labor is abundant and can be obtained on advantageous terms through
unilateral and bilateral measures. Second, there is little scope for reciprocity between migrant
sending and migrant receiving states. Third, and largely as a result of the first and second, there
is no leadership from a state of sufficient weight internationally to build an international regime. 28
Hatton focuses on the lack of reciprocity, stressing that international migration is game of
absolute, not comparative, advantage, making multilateral cooperation extremely difficult.29
It seems the likelihood of establishing an international institution with global reach on
migration issues is vanishingly small. Yet, as was argued above, a unilateral framework is also
inappropriate as human rights obligations are divided between sending and receiving countries. A

26
C.f. Ishan Ashutosh and Alison Mountz, "Migration Management for the Benefit of Whom? Interrogating the
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middle round is needed, a framework within which states can act unilaterally and bilaterally in
order to maximize respect for temporary migrants’ human rights.
I propose a way of categorizing human rights obligations as they pertain to temporary
migrants: human rights can be divided between those that are inherent in citizenship which are
the responsibility of the sending state, those that are inherent in the physical body which are the
responsibility of the receiving state, and those that fall between systems of responsibility and so
require shared responsibility in order to give substantive meaning to the right.
Table 3: Human Rights Obligations under Divided Responsibility Framework
Type
Citizenship
obligation

Agent
Sending
country

Presence
obligation

Receiving
country

Involvement
obligation

Joint

Definition
The obligation to protect and enable those
human rights which are inextricably linked
to the basic citizens’ rights.
The obligation to protect and enable those
human rights which are inextricably linked
to the physical body of the rights-owner.
The obligation arising from a direct causal
link between actions and/or policy in one
country and human rights outcomes in the
other country.

Example
Elections and voting
UDHR Article 21(3)
Prohibition of torture
UDHR Article 5
Social security
UDHR Article 22

The sending country has a special relationship with the migrants it sends abroad on the
basis of their citizenship. The sending state therefore has a special responsibility, an obligation, to
protect the human rights of their citizens, regardless of where they are in the world. Further, as
the country of citizenship, they retain the primary obligation to protect those human rights for
which citizenship is a basic component. We will refer to this as citizenship obligation.
To better understand the citizenship obligation, I first look at the concept of citizenship
and its meaning in the world today. Citizenship can be understood as a set of practices and
institutions. At its heart, citizenship is membership in a state-based political community.
Citizenship is bound up in identity; it is a defined, bounded group with clear insiders and
outsiders. To those inside the circle of citizenship, the state extends certain rights and benefits; in
exchange the citizen owes a duty of loyalty and respect for the laws of the state. The exact list of
citizens’ rights varies by state but at minimum includes: the issuance of identity documents
(passports); entry into the country and permission to reside and work there; the ability to hold
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property on equal terms; political participation to the fullest extent available; and state protection
domestically (police), against war and aggression (military); and internationally (diplomatic).
In addition to these practices and institutions, there is also a normative component.
Citizenship as a norm is firmly established in the international system today30: states have
citizens, citizens have rights and duties. However norms are not static and this one is currently
evolving to encompass new demands. Sassen argues that “the changes brought about by
globalizing dynamics in the territorial and institutional organization of state authority are also
transforming citizenship.”31 As the movement of people is increasingly impeded by national
borders,32 migrants and human rights advocates are increasingly demanding more effective and
just means of regulating the flow of people and apportioning the benefits that correspond with
citizenship (versus alien) status. The problem is that “if citizenship is theorized as necessarily
national, then these new developments are not fully captured in the language of citizenship.”33
Citizenship norms must adapt to changing global circumstances.
Citizenship is also intimately intertwined with human rights, which “share similar roots in
liberal individualism.”34 Both citizenship and human rights are based in the language of rights and
responsibilities. In fact, the limitations of citizenship in ensuring adequate rights protections
helped lead to the rise of the international human rights norm as an expanded list of rights, rightsowners, and duty-holders.35 The basic citizens’ rights, listed above, are all considered either

30
I am concerned here with the norm between state actors of citizenship as a means of categorizing the global
population. There are also norms of citizenship which refer to the domestic norms regulating how citizens behave and are
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human rights or their logical policy expression. Even the basic fact of having citizenship is itself a
human right – every individual has the right to a nationality.36
But while the basic citizens’ rights may be human rights, the reverse is not true: not all
human rights are citizenship rights. When we look at citizenship obligation, therefore, we have a
means of distinguishing its content: citizenship obligation is the duty to protect and enable those
human rights which are inextricably linked to the basic citizens’ rights (nationality, passport, entry,
property, political participation, and physical security). Further, the sending country, as the
country of citizenship, is the only agent positioned to fulfill the full substantive content of these
rights, thus they retain the primary obligation to act.
Yet, as not all rights are citizenship rights, citizenship obligation does not adequately
protect the full set of human rights for temporary migrants. In order to ensure that temporary
migrants have access to and protection of their human rights, we must go further.
The receiving country has a special relationship with all of the individuals in its physical
territory, including temporary migrants. The receiving state therefore has an obligation to protect
the human rights of its residents simply on the basis of their presence and regardless of their
legal status. Further, as the country of residence, they retain the primary obligation to protect
those human rights for which physical presence is a basic component. I will refer to this as
presence obligation.
The basic fact of physical presence is a simple geographic circumstance. However, that
geographic circumstance becomes more complicated when we examine the related
circumstances needed to make the individual’s physical presence safe, secure and sustainable.
First, physical integrity depends on the indispensable human ability to think, to hold an opinion,
and to act on that opinion. Physical presence assumes personal autonomy. And, as will be
discussed in greater detail below, the need for basic education is a necessary corollary of

36
"The Universal Declaration of Human Rights." See also: Mirna Adjami and Julia Harrington, "The Scope and
Content of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," Refugee Survey Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2008).
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personal autonomy and the ability to think and hold an opinion. Second, the individual’s
physiological needs, such as clean water, adequate diet, shelter, and rest, must be met.
Physiological needs also include reproduction and sexual needs, but must also incorporate
protection against gendered discrimination and sexual violence. For these physiological needs to
be sustainable, the individual will need access to further essentials such as medical care, healthy
working conditions, freedom of movement within the country, and property rights. Finally, physical
presence demands security from physical attack, whether due to crime or war or state violence.
And for security from attack to be sustainable an appropriate level of policing and legal
guarantees, neither too strong nor too weak, must be in place.
Presence obligation is based on the fact that some human rights are inherently linked to
the physical body of an individual. These factors – autonomy, physiology and security – form the
basis of a secure and sustainable physical presence and, therefore, the basis of the presence
obligation.
As with citizenship, physical presence has an intimate link with human rights. Human
rights are theorized as rights inherent in the individual on the basis of their humanity. Physical
integrity, in terms of bodily security, personal autonomy, and self-determination are at the core of
the human rights mission. But not all human rights are tied to physical presence. When we look at
presence obligation, therefore, we have a means of distinguishing its content: presence obligation
is the duty to protect and enable those human rights which are necessary to needed to make the
individual’s physical presence secure and sustainable, ensuring his mental and physiological
needs as well as his physical safety.
Not all human rights are based on the physical body of the individual. In the same way
that citizenship obligation does not adequately protect the full set of human rights for temporary
migrants, neither does presence obligation protect the full set. In fact, there remains a significant
set of human rights and obligations that remain unaccounted for by either citizenship or presence.
In order to ensure that temporary migrants have access to and protection of their human rights,
we must go further.
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Up until this point I have drawn a very definitive distinction between sending and
receiving countries, between the country of citizenship and that of physical presence. But
migrants lead transnational lives. The very content of some rights spans national borders. These
are human rights that derive from humans’ social nature; they are based in the networks, intimate
or widely drawn, that humans are inevitably, necessarily involved in. Where these networks span
borders, policy in one country may significantly impact human rights outcomes in another.
Returning to the idea of the increasing causal links, we can say that these transnational networks’
effect on human rights create an additional “special relationship” which involves sending country,
temporary migrant, and receiving country together. Returning to Pogge’s contention that
involvement intensifies obligation, we can say that on the basis of this involvement both sending
and receiving countries together take on additional obligations. I will refer to this as “involvement
obligation.”
Involvement is based on the premise that humans, as a social creatures, forms networks
that are necessary for a life of dignity. These networks each have a set of values, norms and
institutions which structure patterns of behavior and interaction, facilitating communal action. The
networks which humans are inevitably, necessarily involved in include family, associations of
various types (recreational, unions, political parties, etc.), and various levels of society (local
communities, cultural groups, national groups). However, in the case of temporary migrants, not
all of these networks can be confined within the borders of any given state. The transnational
character of the temporary migrant’s life – with childhood, family, and retirement largely confined
to one state and the productive years and activities either confined to a different state or split
between them – splits families and social groups. Further, as a migration corridor strengthens,
culture and society may take on a significant transnational dimension reflecting migration
between two specific countries as a patterned behavior with its own set of values and institutions.
Sending and receiving countries are inevitably intertwined as the substance of these networks
inherently bridge national borders.
Humanity’s social nature of is intertwined with the human rights agenda. Donnelly points
out that, though human rights as they are laid out in the UDHR and the Covenants are conceived
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and phrased in terms of individual rights, “the very ideas of respecting and violating human rights
rest on the idea of the individual as part of a larger social enterprise.”37 Human rights largely
regulate the minimum conditions upon which the individual enters various types of human
communities – political, economic, and social – which allow him to create a life of human
dignity.38
However, the idea that these community networks might span national borders is not well
represented in the existing human rights framework. While human rights as they are established
in practice today envision the individual as part of families, political parties, unions, associations,
ethnic and cultural groups, and nations, they do not envision the individual as a member of a
group that is larger than the state or that transcends state borders. Yet the human rights of
international migrants necessarily span national borders. Involvement obligation, corresponding
to this limited set of rights, includes issues that are of immediate impact in the lived experience of
those migrants. These include most social rights including social security and protections of the
family. For these rights to have substantive meaning in a migrant’s transnational life, they must
function across borders.
Neither citizenship nor physical presence as a source for human rights obligations is
particularly controversial; most human rights approaches are based in either one or the other.
What is novel is the fact that I accept both, allow the corresponding obligations to be assigned to
different countries, and have identified some rights which do not fall under either set of
obligations. This work goes one step further, arguing that a significant set of temporary migrants’
substantive rights remains unaddressed by either citizenship or physical presence. These rights
are not based in citizenship rights nor are they inextricable from the physical body. Instead they
are transnational.
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Involvement obligation, then, is the duty to protect and enable these rights that
necessarily span borders in the lives of temporary international migrants. Further, as the content
of these rights spans borders, both the sending and receiving countries are involved and they
retain a joint obligation to act to fulfill the substantive content of these rights.
Mapping Obligations with the UDHR
We often hear that rights have “corresponding” duties or obligations. However, the
content of these duties is often left unexplored, assuming that state responsibility is a relatively
uncomplicated matter of (lack of) will to enforce. However, with the growing importance of
transnational forces, temporary international migration foremost among them, this simplifying
assumption no longer holds for millions of people. The previous section described the nature and
content of three categories of human rights obligations: citizenship, presence, and involvement.
With this deeper understanding of the obligations in play, we can now explore how they
correspond to the list of human rights acknowledged in the UDHR.
Framing Human Rights
The UDHR specifies some rights that frame the international human rights agenda.
Without them the structure of the human rights system in the international community would not
function. First, the first two Articles of the UDHR specify that all individuals are free and equal in
rights and that everyone is entitled to all rights without discrimination. These two rights are
essentially definitional to human rights: for a right to be human, recognized on the basis of the
humanity of the individual and for no other reason, rights must be granted to free and equal
individuals without discrimination. As such, these two rights are inseparable from all other human
rights. All duty-holders retain an obligation to provide these rights as they cannot provide any
other rights as human rights unless and until they fulfill the rights to free and equal rights and
nondiscrimination. This applies equally to citizenship, presence, and involvement obligation.
Second, the final two Articles of the UDHR include allowable limitations (Article 29) and a
salvatory clause (Article 30) stipulating that nothing within the UDHR should be interpreted as to
allow actions which would contravene any of the rights it specifies. These types of clauses are
fairly standard in treaty law, allowing treaty terms to function despite imperfects in the real world.
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They are necessary for the overall strength of the UDHR and, as such, apply equally to
citizenship, presence, and involvement obligation.
Citizenship
As argued above, the exact list of citizens’ rights, as distinct from human rights, varies by
state but at minimum includes: the issuance of identity documents (passports); entry into the
country and permission to reside and work there; the ability to hold property on equal terms;
political participation to the fullest extent available; and state protection domestically (police),
against war and aggression (military); and internationally (diplomatic representation). Citizenship
obligation is the duty to protect and enable those human rights which are inextricably linked to
these basic citizens’ rights; the country of citizenship retains the obligation to act to protect and
fulfill these human rights for its citizens, even when they reside abroad.
These aspects of citizenship can be mapped with the human rights specified in the
UDHR in a fairly straightforward, direct manner. To quickly summarize: Citizenship begins with
the right to a nationality, Article 15 of the UDHR. The right to entry is protected in Article 13 (2); to
reside in Article 13 (1); and to work in Article 23 (1).39 The right to hold property is specified in
Article 17 and rights to political participation in Article 21. The right to state protection does not
have a one to one corollary. However, protection is the focus of Article 3 and protection against
the overreach of the state security apparatus is protected in Articles 5 through 11. The ultimate
protection against the overreach of the state is the freedom of movement and the right to exit the
country (Article 13). These articles of the UDHR are directly related to citizenship obligation.
There is a further set of rights specified in the UDHR, however, that are indirectly related
to citizenship obligation.40 These rights are necessary in order to give substantive content to the
direct rights. In particular, the right to political participation is an empty concept if the individual is
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unable to freely engage in political thought, to express political opinions, and form political groups
to represent her interests. These needs are reflected in the right to assembly and association
(Article 20), the right to opinion, expression, and religion (Article 19), and the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion (Article 18), respectively. Similarly, the right to privacy is an
important basis for state protection and for protecting against the overreach of the state security
apparatus. The right to privacy is protected in Article 12 of the UDHR. Cumulatively these rights
specify the domain of the individual within which the state should not intervene, and ensure that
the individual is able to form non-state groups to protect his physical and political interests.
A Closer Look at Property Rights: Article 17
The right to property is contentious within human rights agenda.41 The existence and
appropriate extension of property rights is an area of significant debate, including issues such as:
the (moral) limits of accumulation, intellectual property rights, organs and tissues as property,
cultural property, communal and corporate property ownership, squatting and slums, the relation
of labor rights to property rights, etc. In fact, even the basic existence of a right to own property
may be contested; the right to property, though enshrined in the UDHR, is not included in either
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. But if it is to be reconciled with the larger human rights
agenda, it must be understood as applying first to the body of the individual. Property rights as
human rights begin with Locke’s premise that the individual owns himself and his labor and has
the right to profit from his labor. However, property rights as human rights can only be extended
to other possessions in a limited way, with the understanding that possession may be limited in
the common good and that the right to property cannot justify the neglect or abuse of other
human rights.

41
The full ramifications of this debate are beyond the scope of this work. This work will confine itself to the basic
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confiscation of possessions. John Locke, "The Second Treatise (1690)" in The Human Rights Reader, ed. Micheline Ishay
(New York, NY: Routledge, 2007).
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A Closer Look at the Right to Work: Article 23 (1)
The right to work is viewed skeptically by many.42 It is the right to freely engage in chosen
economic activity in order to earn a minimum standard of living. The right to work places an
obligation on state actors first to refrain from denying access to work or impeding individuals from
choosing their desired work. This negative obligation generally does not pose a concern, though it
may sometimes bump up against local licensing or educational requirements that impose barriers
to entry into some professions, from medical doctors to beauticians. And, indeed, the right to work
is primarily realized by individuals through their economic activity and the state’s primary
obligation is to respect and protect this activity.
However, when posed as a positive obligation – that the state has an obligation to ensure
that there are sufficient jobs available for all or provide opportunities to those who cannot find
work – the right to work becomes very contentious indeed. In order to adequately fulfill this right a
state will need to take measures to ensure adequate employment opportunities. This means
ensuring education and training as well as job-creation policies to encourage steady, full
employment. This is a far more onerous, and far less implemented, interpretation.
This positive vision of the right to work, and the corresponding obligation for the state to
fulfill (versus respect or protect) this right by ensuring employment opportunities, is best viewed
as a citizenship obligation. The right to work is not inherent in physical presence; we do not ask
that states extend the right to work to foreign tourists or students, for example. However, it is
generally understood that citizenship entails the right to enter one’s country in order to reside and
work there. The state does not require citizens to obtain residence or work permits; these are
benefits extended to citizens as a matter of course. Placing this citizenship right in the context of
human rights extends the negative obligation that the state not prohibit or unnecessarily impede
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work to also include the positive obligation to actively seek to ensure that employment
opportunities meet the level of demand for work.
The problem is that for major migrant sending states, the promotion of international
migration is exactly the state’s solution to the problem of high unemployment. Rather than
creating jobs at home, states like the Philippines specialize in identifying opportunities, training
workers, and exporting their citizens for employment abroad. Migration as a labor policy clearly
does not meet the state’s obligation with regard to its citizens’ right to work. While labor migration
is an acceptable strategy for individuals to utilize to seek better opportunities, states cannot
simply export their human rights obligations.
Facilitating labor migration may respect (not deprive) an individual’s right to work;
however it cannot be said to help the state protect (ensure that third parties also respect) or fulfill
(to provide what is necessary) that right. It fails to protect against third party deprivation as the
sending state is generally unable to extend the reach of its labor law beyond its own borders
meaning that rights-holders will be unable to make effective claims against the obligation holder
in the event of a rights violation. It fails to fulfill the right to work as creating access to international
movement is not the same thing as creating access to work. The state retains ultimate
responsibility for the creation of adequate employment structures; while it may be able to
delegate this obligation to the local level, it cannot delegate to another state over which it has no
sovereign authority. International labor migration does not transfer the obligation associated with
the right to work, per se, to the receiving country.
However, once an individual has been admitted to a foreign country and granted
permission to work (usually by means of a work permit), the remaining work-related human rights
must apply: choice of employment, just working conditions, equal pay, and just remuneration
(Article 23), and rest and leisure (Article 24). These aspects of the right to work are properly
understood as ensuring the safe, healthy, and sustainable physical presence of the individual.
The receiving country also assumes some responsibility for the future un/employment of this
individual by virtue of the state’s (voluntarily assumed) involvement. Thus we can say that
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protection against unemployment (Article 23 (1)), is an involvement obligation requiring
coordinated action between both sending and receiving countries.
Presence
As was established above, presence obligation is based on the fact that some human
rights are inherently linked to the physical body of an individual. First, physical presence assumes
personal autonomy, to think and act as an autonomous being, and the need for basic education.
Second, the individual’s physiological needs, such as clean water, adequate diet, shelter, and
rest, must be met. For these physiological needs to be sustainable, the individual will need
access to further essentials such as medical care, healthy working conditions, freedom of
movement within the country, and property rights. Second, physical presence demands security
from physical attack, whether due to crime or war or state violence. And for security from attack to
be sustainable an appropriate level of policing and legal guarantees, neither too strong nor too
weak, must be in place. Presence obligation is the duty to protect and enable those human rights
which are necessary to needed to make the individual’s physical presence secure and
sustainable, ensuring his physiological needs as well as his physical safety. The country where
the individual is physically present, the receiving country of international migrants, retains the
primary obligation to act to protect and fulfill these rights.
These aspects of physical presence can be mapped with the human rights specified in
the UDHR in a fairly straightforward, direct manner. Physical autonomy is reflected in Articles 18
and 19. The right to education is established in Article 26. Physiological needs - such as clean
water, adequate diet, shelter, and rest – are protected in Articles 24 and 25 (1). Medical care is
also included in Article 25 (1). Working conditions are specified in Article 23, and property rights
in Article 17. Protection against physical harm is guaranteed by Articles 3, 4, and 5. Legal
guarantees are laid out in Articles 6 through 11. Again, the ultimate protection against the
overreach of the state is the freedom of movement and the right to exit the country (Article 13); for
receiving states, this is also supplemented by the right to claim asylum from political persecution
in the sending country (Article 14).
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As with citizenship, there is a further set of rights specified in the UDHR that are indirectly
related to presence obligation in order to give substantive content to the direct rights already
enumerated. In particular, the right to work and to favorable working conditions are empty
concepts without the right to freedom of assembly and association (Article 20) and the right to
unionize (Article 23). Similarly, the right to privacy is an important basis for personal autonomy, as
well as for protecting against the overreach of the state security apparatus. The right to privacy is
protected in Article 12 of the UDHR.
A Closer Look at the Right to Education: Article 26
The right to free and compulsory primary education for temporary migrants is complicated
by the fact that primary education is not just about teaching literacy and basic math skills. Primary
education serves a socializing function and may have significant impact on students’ value
structures. This is often utilized by states to encourage desired civic (and moral) traits. So the
sending state has a stake in the education of its citizens abroad, as does the receiving state in
the education of individuals within its territory. Is education, then, a case of entanglement
between the sending and receiving countries, resulting in involvement obligation – the obligation
that the two countries work together to create a functioning transnational system? I argue that it is
not.
Education influences civic traits, but it equally influences ethical, religious, and cultural
values. Education influences patterns of thought, opinion, and expression. It is an influential
source of information and an early form of association for young persons. The overwhelming
moral weight is in favor of allowing not the state but the individual – or, in the case of minors, their
parents or guardians - to choose the ethical and moral content of education. And in fact, in tacit
recognition of this socializing function, the UDHR specifies that parents should be able choose
the type of education that children receive.43
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And once control over the ethical and moral content of education is placed with the
individual/parent, the case for involvement between sending/citizenship and receiving/presence
states fades away. In fact, so does the argument that the right to education is tied to citizenship
fade away. The only appropriate way to view education, therefore, is as linked to physical
presence and as a presence obligation.
Involvement
As argued above, involvement obligation is based on the premise that humans, as a
social creatures, forms networks. The networks which humans are inevitably, necessarily
involved in include family, associations of various types (recreational, unions, political parties,
etc.), and various levels of society (local communities, cultural groups, national groups). The
transnational character of the temporary migrant’s life – with childhood, family, and retirement
largely confined to one state and the productive years and activities either confined to a different
state or split between them – splits families and social groups. Sending and receiving countries
are inevitably involved, as the substance of these networks inherently bridges their national
borders. Involvement obligation, while corresponding to a limited set of human rights, includes
issues that are of immediate impact in the lived experience of those migrants. These include
social security, protections of the family, and cultural guarantees.
International Order
The state is viewed as the primary actor obligated to respect, protect and fulfill human
rights without respect for how this obligation is to be exercised in cases where networks span
national boundaries. However in the case of temporary migrants, some rights and their
corresponding obligations do span these boundaries. There is one aspect of the UDHR that gives
a basis for the internationalization rights and duties. Article 28 of the UDHR: “Everyone is entitled
to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration
can be fully realized.”44
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Article 28 was, and remains, aspirational: to create a peaceful international system. The
UDHR was written in the post-WWII context and with the intent to contribute to a lasting
international peace: “Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by
the rule of law.”45 With the vivid memory of Nazi atrocities, the respect for human rights was
envisioned as a means of preventing such violence as must propel nations, peoples to war. If a
lack of rights and freedoms might compel conflict, then every individual’s ability to live free and
secure in his rights depends on the ability to create a peaceful international system and every
state has an obligation to cooperate in realizing this aim.
Yet, as has been argued above with respect to human rights obligations, increased
involvement means increased obligation. Human rights in general place obligations on all states
to create a global order that facilitates the exercise of human rights. But where interactions
between states are more frequent, intensive, or patterned, the resulting obligation is more morally
pressing. In issues of human rights which no state can hope to achieve unilaterally, the primary
obligation is held not by one state, but by multiple states in cooperation. This is the basis of what I
have termed involvement obligation. Article 28 gives this type of international cooperation a
footing in the UDHR. Human rights may be viewed as a global public good. And as the world
grows more globally interconnected, the need for a cooperative, rights-respecting international
order also grows. Article 28 is increasingly relevant as the international system grapples with
increasing international flows such as international migration.
Family
With regard to protections for marriage and the family (Articles 16 and 25(2)), the original
draft of the UDHR would have protected only “the right to contract a marriage in accordance with
the laws of the state.”46 Its expansion into what would become Article 16 of the UDHR
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acknowledges the fundamentally social nature of humans, but also reified a particular conception
of “family” as the “natural and fundamental group unit.”47 The concept of the “traditional conjugal
family” has expanded under international human rights protections to date in order to incorporate
broader women’s rights, reproductive rights, sexual orientation rights, and others.48
Today we also need to broaden our conception of the family to acknowledge the
transnational character of migrant families. 49 The UN Commission on Human Rights addressed
this need in Resolution 2001/56 which encourages states to promote and facilitate family
reunification and remittances and “encourages States of origin and of destination of migrants to
consider the adoption of bilateral or regional strategies aimed at protecting the human rights of
migrants and their families.”50 The need to make more money to support their families is one of
the primary drivers of low-skilled labor migration and typically 10 to 20 percent of the migrant’s
income is remitted to their families in the sending country.51 At the same time, family (as well as
social, ethnic and other networks) often play a role in the decision to migrate and in determining
the country of destination. The result is a family that is inherently transnational, split between at
least two countries, sending and receiving.
Moreover, mothers and children are increasingly split as migration “feminizes.”52 About
half of migrants are women. The percentage of women migrants has not changed dramatically in
the past forty years, but the reasons why women migrate have: a higher percentage of women
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migrate for economic opportunities today, a lower percentage for family reunification.53
Ehrenreich and Hochschild famously exposed a “global care chain” in which women migrate to
provide for their families by working abroad as care workers such as “nannies, maids, and sex
workers,” leaving their own children to be raised by grandmothers or aunts.54 This represents a
“globalization of women’s traditional role” which increases the demand for female migrant care
workers and disproportionately shifts the burden of global reproductive work onto women from the
global south.55 In this context the protection of motherhood and childhood (Article 25(2)) take on
greater transnational dimensions.
Effective protections for transnational families require sending and receiving countries to
work together to ensure that families, especially parents and children, are able to maintain strong
affective ties despite prolonged physical separation. The sending country is involved in family
welfare of its citizens abroad, because significant elements of this family typically remain in the
home country, particularly dependent minors and elderly parents. The receiving country is
involved in family welfare because temporary contract migrants are typically working in the
receiving country to provide for these dependents. Policies created and implemented in one
country will have a direct impact on outcomes in the other, creating a causal link between
receiving country policy and human rights outcomes in the sending country.
In practice, the opportunities for cooperation are many. There is a need to streamline
procedures to enable access to and registration of marriages and their dissolution across
international borders such that a marriage, annulment, or divorce obtained legally in one country
is recognized in another. Births and deaths also would benefit from streamlined processing.
Pregnant women commonly face disadvantages in the recruitment and hiring process; in places
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such as the UAE and Taiwan56 women are given pregnancy tests as part of their physical
examination upon applying for employment visas and will be repatriated if they are found to be
pregnant. There is a need for sending countries to review family reunification policies to expand
them to the greatest extent practicable. For those who are not eligible for family reunification, or
during the waiting period for those that have applied, sending and receiving countries must
ensure that families nonetheless have access to sufficient means of communication and periodic
travel in order to maintain familial ties.
Social Security
Social security (Articles 22 and 25) involves both sending and receiving countries as the
productive phase of life, which would normally fund the non-productive phases (both young and
old), is often spent in a different country than the nonproductive phases. Again, policies created
and implemented in one country will have a direct impact on outcomes in the other, creating a
causal link between receiving country policy and human rights outcomes in the sending country.
Migrant sending countries, often lower income developing countries, may find themselves
with insufficient resources to provide basic social security. Collecting taxes from workers
overseas is one option, though levying high taxes on income earned abroad is unpopular,
especially as migrants are already liable for many taxes levied by the host country. Receiving
countries, alternatively, tend to increasingly restrict migrants’ access to social security in hopes of
reducing the costs of migration to the state as well as discouraging “welfare migration.”57 The
result is that migrants fall through the cracks, offered inadequate social security protections by
either sending or receiving state.
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For the sending country, failure to plan for migrants’ eventual return reduces the
substantive content of the individual’s human right to return. To say that an individual has the
right to return at the end of their working career, but without having access to basic social rights
such as unemployment, sickness, disability and old age protections, may make this a non-choice.
Major sending states have an additional source of obligation. States are obliged to make
social security provisions “in accordance with the organization and resources of each state,” (Art.
22).58 Where the state is organized to facilitate migration and where the state gains a significant
amount of resources from migrants, this should be taken into consideration. For major sending
states, there is no excuse for failing to provide functioning social security systems for migrant
citizens.
For the receiving country, the obligation derives from the migrant’s participation in society
and, for unemployment security specifically, in the workforce. Even where unemployment,
sickness, disability, family status or age are legal reasons to end migrants’ status, the obligation
remains. A receiving state cannot simply export the obligation, forcing the receiving state to
shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden of insuring against risk. Deportation or
repatriation of migrants because they need social aid but without ensuring that social needs can
be met by the migrant in the sending country or working to support migrants’ social security in the
long term effectively strips social rights of their substantive content. This onus is particularly stark
in cases where the receiving state has collected taxes from migrant populations which would
normally go to fund social security programs.
Sabates-Wheeler and Feldman argue: that social protection for migrants has four
components:
(i) access to formal social protection – that is, social security and social services
– in host and origin countries; (ii) portability of vested social security rights
between host and origin countries; (iii) labour market conditions for migrants in
host countries and the employment recruitment process for migrants in the origin
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country; and (iv) access to informal networks to support migrants and their family
members.59
It is significant that each of these four elements is transnational in character. Access to
social security that serves migrants requires arrangements that function internationally.
Portability, contract standardization, legal guarantees and enforcement are major elements where
bilateral or multilateral cooperation is required.
Culture
Article 27 of the UDHR establishes the human right “participate in the cultural life of the
community,” including the arts and scientific progress. Culture, however, is a broad concept that
is not defined in the UDHR. The exact meaning of culture and the appropriate content of cultural
rights is continually shifting. At minimum, though, cultural rights protect the right to information,
language, and education that are in keeping with cultural values; participation in handicraft and
local economic forms; access to research activities and outcomes; as well as cultural practices.
Cultural rights are significant. They protect core aspects of an individual’s identity.
Culture, and cultural rights, patterns thought, speech, action, and production. This is expressed
individually (cultural identity) and as a group (cultural community). However, the UDHR vests
these rights in individuals, not the cultural community as a whole. The right to participate in
cultural life is primarily realized by individuals through their culturally-oriented activity and the
state’s primary obligation is to respect and protect this activity. The obligation to fulfill cultural
rights consists of the duty to ensure that the opportunities for such engagement and action are
available to all.
In the case of international migrants, therefore, we must look at access to opportunities
for cultural engagement and activity. The problem is that migrants are often seen to have given
up their cultural claims when leaving their country of origin, yet are often viewed as outsiders from
the perspective of their host country’s local cultural community. 60 Sending countries are more
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likely to recognize the continuing importance of cultural rights (for them, cultural expressions and
transnational cultural involvement keeps the diaspora involved and so the remittances flowing in),
but they face steep challenges to continuing community engagement from a distance, especially
without receiving country support. In contrast, receiving countries are likely to view migrant
cultural expressions as a threat to domestic unity; temporary migrants are may be viewed as
outsiders and long-term or permanent residents as needing to assimilate. Receiving states are
unlikely to prioritize the rights of minority migrant groups when they conflict with the interests of
the majority national group.
From the perspective of the migrant cultural community is a transnational concept.
Temporary migrants can claim engagement in three cultures. They remain involved in the home
country culture due to heritage, formative experiences, continuing lifestyle and family ties, and/or
the intent to return. They become involved in the culture of the receiving country due to
immersion in the host community on a daily basis. Finally, where migration flows are strong, a
particular “culture of migration” may also form where the experience of migration (either self or
close family member) patterns a community’s thoughts, speech, actions, and modes of
production. The Philippines is often given as a primary example of the culture of migration.61
Policies created and implemented in one country will have a direct impact on outcomes in
the other, creating a causal link between receiving country policy and human rights outcomes in
the sending country. With cultural rights as with other involvement rights and obligations, the
greater the migration flow, the greater the involvement, the greater the primacy of the
corresponding obligation to cooperate to ensure that migrants can enjoy the right in question.
In practice, there are many opportunities for cooperation. Traditional vehicles of home
country community include hometown associations, but may also include a variety of cultural
practices. Professional associations, schools, clubs, even holiday observance all play a role. Host
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country policies need to be aware of and allow space for these associations and activities. But the
most significant issue is the vexed question of integration and assimilation. Much of the existing
literature on migration and cultural rights looks regular migrants; with the possibility of longduration stays, perhaps permanent, the state often pushes for migrant integration, threatening
cultural identity. With temporary migration the reverse may be the case: knowing that migrants
will inevitably exit, the state may resist migrant modifications to the local cultural structures,
including the incorporation of home country or transnational cultural forms.
Indirect
As with citizenship and physical presence, there is a further set of rights specified in the
UDHR that are indirectly related to citizenship obligation. These rights are necessary in order to
give substantive content to the direct rights. In particular, the rights to family and culture are
empty concepts if the individual is unable to freely engage in freedom of thought, expression, and
assembly groups to represent her interests. These needs are reflected in the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion (Article 18), the right to opinion, expression, and religion (Article
19), and the right to assembly and association (Article 20), respectively. Similarly, the right to
privacy is an important basis for family life and for protecting against the overreach of the state
security apparatus. The right to privacy is protected in Article 12 of the UDHR.
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Summary of the UDHR
Table 4: Rights, Obligations, and the UDHR
Human right specified in the UDHR
Article 1: Innate freedom and equality
Article 2: Nondiscrimination
Article 3: Life, liberty and security of person
Article 4: Ban on slavery
Article 5: Ban on cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment
Article 6: Recognition as a person before the
law
Article 7: Equal protection of the law
Article 8: Effective judiciary
Article 9: Ban on arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile
Article 10: Fair and public trial
Article 11: (1) Innocent until proven guilty, (2)
prohibition of ex post facto charges and
penalties
Article 12: Privacy; ban on interference in
family, home, correspondence and reputation.
Article 13: (1) Freedom of movement and
residence within any country (2) exit any
country and return to own country
Article 14: (1) Asylum, (2) limits asylum to
persecution for political acts
Article 15: (1) Nationality, (2) Ban on revoking
nationality or preventing changes of nationality
Article 16: (1) Marriage with equal rights, (2)
free and full consent before marriage, (3) family
is entitle to protection by society and the state
Article 17: (1) Property, (2) Prohibition of
arbitrary deprivation of property
Article 18: Freedom of thought, conscience
and religion
Article 19: Freedom of opinion, expression,
and information
Article 20: (1) Peaceful assembly and
association, (2) Ban on forced association
Article 21: (1) Take part in government of own
country, (2) equal access to public service in
own country, (3) Elections with universal
suffrage
Article 22: Social security
Article 23: (1) Work, choice of employment,
just working conditions, protection against
unemployment, (2) equal pay, (3) just
remuneration “ensuring for himself and his
family an existence worthy of human dignity,”
(4) form and join trade unions

Citizenship
Framing
Framing
Direct

1:
2:

1:
2:
1:
2:
1:
2:
1:
2:
3:
1:
2:

1:
2:
1:
2:
3:
1:
2:
3:
4:
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Direct

Presence
Framing
Framing
Direct
Direct
Direct

Direct

Direct

Direct
Direct
Direct

Direct
Direct
Direct

Direct
Direct
Direct

Direct
Direct
Direct

Indirect

Indirect

Direct
Direct

Direct
Direct*

Involvement
Framing
Framing

Indirect

Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Indirect

Direct
Direct
Direct

Indirect

Indirect

Direct

Indirect

Indirect
Indirect
Direct
Direct
Direct

Indirect
Indirect

Indirect
Indirect

Direct**

Direct**
Direct
Direct
Direct

Direct
Direct**

Article 24: Rest and leisure, limitation of
working hours, holidays with pay
Article 25: (1) Adequate standard of living
(food, clothing, housing, medical care, social
services), (2) social protection for mothers and
children
Article 26: (1) Free and compulsory primary
education, (2) education to fully develop human
personality, (3) parents choose the type of
education for their children
Article 27: (1) Free participation in the cultural
life of the community, (2) intellectual property
Article 28: Social and international order
Article 29: (1) Duties to the community, (2)
limitations to secure the rights of others, (3)
prohibition on actions contrary to the purposes
and principles of the UN
Article 30: Prohibition of acts to destroy human
rights

Direct
1:
2:

Direct

1:
2:
3:

Direct
Direct
Direct

Direct

1:
2:
1:
2:
3:

Framing
Framing
Framing

Framing
Framing
Framing

Direct
Direct
Direct
Framing
Framing
Framing

Framing

Framing

Framing

* In Article 13 (1) only the right to exit is linked to presence obligation.
** In Article 23 (1) only to the right to work is linked to citizenship; choice of employment and just working conditions
are linked to presence; protection against unemployment is linked to involvement.

Can Divided Obligations be Exercised Extraterritorially?
So states are obliged. Sending states have citizenship obligation, receiving states have
presence obligation, and they share involvement obligation. These obligations correspond to
relevant human rights specified in the UDHR. But what, exactly are they obligated to do? Can we
envision an extraterritorial jurisdiction over individuals residing and working abroad? In other
words, the problem is not simply state-based jurisdictions, but the presumed territoriality of
jurisdiction is deeply problematic for migrants.
Presence duties conform to the traditional territorially-based jurisdiction; they present no
challenge to state sovereignty. This is a matter of the state acting to protect those within its
territorial jurisdiction, as per traditional sovereignty norms. Citizenship duties, however, operate
on a different logic: affiliational jurisdiction. To enforce citizenship duties, states claim jurisdiction
over citizens regardless of their territorial presence or absence. This challenges the international
norm of sovereignty: granting a citizen abroad the ability to participate in politics at home extends
the home state’s political sovereignty into the sovereign territory of another state. Sending and
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receiving state sovereignties collide. Involvement duties go one step further: jurisdiction is shared
between two presumably equal agents who must act cooperatively.62
In other words, citizenship, presence, and involvement have fundamentally different
logics regarding jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is essentially the license to act. If presence, citizenship,
and involvement duties all operate on different jurisdictional logics (respectively: territorial,
affiliational, and shared), how can states act in a coordinated, efficient way?
This is not a new question. It is essentially an extension of the question regarding the
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in a sovereign state system. This is an ongoing debate
and a full discussion is beyond the scope of this work.63 In summary, what is at issue is the
balance of competing international norms: state sovereignty and human rights, non-intervention
and peace preservation. International norms emerge, evolve, and fade. The norm of sovereign
non-intervention has been dominant but may be weakening, and human rights norms
strengthening. I am arguing that in order to extend human rights internationally, these norms
need to continue evolving. Part of bringing in temporary migrant workers is assuming the relevant
duties for their human rights. This includes ceding some sovereign privileges in favor of
cooperation on citizenship and involvement duties.
Conclusion: From Aspiration to Practice
This project looks at the rights of specifically temporary migrant workers precisely
because human rights advocates often assume that these programs are unable to provide for the
human rights of the individual migrants. Many theorists argue that the temporary nature of
temporary contract migration schemes is not morally permissible. Carens, perhaps the most wellknown, bases his argument on the idea that over time (between five to ten years) social
membership gives a migrant, legal or illegal, a moral claim on permanent legal status: "At some
point a threshold is crossed, and they acquire a moral claim to have their actual social
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membership legally recognized."64 Lenard and Straehle similarly argue that: “we re-describe the
‘temporary’ element of temporary labour migration programs; the length of stay is not ‘temporary’,
in our view; rather, it is the labour restrictions imposed on migrants who enter on the relevant
visas that ought to be ‘temporary.’65
Bell and Piper concede the point that temporary labor migration programs violate human
rights, but point out that ending them would actually lead to a worse outcome for temporary
migrant workers. Looking at Singapore and Hong Kong, they argue that the relevant governments
are likely to respond to increased rights by drastically reducing opportunities to enter, thus leaving
migrants with time limits, no access, or illegal access. They suggest that:
unequal rights between citizens and migrant workers may be justified if this
arrangement (a) works to the benefit of migrant workers (as decided by the
migrant workers themselves), (b) creates opportunities for people in relatively
impoverished societies to improve their lives, and (c) there are no feasible
alternatives to serve the ends identified in (a) and (b).66
Bell and Piper argue that this is the case in Hong Kong and, more tentatively,
Singapore.67
Even Martin and Rhus, advocates of temporary labor migration programs as a means of
extending labor opportunities, assume that temporary workers “trade” away their rights for an
increase in labor mobility.68
In contrast, I have argued in this chapter that temporary contract migration can
theoretically be conducted in such a way as to fully respect migrants’ human rights by
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appropriately apportioning human rights obligations on both the state of citizenship as well as the
state of presence. The question then becomes: how do we move these normative aspirations into
the real world?
The remainder of this dissertation looks at one particular case study in depth: the
Philippines-UAE migration corridor. Here let me begin by saying that temporary contract migration
as it is currently practiced in the UAE violates nearly every principle of human rights respecting
migration programs. Labor recruiting and contracting issues are distressingly common,
sometimes rising to the level of forced labor. Conditions are particularly bad for construction
workers due to their housing in labor camps and for domestic workers who are not covered under
the country’s labor laws. But all workers are vulnerable to widespread, systematic violations such
as passport confiscation, long hours without overtime compensation, verbal abuse, unequal pay
with systematic disparities on the basis nationality, and/or extremely low pay below a living wage.
The UAE’s record on respecting the human rights of temporary contract workers is
woeful. Yet despite its shortcomings, millions of temporary contract laborers continue to pour into
the country to fill positions at all levels. The UAE thus gives us the opportunity to analyze the
severity of the situation that temporary workers face and judge the potential effectiveness of
remedial measures. Applying the divided responsibility framework developed here, we can see
that there are concrete measures that can be taken by both the sending and receiving countries,
as well as measures that can be taken cooperatively, that will improved the human rights situation
and the lived experience of millions of temporary migrant workers.
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CHAPTER THREE: DEMOGRAPHICS IN THE UAE AS BOTH CHALLENGE AND STRENGTH
Introduction
This chapter has two aims. First, it shows the historical forces that established the
temporary contract migration corridor between the Philippines and the United Arab Emirates from
the perspective of the UAE. Tracing the period from colonialism through the 1970s, the chapter
first explores the social, political and economic forces that established the UAE’s position as the
major labor receiving country in the global economy. The UAE’s harsh environment historically
offered few opportunities for settled existence let alone advanced human development. The
discovery of large oil reserves in the 1950s transformed this landscape almost overnight.
However, the local population was grossly insufficient both numerically and in terms of needed
skill sets to meet the needs of a rapid transformation to a modern economy based on the
extraction and export of petroleum. The UAE responded with the wholesale importation of a labor
force. The result of labor importation in the UAE has been a demographic imbalance of startling
proportions: locals today make up roughly 10 percent of the total population.
Second, this chapter will show how the management of labor migration policy effects not
just economic, but social and political stability. Labor migration serves a crucial economic function
in the UAE. However the governing regime understands that the management of such large and
vital flows substantially affects social and political stability. The demographic imbalance is usually
viewed as a threat to the UAE - the concentration of foreigners may result in the overwhelming of
local culture, places the UAE economy at the mercy of foreigners, and presents opportunities for
large-scale public disorder. This chapter will show how the demographic imbalance is also utilized
by the governing regime to shore up UAE national identity, ensure the privileged status of Emirati
citizens, and thus contribute to regime legitimacy and stability domestically. Three interrelated
strategies are examined: the local institution of sponsorship, kafala, which ties foreign workers to
local employer/sponsors; the active management of the national composition of the workforce as
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well as the duration of stay in order to avoid the full integration of foreigners and the spread of
radical ideas; and the resultant creation of a local hierarchy primarily based on nationality in
which Emiratis occupy an isolated but privileged position.
Terminology
We must pause for a moment to consider some terminology. In the United States the
area that we are discussing is most often referred to as the Persian Gulf. Among the citizens of
the region, however, this terminology is strenuously objected to, since they regard the term
“Persian” as synonymous with “Iranian.” The term “Arabian Gulf” is preferred in the region and I
will adhere to this naming protocol. The term “Gulf States” is used to refer to the countries of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates. The Trucial States is the name that the British as colonizers gave to a series of
small territories on the tip of the Arabian Peninsula which were controlled by local emirs; each
emirate was too small to be recognized as a separate colony and so the area was given the
corporate name “Trucial States.” Upon independence the Trucial States assumed their current
name, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In this chapter, the name Trucial States is used to refer to
the former colonial entity and UAE to refer to the modern state. The term “emirate” is used to
refer to the territory over which a single emir (sheikh, or Arab royal family) exercises control. The
term “sheikhdom,” alternatively, is a Western notion that refers to modern states which are
controlled by a Sheikh (Emir or Arab royal family). Sometimes sheikhdoms and emirates coincide,
as in the case of Bahrain, sometimes they do not, as in the UAE.
The UAE and the Birth of the “Demographic Challenge”
The Arabian Desert is a forbidding place.1 The core of the emirate of Abu Dhabi is
covered by a desert so inhospitable that at its core is an area known as the Rub Al Khali, the
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“Empty Quarter,” as humans have not managed to establish permanent settlement there.2
Instead, tribes in the area skirted on the fringes of this great sand desert, either living a semisettled or a nomadic existence and utilizing all of the scarce resources that could be found. Life
was dictated by the availability of fresh water sources and so settlements formed in the periodic
desert oases, in the Hajar Mountains, and at the coast of the Arabian Gulf.
While most agriculture was impossible in the desert oases, date palms could grow there
and became a cornerstone of existence both for its fruit and for the palm fronds from which
everything from baskets to houses were constructed. Dates could be eaten fresh or preserved by
boiling and compressing into a sugar-rich mash. But settled existence was impossible and
families often moved between the oases and the coast with the seasons - spending summers in
the shaded and less humid oases harvesting dates, and spending winters fishing at the coast.
Camels provided transportation and sustenance (camel milk and occasionally camel meat) as
well as leather and cloth (yarn was spun from camel hair), and were an object for trade.
Further north, away from the Empty Quarter, life gets a bit easier and permanent
settlements were possible. At the base of the Hajar Mountains water is more reliable and
available in greater quantities and so some additional crops could be planted in fields irrigated by
the traditional falaj. Livestock such as goats and donkeys could also be maintained. Settlements
along the Northern coast could combine fishing and agriculture. Port cities soon emerged, such
as Sharjah and Dubai, facilitating trade between East Asia, East Africa, and Europe. Smuggling
(especially gold into India) and piracy also emerged as lucrative businesses for these port cities.
At the coast, from north to south, there was fishing and pearling. Fishing provided both
food (for human and camel) and fertilizer (for use or sale); what was not eaten fresh was dried or
salted to preserve. Summer was pearling season and crews would spend the four summer
months at sea. While pearls formed a part of the traditional economy for centuries, the pearling
industry flourished in the 18th and 19th centuries with increased demand from India. During this
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time permanent settlements were established on the southern coast, the most significant on Abu
Dhabi island, and limited amounts of cash started entering the economy. In 1904 it was estimated
that around 80,000 people lived in the territory that is today the UAE, one tenth of whom were
nomadic or semi-nomadic Bedouin, the rest leading a relatively settled existence.3
The first half of the 1800s saw a decline in the role of Arab merchants in the East India
trade. Western countries’ interest in the region was primarily associated with its utility as a trade
route and it was the British that would eventually gain dominance in the region.4 Beginning with
the treaty between the Sultan of Oman and the British East India Company in 1798, Great Britain
concluded a series of treaties with the Gulf States in which they offered an external security
guarantee in exchange for the exclusion of third party traders and the end of piracy in the Gulf.5
In 1820 the British navy destroyed several ports and their fleets of ocean-going ships in the
Trucial States and imposed the General Treaty of Peace on the Sheikhs of the Trucial States and
Bahrain. Treaties conducted between 1820 and 1892 gradually extended Great Britain’s role in
controlling the foreign affairs of the Trucial States - Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras alKhaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Quwain - including disputes between rulers. Before Britain
formalized and reified claims to rule in the Gulf, none of the ruling families had been able to
assert uncontested dominance; Britain established some boundaries between the emirates and
prohibited aggression between them. However, Great Britain largely abstained from direct
involvement in internal affairs and governance. There was no attempt at imposing colonial law or
administration of domestic matters, nor significant efforts to develop the region through Westernstyle institutions of education and healthcare, infrastructure, industry or agriculture. While the
restraint from interference in internal affairs may have been appreciated by the rulers of the
Trucial States at the time, it would later cause some resentment. In contrast to other British
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protectorates, upon securing its independence in 1971 the UAE would be little more developed
than it had been a century earlier.
In the 1930s the pearling industry in the Trucial States collapsed as Japan introduced
cheap cultured pearls and the wider world entered an economic recession. Coming as this did
after the loss of involvement in the East Asian trade routes and the end of piracy due to British
intervention, the large coastal settlements such as Sharjah, Dubai, and Abu Dhabi suffered
greatly from the loss of their last significant source of trade. Other countries in the region were
already producing oil and beginning on the rapid path to modernization. But oil had not yet been
discovered in commercial quantities in the Trucial States.
With the end of WWII and the loss of its Indian colony in 1947, the British lost its original
reason for desiring control over the Arabian Gulf. Its position as an ally in the Cold War and a
counter to socialist-leaning Arab nationalism in Egypt, Libya and elsewhere gave the Gulf some
geopolitical importance. However, Britain soon gained a new reason for desiring influence over
the Trucial States: oil. Forbidding though the Arabian Desert may be, it covers vast oil reserves
and “in the immediate post-war period the Gulf provided Britain with 80 percent of its crude oil
imports.”6 But, while oil was being exported from the region and reserves had been discovered in
the Trucial States in 1953, the UAE was barely beginning to develop its reserves. In the hopes of
exploiting these oil reserves, development in the Trucial States finally became a British priority.
Development was to promote economic activity and to minimize sympathy with the pan-Arab
movement. According to a British official from the time: “our principal remaining interest in the
Persian Gulf as a whole is access to the oil on the best possible terms. We may also feel,
because of our historical associations, a certain sense of obligation to improve the lot of the
people on humanitarian grounds particularly as our influence would soon decline if we made no
such effort.”7 The 1950s saw the first steps towards development and modernization in the
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Trucial States. The first modern school in the area was established in Sharjah in 1953, for
example.8 Development would continue slowly for the next decade.
Oil in commercial quantities was finally discovered in the Trucial States in 1958 and the
first oil shipments left Abu Dhabi in 1962.9 With this, the Trucial States finally had a large and
reliable source of revenue. But development was painfully slow. Despite encouragement from the
British who now viewed development as essential to stability and commerce in the region, the
ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan al-Nahyan (Shakhbut), was reluctant to spend the
money that was flowing in to the government coffers. He literally kept the revenues from oil
production under his bed: at one point British officials estimated that he had one million pounds
sterling kept there in five gallon oil containers.10 He preferred to proceed slowly and carefully and
to personally oversee every detail of the development plans that he signed, slowing to a crawl
development projects but also hindering the creation and consolidation of essential state
functions such as government departments of finance, health, education, public works, etc. In
1963 there were strikes in the oil fields, protesting conditions in the emirate and there were
whispers that the al Nahyans might replace Sheikh Shakhbut with his younger brother, Sheikh
Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (Zayed).11 The final straw was a dispute over maritime borders with
Dubai in 1966 in which Shakhbut repudiated an agreement he had made only a year before,
angering both the Dubai ruling family and the British. On 4 August 1966 the Al Nahyan family
peacefully overthrew Shakhbut and placed Zayed in power.
Sheikh Zayed proved to be the right man in (almost) the right position at the right time. A
charismatic younger son of Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Sheikh Zayed was governor of Al
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Ain, the second largest city in Abu Dhabi and the traditional source of its power, during his brother
Shakhbut’s rule. Where Shakhbut was wary of change, Zayed embraced it. While Zayed was
governor in Al Ain, that city developed at a much faster pace than the capital, Abu Dhabi. His
success in negotiating both the modernization of Al Ain as well as royal family politics, led to his
selection as the new ruler of the emirate Abu Dhabi when Sheikh Shakhbut’s reign became
untenable in 1966. With Zayed in power development in the emirate proceeded rapidly. Zayed
invested in infrastructure projects and provided money to locals for housing and business
enterprises. Not all of the money thrown in to rapid modernization was well spent, but the
progress made in the first years of Sheikh Zayed’s rule was impressive.12
Development proceeded rapidly not only in Abu Dhabi, the source of most oil revenues,
but also in the poorer northern emirates of Ajman, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm
al-Quwain. One of Zayed’s first decisions as ruler of Abu Dhabi was to transfer resources to the
rulers of these emirates. This established Sheikh Zayed as protector of these Sheikhs and
allowed for better governance of the northern territory.13 It was also instrumental in establishing
Abu Dhabi’s position and influence over the Trucial States as superior to that of Dubai, a fact
which would be crucial in uniting the emirates in the next few years.
On 16 January 1968 Britain announced its plans to withdraw from the Arabian Gulf by the
end of 1971. This was part of a larger move by the British to reduce defense expenditure and
move to liberal economics, rather than colonialism, as a means of ensuring British interests in the
region.14 With the British withdrawal, the very survival of the tiny sheikhdoms of the Trucial States
was jeopardized. When the British signaled their intention to relinquish their control over the
region, disputes emerged between the small Gulf sheikhdoms and the regional powers (Iran, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia), as well as between the Gulf States themselves. Border disputes often arose due to
inconsistencies or omissions in the British record and gained importance as the Gulf States tried
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to define themselves and to establish ownership over potentially oil-rich areas that had previously
been home only to semi-nomadic tribes.
The British supported federation of the Trucial States, Bahrain, and Qatar as the best
way to avoid conflict and maintain stability in the Gulf. After initial declarations in favor, Bahrain
and Qatar refused the idea of federation and instead respectively declared independence in
1971. This left the seven tiny emirates. There was some fear among the British and other
Western powers that Abu Dhabi would also choose to go its own road, leaving the remaining
emirates too poor and small to establish a functioning federal state. Under Sheikh Shakhbut
federation would indeed have been difficult, especially given hostilities between Shakhbut and
Sheikh Rashid, the ruler of Dubai. But Zayed was a firm supporter of federation and, indeed,
became the driving force in the creation of the United Arab Emirates. When no agreement on
federation had been reached by July of 1971, with British forces scheduled to withdraw that
December, Zayed began negotiating in earnest. In particular he needed to convince Dubai’s
Sheikh Rashid; in order to do so the extent of the federal government was curtailed and Dubai
was given rights in the federal structure nearly on par with those of Abu Dhabi, including the right
of veto on the Supreme Council, the federal governing body.15 This has had a lasting impact as it
has left responsibility for key policy areas that would normally be determined at the federal level,
such as immigration policy, ambiguous and therefore open to emirate-level intervention.16
In the end, Sheikh Zayed was able to convince the Sheiks of six other emirates to
federate and United Arab Emirates emerged as a nation in 1971. As the dominant political and
economic force, Abu Dhabi under Zayed would both take the leading role in, and provide the
most resources to, the federal government. The other emirates would gain protection and
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resources from the new federation. The institutions of the new state drew significantly on
traditional and colonial forms, and relied on traditional authority structures to gain legitimacy.
Given the speed with which the country had to create its basic institutions in order to meet the
deadline set by British withdrawal, there were few alternatives. The new Federal Supreme
Council was based on the colonial Trucial States Council, the powerful Council of Ministers is
largely drawn from the royal and other prominent families. The Federal National Council, though it
has somewhat wider participation and is gaining a democratic form, has little power and generally
serves a consultative role, similar to a traditional majlis.17 The actual majlises themselves have
not disappeared and many of the rulers or others in the royal families continue to hold them; this
mechanism for personal contact and communication between the rulers and the ruled is
cherished in the UAE.
After independence the UAE continued to develop rapidly. As the oil and gas sector
gained strength and sophistication, new industries sprang up. The need for basic infrastructure
(paved roads, electricity, running water, etc.) and for the development of the citizen population
(hospitals, schools, etc.) spurred the initial expansion of the economy. The capacity of the local
population - both in terms of sheer numbers and in terms of expertise - was quickly overwhelmed.
To staff the expanding economy the UAE quickly turned to the importation of labor. As more and
more foreign workers came to the UAE, the economy further expanded to cater to their needs,
offering everything from ethnic restaurants to specialized bank accounts.
With time the preponderant role that oil and gas play as the keystone of the economic
architecture became viewed as a weakness as well as a strength. UAE rulers now wish to
reduce their dependence on this non-renewable resources, and are seeking a path toward a
prosperous post-oil economy. Recently the government has been investing heavily in tourism,
alternative energy, and financial services with the hopes of creating viable economic alternatives
to petrochemicals. Crucially, tourism and alternative energy continue to rely heavily on imported
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labor and expertise; only in banking is the UAE having some success in “emiratizing” the new
industry. It seems that labor importing is a long-term economic necessity in the UAE.
Labor Migration Policy and Its Effects on Social and Political Stability
While economic growth boomed with the discovery of oil, the native population was
unable to keep up with the demand for labor. Population growth ballooned due in part to high birth
rates and rising life expectancy among the citizen population, but in large part due to the largescale migration of temporary workers. Table 5 below shows that population growth in the UAE is
largely driven by the growth in the number of non-nationals present in the country.
Table 5: UAE Population Growth, 1950 – 2015 (thousands)
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Sources: Total Population: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United
Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm
Accessed: 24 March 2013.
Nationals and Non-Nationals: United Arab Emirates National Bureau of Statistics, Population by Emirates 19752005,
http://www.uaestatistics.gov.ae/ReportDetailsEnglish/tabid/121/Default.aspx?ItemId=1869&PTID=104&MenuId
=1 (Accessed 24 March 2013)
The large jump in numbers from 2005 to 2010 is associated with a change in the method used by the UAE
government in estimating its population (from census data to administrative data such as visa issuance and
birth and death reports). As there is little incentive for locals to misreport on the census and a large incentive for
migrants to do so (due to the pervasiveness of illegal living arrangements among middle and low-wage
earners), it is assumed that the census data underrepresented the migrant population and thus that this jump in
numbers is largely attributed to the inclusion of previously uncounted migrants.

While labor migration was necessary for rapid economic development and the full
exploitation of the country’s national resources, this preponderance of foreign nationals was
bound to have a significant impact on the culture and politics of the UAE, as well as on its
75

economy. As one German official famously lamented in reference to his country’s import of
Turkish workers, “we asked for workers, and they sent us men.” When large numbers of conationals exist in close proximity, they have a tendency to form groups, to congregate in
residential neighborhoods, to establish ethnic restaurants, groceries, and shops.18 And there are
very large migrant national groups in the UAE. In 2013 Emirati citizens were only the fourth
largest national group in the UAE; there are more Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis in the
country than there are Emiratis. See Table 6 below.
Table 6: Migrants in the UAE by National Group, 2013
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Pakistan: Aftab, M. "UAE-Pakistan Trade to Expand." Khaleej Times 25 November 2013, Online ed.;
Bangladesh and Egypt: "Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision: Migrants by Destination and
Origin." Ed. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division2013.
POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013; UAE: “Methodology of estimating The Population in UAE,” United Arab Emirates
National Bureau of Statistics, 31/03/2011, http://www.uaestatistics.gov.ae/ReportPDF/Population
percent20Estimates percent202006 percent20- percent202010.pdf, accessed 24 March 2013; Philippines:
Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos as of December 2012: Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 2012.

Drastically outnumbered in their own country, migrant groups tend to look threatening
from the Emirati point of view. There are a cluster of issues that could potentially pose problems
for the UAE. Economically, the country is dependent on the labor of individuals who owe little
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allegiance to the country and may well decide to leave should conditions turn less favorable, and
who remit billions of dollars every year to their home country, draining that money from the UAE
economy. Politically, large numbers of foreign nationals in the UAE invites greater scrutiny from
the government, in part because they may attempt to form interest groups aimed at influencing
UAE politics or bringing critical international attention. In terms of hard security, there are fears
that most of the serious criminal element in the UAE is composed of foreigners, and that
disaffected workers may cause public unrest by organizing strikes or other demonstrations. One
of the most commonly referenced threats, though, is the threat to Emirati national identity. The
fear is that as the ratio of citizens to foreigners decreases, Emirati culture will be overwhelmed.
Alternatively, this “demographic imbalance” may strengthen Emirati national identity and
boost regime legitimacy. By creating an internal “other,” traditional identity and cultural forms are
reproduced and their relevance reinforced. As will be discussed below, the creation of a unified
national identity has been a challenge for the United Arab Emirates. The formation of an in-group
identity presupposes the existence of an out-group; migrant populations present the perfect group
for “othering.” So long as the composition of the migrant population and their length of stay is
carefully managed in order to avoid migrants’ integration with the local population, locals will
remain a visible minority in their own country. Longva makes a similar point in reference to
Kuwait:
From the mid-1970s onwards, with the enormous increase in Kuwait's oil
revenue, it gradually became clear that the purpose of the Kuwaiti migration
policy was to maintain the transient character of labor immigration in order to
ensure that the migrants did not settle down permanently in the country. Given
their numerical superiority, this would inevitably have changed the character of
Kuwaiti society. ... As a result non-integration, rather than integration, was
viewed as the basis of social stability. In carrying out this politics of exclusion the
Kuwaitis consistently played on the diacritical differences between the migrants
and themselves, maintaining, reinforcing, and, when necessary, inventing such
differences.19
In order to mitigate the threats and maximize the benefits of labor migration, it is carefully
managed by the UAE state. Three mechanisms are particularly useful for fine-tuning the balance
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between migrants and citizens: kafala, national composition of the workforce, and hierarchy and
Emirati privilege.
Kafala
As discussed above, state formation in the UAE relied on the institutionalization of many
traditional authority structures. Another traditional form that was institutionalized in the new state
is kafala, the local tradition of sponsorship. The word “kafala” derives from the root k-f-l meaning
to vouch or be responsible for, or to provide for or be legal guardian of.20 “It has been suggested
that this socio-cultural institution originated from the age-old Bedouin custom of granting
strangers protection and temporary affiliation to the tribe for specific purposes,” and was
modernized as a means of controlling migrant labor on pearling boats.21 In a close-knit tribal
society this type of patronage might be necessary for a guest worker to function within the group.
A peculiar junction in history then led to its codification in the labor laws of the GCC countries.
Kafala became the basis for of immigration policy for the new UAE state - as was and is the norm
in the Gulf.
The basic premise behind kafala is that each and every foreigner in the country must be
sponsored by a responsible party, the sponsor or kafeel. For most workers, this sponsor is the
employer; high-wage earning professionals may sponsor family members.22 The sponsor takes
on responsibility for the well-being of the worker, ensuring his health and safety as well as the
payment of his wages. However, the kafeel also takes on responsibility towards the community,
essentially vouching for the good conduct of the guest worker and ensuring that there is a
permanent member of the community who is responsible for any damages, economic or social,
that the guest worker might cause. In theory, the sponsor functions as an intermediary between
the worker on the one hand and the community on the other, which would require him to maintain
a personal relationship with both the worker and the community. The relationship towards the
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worker, unsurprisingly, has taken on paternalistic elements, legitimizing a high degree of
supervision and control over the actions of the guest worker.
The implications of kafala on the human rights of migrant workers will be discussed in
succeeding chapters. Here I would like to focus on the benefit that kafala gives to Emirati
nationals and the UAE government. Emirati nationals gain a pool of labor over which they may
exercise extensive control. Workers are tied to a single, specific sponsor; this individual’s name is
actually on the worker’s UAE residence visa and labor card, tying both of these prerogatives to
continued employment with that specific individual. Any changes to the visa or the labor permit,
therefore, must either be made with the permission of the sponsor or by proving to the Ministry of
Labour23 that the sponsor has been at fault under the prevailing law to such an extent as to
release the migrant from her obligations. In this way kafala constrains workers from seeking
alternative employment.
The ethic of responsibility that underlies kafala also constrains migrant workers and
empowers local sponsors and employers. The idea that sponsors are responsible for the conduct
of the workers that they have brought in to the country extends beyond the working relationship.
This idea has supported the widespread, though illegal, practice of withholding passports,
constraining workers’ freedom of movement and their ability to flee abusive situations. Even
should a migrant decide to flee an abusive situation, the sponsor is once again in the more
powerful position. Fleeing from your sponsor, “absconding,” is illegal under UAE law.24
Kafala keeps labor costs low. As all businesses in the UAE must be majority owned by a
UAE national, this is a direct support to the citizen population. The large supply of available
workers globally would already tend to keep wages and the cost of that labor low. But the control
that sponsors are able to wield under the kafala system allows them to leverage their position to
get an even better deal. Under UAE labor law, the employer does not need to give cause for
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making a worker “redundant” and firing her. Migrants may fear that complaints about abusive
working conditions (for example late payment of wages or long working hours without pay or
overtime are common complaints) may lead an employer to fire them which, in turn, would
terminate their residency and force them to repatriate. Instead, many would prefer to accept their
working conditions, at least for the duration of their contract, allowing the employer to extract
more value from their labor. The threat of deportation looms large in the minds of many migrants.
Finally, kafala also opens up opportunities for Emirati citizens to gain an additional source
of income from migrants. Winckler estimates that 600,000 foreign workers in the UAE have
obtained visas by paying an Emirati citizen to sponsor them without actually employing them.25
The migrant is then able to stay in the country, often for the purpose of working illegally.
The UAE government also benefits from kafala. It reduces the burden on the state for
regulating immigration. As residence is tied to the employer, not the state, immigration becomes
essentially an employment relationship rather than a political relationship. Government capacity
to monitor workers is greatly increased as workers are embedded in a system in which each
worker is tied to an employer with the de facto power of an immigration official. Individuals who
pose problems, threaten to disrupt the status quo, or become vocal in their criticism are usually
identified early. Firing such an individual means that any potential political implications of their
deportation are minimized; the interaction becomes an economic transaction instead.
Kafala also minimizes the state’s role in providing welfare and assistance to individuals in
distress. These costs are largely displaced onto the employer who is required to provide benefits
such as health care,26 an end of service gratuity,27 and periodic return travel to the home country
and repatriation at the termination of employment. Also, as immigration is an employment
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transaction, the migration of non-workers is restricted. Only those migrants who are able to show
financial ability to support their family are allowed to sponsor dependents. Low-wage workers
must leave their families behind. This reduces the state’s burden to provide services such as
food, shelter, and education to at risk populations.
Kafala reduces the bureaucratic and welfare burdens on the state, but also gives the
state space to deny responsibility for violations of law and human rights. Mednicoff cites the
extraordinary example of the Sheikh Issa scandal: after a video surfaced of a member of the
ruling family, Sheikh Issa, beating and torturing an Afghan merchant, the UAE Ministry of Interior
released a statement “that the incident was a private matter to be settled among the parties.”28
But most instances of this are more mundane. When critics complain of widespread abuses such
as the withholding of wages, withholding passports, or denial of compensation for overtime, the
UAE government points to the fact that these practices are illegal. The fact that the system
discourages workers from reporting such violations is not addressed.
In the end, kafala encourages the weak enforcement of labor laws and the displacement
of immigration regulation onto employers. As this benefits both Emirati sponsors and the UAE
government, it is unlikely to change. However kafala is increasingly out of step with the demands
of the modern Gulf economy. Let us for the moment make the (debatable) assumption that kafala
served a necessary social and economic function in the pre-state era. As the economy of the Gulf
rapidly expanded with oil wealth in the 1970s, the migrant worker population exploded. Today
migrants represent over 90 percent of the population in the UAE and around 85 percent of the
workforce.29 It is unsurprising that the personal relationships which may have originally
underpinned kafala have broken down. As distance between the Kafeel and the worker grows,
the ethic of responsibility also diminishes, resulting in an unwarranted and uninformed
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circumscribing of migrants freedoms and rights. At best today kafala is a formality; at worst it is a
mechanism for constraining agency and exercising unwarranted control over workers.30
Nonetheless, the UAE government has signaled its commitment to kafala. While other countries
in the region have relaxed or abandoned kafala, notably Bahrain and Kuwait,31 the UAE appears
to have no such intentions.32
National Composition of the Workforce
With the explosive growth of the oil and gas sector as well as the development of support
and service industries that sprang up around it, the UAE soon faced an acute labor shortage.
Bringing in Arab migrants to fill labor shortages seemed the logical solution. Indeed, this is the
route that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain had taken when they began to develop their
economies post-WWII. However, bringing in these populations had a significant drawback: they
often brought pan-Arab and other radical political ideas with them and were willing to engage in
activism such as civic organizations, demonstrations and strikes. “The pan-Arab and nationalist
leaderships that emerged in Kuwait and Bahrain displaced the more conservative merchant
nationalists of 1938 as the leading sources of opposition to the Al-Khalifa ruling family in Bahrain,
the Al-Sabah in Kuwait, and their British advisers.”33 Pan-Arabism presented a particular
challenge for the Arab Gulf states in general because their cause often generated sympathy with
more liberal or nationalist citizens.34 In 1962 a Nasserist revolution toppled the Imam al-Badr
regime in North Yemen, bringing the first republican government on the Peninsula and sparking a
similar revolution in South Yemen in 1967 which ousted the British presence there. From South
Yemen, pan-Arab unrest spread across the border to Oman; the new People’s Republic of South
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Yemen supported Oman’s socialist revolutionary guerillas in the Dhofar region. Egypt and Iraq
also offered the Dhofari militants limited support, as did China.
This drama in Yemen and Oman was ongoing in the late 1960s, just as neighboring Abu
Dhabi was transitioning to Sheikh Zayed’s leadership and the Trucial States were gearing up for
faster paced development. When, in 1968, the Dhofari militants began to call themselves the
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) and declared their fight
to be against imperialism and oligarchic regimes, it is no wonder that the British-backed Sheikhs
of the Trucial States would get a bit nervous.
Other migrant populations also engaged in demonstrations and strikes at times, however
they garnered little local support and so were easier to deal with. In Bahrain and Kuwait in the
1950s and 1960s, “Iranians were depicted as pawns of the Shah’s imperial schemes, and
migrants from India and Baluchistan as a menace to Arab identity.”35 When they did strike, they
were unable to draw on group identities, either tribal (as was the case in Yemen and Oman) or
pan-Arab, that resonated with the larger public and so lacked popular support and resources – “a
crucial indication of the importance of the ideas, organizations, and alliances that enabled
workers’ protests to have a larger political significance or not.”36 Non-Arab migrants’ protests
lacked larger political significance.
The UAE learned from unrest in the region and has manipulated the ethnic and national
composition of its workforce as a means of controlling potential unrest. The composition of
workers and the flows of various nationalities may vary considerably from year to year as either
sending or receiving country em/immigration policies change. For example, from 2012 to 2013
the number of Nepalese workers coming to the UAE increased drastically, from around 2,000 per
month in 2012 to about 9,000 per month in 2013 as construction in the region rebounded after the
global economic crisis.37 Alternatively, the import of Bangladeshi labor, formerly one of the largest

35

Chalcraft, "Migration and Popular Protest in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf in the 1950s and 1960s."

36

Ibid.

37

Anwar Ahmad, "9,000 Nepalese Workers a Month Flocking to UAE,” The National, 27 April 2013.

83

migrant flows, fell to almost nothing in 2013 as the UAE “tried to balance its labor market,”38
reducing its reliance on this Muslim source. Rumors often circulate that visas are being slowed or
halted for Egyptians or individuals from other countries with significant disturbances during the
Arab Spring.39
Longva reminds us that the shift from Arab to Asian migrant labor in the Gulf was due to
more than political/ideological concerns. On the one hand, the number of Arab workers available
was declining; on the other hand, Indians and others who had long mercantile ties to the region
began to utilize these established networks for labor migration, aided by aggressive state policies
to support labor export.40 She argues that a combination of these forces led to the ultimate shift in
migration policy to encourage the import of Asian workers.
In the 1970’s most regimes in the Gulf region therefore turned to Asian labor sources.
Workers needed to be cheap, educated, and able to communicate. At the same time that the
UAE began looking for a non-Arab source of labor, new sources of cheap labor aggressively
entered the global labor market. The Philippines was one of these countries. Filipinos were
quickly incorporated into the UAE economy. They offered several advantages. Filipinos were
highly educated and skilled, but still willing to work for relatively low salaries compared to Western
and Arab workers with similar qualifications. Although few speak Arabic, most are at least
conversant in English, making communication possible. And, of course, they were culturally
inoffensive.
Hierarchy and Emirati Privilege
The UAE federation of sheikhdoms as a political structure left the traditional authority
structures in place, unique in the region where most states formed around one dominant leader or
family.41 Heard-Bey argues that this was essential to the UAE’s successful state formation.
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Forcing a single, dominant leader on the country would not have created unity among the seven
emirates, she argues, but rather led to destructive infighting.42 Instead, by assuming the large
majority of the financial responsibility for the federation, the leaders of Abu Dhabi gradually
emerged as national figures and leaders. At the same time, leaving the distribution of the
resources to the individual rulers of the emirates reinforced their role as beneficent rulers of the
people while also encouraging them to support the federal structure. These two forces in tandem,
it was hoped, would gradually create unity and a national identity.
It is difficult to say how successful the UAE has been at consolidating and
institutionalizing this national identity. In discussing citizenship in Kuwait, Longva argues that the
traditional vertical hierarchical structures which have been preserved in the state forms of the Gulf
States explicitly trade total allegiance for protection and material welfare, thus undermining the
concept of political entitlement.43 Thus citizenship in the Gulf is characterized not by a sense of
national identity, but by a sense of entitlement to material benefits which should be provided by
the state to its citizens. Migrants, therefore:
“are the foil in relation to which the Gulf nationals perceive and define
themselves. As non-nationals, the migrant workers are excluded from the social,
economic, and legal privileges that Gulf citizenship entails and thus present a
strong contrast that helps elicit national consciousness among the citizens.”44
The UAE is essentially a rentier state. For the general population, the provision of
resources was an attractive benefit of federation. The UAE government is largely funded by oil
and gas revenue. Rather than collecting taxes from the population, revenue is actually
redistributed to the citizenry through a variety of programs: free education (primary through PhD),
free health care (including treatment abroad if needed), land and housing grants, marriage
support, privileges to Emiratis in the private sector such as legal requirements on business
ownership and preference in contracting, and, perhaps most importantly, public sector
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employment on generous terms. As it is the state that is distributing income to society, rather than
the reverse, the state has less need to offer concessions to society such as “a democratic bargain
or a development strategy.”45
Al Suwaidi acknowledges the existence of a rentier state but likens it to a social contract
and claims that governance in the UAE is underpinned by a Lockean “explicit and implicit consent
of the governed, in which the government's legitimacy rests upon a universal acceptance of both
its form and those who lead it.”46 Heard-Bey makes clear that this idea of consent of the governed
has historical roots:
…[A]lthough the decision-makers in a tribal society are members of those
families which have established their leadership prowess over several
generations, an individual has no guarantee to inherit the chance to take up the
mantle of a predecessor. He has to prove himself. In the past a leader who was
not as brave, hospitable, generous and just as was expected of him lost his
following. … In the tribal society of eastern Arabia, where people had few worldly
goods, they could vote with their feet and would go to pay allegiance to a better
leader.47
While some aspects of this tribal version of consent of the governed continue to function
today, this theory is deeply flawed as a description of modern politics in the UAE. Succession in
the royal families may not be guaranteed by birth to an individual; however leadership does not
leave the family. And the ability of the populace to “vote with their feet” is now quite constrained
by both internal and external borders that reify the power of the ruling families. Yom and Gause
refer to this type of cultural argument as a rehashing of the “old Orientalist logic” which ignores
“the historical reality that powerful ruling monarchies owe much of their modern power to colonial
machinations rather than indigenous forces.”48
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Instead, the rulers today are quite literally buying their legitimacy. Their generosity has
been successful in generating cross-cutting coalitions to support the ruling families. The genius of
Sheikh Zayed’s insight in 1966 still functions today: “Sheikh Zaid’s belief is that money should be
made to circulate in the smaller Trucial States to the north of Dubai and that the Rulers
themselves must have money in order to behave as rulers towards their people.”49 Oil revenues
have supported the unique Gulf monarchical cultural and institutional forms that might otherwise
seem anachronistic, enabling them to continue functioning despite the rapid modernization and
globalization of society and economy in the UAE.
But this approach has a limit. It is bounded by state resources. Public sector employment
has been one of the primary mechanisms through which to transfer a percentage of rents to the
populace. In the UAE the local population is only about one million and less than 10 percent of
the labor force.50 Until now there have been enough prestigious public sector jobs at senior and
mid-level positions to go around, employing most Emiratis on generous terms. But that is
changing. With 85 percent of economically active nationals employed in the public sector (over 90
percent if you take joint public/private entities into consideration) the public sector is
oversaturated.51 While the government is strongly encouraging the “emiratization” of the private
sector, most Emiratis prefer the higher prestige, higher wages, shorter working hours, more paid
holidays, and greater job security that is to be found in public sector employment. As a result,
youth unemployment, already at 23 percent, is growing.52 Christopher Davidson estimates that
the Gulf States are hitting their “break-even oil price,” the price per gallon of oil needed in order
for oil production to generate sufficient resources to pay for state expenditures, and that Bahrain
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and Oman may have exceeded it already.53 The reluctance of Emiratis to enter the private sector
also drives greater reliance on imported labor in the private sector;54 99 percent of private sector
employees are foreign nationals.55
Conclusion: Voice and Exit
While the UAE economy was jumpstarted by the discovery of oil in 1953 and its
commercial exploitation in 1958, it quickly expanded. Oil wealth primed the pump, creating jobs
not only in the oil and gas sector, but in a variety of support and service industries as well. To
manage its new economy, the UAE was forced to import a massive workforce, from manual
laborers to senior corporate officers. The result has been astounding national wealth unequally
distributed between rulers and ruled: between the sheikhs and citizens, between employers and
workers, even between Western expatriates and other workers. The system has worked to the
UAE’s advantage so far, but problems loom. The question that overshadows all other is this: what
happens when the oil runs out?
The rulers of the United Arab Emirates are not blind to the fact that oil is a finite resource.
In 2007 the government of Abu Dhabi released its Policy Agenda 2007-2008, the first document
of Abu Dhabi’s “2030 Plan.”56 The basic premise of this economic planning documents is that the
economy of Abu Dhabi must diversify. The section on “planning and economy” begins with this
assumption:
While deeply appreciating the opportunities created by the oil and gas sector, the
Government recognizes the need to broaden and diversify the Emirate’s
economic success, and actively work to reduce the degree to which the economy
of Abu Dhabi relies upon the upstream hydrocarbon sector.57
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The Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030, part of Plan 2030, identifies the following
economic sectors as the prospective “engines of economic growth and diversification”58:


Energy – Oil & Gas



Petrochemicals



Metals



Aviation, Aerospace, & Defense



Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology, & Life Sciences



Tourism



Healthcare Equipment & Services



Transportation, Trade, & Logistics



Education



Media



Financial Services



Telecommunication Services
The government of Abu Dhabi is careful to specify that they are not moving away from oil

and gas; rather oil and gas revenues will fund the expansion of the economy into these new
sectors, driving economic growth and increasing domestic prosperity. In the future oil and gas
revenues will decline as a share of GDP first because other economic activities are increasing
and only secondarily as the UAE hits up against the natural limits of its oil reserves. This is how
Abu Dhabi imagines it will avoid that “break-even oil price” that Davidson argues is looming and
instead continue to support a high standard of living for its citizens and shore up its ruling bargain
over the long term.59
Several of these newly prioritized sectors, however, come at the cost of rising
international visibility. In particular, investments in tourism, education, and media services are
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likely to increase the visibility of the UAE internationally. In tourism, Abu Dhabi has begun
construction on a new cultural district on Saadiyat Island. The first of its museums, the Louvre
Abu Dhabi, is set to open in December 2015. It is likely that the new Zayed National Museum will
follow, and possibly the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi will as well. However, both the Louvre and the
Guggenheim projects have faced international criticism. The Guggenheim faced an artists’
boycott in 2011 due to criticisms over labor conditions. Sporadic protests have been ongoing,
including protest at the New York Guggenheim in March of 2014.60
But it is the branch campuses of western universities that have come in for the greatest
criticism. The UAE has branches of forty campuses, most of which are in Dubai.61 At the top are
New York University (NYU) and Sorbonne University, both of which have branches in Abu Dhabi.
New York University in particular has faced criticism from students and faculty, the larger
academic community, and the wider world. Criticism first centered on the deplorable working and
living conditions laborers faced on the construction of its Saadiyat campus, a charge which NYU
hoped to address by instituting a “Statement of Labor Values” and requiring contractors on the
project to sign up to certain minimum guarantees.62 However, labor violations continued,63 leading
more people to larger questions: how can one justify the tiny “bubble” of academic freedom and
entitlement that NYU represents in a country where even the most basic rights are denied to the
vast majority of the population? What is the value of a liberal arts education abroad when even its
own faculty and students are subject to many of these same restrictions the moment they set foot
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off campus? Christopher Davidson, former professor at Zayed University, a local university, has
been amongst the most vocal critics:
With this mindset in place, many Western institutions - including universities that should have been placing greater value on freedom, democracy and human
rights have wittingly aided the survival of these regimes. Gulf monarchies have
been sponsoring universities, museums and other cultural centres in the West in
order to remind their superpower protectors of their existence and accumulate
"soft power" with influential governments.64
Rising international visibility inevitably draws increasing attention to human rights abuses,
including abuses of temporary contract labor. Thanks to the brightening spotlight aimed by
Western governments and human rights NGOs, labor issues are gaining prominence. That in turn
may even start to create a more favorable climate for protests and strikes as workers feel more
protected by the UAE’s economic and security patrons. Certainly one must hope that the creation
of progressive institutions of education and culture will not only increase external awareness, but
will also increase domestic sympathy with the plight of those who are the worst off.
However, so far any possible loosening has proved ephemeral. Emboldened by the
bubble of intellectual freedom he enjoyed in his job at the Sorbonne Abu Dhabi, Emirati lecturer
Nasser bin Ghaith posted comments calling for political reform in an online forum. He and four
others were arrested for insulting the government and inciting others to break the law; he was
convicted and jailed. The Sorbonne declined to offer support for bin Ghaith, citing the fact that he
had not been arrested for his academic work.65 At the end of construction on NYU’s new campus,
and despite the university’s labor values and contracted guarantees, many workers still faced
terrible working and living conditions. In October of 2013, as the NYU construction project neared
completion, workers of BK Gulf at Labor Camp 42 went on strike; on the second day the protests
were busted up by the police, hundreds of strikers were jailed and deported.66
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In effect, international pressure may amplify workers’ voice, but it has not yet had much
tangible impact on their conditions. But there is another option available to workers in the UAE:
exit. The existence of an effective system for keeping workers’ from getting political and economic
voice is limited by the fact that workers can still vote with their feet. If there is external aggression
or significant regional instability, the demographic imbalance turns from asset to liability. In that
case migrants who are necessary to the functioning of both the government and the economy,
but nonetheless free to leave and (intentionally) not committed to their adopted state, may indeed
exit the UAE.
Right now the UAE only envisions such a mass exodus of laborers in the event of a
deteriorating macro situation: significant internal or external conflict. However, at the micro level,
exit remains an important strategy of last resort for workers in the UAE. Workers may wait until
their employer sends them home on paid annual vacation (legally required in the UAE) and then
never return or may simply work to the end of their initial contract but not renew, at which point
they can either look for a new job or their UAE employer is legally required to pay to repatriate
them. From the macro perspective, the fact that individuals may choose to exit is not viewed as
particularly consequential. The assumption is that when one worker leaves there will always be
another willing to take his place. The question we need to ask is whether this assumption is true.
There is some reason to hope that the global supply of cheap labor to the UAE is not
bottomless. Wages are rising in some of the world’s largest labor sending countries like China67
and Bangladesh.68 As opportunities in sending countries improve, the push to migrate may
lessen. At the same time, we need to remember that the UAE government is not willing to allow
just any migrant to enter the country. The government actively manages the national composition
of its workforce to meet strategic goals. Employers too have an incentive to recruit workers with
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basic competencies to lower the cost of training on the job site. It is possible that the race to the
bottom has an end. Nonetheless, the bottom is a long way off.
Fortunately, though, even if an adequate labor supply is practically endless, exit still has
a limited ability to pressure employers for change. Labor turnover has a cost; either the employer
or the worker has to bear this cost. If the worker bears the cost (through higher placement fees,
for example), then eventually the cost of migrating to the UAE will outweigh the benefits, causing
the flow of workers to dwindle; if the employer bears the cost, then if turnover is too high the cost
of poor conditions will outweigh the benefits. Protecting and increasing the ability of migrant
workers to exit exploitative working conditions therefore becomes key not just to limiting the
damage caused by these situations, but to preventing abuses in the first place.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FILIPINO MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE ARAB GULF COUNTRIES
Introduction
This chapter will show how the colonial experience in the Philippines tied that country’s
economic development to that of the colonial power, the United States. When the Philippines
achieved independence, the domestic economy was riddled with inefficiencies and corruption and
unable to support its growing population. Faced with exploding national debt, a contracting
national economy, and political unrest at home, the Marcos administration turned to the largescale export of labor to restore the country’s fortunes. Over time, migration became a primary
strategy not only for national development and the employment of surplus workers, but also for
mitigating the social unrest that the lack of domestic opportunities would otherwise encourage.
A Brief History of Filipino Migration
With 2,220,000 overseas foreign workers deployed in 2012,1 or 2.3 percent of the total
population, the Philippines is one of the world’s major emigration countries. What really sets the
Philippines apart from other major sending states such as Mexico or India is the high level of
state involvement in migration at all stages of the process, from pre-departure to reintegration
upon return. The Philippine state actively educates its citizens to be competitive in the global
labor market, identifies opportunities for labor export, advertises the “great Filipino worker” to
foreign governments and employers abroad, manages pre-departure tasks such as ensuring
skills proficiency, contract registration, and destination country-specific orientations, polices
departure through Manila International Airport, offers continuing support to citizens abroad
through its diplomatic missions, seeks bilateral agreements with major destination countries to
both increase flows and protect workers abroad, strongly encourages (at times even requires)
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remittances through official channels, offers opportunities for migrants to invest in the Philippines,
and supports return and reintegration programs. Some authors have referred to this as a “labor
brokerage” strategy on the part of the Philippine state. 2 The scope of government activity in this
arena is unparalleled in the world today. How and why did the Philippines arrive at this strategy of
not only facilitating, but encouraging temporary labor migration?
Colonialism: Setting the Stage for Filipino Migration to the Gulf States
The Philippines was first encountered by the West in 1521 when the Portuguese explorer
Magellan arrived on his famous journey around the world in an attempt to find the Spice Islands.
Magellan would ultimately die in battle in the Philippines after involving himself in a dispute
between local chieftains, but not before claiming the islands for Spain, who had supported his
voyage. Spain established colonial rule in the Philippines through the encomienda system of
feudal control and administration, common to all of its colonies. The encomendero, or governor,
was able to enrich himself by collecting tribute in the form of money, goods, or labor from the
indigenous population under his control. Of this tribute, a quarter was kept by the encomendero, a
quarter by the local church, and half by the colonial government.3 Local leaders were coopted as
intermediaries between the Spanish and the indigenous populations and benefited materially
through this function, “chang[ing] the configurations of traditional village society.”4 This bifurcation
formed the basis of a durable social hierarchy with foreigners at the top followed by a local elite
enmeshed in the global economic exploitation of the poor masses.5
Philippine migration is typically divided into four eras, or “waves.” The first wave resulted
from this first colonial encounter. The Philippines was initially connected to world trade through
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the “galleon trade” as a Spanish colony in the 1500s, which linked Philippine economic
development exclusively to Spanish economic needs. 6 Lacking significant mineral wealth,
manufacturing capacity, or agricultural development, tribute under the encomienda system was
not as valuable as that provided by other Spanish colonies. The Philippines’ real value to the
Spanish crown was as a point of transshipment: Chinese and other East Asia goods were
brought to Manila before being shipped to Acapulco then on to Europe. As little was produced in
the Philippines, the galleon trade did little to encourage local economic production or
development despite Manila’s key role in the trade. Starting in 1565, the galleon trade was
essential to the Philippine economy nonetheless, as the silver obtained by the sale of goods in
Acapulco was used to buy provisions and enriched local elites and the Spanish Crown. As the
galleon trade ended (due primarily to resistance from merchants in Spain) in the early 1800s,
Manila port gradually opened up to wider trade and became a global port city. While some local
products gained importance, especially sugar, Manila would remain largely dependent on trade.
This pattern of tied economic development would continue throughout Philippine history and
would become important in establishing the labor brokerage state in later years.
By the end of the 1800s, the Philippines was emerging as a consolidated political identity.
What had started as a group of islands largely organized around decentralized chiefdoms loosely
consolidated in a shifting pattern of alliances and rivalries became a single entity through colonial
administration and local reactions against it. The Philippines was gaining a national identity.
Renato Constantino, the eminent Filipino historian, is worth quoting at length:
The participation of the people in the various uprisings inevitably endowed them
with the beginnings of political awareness. They saw what concerted effort
meant; they were able to experience the sensation of collective and therefore
intensified hatred against their oppressors. …
The tradition of struggle against a common enemy was a principal factor in
forging a consciousness of nationality. The other factor was colonialism itself.
Administrative measures national in scope, and economic policies which resulted
in the emergence of a national market, welded the separate islands into one
country and one people ready to fight an anti-colonial war. The Revolution was
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the culmination of the unarticulated and confused strivings of generations; it was
also the final act in the forging of a nation.7
The Philippine revolution began in 1896 as revolutionary leaders formed a shadow
government and declared an armed struggle for independence. A stalemate was quickly reached
and a truce agreed upon in 1897 in which revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo went into exile.
Open hostilities resumed with the start of the Spanish-American War in 1898. Aguinaldo returned
with American support to lead the Filipino troops against the Spanish. When Spain lost the
Spanish-American War, colonial rule was transferred to the United States with the Treaty of Paris
in 1898. The Philippines, which had expected independence at the conclusion of the war,
continued to fight for independence until July 1902 and the signing of the Philippine Organic Act
officially establishing Philippine governance under US colonial rule. Sporadic acts of resistance
against colonialism would continue, however.
The colonial experience under the United States marked the beginning of a second wave
of Filipino migration with flows largely directed towards the United States. The US was quick to
establish its rule in the Philippines. The US Congress passed the Spooner Amendment
authorizing the US to establish civil governance in the Philippines in March of 1901, even before
the officially recognized end of the Philippine-American War in July 1902. Along with establishing
legislative and judicial functions, the Americans put in place patterns that would set the
Philippines up for future labor migration. First, the United States as colonial power revamped the
education system of the Philippines. As part of its “benevolent assimilation,” the United States
established free primary education in English-language public schools. Teachers were brought
from the United States to teach in the Philippines. Additionally, the children of prominent families
were often sent to the United States for their education with colonial government scholarships,
which “established a direct migratory route between the Philippines and the United States.”8
English-language instruction would have a lasting impact on the Philippines. Today Filipino9 and
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English are the two official languages of the country. More importantly, the fact that most Filipinos
speak at least rudimentary English proves a significant advantage in the global labor market,
providing a means for workers to communicate with each other and with employers in a
multicultural work environment.
Second, the United States continued the pattern of tied economic development, giving
US businesses priority access to the Philippines while hobbling Philippine trade with other
countries through a series of tariffs and quotas. Even the Tydings-McDuffie Act, passed by the
United States Congress in 1934 and establishing a ten-year timeline for Philippine independence,
continued to impose tariffs and quotas which privileged US economic interests at the expense of
Philippine economic development. At the United States’ insistence the Philippine Constitution of
1935 ensured the property rights of US citizens and corporations. At the time, trade between the
US and the Philippines had exploded and US investments in the Philippines were worth $200
million.10 80 percent of Philippine exports went to the United States and 65 percent of imports
came from the US.11 Thus, tied economic development under US colonial rule continued the
pattern of Philippine dependence on the colonial power, further enriched and entrenched local
power elites, and hindered the growth of a functioning, independent economy.12 This is a pattern
which would continue after independence.
Finally, US colonialism favored existing elites in the Philippines. In order to encourage
collaboration with the United States, as opposed to nationalist, revolutionary struggle for
independence, the United States supported the powerful landed elites’ access to economic
advantage and local political influence. This pattern established key elements of the political

10

Francia, A History of the Philippines: p. 172.

11

Ibid., p. 176.

12

For a detailed look at Philippine economic development under US colonialism, see: Richard Hooley,
"American Economic Policy in the Philippines, 1902 - 1940: Exploring a Dark Age in Colonial Statistics,” Journal of Asian
Economics 16, no. 3 (2005).

98

system in the Philippines that continue today: the provincial basis of national politics, elite control
of national politics, and patronage politics operating through pork-barrel public-works projects.13
However, the general standard of living did improve under US colonialism. The United
States invested in education, utilities, communications, and infrastructure projects as well as
major agricultural and manufacturing industries.14 It was also during the time of American colonial
rule that the Philippines would first experiment with large-scale labor migration. As denizens of a
US colony, Filipinos had access to the US labor market that was increasingly denied to other
Asian labor-sending countries by laws such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the Scott Act
of 1888, and the Immigration Act of 1924. Filipinos primarily came as cheap labor for Hawaiian
plantations. Estimates range, but about 150,000 Filipinos arrived in the US between 1907 and
1930, most of whom went to Hawaii.15
World War II also played a role in establishing labor export as an economic strategy. The
Philippines sided with the United States and was the sight of significant fighting in the war. Manila
was first bombed by the Japanese on 8 December 1941, only nine hours after Pearl Harbor.
Japan occupied the Philippines in early 1942, quickly and easily forcing out the American military
presence led by General MacArthur (who famously vowed to return) and sending the Philippine
government into exile. The last official Filipino troops surrendered to Japan on 6 May 1942.
Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1944 was notoriously cruel. Troops, both American and
Filipino, captured by the Japanese were treated horrendously and the general public was subject
to harassment and abuse; crops were diverted to feed Japanese soldiers, causing hunger among
the population.16 The United States military and General MacArthur did return in October 1944. In
a series of devastating battles – including the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle of
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WWII, and the fierce, month-long urban Battle of Manila – the US retook the Philippines on 5 July
1945, but at huge cost. WWII took a massive toll on the Philippines.17 Of the more than 200,000
Filipino soldiers that fought, more than half died; roughly another one million Filipino civilians
perished. Manila was basically leveled and at least one hundred thousand civilians died in that
city alone. Urban centers and infrastructure were severely damaged. Shipping capacity, the
mainstay of interisland transportation and commerce, fell dramatically.18 Sicat estimates that total
economic output fell precipitously during Japanese occupation, decreasing by 70 percent from
1940 to 1945.19 At the end of the war the newly restored Philippine Commonwealth government
estimated that damages to capital goods totaled at least 1.2 billion USD (nearly 20 billion USD in
today’s inflation adjusted dollars).20
The need to rebuild coupled with reparations payments could have led to a new start for
the Philippine economy. This did not happen. The international sentiment regarding reparations
quickly changed in the aftermath of WWII. Rising tensions with the Soviet Union and the looming
Cold War meant that the Allied Powers wanted to settle affairs in Asia quickly and establish
Japan as a new ally. The US stopped supporting reparations and eventually the Philippines
settled with Japan for $550 million USD in payments, goods and services, and another $250
million USD in long-term loans. The United States provided another $620 million USD; however
the majority of these funds, $400 million USD, was to be spent on the restoration of individuals’
(including US citizens’) property, “reaffirming the unequal distribution of land and wealth that
characterized the pre-war Philippines.”21
The Philippines remained a US colony for another year until the Commonwealth era
ended with the formal establishment of the Third Philippine Republic in 1946. The first five elected
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Presidents of the Philippines (Manuel Roxas, 1946-1948; Elpidio Quirino, 1948-1953; Ramon
Magsaysay, 1953-1957; Carlos P. García, 1957-1961; Diosdado Macapagal, 1961-1965) were a
mixed bag. The post-war need for national reconciliation and reconstruction drove the national
agenda, but the administrations vacillated between continuing reliance on the United States and
efforts to reduce American influence (particularly García’s “Filipino First” policy). After the first few
years of post-war reconstruction, GDP growth slowed and remained low until today. At the same
time, unemployment rose and remained high (see Table 7 below).
Table 7: Philippine GDP Growth post-WWII, 1946 - 2005
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This mixture of slow GDP growth and high unemployment proved particularly difficult for
the Philippines to manage. War damages, both to public infrastructure and to private capital
stocks, made the creation of local employment difficult. And by the post-war period, the migration
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path to the United States, previously an escape valve for excess labor, was narrowing drastically.
The Immigration Act of 1924, also known as the National Origins Act, had established a quota
system for the entry of foreigners into the United States, restricting immigration visas to 2 percent
of the number of that nationality present in the US as of the 1890 census and completely
excluding Asians. Filipinos had been exempt from the quota system because of their colonial
relationship with the United States. In 1934, however, the Tydings-McDuffie Act ended this
immigration path, immediately classifying Filipinos as aliens for immigration purposes even before
full independence was granted and limiting immigration to the continental United States to fifty
Filipinos per year.23 In 1946 the Philippines (along with India) was exempted from the Asian
exclusion zone by the Luce-Celler Act and so became eligible for a meager one hundred
immigrant visas.24 In addition, small numbers of Filipinos, primarily nurses, came into the United
States via the Exchange Visitor Program established in 1948.25 But until the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965 got rid of racial restrictions and increased the cap for each Eastern
hemisphere country - such as the Philippines - to 20,000, the flow of Filipinos to the United States
slowed to a trickle.26
Independence and the end of privileged access to the United States’ labor market
marked the beginning of the third wave of Filipino migration. Filipinos had to look elsewhere for
opportunities for work. The pattern of Filipinos abroad began to globalize. Destinations in Asia
gained in importance and Europe began to emerge as a significant destination. By 1973 – the
end of the third wave – deployment of overseas foreign workers to Asia was two and a half times
greater than deployment to the Americas (not including trust territories).27
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The Marcos Years: Reaching the Point of No Return
The fourth wave of Philippine migration is characterized by state dependence on and
institutionalization of migration as a strategy for economic, and therefore political, survival. This
began during the Marcos regime (1965 – 1986) with Philippine Presidential Decree 442 of 1974.
Marcos faced the problem of how to create economic growth and employment for the expanding
and urbanizing population, while appeasing both his domestic constituency and his international
patrons and despite an ailing economy. The administration began a massive effort of investment
in infrastructure projects, raising government expenditure in real terms by approximately 43
percent by 1968.28 This spending spree was largely funded by international borrowing. At the
beginning of Marcos’ presidency, Philippine national debt stood at $600 million USD29, 10 percent
of GDP; by 1968 national debt was 1.4 billion USD and 19 percent of GDP. Fearing that national
debt was quickly spiraling beyond the government’s ability to repay, in 1970 official creditors and
the IMF stepped in, offering to restructure Philippine debt in exchange for the country’s
participation in an IMF stabilization program. Austerity measures quickly stabilized the current
account balance, but at huge cost to the general population. Consumer prices jumped at the
same time that real wages dropped. As income inequality and absolute poverty grew so did
political opposition to the Marcos regime. Protests and riots roiled the country in1971 and 1972.
As the Communist Party of the Philippines played a significant role in organizing the
protests, the Marcos regime was able to label the political unrest as part of the global communist
threat, and was given virtual free rein by the international community to respond with severe
tactics. On 22 September 1972 Marcos declared martial law in the Philippines. Beyond arresting
dissidents, Marcos moved quickly to break the economic and political power of the existing elite
by confiscating assets and dissolving Congress. He assumed rule by Presidential decree and
declared his “New Society” would aim to end poverty in the Philippines. In large part this was to
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be achieved through a streamlined and technocratic approach to progressive development. In
practice this meant a return to international borrowing,30 this time through state-owned
corporations to hide the rising government expenditure. The international community, and the
United States in particular, continued to support the Marcos regime financially and politically. With
the support of the military, powerful new interest groups in the country, and strong international
allies, the Marcos regime would be able to repress opposition for over a decade.
Amid the economic and political restructuring of the early martial law years, Marcos
issued Philippine Presidential Decree 442 (PD442) in 1974, institutionalizing the state’s labor
export policy. PD442 had several unusual provisions. First and most significantly, it established
the state dominance in labor recruitment and minimized the role of private recruiters. PD442
created three agencies to manage recruitment: the Bureau of Employment Services (BES), the
Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB) and the National Seaman Board (NSB); in
1982 these agencies would consolidate into one agency, the Philippines Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).31 Second, it banned foreign employers from hiring Filipinos directly,
institutionalizing the role of intermediaries in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino labor.
Finally, it required that a percentage of each OFW’s wages be remitted to family members in the
Philippines using official channels.32
But a further problem remained, a political problem: labor export did not fit well with the
strong economic nationalist rhetoric that was popular in the Philippines post-independence. So
Marcos and succeeding administration faced the challenge of turning labor migration into
something nationalistic, patriotic. Marcos billed his new labor code established in PD442 as the
new “magna carta” of labor and began to praise migrant workers for their contribution to the
Philippines. But this discourse would be perfected in later administrations, particularly under
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Corazon Aquino (1986 – 1992; the first to name migrants as “modern-day heroes”) and Gloria
Macapalgal-Arroyo (2001 – 2010).
And thus the forth wave of Philippine migration began. When the OEDB was formed in
1975 there were an estimated 1,174,940 Filipino workers overseas with an estimated annual
deployment33 of 36,000; by the time the OEDB was replaced with the POEA in 1982 deployment
alone had increased to over 300,000 (64,169 of which were seamen).34 In its seven years of
operation the OEDB “opened” fifty two new labor markets, sent twenty three “marketing missions”
to various countries to initiate recruitment negotiations, and signed bilateral agreements with
Austria, Commonwealth of the Trust Territories, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and Zambia.35
Passed in a moment of optimism, when GNP and employment opportunities in the
Philippines were increasing buoyed by momentarily high prices for Philippine exports, PD442 was
originally envisioned as a temporary, stop-gap measure until local opportunities could catch up to
population growth. But once begun the cycle of labor export would prove hard to break. When the
price of exported commodities fell in 1975 and again in 1980, the Philippine economy took a
significant hit. While the state tried to buy its way out of yet another economic slump, increasing
capital expenditures even further and taking on ever more national debt, the domestic
employment situation had become untenable.
In short, faced with exploding national debt, a contracting national economy, and political
unrest at home, the Marcos administration turned to the large-scale export of labor to restore the
country’s fortunes. Guevarra calls this model the “labor brokerage state.”36 This option fit not only
with the country’s legacy as an educated, English-speaking colony but also with the new export-
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led industrial economy that Marcos intended to create, only the primary product the Philippines
was exporting was its labor force. Although the Nationality Act of 1965 in the United States had
gotten rid of racial restrictions and increased the cap for Filipino migrants, the 20,000 migrants
allowed into the United States was a mere drop in the bucket compared to unemployment and
economic need in the Philippines. The Philippines needed to find new labor markets. The result
was that by the time PD442 was announced in 1974, the Philippine state was actively looking for
labor migration opportunities for its citizens globally.
At just that moment in history, a new labor market was emerging in the oil-producing Arab
Gulf states as global oil prices boomed. It is interesting to note that of the nine countries that the
OEDB signed agreements with from its creation in 1975 until 1982, five were oil-producing
countries in the Middle East; by 1982 over 84 percent of Filipino migrant workers were deployed
to the Middle East. The UAE was one of those countries that the OEDB had an agreement with.
The UAE had achieved independence in 1971 and was developing its economy at a breakneck
pace. As discussed in the previous chapter, there was a need for labor to staff the growing
economy but simultaneously a reluctance to rely too heavily on Arab migrants or, indeed, any one
national group. Growth in labor migration between the Philippines and the UAE was a natural
outcome for both countries. The Philippines established official diplomatic ties with the UAE in
1980.37 By 1982, the first year the Philippines government recorded country-specific deployment
data, there were 7,762 Filipinos deployed to the UAE38; in 1986 when Marcos left power there
were already 22,322 deployed to the UAE.39 This number would only continue to grow.
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Table 8: Deployment of Filipinos to the UAE, 1982 - 2011

250,000

200,000

150,000

100,000

50,000

0

SOURCE: Annual Reports of the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration; available online:
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Marcos was overthrown in February of 1986 in a peaceful revolution known as the
People Power Movement. During the final years of his rule, Marcos was plagued by failing health,
scandals involving the imprisonment, torture and murder of political opponents, the loss of US
support, and continuing rampant corruption. When presidential elections in 1986 were rigged and
Marcos was declared the winner, the result was widespread rebellion. The political opposition
managed to unite behind a single leader, Corazon Aquino, there were high-level defections in the
military and police, and the Catholic Church dropped its support of the Marcos regime. On
February 25th the Marcos family and its closest allies fled the country, taken aboard US military
aircraft to Hawaii.
The Marcos legacy was one of continuing economic distress. When he was overthrown
by the People Power Movement, GDP was declining and Philippine national debt had reached
over $28 billion USD, an unmanageable 94 percent of GDP (see Table 2 below). Unrestrained
spending had not been limited to development projects, either. Imelda Marcos, President Marcos’
powerful wife, had been infamous for her “beautification” campaigns (activities such as erecting
and whitewashing walls to screen the massive slums from view of major streets) and, upon her
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exile to Hawaii, the world marveled at her shoe collection containing an estimated 3,000 pairs.
Corruption, long a problem in the Philippines, had reached new heights, epitomized by the
personal wealth accumulated by the Marcos family: the family embezzled an estimated $5 to $10
billion USD,40 much of that in the form of certificates for gold bullion that the family smuggled with
them to Hawaii on US military planes. Little of these ill-gotten gains have been recovered by the
Philippines government, despite a long effort to do so.41
Table 9: Philippine GPD and Debt under President Marcos
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Beyond the imposition of martial law and the violent repression of political opposition, the
explosion of the national debt, and massive fraud and corruption, there were three bright spots on
Marcos’ record. First, despite the waste of money through corruption, many desperately needed
infrastructure projects were completed under his rule. Roads, sewers, hospitals and schools were
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built in areas in desperate need of them. Second, he had managed to dislodge the established
political elite in the country. This achievement was dimmed by the fact that he had supplanted the
traditional elite with a new cadre of political and economic elites that were loyal to him.
Nonetheless, with his overthrow there was at least some competition among elites. Third,
opposition to the Marcos dictatorship had “nurtured the growth of vibrant civil society
organizations dedicated to promoting the interests of … others who had long been marginalized
by the country’s political system”42 and reaffirmed the country’s commitment to democracy. When
Marcos was overthrown by a popular mass movement, there was hope that the moment for
genuine, far-reaching economic and political reform had come.
The Post-Marcos Era: Labor Migration as a National Project
The success of the People Power was made possible in part by the fact that the
opposition to Marcos, from the old elites to the communists, were able to unite and support one
figure: Corazon Aquino. Ms. Aquino was the widow of popular opposition figure Benigno Aquino
Jr. Benigno had been assassinated by the Marcos regime in 1983; the general outrage that
followed his assassination is often pointed to as the moment when momentum began to shift
away from the Marcos regime and towards the opposition.43 His wife, Corazon, had little
experience in politics but Benigno’s death thrust her upon the national political scene. She
harnessed her image as a “simple housewife” in order to garner support, a tactic that proved
successful.
When Marcos and his allies fled into exile in 1986, Corazon Aquino assumed
“revolutionary power” and ruled by decree to undo the Marcos legacy and write a new
constitution: she abolished the 1973 Constitution, disbanded the existing parliament, established
a provisional “Freedom Constitution” allowing her to exercise both executive and legislative
authority, reorganized the legislative branch, established new legal codes, revised the
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membership of the Supreme Court, repealed some repressive laws, restored habeas corpus,
freed political prisoners, and began the quest to recover the wealth stolen by the Marcos regime.
She formed a committee to draft a new constitution, approved by 78 percent of voters in 1987,
which limited presidential powers and re-established a bicameral legislature. The new constitution
strengthened social justice, civil liberties, and human rights. But most Marcos-era laws are still on
the books and many of the companies that were placed under the control of his cronies are still
owned by them despite efforts at monopoly-busting and market reforms. Elections were held in
1986 and Corazon Aquino was elected President. “Yet in these elections, many of the traditional
elites were returned to power, causing a reprise of the obstructionist legislature that historically
prevented major reform.”44 The Philippines quickly moved back to the former patronage politics
based on provincial elites
The economy also continued to disappoint. Despite popular pressure to disavow the
foreign debt racked up by Marcos, Aquino decided to honor all debts in order to secure new,
needed loans and attract foreign investment. National debt increased by $5 billion during her
presidency, though the debt to GDP ratio was reduced a modest amount to 63 percent.45 Inflation
was in the double digits for most of her presidency (1986-1992), topping at 19 percent in 1991,
and unemployment averaged 8.4 percent; both were higher than under Marcos.46 Blackouts had
become common in Manila. With the economy continuing to worsen, Aquino also continued to
rely on the export of labor. Aquino was the first to refer to Filipinos abroad as national “heroes,” a
theme that would be picked up and amplified by later politicians. By the end of Aquino’s term in
1992 cash remittances flowing into the Philippines were valued at $2.2 billion USD, double what
they had been in 1989 when the Central Bank of the Philippines began keeping records.
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The importance of remittances as a source of foreign exchange would only increase,
especially as compared to foreign direct investment (FDI) and official aid and development
assistance offered by the international community. Succeeding presidents would continue to
encourage labor migration and the resulting remittance flows.

Billions

Table 10: Sources of Foreign Exchange, Philippines, 1986 - 2011
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Nonetheless, Corazon Aquino was generally beloved for her fierce defense of the
democratic system as well as for her personal qualities of humility and her upright character.
When Aquino’s advisors claimed that, as she had not been inaugurated under the 1987
Constitution, its prohibition of reelection did not apply to her, Aquino vehemently disagreed and
refused to run again. Instead she supported her close ally, Fidel Ramos. Her voice would remain
powerful and she prominently influenced the course of Philippine politics under the next three
administration as well.
Ramos had been a military general under Marcos and had led the surprising military
revolt against him. Ramos won a narrow victory in the 1992 presidential race. The first major
challenge to labor migration as an explicit government policy came in 1995. In that year Flor
Contemplación, a Filipina domestic worker in Singapore was arrested for the suspected murder of
a fellow Filipina domestic worker and a Singaporean child in the latter’s care. Ms. Contemplación
confessed to the murder while in police custody (though rumors of police abuse in obtaining the
confession persisted), was tried, found guilty and sentenced to death. President Ramos
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(president from 1992 – 1998) requested clemency on her behalf or at least a stay of execution
pending the results of the autopsies; his requests were denied and Flor Contemplación was
executed on 17 March 1995. Manila recalled its ambassador from Singapore and downgraded its
diplomatic missions in protest. But for the Filipino public, this was seen as too little, too late. The
lack of support by the Philippine embassy in Singapore for Ms. Contemplación during her arrest
and trial, and the ineffectual efforts of the President after her sentencing came in for severe
criticism. The broader question was raised as to what the government was, and what it should be,
doing to protect the “heroes” that it advocated sending abroad. Criticism strengthened when a
similar case involving a Filipina domestic worker, Sarah Balabagan, in the UAE, emerged later in
1995. While Ms. Balabagan escaped the death penalty, her case was seen to highlight the
vulnerability female domestic workers face in foreign homes.
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Figure 1: The Story of Sarah Balabagan
Sarah is from Mindanao, the predominantly Muslim province in the south of the
Philippines. A middle child in a large family, Sarah left the Philippines at age 16 to become
a domestic worker in Al Ain, United Arab Emirates. In 1995 she entered the UAE on forged
documents, showing that she was 27 years old.
Shortly after she arrived, Sarah killed her employer, Almas Mohammed al-Baloushi.
She stabbed him 34 times. She alleged that he was raping her at the time and she acted in
self-defense. The case raised significant attention in the UAE, the Philippines, and globally.
In the UAE, many Emiratis were outraged at the killing in the supposedly protected sphere
of the home, and supported the al-Baloushi family’s demand for the death penalty. In the
Philippines and internationally, especially as the case followed shortly after the Flor
Contemplación case, support for Sarah was strong.
Sarah ended up being tried twice. At her first trial she was convicted of
manslaughter and sentenced to seven years in prison and payment of 150,000AED
($40,872 USD) in blood money. But she was also awarded 100,000AED ($27,248 USD) in
compensation for the rape. The al-Baloushi family protested against the verdict. Sheikh
Zayed intervened and called for a retrial.
At her second trial, Sarah was found guilty of premeditated murder. Sarah was
sentenced to death. An international outcry followed. The Philippines government as well as
various international rights organizations such as Amnesty International, were active and
vocal – to the point of being unhelpful by pushing the Emirati authorities into a corner, it was
sometimes argued – in advocating for her release. Sheikh Zayed again intervened,
requesting the al-Baloushi family to accept blood money in lieu of the death penalty. After
initial rejections, the family agreed.
On appeal the death sentence was quashed. Instead, Sarah was sentenced to one
year in prison, payment of 150,000AED ($40,872 USD) in blood money, and 100 lashes
with a cane. This sentence was carried out. The flogging was divided into 20 lashes a day
for five consecutive days and the police officer carrying out the punishment was required to
tuck a Koran under his arm to limit the force of his blows. She was released from prison
early, after 9 months, upon one final intervention by Sheikh Zayed.
A wealthy Filipino industrialist in the UAE donated most of the blood money. Gifts,
in cash and kind, flowed in for Sarah. By the time she was released from prison, she was a
wealthy woman by Filipino standards: a special trust fund worth several hundred thousand
dollars had been set up in her name with donations from around the world. A Filipino movie
was made of her story.
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The Ramos administration responded to the Contemplación and Balabagan cases with
the establishment of the Gancayco Commission and the Republic Act No. 8042: Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (“Migrant Workers Act of 1995”). The Gancayco Commission
was charged with looking into the actions of the government to protect its citizens overseas and
to make policy recommendations for improvement. The Commission recommended sweeping
changes:


Phase out the deployment of female domestic workers to the Middle East;



Phase out the deployment of female entertainers in Japan, Greece, and Cyprus;



Tighten pre-departure and departure procedures including accreditation of employers,
verification of contracts, pre-departure seminars, etc.;



Strict enforcement of policy to establish OWWA centers in every diplomatic post;



Strict enforcement of policy to establish the country-team approach in all embassies;



Permanently ban agencies engaged in illegal recruitment;



Create of special prosecutors and investigators for illegal recruitment cases;



Create special courts to give priority handling to illegal recruitment cases;



Provide legal assistance to all Filipinos involved (either as victim or wrongdoer) in capital
or serious offenses;



Create banks and hospitals for migrant workers and conduct feasibility studies for
livelihood projects for returning workers;



Create the economic and social environment needed to generate jobs domestically.47
In effect, the Gancayco Commission sought to reduce the deployment of Filipinos to

situations that were likely to be dangerous either due to the type of job or the method of
deployment, to strengthen the ability of the state to provide support to workers abroad through its
embassies, to encourage the return and reintegration of migrant workers and eventually to end
the need for labor migration in the first place. These recommendations were met with some
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official skepticism at the time,48 but received general popular approval and have guided Philippine
policy regarding labor migration since 1995. These ideals continue to be influential in the POEA
and Philippine embassies today.
The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 was lauded by the Ramos administration as the migrant
workers’ “magna carta” – ironically, the same term that had been used by Marcos to describe
PD442 in 1974. The Act is explicit in shifting the language used by the state with regards to its
position on, and role in, the export of migrant labor from the Philippines. On the one hand, the Act
establishes the protection of Filipinos abroad, especially migrant workers, as a legitimate role of
the Philippine state. On the other hand, the Act expressly states that: “the State does not promote
overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and achieve national
development.”49 The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 is the first statement of a rhetorical shift from
“promotion” to “management” of labor migration. The Act lays out the government’s plan for what
that management will look like (see Figure 2, below).
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Figure 2: Significant Elements of Republic Act No. 8042: Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995
























Gender-sensitive criteria for policies and programs;
Free access to courts, judicial bodies, and legal assistance extended to Filipinos overseas;
Political participation in the Philippine democratic process is extended to Filipinos overseas;
Promotion of skilled migration as a means of protection for migrant workers:
“The State recognizes that the ultimate protection to all migrant workers is the
possession of skills. Pursuant to this and as soon as practicable, the government
shall deploy and/or allow the deployment only to skilled Filipino workers.”
Prohibition of recruitment fees paid by migrant workers;
Cooperation and partnership with non-governmental entities (AMMENDED in 2010 by RA
10022 to include recruitment agencies);
Migrant workers may only be deployed to countries where their rights are protected by
existing labor laws, multilateral legal instruments, bilateral agreement, or if the state is “taking
positive, concrete measures to protect the rights of migrant workers,” (AMMENDED in 2010
by RA 10022 to remove the final category – quoted above – and require Embassies or
Department of Foreign Affairs foreign posts to certify to the POEA whether labor conditions
in each country meet Philippine requirements);
The government of the Philippines may impose deployment bans when necessary;
Defines “illegal recruitment” to include, among others things:
o Charging excessive or inappropriate fees;
o False information or misrepresentation;
o Recruitment for jobs “harmful to public health or morality or to dignity of the
Republic of the Philippines;”
o Contract changes or substitution;
o Passport withholding;
o AMMENDED in 2010 by RA 10022:

Regulates conditions under which loans may be made to migrant workers
for the purpose of funding allowable fees;

Restricts conditions under which recruiters may impose compulsory
conditions on health examinations or training;

Forbids recruiters from “passing on” insurance fees to the worker;
Makes the recruitment agency jointly liable with the employer for monetary claims including
damages and unjust termination;
Requires POEA to issue travel advisories and circulate information about labor and
employment conditions, the human and workers’ rights standards of destination countries;
Establishes funds for emergency repatriation, Migrant Workers Loan Guarantee Fund, and
Legal Assistance Fund;
Establishes a reintegration center for the reintegration of returning OFWs;
Establishes a Resource Center for OFWs and Overseas Filipinos in every Embassy;
Ensures shared government data on migration;
Assigns roles in overseeing migration to the Dept. of Foreign Affairs, the Department of
Labor and Employment, POEA, and OWWA; AMMENDED in 2010 by RA 10022 to include
the Department of Health and Local Government Units;
Reaffirms the country-team approach, established in 1993, at Philippine embassies;
Deregulation or phase out of:
o Recruitment activities: to become a matter between worker and employer;
o POEA to drop regulatory functions.
This section REPEALED in 2007 by RA9422
AMMENDED in 2010 by RA 10022 to establish:
o Mandatory insurance coverage at no cost to the worker;
o Congressional oversight committee

SOURCE: "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act." Republic Act No. 8042. Ed. Congress of the
Philippines. Manila, Philippines, 1995. http://www.poea.gov.ph/rules/ra8042.html
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In particular, the Act establishes a mandate for increased government monitoring,
promotion, and active protection of migrants’ rights abroad. The act places the primary burden of
this increased activity on the Department of Foreign Affairs:
The protection of the Filipino migrant workers and the promotion of their welfare,
in particular, and the protection of the dignity and fundamental rights and
freedoms of the Filipino citizen abroad, in general, shall be the highest priority
concerns of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine Foreign Service
Posts.50
This places the various Embassies of the Philippines, as well as the outposts of the
Department of Labor and Employment that are embedded within many embassies (today
Philippine Overseas Labor Offices, POLOs, have been established in thirty four cities, including
both Abu Dhabi and Dubai), in the uncomfortable position of attempting to ensure the
enforcement of laws beyond the sovereign scope of the Philippines government. Embassy teams
are given the responsibility to ensure that “labor and social welfare laws in the foreign countries
are fairly applied to migrant workers.” 51
Through the Gancayco Commission and the Migrant Workers Act of 1995, the Philippine
state began to define a set of rights that are portable, that Filipino citizens take with them when
they leave the country. They also establish the legitimacy of the Philippine state in taking
concrete actions to ensure not only those rights proffered by the Philippine state, but also those
recognized by international agreements to which the receiving state is a party, are guaranteed in
practice.
The Gancayco Commission and the Migrant Workers Act of 1995 were popular and the
Ramos administration was generally successful for its first few years. The economy grew and
foreign direct investment and remittances inflows were strong. Although unemployment remained
at around 9 percent for most of his presidency, domestic wages increased. However, his
presidency was tainted in the end by his attempt to amend the 1987 Constitution to change from
a presidential to a parliamentary system of governance. Although this could plausibly be seen as
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a means of limiting the power of the executive office and encouraging parties to strengthen their
reliance on policy platforms (instead of populism and expediency), this was seen as a move by
Ramos to avoid the single term limit on the Presidency and retain power. Former ally Corazon
Aquino led the successful political opposition against the proposed amendment.
Popular actor and political outsider Joseph Estrada won the 1998 presidential election.
His administration became infamous for corruption. Transparency International estimates that he
embezzled between $78-80 million USD.52 Impeachment proceedings were initiated against him
in 2000. When the Supreme Court decided not to allow evidence to be entered against him that
had not been included in the initial impeachment complaint, it was widely perceived as evidence
of corruption in the Court. A new round of popular protest followed and the “People Power II”
movement, again led by Corazon Aquino, pushed Estrada out of power. His vice president, Gloria
Macapalgal-Arroyo, was sworn in as President on 20 January 2001. She was later elected to a
full term as president in the 2004 elections amid allegations of vote-rigging.
Gloria Macapalgal-Arroyo is from a powerful political family in the Philippines; she is the
daughter of former President Diosdado Macapagal (president from 1961 – 1965). If Corazon
Aquino was the first to term migrants as national heroes, Arroyo was the politician who perfected
this narrative. The idea of labor bans on the deployment of Filipino workers, particularly female
domestic workers and entertainers, to vulnerable positions was seriously discussed under the
Ramos administration after the Flor Concepción tragedy. This option was not used at the time
due to fears that bans were unrealistic given the economic situation in the Philippines and so
would only lead to increased illegal migration which only places workers at greater risk.53 The
challenge of how to make workers less vulnerable remained a central debate. Arroyo’s particular
contribution to Philippine labor export has been her activity to “upgrade” Filipino migrant workers
in order to add value to this particular export commodity.54 One such initiative aims to create
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“supermaids”: “As of 2006, all deployed domestic workers must be at least 23 years old, attend a
country-specific language and culture course, and secure a certification on household work from
a government-sponsored testing center.”55
The logic behind “upgrading” is simple: labor and human rights abuses disproportionately
affect low-skill, low-income workers, so increasing the skills of potential migrants should reduce
human rights violations. The causal chain is assumed to function along these lines: higher skilled
workers are able to do more complex or specialized labor; as relatively few migrant workers have
these skills, these “upgraded” Filipino workers face less competition, are in higher demand and
thus have more opportunities to choose an employer or to change employers; the fact that these
workers are in demand increases their leverage with employers, allowing them to demand higher
wages and/or better working conditions. Upgraded workers are empowered workers, able to
demand better treatment and thus less likely to suffer abuse or to require state intervention. The
state benefits from increased remittances, decreased reliance on welfare systems by OFWs and
their families, and decreased political stress - between sending and receiving state as well as
between the Philippine state and its OFW constituents - that might otherwise arise due to
maltreatment of workers abroad. This strategy has so far had little impact on the skill level of
workers sent abroad. From the time when Arroyo took office in 2001 until today, the number of
new domestic workers the Philippines sends abroad continues to overwhelm the number of new
nurses hired, a high-skill profession that the Philippines government supports for deployment (see
Table 11, below). While there have been brief periods in which the gap narrowed (from 2003 –
2004 and 2007 – 2008), the rate of new hires of domestic workers in general is increasing faster
than the rate of nurses; in 2013 there were ten times as many domestic workers newly deployed
as nurses.
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Table 11: Filipino New Hires by Occupation
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Guevarra criticizes this approach:
In effect, the state shifts the burden of responsibility and protection from itself to
the workers by implying that their best protection is empowerment – which they
can achieve by becoming responsible and self-regulating. While these are fine
virtues, this social labeling is disconcerting in that it is solely geared toward
affecting the conduct of Filipino workers and not that of foreign employers or
labor brokers.56
But, of course, the Philippine state has little capacity to affect foreign workers or foreign
governments. Even its ability to regulate labor brokers is complicated by the fact that many
brokers in the Philippines work with a second broker or placement company in the receiving
country over which the Philippine state has little leverage. The ability of the sending state to
unilaterally regulate these transnational networks is minimal. In this context, focusing on the
migrants through skills training and information dissemination makes sense as a strategy for
sending countries. However, effective regulation will have to rely on bilateral or multilateral
cooperation between sending and receiving countries.
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Bilateral agreements, though actively pursued by the Philippines as a more achievable
goal than binding international agreements, have their own limitations. The primary difficulty is
that major sending countries have a weak bargaining position. Ironically, the more migrants the
sending country has in any specific receiving country, the more they rely on that country for
employment opportunities and remittances, the more they need an agreement and yet the worse
their bargaining position is. Additionally, bilateral agreements are only effective if successfully
enforced and enforcement is largely up to the receiving, not the sending, country.
In 2010 the Philippines had bilateral agreements on labor and/or migration in force with
fifteen countries; however it is unclear whether many of these agreements are binding or merely
guidelines.57 It is noteworthy that the Philippines has agreements in place with several of the
countries known to have poor records with regards to the human and labor rights of migrant
workers, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan for example. These agreements have not necessarily
improved the situation. Despite a MOU on labor cooperation in 2010, a total labor ban imposed
by the Philippine government on Jordan was not lifted until 2012 when Jordan signed further
agreements with the Philippines to meet Philippine legal requirements such as the $400 USD
minimum wage. Even after these further agreements, abuse of domestic workers in Jordan
remains distressingly common. In 2012 a facility run by the Embassy of the Philippines in Jordan
received more than 950 requests for help, nearly 600 of which resulted in the Filipino being
repatriated.58 In 2011 the Philippines and Saudia Arabia engaged in a diplomatic row over the
state of domestic workers in the Kingdom. An estimated 250,000 Filipinos and 900,000
Indonesians worked as domestic workers in Saudi Arabia at the time.59 The governments of the
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Philippines and Indonesia had issued new hiring guidelines60 which included a $400 USD
minimum wage for domestic workers. Saudi Arabia responded by banning Filipino domestic
workers outright. It was an interesting standoff, with each country betting that the other had more
to lose. On the one hand, Filipinos and Indonesians make up the bulk of domestic workers in
Saudi Arabia and replacing well over one million workers with domestics from other countries
would be difficult and expensive for Saudi employers. On the other hand, while the Philippine
government is clear that it is not afraid of losing out on domestic worker positions in Saudi Arabia,
the Kingdom is the top destination for OFWs and the Philippines would have a very difficult time
should a labor ban begin to affect other sectors. The ban stayed in place for over a year but, in
the end, Saudi Arabia backed down, lifting the ban and signing an agreement recognizing the
minimum wage and other protections. Again, enforcement is lacking and reports of abuse of
domestic workers in Saudi Arabia continue.
Labor Migration Policy and Its Effects on Social and Political Stability
Despite difficulties in establishing protections for its workers overseas, every Philippine
administration since Marcos has relied heavily on labor migration. While Marcos originally
envisioned labor export as a stop-gap measure, it offers some unique advantages to the exportoriented state. And once begun, workers and politicians alike began to depend on the benefits
that employment abroad offered. While the rhetoric surrounding labor migration may have shifted
from “promotion” to “management” of Filipino labor migration, the policy in practice has only
strengthened the labor migration cycle.
Economic Effects
Employment: Providing employment opportunities is the most obvious advantage that
labor export offers. With persistently high levels of unemployment and low economic growth (see
Table 7, above), the Philippines is an obvious candidate for large-scale export of labor. Beyond
the movement of laborers abroad, remittances may have a further impact on the sending-country
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labor supply. There are studies that suggest that households that receive remittances are less
likely to participate in the local labor market.61 There is a relatively straightforward mechanism
through which this works: income received from family members abroad contributes to family
resources, reducing the need for recipients to work. However, there is a secondary mechanism
that may be functioning as well. As working aged household members migrate abroad, those that
remain behind must compensate for this loss in various ways, for example as the full burden of
housework and child care falls on those who remain behind. Alternatively, Amuedo-Dorantes and
Pozo point out that the income effect may be mitigated by the “disruptive effect” as the household
compensates for foregone income (the migrant is often the primary breadwinner of the family and
immediately after migrating there is typically a period of time while the migrant is becoming
established during which they are unable to remit) and the up-front costs of migration through
continued participation in the local labor market, though perhaps working fewer hours or engaging
in informal sector work.62
Poverty, consumption, and welfare: Remittances to family members have immediate
impact in reducing poverty for beneficiaries.63 And much of the money received is spend on the
basic, immediate needs of the recipient household such as food and shelter, healthcare, and
education, increasing recipient household welfare.64 Further, such spending can improve welfare
beyond the immediate recipient household: “consumption and the often downplayed ‘nonproductive’ investments in housing, small businesses and education can have positive multiplier
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effects and increase local economic activity, through which the benefits of remittances also
accrue to non-migrant households.”65
Investment: As money comes into the economy through remittances, what is not spent on
consumption may be invested.66 Migrants rarely invest in traditional ways, buying stocks, bonds,
etcetera; they are more likely to save money in local banks which in turn lend the money out to
local entrepreneurs. Alternatively, migrants may directly invest in creating their own businesses,
usually microenterprises. This will be discussed further in Chapter Eight, looking at the economic
goals and aims of Filipino interviewees. And, although it is not a traditional investment, one can
also talk about investment in human capital. Financing the education of family members such as
siblings and children is often a primary goal of remitters. Knowing that high-wage employment is
available abroad may encourage families to invest in education and skills training that is in high
demand globally.
Tax revenue: Through the collection of taxes, the state actually captures a portion of
remittances that are spent on consumption and investment.67
Counter cyclical: Although not known when PD442 was issued in 1974, it is now
emerging that remittances are counter cyclical from the perspective of the migrant-sending
country. As remittances are motivated by altruism, they increase during periods of economic
stress in the home country.68 This is beneficial to the immediate recipients who receive badly
needed income, but also to the wider economy as capital continues to flow even during economic
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crises, smoothing consumption and thus mitigating effects on both households and the wider
economy.
Foreign exchange and GDP: Investments and remittances sent through official channels
provide a significant source of foreign exchange for the Philippines. By 1977, the earliest
numbers available, remittances already outstripped either foreign direct investment (FDI) or
official aid and development assistance (see Table 10, above). Today, remittances far outweigh
these flows and continue to grow.
The effect on GDP is less clear. While many researchers see benefits for economic
growth, Chami et. al. actually find a negative effect on economic growth.69 Their overall
perspective is that the impact on long-term economic growth depends on how the individual
governments in question use or channel remittances.70 And there are plenty of pernicious
incentives and thus perverse effects of labor export and remittances.
Perverse effect on the economy - Dutch disease: While remittances provide needed
foreign exchange in the short term, there is a fear that in the long term they may actually destroy
the conditions for the growth of the domestic economy.71 “Remittances constitute an inflow of
finance and this may lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate undermining the
competitiveness of the traded-goods sector and, in particular, of exports; the so-called Dutch
disease effect.”72 While this does sometimes happen, it is not inevitable:
“there are many different paths through which remittances affect an economy. …
[N]one of these paths is necessarily active at any given time--that is, many
economic and social conditions determine whether any given path is active or
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significant. And, finally, many of these paths have opposing or conflicting
economic effects.”73
Social Effects
Perverse effects on individuals and families - reduced incentive to work, social costs of
migration, decision-making with limited knowledge: As mentioned above, households receiving
remittances are less likely to participate in the sending-country labor market. If this happens on a
large scale, leaving too few workers in the sending-country labor market, it may drive up wages,
in turn increasing production costs, and so reducing economic competitiveness.74 In a country like
the Philippines, with double-digit unemployment numbers and with significant competition for local
job opportunities, this pernicious cycle does not seem to be a realistic fear.
However, social costs associated with migration are being felt in the Philippines.
Migration splits families apart. There are fears that dividing spouses leads to increased levels of
infidelity and of broken marriages. As divorce is illegal in the Philippines,75 broken marriages in
turn lead to more social costs in continuing infidelity as spouses split and form new long-term
relationships, sometimes including children, with others that they are not free to marry. But the
greater concern is for the children of migrants. It is thought that mothers, as opposed to fathers,
migrating may be particularly detrimental to children.76 There is a perceived “crisis of care” in the
Philippines as mothers migrate in order to provide a living wage for families, leaving children to be
raised by their grandparents or other close female relatives.77 Behavioral and emotional problems
may result. Education outcomes for the children of migrants are mixed: increased income means
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increased access to education for children, but without parental involvement attendance and
performance may suffer.78 Alternatively, Parreñas argues that the difficulties may be worse for
fathers, who have a harder time emotionally connecting with children from abroad than mothers
do.79
It should also be noted that migrants often make decisions about migration based on
incomplete or inaccurate knowledge. Often when they arrive in the country of destination, they
find that the expenses associated with living and working abroad are higher than expected. This
limits the amount of money available to be remitted, saved and/or invested.80
Political Effects
A new political constituency: As the numbers of Filipino workers leaving the country
increased, a new constituency was born. In 2003 the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 9189
(amended by RA10590), "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act," allowing Filipino workers to vote
from abroad. Today nearly 10 percent of Filipinos live – and in many cases work – outside of the
Philippines. And that 10 percent supports a much larger number of Filipinos still resident in the
Philippines through remittances. In the end, a large percentage of the Philippine population is
affected by labor migration. This has the potential to be a powerful constituency. Filipino
politicians have been courting migrants and their families as a political force. During the 2004
presidential elections, the first to allow overseas voting, registration or certification to vote from
abroad had to be completed during a two month period that elapsed six months before the
elections; the ability to register and then to vote was also hindered by the fact that all paperwork
and voting had to be done in person at an Embassy or consulate. 81 Turnout in the 2004 was a
reasonable 65 percent (compared to local turnout of 70 to 75 percent) but only 26 percent in the
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presidential elections of 2010 and with midterm elections in 2013 reaching only 16 percent.82
Reforms were made to the process allowing for field and mobile registration units for the next
elections in 2016 as well as other measures aimed at increasing participation. As the practical
ability to vote from abroad is extended to more people, the importance of OFWs as a political
constituency only increases. Connecting with this valuable constituency may make a significant
difference come election time.
Stability: As in other major sending countries, labor migration supports political stability by
serving as a “safety valve,” reducing unemployment, reducing the demand for state welfare, and
decreasing the chances of political rebelliousness and instability. However, this stability may be
threatened due to scandals, such as the Contemplación or Balabagan cases described above.
Perverse effect on governments - stability as a negative and reduced incentives to
implement political and economic reforms, dependency: The biggest concern is how labor export
as a development strategy affects governance. There is evidence that large scale migration and
remittance flows negatively impact sending country institutions.83 Government promotion of largescale labor migration in the Philippines was a response to economic weakness at home, a lack of
infrastructure, and rising public dissatisfaction with government corruption and ineffectiveness. By
relieving these pressures, labor migration may also reduce the pressure to fix the root domestic
political and economic problems. Further, it may produce a new set of incentives, institutionalizing
the structures that produce and support labor export, and thus perpetuating it. For example, the
higher education system of the Philippines has been rearranged to support labor export,
producing well-educated graduates explicitly for migration abroad in fields such as nursing.84
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Once in this position, labor export heightens fears that the Philippines is too dependent in
the global economic system. Labor export “heightens the division of labor between the global
North and South.”85 Burdened with massive debt and hindered by local influence peddling and a
bureaucratic structure that benefits from the status quo, the Philippines is unable to generate
sufficient employment opportunities at home, instead exporting its brightest and most
entrepreneurial citizens to work for low wages in jobs that they are overqualified for.
Despite its limitations, the export of labor fit well with the general redesign of the
Philippine economy towards export-oriented industrialization. Not only does labor migration
provide expanded employment opportunities, reducing unemployment at home and relieving the
social and political tensions that often accompany high unemployment levels, but it also provided
some badly needed capital for the Philippine economy.
Conclusion
Exploding national debt, a contracting national economy, and political unrest at home
may have caused the Marcos regime to turn to labor export as an economic and development
strategy, but this pattern has since become embedded in the institutions of the state. Since the
downfall of Marcos, labor export has been supported and expanded by succeeding democratic
regimes. The result is that the Philippine state is involved in the migration process at all stages
“managing” the process. Within the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) alone there
are a family of agencies to oversee labor migration, the most significant of which are the
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), the POEA, and the POLOs. Under the
Department of Foreign Affairs, there is an Undersecretary for Migrant Workers Affairs, the
Overseas Absentee Voting Secretariat, and the embassies and consulates take an active role.
The Office of the President has the Commission on Filipinos Overseas. This web of agencies
facilitates migration and also provides a mechanism for responding to migrant issues, including
human rights concerns.
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Yet migration as a development strategy has a mixed record. At the micro level,
remittances tend to help recipient families increase their standard of living. At the macro level,
migration promises to provide needed capital, monetary and human, to fund development
projects. But migration will only serve to prime the pump if the other necessary conditions for
development are present. In order to create a self-sufficient national economy in which the role of
labor export declines, the Philippines needs to address major inadequacies at home, particularly
the cumbersome bureaucracy and widespread corruption. In the meantime, it seems that the
“culture of migration,” established both with the Filipino people and in its government, is set to
continue for the foreseeable future.
The challenge remains how to make workers less vulnerable. And the Philippine state,
over years and decades of experimenting with migration policy, has arrived at its current web of
agencies providing a host of requirements, restrictions and entitlements. But there is a tension
here between the positive impulse that is state’s expanded notion of responsibility for the human
rights of its citizens abroad and the negative outcome that has resulted in the state constraining
migrant agency. Policies that require Filipinos to utilize the services of a recruitment agency
despite the inability of the state to curb their exploitative practices, or which limit the right of
Filipino citizens to exit the country, highlight the dangers of the approach that the Philippines
government has taken.
The migrant gains an extra layer of protection when engaging in the precarious world of
international labor. But this layer of protection is thin. The sending state has limited capacity. This
is both a function of the Philippines as a specific state – lack of resources, byzantine bureaucratic
structure, and pervasive corruption – and of sending states in general – their ability to project into
the physical territory of another state (the receiving state) is limited by the other state’s own
sovereignty. In effect, the Philippines government, in a patronizing attempt to protect workers
from the worst violations, has bound them in a series of policies and programs that serve to
constrain their agency or, worse, push them into illegal immigration.
The Philippine state needs to improve actions on its basic responsibilities for human
rights, draw attention to those areas where receiving countries bear the burden in whole or in
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part, and establish partnerships where possible. Where partnership are impossible or impractical,
rather than see the state focus on regulating the behavior of workers beyond its borders, focus
should be placed on policies that enable, rather than constrain, workers: freeing movement and
removing barriers to exercising agency. The remaining chapters will explore such policy options
in detail.
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CHAPTER FIVE: WORKING, WAGES, AND THE MIGRANT UNDERCLASS
Introduction
The aim of the next three chapters is to take the framework of divided responsibility for
TCW’s human rights laid out in Chapter Two and apply it in the context of Filipino workers in the
United Arab Emirates. Chapters 3 and 4 showed how the migration corridor between these two
countries was established and how the governments arrived at the migration policy configuration
that exists today. The next chapters will illustrate how the practice of temporary contract migration
impacts the human rights of individual workers throughout the migration process, using interviews
conducted with Filipinos in the UAE. This approach will serve to highlight where the policies
currently in place fail to adequately address weaknesses, and how the divided responsibility
framework can improve upon the current situation.
While the theoretical framework is organized by categories of rights, by locating
obligation for the rights specified in the UDHR, this section is organized by the major themes that
orient the migrant experience in the UAE in order to contextualize the framework. I will walk
through the major issue areas of concern in temporary contract migration, highlighting the
challenges that each poses for human rights, addressing where the obligation to remedy lies, and
proposing mechanisms through which such remedy can be effected.
I will attempt to balance the competing goods of protecting human rights on the one hand
and respecting migrants’ agency on the other. In a perfect world these two important realms
would coincide, but in practice today they often conflict. This happens in two ways. First, policies
that are put in place to protect migrants often restrict their ability to make choices that they view
as in their best interests. In response, migrants may choose to circumvent the official process,
putting themselves in situations that are actually riskier than if no human rights protections
existed. Second, a policy that intends to address one human rights deficit may actually limit the
exercise of another human right. Often the government will acknowledge this effect, but will have
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judged that the benefit outweighs the harm. How legitimate is this type of decision? When does
the state have the right to make this judgment and what role should migrants play in the decision?
The next three chapters will rely heavily on interviews conducted with Filipino migrants in
the UAE to illustrate how migrants respond to their precarious situation in order to reduce
vulnerability to exploitation and human rights abuses. Protection against the exploitation of guest
workers has less to do with human rights protections in the receiving country than is often
assumed, and more to do with the ability of migrants to leverage human and social capital
through expanding migrant networks in order to improve their conditions and make tradeoffs that
secure their livelihood in a global job market. By leveraging human and social capital through
expanding migrant networks, migrants are potentially able to improve their position.
This chapter will focus on recruiting, contracting, wages, debt and discrimination. When
combined, these factors have the potential to create a toxic employment situation, reducing
migrant labor to little more than forced or bonded labor. The violations of human rights discussed
in this chapter are among the most high profile internationally and among the most studied
precisely because they potentially have such grave impact on the human rights and lived
experience of migrant workers.
Recruiting
The ILO estimates that of the 214 million international migrants in the world in 2010, 105
million were economically active.1 The POEA estimates that in 2013 there were 562,635 newly
hired migrant workers (not including seafarers) from the Philippines alone. Connecting all of these
workers with employment positions across the world presents a major challenge. There is an
information gap regarding what jobs/workers are available, where, and on what terms. This
information gap is generally overcome in one of two ways: recruitment agencies or personal
networks. Each strategy has risks and advantages.

1

Quoted in: Cholewinski, "International Labour Migration".

133

The first job that a migrant gets upon arrival in the UAE is often difficult. Without
experience in the country and with residence tied to employment, workers’ first job is often
exploitative. Danielle, an office worker, describes her first job in the UAE:
First job, it was really terrible because the employer knows that I don't have any
experience. So I went, I experienced that. I didn't get salary on time. I was so
naive about the laws and other things that my employer is able to give me
insufficient compensation. And I found out that I didn't have any working visa.2
How does this happen? What conditions in the process of finding work in the UAE lead to
so many negative initial experiences?
Recruitment Agencies
Recruitment agencies are middlemen in the migration process. They form a central
position where employers and workers can meet. In this context, recruitment agencies’ first
responsibility is as matchmaker, matching employer needs and employee skills. In order to
assure a good match, recruitment agencies must serve as information brokers. They must be
familiar with the prospective employer’s requirements and the skills that the offered job demands,
they must know the legal requirements shaping migration in both the sending and receiving
countries in order to ensure that the worker is legally able to migrate and work abroad, and they
must be familiar with the professional capabilities as well as the expectations for living and
working conditions of the prospective migrant worker.
The government of the Philippines also requires agencies to provide some other basic
functions for workers. In particular, Philippine law requires the Philippine recruitment agency
disclose the full terms and conditions of employment to the worker and makes the agency jointly
liable for “all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the
contract, including but not limited to payment of wages, death and disability compensation and
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repatriations.”3 In other words, the government requires that the recruitment agency provide an
employment contract that meets both Philippine and UAE law and which the worker must sign
before leaving the Philippines. Additional legal requirements include a pre-departure orientation,
and repatriation if necessary.4 There are also several secondary functions that recruitment
agencies often provide in order to attract clients – both employers and employees. Agencies
provide logistics support, which includes providing accommodations in Manila for prospective
workers while paperwork is being processed, orchestrating document collection and
authentication, arranging medical and PDOS (Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar) appointments,
making travel arrangements, and pick-up and orientation at the airport in the UAE. Finally,
agencies offer informal mediation in the event of a labor dispute.
For these services, recruitment agencies charge a fee. Under Philippine law these fees a
capped at one month’s salary plus allowed documentation fees (passport, good conduct
clearance, authentication, birth certificate, OWWA medicare, required trade tests, required
inoculations, and medical exam; the agency may only charge for reimbursement of the actual
cost as stated by official receipts) unless the charging of recruitment fees is not allowed by the
receiving country, in which case no fees should be charged to the worker.
UAE Labour Law does prohibit charging recruitment fees to the worker:
It is not permissible for any licensed labour agent or supplier to demand or
accept from any worker whether before or after his recruitment, any commission
or material reward in consideration for arranging such recruitment, nor may he
obtain from him any expenses except as may be decided or approved by the
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.5
The employer should bear the cost of recruitment, transportation, visas and work permits,
etc. It is generally understood that the UAE does not enforce this rule, particularly on foreign
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recruitment agencies.6 The Philippine government has likewise made no attempt to prohibit
Philippine recruitment agencies operating in the Philippines from charging the otherwise legally
allowable one month’s salary. And so recruitment agencies in the Philippines routinely charge
recruitment fees to workers destined for the UAE despite the fact that it is technically illegal to do
so.
Should the recruitment agency violate the law or should an employment situation abroad
prove to be unacceptable, the worker may file a case against the recruitment agency with the
Philippines Adjudication Office. the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers specifies that the Philippine agency “shall assume
joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in
connection with the implementation of the contract, including but not limited to payment of wages,
death and disability compensation and repatriations” and “shall guarantee compliance with the
existing labor and social legislations of the Philippines and of the country of employment of the
recruited workers.”7 The recruitment agency may be required to compensate the worker and may
be subject to administrative penalties: reprimands, suspension of license for up to one year, or
the cancellation of the license to operate. Monetary awards and fines that cannot be paid outright
may be paid from the agency’s escrow deposit or surety bond, posted by every agency as a
precondition for licensing, though the sums involved (a bank deposit under an escrow account of
Php 1 million / $22,624 USD and a surety bond of Php 100,000 / $2,262 USD8) are often
insufficient as a deterrent and may be insufficient to cover all damages.
Problems with recruiting agencies appear to be common among OFWs in the UAE,
though they rarely result in the worker filing charges either in the UAE or the Philippines. Out of
the forty seven OFWs interviewed, twenty one utilized the services of a recruiter; of those, six
experienced a significant problem.
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As a middleman, recruitment agencies essentially have two “clients” in any transaction:
the employer and the worker. This can lead to a conflict of interest in which the interests of one
client are prioritized above the other. Especially at the low-skilled end of the spectrum, this tends
to disadvantage the worker. The UAE labor market is competitive, with more workers seeking to
enter the market than there are jobs available. Agencies compete to attract employers and to
attract the best possible workers from the Philippines to fill those positions. This often results in
agencies placing overqualified workers in positions with below average wages.
One interviewee, Juliana, went through a recruitment agency to obtain a job as a barista
at a UAE-branch of a western chain coffee shop. Her employer paid all expenses related to her
recruitment and travel, including agency fees, but the job was very low salary and low skill. When
asked if the agency did a good job for her, Juliana says no, because they “didn’t respect my
interests” in arranging a barista position for her: “anyone with a high school degree could do this
job. And I have a bachelors.” She feels she was overqualified for the position and, after working a
bit more than a year, changed employers to a higher-skill, higher-wage position.9 To get Juliana
released from her original employer before the end of her original two-year contract, her second
employer agreed to reimburse the original employer for the expenses related to her recruitment.
Such deals are not uncommon.
More significant problems with recruiting agencies also arise. One of the most common is
overcharging for services. Filipinos destined for the UAE should not be charged anything, given
that UAE law forbids collecting recruitment fees from workers. Of the twenty one interviewees that
utilized the services of a recruitment agency, fifteen were illegally charged a fee. Even ignoring
the UAE prohibition, charges to the migrant under Philippine law are legally capped at one
month’s wages,10 yet workers may be charged more. Of those fifteen interviewees that were
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charged, two were charged more than the equivalent of one month’s wages by their recruiting
company.
Dominic’s story is a fairly straightforward example of overcharging for recruitment. His
first two-year contract in the UAE, arranged through an agency, paid 3,250 AED ($885 USD) per
month, which was about one half the normal salary for an accountant in the UAE. The recruiter
charged him the equivalent of two months’ salary and Dominic paid using the money he had in
savings. When he signed his second two-year contract with the same employer, his salary went
up to 7,500 AED ($2,042 USD), but that was still low given that he had been promoted to a senior
position, worked with two departments, and had gained consulting responsibilities. The next time
he renewed his contract he held out for 12,000 AED ($3,267 USD) per month.11
Ava, domestic worker, went through a recruitment agency to find work. The Middle East
would not have been Ava’s first choice of destination, but it is what the agency offered her. She
had to pay 9,000 AED ($2,450 USD) for the agency fee, the equivalent of several months’ salary;
her employer paid travel and expenses. However, the family treated her very poorly, refusing to
give her sufficient food. She was only allowed to eat table leftovers; when there was nothing left
over she did not eat. “If there [were] apples, Madam counted. I couldn’t take.” They treated her
like a robot. “But humans don’t go on forever; they get tired, they get sick.” After nine months, Ava
ran away.12
Another two interviewees were overcharged not by their recruiter, but by their employer.
It is not uncommon for employers to pay the recruitment fee as per Philippine and UAE law, but
then to turn around and demand reimbursement from the employee.


Nicole, domestic worker, had three months’ salary withheld by her employer; Nicole
preferred not to talk about exactly what ended this job, but she had to leave on short
notice and return to the Philippines.13
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Ella, food service, had five months’ salary withheld by her employer, and was paid
the ridiculously low salary of 600 AED ($163 USD) plus free food, accommodation,
and transportation.14

While some, like Dominic, have sufficient money at their disposal to pay recruitment fees,
most have to take out a loan to pay this fee. Loans may be provided by the recruiter, the
employer, or a bank loan; but the migrant is more likely to borrow the money from family or
friends. Overcharging for recruitment fees can be the first step in a spiral of debt for migrant
workers, eroding their ability to earn a living wage and, at the most extreme, placing migrant
workers at risk of forced labor.
The second common problem is that agencies place workers without fully vetting the
employer or the labor situation, placing the worker in an unfair labor situation. In a little less than
half of the cases of interviewees that utilized a recruitment agency (ten of twenty one cases), the
initial job had a negative outcome; in six of these cases, the conditions affecting the workers were
such as a responsible agency would have been expected to either prevent or address the
problem:


Ava, Nellie, Rika: domestic workers absconded due to severe maltreatment;



Gloria, Victoria: Contract conditions not met;



Ella: Pay below Philippines minimum wage.

Victoria went to the UAE through an agency, and the whole process from the time she
applied with the agency until she was on the ground in the UAE took only about one month; her
employer paid everything, i.e., all fees and transportation. Nevertheless, she would not
recommend her agency because they placed her with a bad company: the company did not
honor contract stipulations on working hours and overtime pay, nor their verbal agreement to give
her annual pay raises. At the conclusion of her initial three-year contract, Victoria quit and found a
new job. She still thinks that there are promising employment opportunities in the UAE and she
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would like to help her brothers find work here. She wants them to go through an agency because
of the difficulty in finding a job in the ninety-day visit visa timeframe, along with the difficulty of
converting that visit visa into an employment visa. Victoria is now looking for an agency for her
brothers to use by selecting good employers in the UAE, then seeing which agencies in the
Philippines they work with.15
Interviewer: How do you find a good agency?
Victoria: Actually I'm looking for an agency for [my brothers]. Like, for certain
company, these are the agencies that they deal with in Manila. I suggested that.
Interviewer: So you're selecting the agency by first finding the company here in
the UAE?
Victoria: Yes.
Interviewer: And then finding out which agencies they deal with?
Victoria: Which agency they have, yes.16
Essentially, Victoria is taking upon herself the informational role that agencies are
supposed to play.
These are precisely the kind of conditions that migrating through an agency jointly liable
for the terms and conditions of the contract is supposed to prevent. Agencies are responsible for
placing migrants in these situations and so are responsible for conducting due diligence. They
receive compensation specifically for their role as an information broker and so bear a duty to
obtain and disseminate appropriate information. The human rights implications of agencies failing
to scrutinize potential employers or check up on workers after their arrival in the destination
country are diverse, as the potential deficiencies in labor conditions are varied.
Finally, the agency may simply be unscrupulous. They may intentionally deceive the
migrant or the state. Recruiters may be implicated in contract bait and switch schemes (discussed
further below), contract falsification or the submission of dummy contracts for verification by the
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Philippines government, falsifying workers travel documents (especially for the purposes of
deploying underage workers), the sale of unused work orders or unused visas (known as
reprocessing, or “repo”), deploying workers to blacklisted employers, or deploying workers on
tourist visas to avoid government regulation. This is unusual, but cases do arise.
Rika comes from a poor family and her parents struggled to put her and her siblings
through school. As soon as she graduated from high school at age seventeen, Rika started
looking for work to help support her family and send her sister to high school. With only a high
school education herself, Rika had a hard time finding a job in the Philippines. A local recruiter
told her that she could find work as a housemaid abroad. The minimum working age in the UAE is
eighteen and the Philippines requires domestic workers to be at least twenty three years of age. “I
know it’s not allowed,” she acknowledged, but her recruiter showed her how to change her
passport to make her age appear higher. At age seventeen, she left the Philippines on a passport
that showed her age as 29, patently untrue. When she got to the UAE, the work was more or less
what she had expected, cooking, cleaning, etc. Her salary was supposed to be 1,000 AED ($272
USD) per month – well below the $400 USD minimum wage established by the Philippines
government; but in thirty one months, Rika was only paid for two months. For the duration of her
first two-year contract, her employer promised to pay her at the end of the contract. At the end of
the contract, no money was forthcoming. To make matters worse, her employer, who had
confiscated her passport, failed to renew her residence visa, and Rika became an illegal
immigrant. During this time Rika’s employer kept her locked in their residence and prohibited her
from using the phone, so she was unable to contact her family or her agency for help. However,
her family, worried that they had not heard from her or received any remittances, did get in touch
with the recruitment agency. Although the agency had placed her with a family in the UAE, they
then were unable to locate her with that same family when her parents reported her missing.
Eventually Rika escaped and fled to the Philippine Embassy in Abu Dhabi.17
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UAE Placement Agencies
When the UAE first emerged as a labor importer in the late 1970’s, the country’s
economy was only beginning its rapid development. With the expansion of the oil and gas sector,
and with it the entire economy, the UAE needed rapidly to increase the workforce and, given the
small national population, turned to migrant labor as a solution. However, the mechanism for
attracting and bringing in labor was also in its infancy. There were no local manpower agencies or
recruiting agencies. In this context, Philippine recruitment agencies were able to deal directly with
Emirati employers as “trustworthy partners.”18 Over time, Emirati agencies did develop and were
able to utilize their own in-country networks to insert themselves as intermediaries in the labor
recruitment process. As of 2009 there were 283 agencies operating in the UAE.19
However, Philippines law requires that recruitment agencies operating in the country be
owned by Filipinos; foreign agencies cannot recruit directly in the Philippines. So these new
Emirati agencies could not take over the process entirely. Instead, today we often see
partnerships between UAE and Philippine agencies. The UAE agency will enlist and interface
with employers and the agency in the Philippines will recruit and vet workers; the two agencies
will work together to match workers to employers, set up interviews, and manage the process.
Fees are split between them on a prearranged basis; however, “many [of the reputable UAE
agencies] no longer pay service fees to recruiters in the Philippines because they are in high
demand.”20 If the UAE agency – that is to say, the employer – no longer pays the Philippine
agency, that agency must generate its revenue through fees charged to workers, driving up illegal
prices for workers.
Owned and operated in the UAE, these agencies are subject to the much lower UAE
regulations on recruitment and employment. The UAE does not require agencies to provide proof
of financial competence, has lower minimum standards for contract requirements, and there is no
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minimum wage. There is little that the Philippines government can do to regulate these agencies
or sanction them in the event of violations of Philippine law. The Philippine government can give
the UAE recruitment agency a black mark if it fails to meet Philippine requirements and, if the
company collects too many black marks, bar them from officially operating with Philippine
agencies. So far this approach has been ineffective.
The Decline of Recruitment Agencies?
There is no long-term data available on the percentage of Filipino workers that come to
the UAE through recruitment agencies, compared to those who utilize alternative strategies. But
the general sentiment among people I talked to was that agencies were no longer the preferred
means of migrating to the UAE. Their function as a paid intermediary and information broker is
only valuable if the individual does not have friends or relatives in the destination country that can
help them free of charge. And as more Filipinos arrive in the UAE to work, the network grows.
For Moses, going through a recruitment agency is associated with increasing regulation
by the government and the massive paperwork and bureaucratic structure, which complicates the
process of departure for many migrants. “Recruitment agency was relevant maybe ten, fifteen
years ago. But because there's a lot of people already here, and it's easier. Because the biggest
stumbling block in the Philippines for the Filipinos are our own government. Our biggest problem
is our government.”21 He prefers the relatively uncomplicated process of getting a tourist visa, and
worrying about gaining permission to work later.
In addition, companies that are in high demand – that pay well and treat workers well –
can have their choice of workers in the country, workers that have proven their ability and
willingness to succeed in the UAE working environment. Many companies that are recruiting
through agencies in sending countries are relying on the fact that potential workers do not know
the cost of living or the prevailing wage rates in the UAE in order to attract cheap labor. Edward
would not recommend that his friends or family use a recruiter to come to the UAE. He feels that
the best positions are often filled in the country, without using recruiters.
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If this will be their first time, then it's OK [to go through an agency]. But if they
have some experience already and they know what is the culture, I mean, they
have already an idea that there's some companies giving a good compensation
here, I don't think so. Because some of the companies were giving not much big
salary.22
Networks and Hiring
As a result of the problems with recruiters and the perceived benefits of relying on
networks in the destination country (cost savings, access to better jobs), many interviewees often
preferred to rely on their personal networks. Zoe: “I learned a lesson that before going to another
country you should really know the background. And if you have friends it is better.”23 It is
important to point out that outcomes in terms of obtaining an initial job with favorable working
conditions24 do not actually differ significantly if the Filipino worker relies on her network rather
than on an agency:


Agency: 21 interviewees



o

11 (52 percent) positive outcomes

o

10 (48 percent) negative outcomes

Network: 25 interviewees
o

12 (48 percent) positive outcomes

o

13 (52 percent) negative outcomes

Networks have their own set of weaknesses as a means of finding employment through “direct
hires,” the use of visit visas, and the illegal purchase of visas.
Direct Hire
Direct hires (also called “name hires”) are the preferred means of obtaining a job abroad.
In a direct hire, the prospective migrant deals directly with the employer to negotiate his or her
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contract terms while still in the Philippines. The advantage is that, while the worker is aware of the
contract terms and conditions before leaving, there is no middleman demanding payment. The
worker is required to obtain clearance from the Philippine government in the form of an OEC, and
so she must obtain a passport, work visa or work permit, and verified employment contract for
submission to and verification by the POEA, and arrange to attend a PDOS and undergo a
medical examination. The employer is still required to pay recruitment, transportation, visas and
work permits costs; the worker pays documentation costs.
The disadvantage is that there is no entity in the Philippines that the Philippine
government can hold liable should a problem arise. Once the worker arrives in the UAE on a
direct hire, their only protection is the relevant UAE law. However, as many Filipinos do not place
much reliance on their own government (a sentiment which will be explored in greater detail in
Chapter Seven), and as successful prosecutions of erring agencies are rare, this does not appear
to be a strong objection.
Direct hires are often orchestrated by workers in the host country who refer friends or
family members to their employer. As such, the friend or relative’s endorsement of the company
essentially replaces the Philippine government’s threat of prosecuting erring agencies as a
means of ensuring good behavior. This guarantee, however, has not proved to be any more
effective. For the eight interviewees who obtained their first job through a direct hire, the
outcomes were mixed.
Coco’s sister lived in the UAE and arranged for her employment at a local school for
students with disabilities. Coco was lucky to get this job as an assistant teacher as she does not
have a university degree; if the employer had gone through an agency it is likely that they would
have hired someone with a relevant degree. Her salary, while not high by UAE standards, is
similar to what a licensed teacher in the Philippines makes. In addition, her working conditions
are quite good, her working hours lower than average, and her salary paid promptly and in full.25
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Coco (Assistant Teacher), interview with the author, 9/30/2013.
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Scarlet also was able to arrange for a direct hire; her outcome however, was quite
different. Scarlet’s friends helped her set up the direct hire. They warned her that the salary
offered was low, but she was generally unaware of living and working conditions in the UAE. She
was not familiar with the cost of living in the city and so did not realize that the contracted wage,
1,500 AED ($409 USD) with no accommodation or allowance, is not a living wage in the UAE.
I just know from the others that it's so low salary, that it's not enough. Yeah
'cause I don't know how much equivalent it is. I only know that [one dirham is] ten
or eleven peso in the Philippines; I don't know that when we rent a just a one
room, or a bed space or, it cost 500 [dirhams, $136 USD]. That's why when I get
there, ‘oh my god, how much I lost?’26
Scarlet thought that she was coming for a job as a clerk – her contract and visa were for
this position – but when she was met at the airport by the company’s Public Relations Officer
(PRO), she was told that there had been a change of plans. The owner of the company needed a
maid and it had been decided that she would fill this position for the next few months until a
regular maid could be obtained. As she would be given food and accommodation in her
employer’s house, her salary was further reduced to 800 AED ($218 USD). Scarlet’s story will be
discussed in greater depth in Chapter Seven; suffice to say that after seven months of
deteriorating conditions, Scarlet absconded. When I talked with her, Scarlet was living in a facility
for distressed workers in the Embassy of the Philippines, awaiting deportation.27
While direct hires remain a desired means of obtaining employment, they are difficult to
arrange and few workers are able to utilize this channel. Instead, many Filipinos exploit loopholes
in the regulation of tourism between the Philippines and the UAE.
Tourist and Visit Visas
Many Filipinos who have relatives or friends in the UAE who might be able to help them
find employment come to the UAE as tourists. Regulations for tourists in the UAE are divided into

26

27

Scarlet (Clerk/HSW), interview with the author, 10/7/2013.
Ibid.
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three categories depending on the nationality of the tourist: GCC residents, nationalities eligible
for visa on arrival, and all others. Filipino tourists are in the third category and so face the
strongest regulations. Filipinos are not eligible for visas on arrival; they must apply ahead of time
through a tourist agency, hotel, or family member (family members must put down a 1,000 AED
($272 USD) deposit, refundable when the tourist leaves the country). The duration of these visas
depends on what type of visa the individual applied for. There are thirty-day tourist visas (100
AED / $27 USD, renewable once for 500 AED / $136 USD), thirty-day short-term visit visas (500
AED / $136 USD, nonrenewable), and ninty-day long-term visit visas (1,000 AED / $272 USD,
nonrenewable) available.28 After the visa expires, the individual must physically leave the UAE
and is banned from reentry for thirty days.29 Individuals seeking employment this way must pay
for their visa, travel, and living expenses during the job search. They have at most ninety days to
find a job and finalize the hiring process.
This is a common practice. According to Agunias, “Maher Hamad Al-obad, executive
director for inspection at the UAE Ministry of Labour, estimates that between 20 to 30 percent of
migrants enter with a visitor visa in hand, find an employer, and change status while in the United
Arab Emirates or in a third country.”30 My interviews indicate that this is, if anything, a low
estimate: of the forty six interviewees, seventeen (37 percent) initially came to the UAE on visit
visas.
Pressure to find a job during the thirty- to ninety-day period also results in individuals
taking jobs that they might not otherwise have accepted or that do not meet POEA standards of
employment.

28
These numbers are from the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs website as of 7 July 2014
(http://www.mofa.gov.ae); costs may differ slightly by Emirate. The duration of visas, eligibility for renewal, reentry bans,
and the cost have changed over time, and sponsoring entities may charge additional fees. As a result interviewees may
have faced slightly different rules at the specific time when they entered the UAE; and conditions may change in the
future.
29
Individuals from countries that are eligible for visa upon arrival in the UAE may extend their stay indefinitely
by doing consecutive “visa runs”: crossing the nearest international border and then returning immediately on a new 30
day visit visa. Most developing counties, including the Philippines, are not eligible for visa upon arrival and so cannot avail
of this strategy. Nonetheless, it would seem that some Filipinos have been successful in doing visa runs. Other Filipinos
will exit to Kish and wait out the 30 day exclusion period there before returning to continue looking for work.
30

Agunias, Migration's Middlemen: p. 16.
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Of course, I’m a college graduate. I want also a good job. … Then my visa is
almost finished. Then the friend of my cousin, he said, one of the [fast food
restaurants] is also opening on that side [of Dubai]. He said, ‘if you want, you
pass your CV and we will interview you.’ So they interviewed me. I’m scared
because, say my visa is almost finished and I need to go exit and where I will get
money again for the payment? Even if my cousin is there, my food is free, the
house if free, I am shy to ask more. … Even working as a housemaid, I will find
so that I will not go home to our country. Then at that time they hired me.31
The job that Alexandra accepted was at the counter of a fast food restaurant, a position
that paid 2,000 AED (about $545 USD) per month, with free accommodation and transportation.
This is below the Philippine minimum wage and, by her own account, barely enough for her to live
on.
Furthermore, individuals on visit visas, particularly if they are concerned about meeting
the deadline, are vulnerable to scams. Maria Joy and her husband arrived in Abu Dhabi on visit
visas. They had used their savings to pay for the visas and had few resources remaining. Aware
that they had a limited amount of time to find jobs, they were discouraged by the low wages
offered by the jobs they interviewed for. One day a man called them claiming to be from a
company in Ajman (one of the northern Emirates in the UAE) that could help them find jobs. If
they agreed to pay 600 AED (about $164 USD) each he guaranteed them he could find them
high-wage positions. They paid but then never heard from the man or his company again. Maria
Joy and her husband, already in a poor position, could ill afford to lose the money, yet they did
not report the scam to the UAE authorities fearing deportation: “We did not complain. Why?
Because we are on visit visa. We both knew that it is prohibited for a tourist to look for a job
here.”32 Sadly, Maria Joy and her husband did not realize that looking for a job while in the UAE
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Alexandra (Food Service), interview with the author, 2/23/2013.
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Maria Joy (Manager), interview with the author, 3/16/2013.
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on a tourist visa is not illegal under UAE law, though exiting the Philippines for this purpose is
prohibited by the Philippine government. This once again points to the need for unified policies.
Finally, it is not possible for an individual to transfer from a visit visa to an employment
visa without exiting the country. As flights to the Philippines are expensive, most workers take the
cheapest flight out of the country: they go to Kish, Iran. A small island of the coast of Iran, Kish is
a free zone and its economy is based on duty-free shopping and GCC workers doing visa runs.
There are half a dozen low cost flights between Kish and the UAE every day, as well as a variety
of budget hotels, restaurants, and other services that cater to low-income workers on visa runs. If
everything goes smoothly, the process of cancelling the old visit visa and obtaining a new
employment visa usually takes a couple of days. Sometimes, however, there is a hiccup.
Angelica came on a visit visa, found a job after one month and was asked to exit to Kish so that
her employment visa could be arranged. Once she was in Kish, however, there was a problem
processing her employment visa. It seemed that there was a conflict in the immigration system
between the visa application submitted by her new employer and one previously submitted by her
sister. Angelica ended up waiting in Kish for three months while the issue was sorted out.33
Buying a Visa
One final option is available to migrant workers in the UAE: buying a visa on the black
market. For a fee, an Emirati with a company will agree to “hire” an individual on paper,
processing all of the necessary documents to get the individual a labor permit and residence visa,
but without actually requiring the individual to work for the company. This is illegal, of course, and
it is difficult to estimate how prevalent visa buying is. However, it is not uncommon in the UAE.
Nicole is the only person I interviewed who admitted to buying a visa. After a series of
jobs as a domestic worker that ended quickly, none lasting longer than two years, Nicole
preferred to go freelance. She decided to get her own visa rather than seek another domestic
sponsor. She paid to have a company issue the visa but does not work for that company. Her
boyfriend, a local policeman, helped her set this up and supported her when money was tight for
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Angelica (Office Worker), interview with the author, 9/12/2013.
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the next few months. She was able to get a residence visa and, when I talked with her, had been
in the country on this visa for about a year. She doesn’t think that she will continue to do this,
however, as it is very expensive. On the other hand, the freelance work she is currently doing
pays better for fewer hours of work. She hopes to convince her one of her current clients to
sponsor her next visa but allow her to continue working freelance on the side, also illegal for both
the worker and the employer.34
Human Rights Implications
Recruiting does not necessarily lead to violations of human rights. In fact, the Philippines
is relying on the idea that recruiting agencies can support migrants’ human rights. However, as it
is currently practiced in the Philippines-UAE migration corridor, recruitment leaves workers
vulnerable. The human rights impact of unscrupulous recruiters can be felt in several ways
depending on the circumstances a specific worker finds herself in. As Rika’s story illustrates,
recruitment agencies can be complicit in abuses against the protection of childhood and the
family, constraining movement and security of person, and ensuring just remuneration. In
aggregate, these violations may constitute a situation of forced labor.
Adding in a second, destination-country agency only compounds these problems. While
in theory adding a second agency to the process should add another layer of protection for the
worker – there is another entity that they can petition for help should the need arise or be held
liable for violations – this is not what we see in practice. Instead, UAE employment agencies are
likely to represent the employer’s interests. And, as these agencies are largely out of the reach of
the Philippine government, there is little incentive for them to change this perspective. In addition,
when a UAE agency is involved, the agency in the Philippines is likely to obtain its fee from the
worker, have less contact with the employer, and so be less informed about the projected
employment situation, and consequently even less able to serve their function as an information
broker.
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Nicole (HSW), interview with the author, 9/18/2013.
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Direct hires have the potential to help migrants by reducing costs and increasing
flexibility. However, there is no guarantee that the company hiring the migrant directly will be any
more likely to respect workers’ rights than companies working with recruiters, and without a
representative in the Philippines, there is no way for the government of the Philippines to hold
these employers accountable. Instead, migrants are entirely reliant on the UAE government,
which has lower labor and human rights standards.
Migrants may prefer to enter on a visit visa as it is cheaper and offers more flexibility than
either recruiting agencies or direct hires. However, the thirty- to ninety-day visit visa timeframe
places the migrant under pressure to find a position. As the end of the visa approaches, migrants
become more desperate and therefore more willing to accept borderline job offers and more
vulnerable to abuse. It is not until they are able to regularize their status and obtain a work permit
and residence visa that they are given any labor protections under UAE law. Again, the
Philippines government has little means to problems abroad and there is no partner entity in the
Philippines that can be held responsible.
Buying a visa places the migrant in the most precarious situations. Migrants remain in an
illegal living and working situation. While the sponsor is also breaking the law, penalties for the
sponsor are not severe. The worker faces a fine, jail time, deportation, and labor ban if
discovered.
Contracting
Filipinos who leave the Philippines in order to work abroad must have a signed contract
registered and verified by the government of the Philippines. The Philippines enforces this policy
at its airport: in order to board a plane, Filipinos must show a valid visa for their destination
country; if they have an employment visa, they must also show the immigration official an
Overseas Employment Certificate (OEC). To obtain an OEC, the worker must have satisfied a
range of administrative requirements, including registration and verification of their employment
contract. The Philippines government will only verify contracts that meet its minimum
requirements, including: specified remuneration; meeting the minimum wage requirement;
provision for food, transportation and accommodation; authorized causes for termination. This
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means that anyone hired through a recruitment agency or through a direct hire should have a
contract before leaving the Philippines.
The UAE also requires that all workers in the country have a contract on file with its
Ministry of Labour. Contracts should be in both Arabic and English (Arabic takes precedence in
the case of a dispute), should specify the date on which work begins and when the contract
concludes, place and nature of work, and the amount of remuneration. Any changes to the
employment contract should also be registered with the Ministry of Labour, but the Ministry will
consider other evidence of changes (such as pay slips showing a raised salary) in case of a
dispute so long as they advantage the worker.
The main problem is that the contract registered in the Philippines and the one registered
in the UAE are not always the same contract.
Contract bait and switch is a very common fraud. The worker is given a contract to sign in
their home country that not only meets all legal requirements, but that looks advantageous to the
worker. The worker signs the contract and is processed for departure, including any payment due
to the agency for their services. Upon arrival in the host country the worker is informed that the
original contract is no longer available or valid and is asked to sign a new contract. 35 The new
contract, however, has terms which are considerably less advantageous to the worker. Often this
new contract has terms which do not meet the minimum requirements set by the POEA in the
Philippines or which are so bad that the migrant herself would have turned down the job had she
still been in the Philippines. Turning down such a contract in the UAE, however, is more
complicated. If the migrant turns down the offer, they also lose their eligibility for residence and
would need to repatriate at their own expense. Alone in a foreign country and after having already

35
The UAE Ministry of Labour is clear that signed contracts should be honored regardless of where the contract
originated. However, in the UAE legal system priority is given to the standardized English/Arabic employment contract that
is required to be on file with the Ministry of Labour. Where the UAE contract and a contract signed in the home country
conflict, the courts may choose to honor the conditions more favorable to the worker provided that the alternate contract is
in Arabic but in the past the courts have tended to rely solely on the UAE contract. C.f.: Ramona Ruiz, "New Labour
Contract Rules Praised,” The National, 17 January 2011. Ola Salem, "Maids Wage Contracts Must Be Honoured If Signed
Says UAE Foreign Minister,” The National, 22 May 2013.
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handed over a substantial sum of money to the recruitment agency, most workers feel they have
little choice but to accept the new contract terms.
Ten years ago Rachelle was the victim of one such scam. Her first job at a department
store in the UAE had terrible working conditions: low salary, long hours, no day off, no overtime,
and no medical insurance.
Interviewer: When you left the Philippines, did you have a contract?
Rachelle: Yeah, we had a contract after I leave. They said that we have only
eight hours duty. We have yearly vacation. But when we reach here, it's nothing
happen.
Interviewer: Did you sign a different contract?
Rachelle: Yeah, when we came here, we have different contract here in the
department store.
Interviewer: So why did you sign the second contract?
Rachelle: We have no choice. I'm already here. And I don't want to go home,
you know. I just borrowed the money to pay for the agency. And I'm already here.
And they said what to do: we have to sacrifice.
Interviewer: So you did that for two years?
Rachelle: We complained. We complained. We go to the Embassy. But they
cannot do anything because they already process our visa. If we will not accept,
they will cancel us. Still we need to pay for the processing fee that they have
done with us. So, we just stay, all of us. We are seven ladies. We finish the two
years then all of us we go. Like that.36
Things have changed a bit in the ten years since this happened to Rachelle. Today, if a
Filipino reported such an incident to the Embassy of the Philippines, more would be done to
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Rachelle (Office Worker), interview with the author, 10/22/2013.
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assist the worker and to penalize the recruitment agency and the employer involved.37 However
contract bait and switch does still happen, relying on the vulnerability of workers and using threats
against their livelihood to prevent them from reporting such incidents.
Victoria found a job in the UAE through a recruitment agency. As is the norm, she agreed
to terms and signed an initial undertaking in the Philippines. However, when she got to the UAE
she was given a contract with different terms, increasing the number of hours she was expected
to work and doing away with overtime pay.38 As this new contract would be registered with the
Ministry of Labour in the UAE, its terms would be those legally binding in that country. She signed
the new contract for one simple reason: “I am already here. I cannot do anything. I can't go back
to Manila.” Victoria worked the full contract term but refused to renew it despite the fact that her
employer was “begging” her to stay.39
Even when the contracts match, employers often fail to live up to contracted terms. The
most commonly violated terms seem to be working hours and overtime pay. Both of these issues
are regulated by the UAE Labour Law which limits the regular working day to eight hours a day
(nine hours in specified professions) with one day off per week, or forty eight hours a week plus
no more than two hours per day of overtime; overtime must be compensated with an increase of
at least 25 percent. Most interviewees had problems in at least one of these areas. Cases of
relatively minor discrepancies between contract terms and actual working conditions provided are
common and often migrants prefer to deal with the situation without involving the authorities.
Unfortunately, dealing with contract violations without the authorities generally means putting up
with existing conditions for at least one or two years in order to avoid a labor ban.

37
This scam may be carried out with or without the recruitment agency’s knowledge. Regardless, by Philippine
law the recruiting agency is jointly liable with the employer for the contract and upon return the migrant can bring charges
against the recruitment agency. However, such cases take a very long time and have a poor record of success.
38
Overtime pay is protected in UAE Labour Law (with the exception of “persons holding responsible senior
posts in the management or supervision”) and so this clause would likely be unenforceable if Victoria had chosen to
contest her contract. However, such contestations are unusual for reasons that will be addressed further in Chapter
Seven. Victoria herself was aware that she could file a case with the UAE Ministry of Labour but chose not to: “I didn't
want any dispute. I just want to leave the company in a nice way.” Victoria (Accountant), interview with the author,
9/28/2013.
39
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While Maria Joy is not thrilled with her own job, it is her husband’s contract that is
worrying her most. He took a job in finance and received two salary payments as usual. But on
the third month his employer told him that he would not be paid unless he met a quota; his wage
was withheld and never subsequently paid. In the fourth month he was told that he was now on a
full commission basis and his wages would entirely depend on his sales. None of these changes
in his wages are stipulated in his labor contract, but Maria Joy and her husband do not dare
report the violation: “If we go to the police, then the company will pay for him and then they will
cancel his visa. I think that's the normal procedure here.” The couple have little savings and are
supporting family members in the Philippines; they are dependent on their wages. But it is not just
the loss of one job that prevents them from reporting the matter. They fear that if he quits now,
less than one year in to his labor contract, he will face an automatic six-month labor ban.40
Finally, in a few cases, the contract may simply never materialize. The employer may
simply withhold the contract from the employee, not giving them a copy of the contract registered
with the Ministry of Labour. Without written evidence of the terms agreed to, a migrant may find it
difficult to fight to see them upheld. Today the Ministry of Labour website makes registered
contracts available to workers online; they may register online using their labor card for access to
the system. Many workers are unaware of this, but it is an important step in the right direction.
When the company that she had worked at for five years had to shut their office in Abu
Dhabi, Mia needed to find another job quickly. She was offered an administrative position that she
thought would be beneficial. In particular, she had negotiated a good wage. However her new
employer failed to issue her a written contract. Mia did receive a labor card and residence visa,
though, so her contract must have been registered with the Ministry of Labour. When she began
working for the new company, she found that her wages were far lower than agreed. When she
complained, she was told that the lower wage was part of her six-month probation period. Mia
was not happy with this new provision, but without a written contract, she had little recourse. After
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six months, however, her salary did not increase. After a year at the same low salary, Mia quit her
job.41
Human Rights Implications
As with recruiting, contracting does not necessarily involve human rights violations and
should rather prevent them. However, weaknesses in the contracting process in practice in the
Philippines-UAE migration corridor leave workers vulnerable to abuse. Contract bait and switch
and a lack of written contract leave workers susceptible to violations of their human rights to
choice of employment and freedom from slavery; they also raise concerns about access to a fair
legal process.
Favorable Remuneration
The Universal Declaration sets out a right to “just and favourable remuneration ensuring
for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity.”42 This is linked to the concept of
a living wage, a wage sufficient to support the laborer and allow him to maintain his family,
allowing for the social reproduction of labor. International organizations such as the United
Nations, International Labour Organization and the World Bank have developed the concept of a
“living wage” as it relates to poverty. The ILO has perhaps the best developed methodology for
assessing living wage: “the hourly pay rate a full-time worker would need to earn to support a
family of four at the poverty line,” where the poverty line is “the income level that is necessary for
a family of four to be able to afford a low cost nutritious diet and non-food necessities at levels
that are considered acceptable for the country.”43 While the ILO methodology intentionally does
not specify what these “non-food necessities” are, preferring to allow room for country-specific
variability, it is clear that the living wage must account for some non-food items. They estimate
that in low income countries non-food costs make up 42 percent of total costs and in high-income
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Poverty and living wage rate estimates derived by this formula are thus country specific but also comparable
across countries. Richard Anker, A New Methodology for Estimating Internationally Comparable Poverty Lines and Living
Wage Rates (Geneva, Switzerland: International Labour Office, 2006): p. 6, accessed May 8, 2015,
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---integration/documents/publication/wcms_079165.pdf.
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countries non-food costs represent 81 percent of total costs for individuals at the poverty line.44 In
general, we can say that basic needs to ensure a living wage include not only subsistence needs
such as food and shelter, but also clothing and necessary personal care items, utilities,
transportation, basic health care, child care, primary education, minimal rest and leisure, and
taxes.45 Thus, living wage rates are country specific, varying depending on local cost of living,
social welfare provisions, and level of development.
It is even more complicated to assess the living wage rate for temporary migrant workers
whose families are typically split between home and host countries which may have vastly
differing costs of living and levels of development. In Abu Dhabi, for example, the cost of living is
higher than in the Philippines – pushed up by very high rent prices in particular, but also, should a
migrant be able to bring his family with him, by the extremely high cost of education. Thus, where
the migrant’s family is assumed to be located will affect the estimated living wage. As will be
discussed in greater depth in Chapter Eight, we must assume that the temporary migrant
worker’s family will remain in the home country. Thus the living wage should be such as will
support a family with one person in the UAE and three in the Philippines.
Of the forty six interviewees that told me about their salary (only one person declined),
the wage breakdown is as follows:
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Anker, A New Methodology for Estimating Internationally Comparable Poverty Lines and Living Wage Rates:

p. 46.
45
The exact elements that are included in living wage vary depending on the calculation. C.f. David H. Ciscel,
"The Living Wage Movement: Building a Political Link from Market Wages to Social Institutions,” Journal of Economic
Issues XXXIV, no. 2 (2000).
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Table 12: Wages of Filipino Interviewees
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SOURCE: Interviews with respondents; employer provided housing in shared accommodations is valued at
500AED /$136 USD.

At the low end of the spectrum, in the 0 – 2,000 AED (0 - $545 USD) per month range,
are three domestic workers and two food service workers. At the upper end of the spectrum are a
doctor and an architect. The cost of basic needs for one person can be quite high in Abu Dhabi. A
sample monthly budget might look like this46:
Bed space in a room shared with four to six people: 500 to 750 AED ($136 – 204 USD)
Groceries to be cooked at home: 500 AED ($136 USD)
Transportation: 300 AED ($82 USD)
Incidental expenses: 300 to 500 AED ($82 – 136 USD)
TOTAL: 1,600 to 2,050 AED ($436 – 559 USD)
After meeting their own basic needs, many Filipinos in the UAE make enough money
either to support their extended families in the Philippines or to start accumulating savings for
their own financial future, but not both. For a low-wage worker earning less than 5,000 AED
($1,362 USD) per month, these bare minimum expenses eat up roughly half of their wages. The
remaining wages could make a sizable contribution to the maintenance of a household in the
Philippines, could pay for a mortgage or the college tuition of a sibling or child, could fund the
establishment of a microbusiness, or could contribute to a retirement fund. However, it is only
enough to do one of these things at a time.

46

Estimates based on interviews.
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For Victoria, this tradeoff is quite explicit. Victoria is the oldest of five children. Her father
is deceased and, as the oldest, she feels responsible for her younger siblings. She worked while
going to university in order to pay tuition and was determined that her younger brothers and
sisters should not have this burden. When she got a job in the UAE, her salary was 4,000 AED
($1,090 USD); she later found a new job paying about 5,500 AED ($1,499 USD). She remitted
half of her salary to support her mother and siblings and lived off of the other half of her salary. It
was not until years later, when the last of her siblings graduated from college and found a job that
her financial obligations in the Philippines reduced sufficiently to allow her to begin saving money
for herself. While she still remits about 1,000 AED ($272 USD) to her mother, she is able now to
save between 1,000 and 2,000 AED ($272 – 545 USD) each month. Victoria is single. She is a bit
wistful when she says that she might like to have a husband and children, but she feels that
staying single allowed her to fulfill her obligations to her parents and siblings:
Single. Still single, unfortunately. Or fortunately, I don't know. Depending on how
you look at things. … It took me a long while to have [my brothers and sisters] all
settled in their own life. Yes. Although, I just miss one part of my life. I am still
single. There's that.47
Does Victoria make a wage sufficient for “ensuring for himself and his family an existence
worthy of human dignity”48 when she feels prevented from marrying or taking such measures as
would enable her to support herself in her old age?
What about Ava, a domestic worker? The local family she works for pay her 1,000 AED 700 AED ($272 – 191 USD) as salary and 300 AED ($82 USD) as an accommodation allowance,
as she does not live in the family’s house. Her employer provides her with health insurance and
annual flights to the Philippines. She earns a bit extra by ironing for another family. This amount
is barely enough to cover her needs in Abu Dhabi and she often needs to share meals with
friends in order to save money. But every month she remits money to the Philippines to help her
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son, his wife and two children. She bought her son a motorcycle with side car so that he could
start a transportation business. But even so, he does not earn enough money to support his
family and is always asking for more. Most months she saves around 100 AED; this is supposed
to be for her own retirement, but she often uses it as an emergency fund to pay for her own or her
family’s unexpected expenses. Ava is not in debt, but can you call this a living wage?49
On the other hand, Nicole’s first position as a domestic worker paid her only 500 AED
($136 USD) per month, but the family treated her well, gave her good accommodation and food,
and allowed her to select any items she needed for herself when the family went grocery
shopping. “When you are working with an Arabic family, you don’t need money. They give you
everything.” She was able to remit most of her salary to pay for her children’s educations. The
value of her accommodations, food, and incidentals in the UAE market would have been at least
1,500 AED ($409 USD), bringing her total package up to 2,000 AED ($545 USD). Is this a living
wage?50
A good estimate for a living wage for an individual with a family to support would be
around 5,000 AED ($1,362 USD) per month, or 2,500 AED ($681 USD) where accommodations,
food and other incidentals are included. This salary should allow the temporary migrant worker to
support herself in the UAE and three family members in the Philippines. By this standard, about
60 percent of respondents were making a living wage sufficient to support themselves and their
families in the Philippines.
Minimum Wage
A minimum wage is a different concept than a living wage. The minimum wage is the
minimum legally allowable wage. In many urban areas globally the minimum wage is set below
the living wage and it is generally recognized that a single minimum wage job is insufficient to
support a family. In the United States, for example, the average family of four would need “more
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than three full-time minimum-wage jobs” at the federal minimum wage in order to support the
family.51
In the UAE there is no minimum wage. The UAE Labour Law specifies that a minimum
wage “enough for the employee's basic needs and to secure means of living” should be set by
Federal decree but no minimum wage has been set yet, thirty five years later.
However, the Philippines government requires that its workers abroad make a minimum
wage:
Guaranteed wages for regular work hours and overtime pay, as appropriate,
which shall not be lower than the prescribed minimum wage in the host country,
not lower than the appropriate minimum wage standard set forth in a bilateral
agreement or international convention duly ratified by the host country and the
Philippines or not lower than the minimum wage in the Philippines, whichever is
highest.52
The government of the Philippines enforces the minimum wage prevailing in the country
on overseas Filipino workers by requiring that a valid contract specifying an appropriate wage is
registered with the government before the Overseas Employment Certificate, required by
immigration officials in order to exit the country, will be issued.53
The UAE does not have a legally-mandated minimum wage and there is no bilateral
agreement between the Philippines and the UAE regarding minimum wage, so the Philippines
minimum wage should prevail. However, this is loosely enforced for everyone but domestic
workers.
The Filipinos surveyed who were earning well above the minimum wage were supportive
of the idea. Fortunado, a highly skilled professional, explained his support:
I have a waiter at my restaurant taking a salary … 300 dollars a month; for one
employee, 300 dollars. And then … you are going to abroad just to get 250
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dollars a month. You see. So what’s the point of going abroad if you can earn
300 dollars in the Philippines, then? It would affect on my salary, definitely,
because I am going to lose something. But in the lower class, like housemaid
earning 300 dollars, you don’t have to go abroad; you stay in the Philippines
because you can earn that as well in the Philippines. … Definitely, it must be.54
The idea of the Philippines government setting a minimum wage for workers overseas is
not as straightforward as it first appears. The problem is that the Philippines government is
unable to offer a viable alternative to low-wage foreign work for all of its citizens. There is strong
competition for low-wage work in the Philippines already; the economy is basically unable to offer
jobs to all of its unskilled workers that are currently working for below minimum wage abroad.
Alexandra tells how the minimum wage provisions set by the Philippines government may
actually work against low-wage migrants:
One of my cousins already is here. I am the one who… I bring her also in [the
same company I work in] because at that time they are hiring and all the tickets
and the visa they are provided [by the company]. … But now they are not hiring
from the Philippines anymore because I think our Embassy are asking already
minimum salary, free accommodation, free transportation, that my company
cannot afford. … For my relatives and in our place, of course even small salary,
as long as they have permanent job, they will accept. But now our company stop
it already. … For example, now they are hiring. I can introduce some of my
neighbors, cousins, but I cannot help them now. They will be hired but of course
they should come here as a visit visa. And they need also money to spend for
that one.55
A brief chat with a (Western) store manager confirmed that the chain was no longer hiring
direct from the Philippines. She felt that this was a pity because Filipinos make good fast food
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workers, but the chain would not raise the salary when there are plenty of qualified workers either
already present in the UAE, or from countries without minimum wage restrictions.
Wage Withholding
There are various reasons why a worker’s wages might not be paid in full each month.
During times of financial crisis a company may decide to withhold wages in full or in part. During
the global financial crisis many construction companies found themselves in this position.56
Employers may garnish wages to cover recruitment costs, although this is illegal under UAE law.
Or the employer may simply not want to pay the worker the agreed upon amount.
The UAE’s Wages Protection System (WPS) has basically ended this practice for most
workers. The WPS is coordinated between the Ministry of Labour and the Central Bank of the
UAE. Employers are required to pay salaries electronically into bank accounts set up for
employees with participating banks; wage information is shared with the UAE Central Bank and
the Ministry of Labour, allowing them to identify companies that are delaying or failing to pay
wages in a timely manner. The UAE introduced WPS in 2009 and it was slowly phased in over
the next two years with deadlines for larger companies first and gradually extending to small
companies. Today most employers are covered by the system and it seems to have drastically
reduced wage withholding. There are still instances of companies failing to pay workers; however
with the paper trail created by WPS, workers have an easier time proving their case if they report
it to the Ministry of Labour.
There are two exceptions to WPS, areas that are still vulnerable to wage withholding.
First, workers sometimes make verbal agreements with employers alongside their formal
contract. These side payments, of course, are not covered by WPS. Gabriel signed a contract
that included only half of the wages he had been promised; the other half was to be paid to him in
cash. Once he started working, however, he found that while the contracted amount was
deposited into his bank account promptly every month, the cash was not always forthcoming.
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Without the full amount written into the contract, however, there was nothing he could do about
this.57
Second, domestic workers are not included in the WPS system. Domestic workers are
still commonly paid in cash. Employers are supposed to provide a receipt for wages, signed by
both the worker and the employer. But many employers forgo this formality and unscrupulous
employers may pressure workers to sign without actually giving them their full wage. Of the seven
domestic workers interviewed, three had had their wages withheld by their employers.
Human Rights Implications
The failure to provide a living wage restricts the workers’ right to fair remuneration and an
adequate standard of living for herself and her family. The Philippines has tried to address this
issue by extending its minimum wage to citizens beyond its borders. But, in doing this, it has
restricted its citizens’ right to exit the country and has essentially trapped low-skilled workers in
the Philippine economy which cannot itself provide stable employment at a living wage, nor
sufficient social security to supplement its unemployed and underemployed population.
Debt
Recruiting, contracting, and wage issues all contribute to migrant debt. Many prospective
migrants needed to take out loans to finance their recruitment fees or visit visa expenses, as well
as to carry them over until the first payday. Often these loans are financed by friends or relatives,
occasionally by a bank or recruitment agency. This is the first step on the road to debt. Low
wages mean that many migrants live right up to their means and have little if any savings. Extra
money is remitted to support family members in the Philippines or loaned out to friends during
times of emergency. If the worker has an emergency and needs extra funds, she has little choice
but to borrow, in turn, from her friends and family.
As discussed above, fees payable by the worker are capped by both Philippine and UAE
law. Philippines law caps fees at the equivalent of one month’s salary, plus reimbursement for
allowed documentation costs. The employer remains liable for visa fees, airfare, POEA

57

Gabriel (Nurse), interview with the author, 10/15/2013.

164

processing fee, and OWWA membership fee. If the receiving country bans the collection of
recruitment fees from the worker, then Philippine law also recognizes this stipulation and likewise
bans the collection of fees.58 The UAE bans the collection of recruitment fees from workers. As
such, recruitment fees should not be charged to workers in the UAE. However, the imposition of
such fees is routine. Most of the people interviewed who paid recruitment fees, paid the
equivalent of one month’s salary. They got the money to pay in several different ways. Some
make arrangements for wage deductions. Enzo borrowed money from friends, some of whom he
has not been able to pay back yet.59 Adrian got the money from two sources: by selling the small
furniture business he had owned and operated in the Philippines, and from his wife, a teacher in
the Philippines, who took out a loan from the teacher’s association.60 Grace took out a loan from
her employer in the Philippines to pay recruiting fees to obtain a new job abroad.61 Ella’s recruiter
helped her arrange a loan through a bank in the Philippines; it took her two years to repay the
loan.62
Employers also pay recruitment fees. They are legally obliged to do so. The problem is
that they may try to recoup those fees if a worker leaves. Lissa was a driver for a local family; the
family paid about 10,000 AED ($2,724 USD) for her recruitment.63 Lissa worked for them for
about five years, she completed two contracts and had negotiated a third contract when a sudden
dispute with her employer over passport withholding disrupted her working situation. Lissa and
her employer both ended up filing charges with the Ministry of Labour, she alleging passport
withholding and he accusing her of absconding. Lissa is now in legal limbo. After the absconding
charges were filed, she was detained pending a decision in her legal case. It is likely that the
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absconding case against her would be upheld in court and she will face a labor ban preventing
her from working in the UAE. Lissa supports family in the Philippines and would like to continue
working in the UAE, though preferably for a different sponsor. In order for this to happen, her
current employer would have to agree and drop the legal case against her, which he might do if
someone were to “buy” her, that is, reimburse her employer for recruitment fees:
Right now I'm looking for someone who will buy me from my employer. …
Yesterday I went to another sponsor because the only way to solve this – the
UAE way – is to sell me to another sponsor. But I'm still waiting for other options.
Like, I don't know, I'm still studying [to see if] I can buy myself, like that. Not yet
sure.64
It is not uncommon for a migrant to have several sources of debt. Haley’s experience
demonstrates how the accumulation of debt, even if it does not overwhelm the individual, can
prevent them from saving and blight their prospects for future prosperity. Haley first came to the
UAE in 2006 to work in a low-level retail position. Consumer credit was easy before the global
market crash in 2008/9 and, despite her low salary, she was able to obtain a credit card. She
used the card to take out a 2,000 AED (about $545 USD) cash advance in order to help out a
friend in need. The friend never paid her back and Haley spent the next few years paying off the
debt. When she finished, after four years in the UAE and with no savings, Haley headed back to
the Philippines hoping to finish her university degree. She spent about three years studying and
working but the family was unable to afford her tuition on top of other family needs, such as the
educations of her younger brother and her nephews. Haley returned to work in the UAE without
completing her degree. She borrowed about Php 10,000 (about $230 USD) to pay for relocation
expenses. When one of her nephews fell ill she borrowed additional money from friends in the
UAE to help cover his hospital expenses. After six months working, she has almost paid back
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these loans. Haley’s debts are barely manageable given her salary and they entirely preclude her
saving money. And with the next family emergency Haley could easily slip back into debt.65
Lifestyle, Debt, and Imprisonment
Debt is an area that the Philippines government and the Embassy of the Philippines
focus on. The narrative is that people migrate abroad for the noble purpose of supporting their
families, and they reprehensibly fall into bad and irresponsible behavior patterns which prevent
them from achieving their goals. Sebastian could be the poster child for this:
Sebastian: Actually the first uh one year, when I'm uh working here, I spend too
much actually. I spend too much.
Interviewer: What were you spending on?
Sebastian: Girls. Yeah, I spend money on girls. So that's why. I go to the bar, I
drink, and I buy things that actually is not necessary, yeah. That's why. So, I
spend too much actually. So when I went vacation, then I just realize: one year
but I had not save much. That's why. So when I come back here I just being
smart, like that. What I do right now with 50 percent I send to my bank in the
Philippines. So I will not use it anymore.66
Beyond “bad” behavior, consumer credit is easy to obtain in the UAE in the form of credit
cards. Many Filipinos take out credit cards not to use for everyday purchases but as a means of
covering unexpected or emergency expenses. The result is that, instead of paying off the balance
every month, many carry a balance and only slowly repay the debt. Of course, assuming credit
card debt as a means of cash financing is, in effect, a very high interest loan.
Marjorie is one person in this type of situation. She took out a credit card after arriving in
the UAE. She did not use the card for purchases, only to borrow cash which she then lent to
friends. One friend, in particular, borrowed large amounts in order to pay for her daughter’s
cancer-related medical bills. In the end Marjorie, whose basic salary as a massage therapist is
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4,000 AED (about $1,090 USD, though she usually earns another 4,000 AED / $1,090 USD in
tips), racked up 16,000 AED (about $4,350 USD) in credit card debt. Some of the friends that she
loaned money to have managed to repay her. Some, she acknowledges, never will. Her friend
whose daughter is fighting cancer remains unable to pay. She does not regret loaning the money,
though she does now regret taking out the credit card in the first place.67
The Embassy of the Philippines focuses on awareness, education and creating
opportunities to save and invest. The Embassy runs seminars on financial literacy under the
“Pinoy Wise” program, launched in 2012, for example.68 The UAE government, by contrast, falls
back on the threat of imprisonment. Unpaid debt is a criminal offense in the UAE and can lead to
imprisonment and deportation. Of course, coming up with the money to repay a debt from prison
is also difficult. Nonetheless, once jailed, the individual will not be released until the debt is paid, a
settlement reached with the creditors, or a financially solvent friend or relative offers to secure the
loan or to surrender their passport to the UAE authorities as a guarantee in order to secure the
debtors release. Declaring bankruptcy is not an option.
Moses tried to help a friend having problems with debt:
So I have this friend that she went to prison for bouncing the check. And she's
the bread winner, so she cannot afford to stay in prison to ride out the debts. And
she needs somebody to give up a passport in exchange, like a bail passport. So
sometime in June I told her: ‘Anyways, my flight won't be until September six. So
yeah, OK. If it would help you go [out of jail], take my passport.’ So I gave up my
passport to the Dubai courts. And the guy’s like: ‘are you sure what you're
doing?’ ‘Yeah, yeah. If it would help them go.’ June, July, August. She only
managed to rectify everything in November. So my passport was in jail for six
months. … But I learned my lesson that it's scary really not to have a passport.
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So I was thinking of getting additional passport; just in case something like that
would happen, I can still get out of the country.69
Unfortunately, some migrants with significant debt which they are unable to pay choose
to flee the country rather than face imprisonment. Ariana’s husband signed as guarantor on a
loan for a friend, let’s call him Bob. A few months after receiving the loan, Bob lost his job and
could not make the loan payments; after a few months the bank reported the friend to the police
and Bob was arrested. Ariana’s husband went to his Emirati boss and asked for help getting Bob
out of jail. But when Bob was released, he ran, sticking Ariana and her husband with the full value
of the loan. “And then we went home [to the Philippines] to talk to his family, to talk to especially
the father, and the father said, ‘I'm not gonna pay him because it's not my loan. And it's your fault,
you signed the paper.’” Arianna and her husband next approached the bank in the UAE and
asked what to do. The bank asked for help locating Bob, the principal debtor, but then never
followed up, either with them or with Bob. She is happy that the bank never asked for payment
from them but she is worried that it will come back to haunt them: “And we always have to check
if my husband is in the blacklist already in the immigration. Good thing we have friends working
there!”70
Human Rights Implications
Reasonable amounts of debt are not a human rights concern. The Philippines
government caps recruitment fees at one month’s salary in part to limit debt to reasonable levels,
so that the investment workers make in recruiting fees does not exceed the returns they receive
from working abroad. The fear is that if a migrant worker’s debt to recruiters and/or employers
mounts too high, this could place the worker at risk of bonded labor, where his entire wages go
towards servicing his debt payments. Unable to change employers or return home, the worker
may have to fall back of yet more borrowing in order to support his family, leading to a spiral of
debt. In the UAE this type of situation has been prevalent among construction workers from

69

Moses (Financial Adviser), interview with the author, 3/18/2013.

70

Arianna (Nurse), interview with the author, 8/3/2013.

169

Southeast Asia, some of whom work for two years or more just to repay their recruitment;71 it
seems less prevalent among Filipinos.
While the UAE does not release detailed crime statistics, it is fair to say that
imprisonment for debt remains a distressingly common problem for Filipinos in the UAE. While
the prohibition on imprisonment for debt is not found in the UDHR (though it is prohibited in the
ICCPR), debtor’s imprisonment as it is practiced in the UAE nonetheless undermines human
rights that are protected in the UDHR. Depriving a person of their freedom as a means of
penalizing a monetary debt is senseless. The state is put to the expense of maintaining them in
prison, the creditor continues to go without payment, and the debtor is senselessly deprived of his
freedom. Imprisonment for debt also impinges on the right of the individual to a just standard of
living – while in jail they are unlikely to be able to earn the necessary money to repay the debt.
Discrimination and the Migrant “Underclass”
Gardner suggests characteristics of the migrant populations in the Gulf: they are “guest
worker” populations for whom naturalization is not feasible; they live lives that are separated from
that of nationals and social interactions between migrants and locals are confined to work;
workers’ experience is organized and controlled through the kafala system; gender, ethnicity,
nationality, language and religion all shape the “migratory conduits between south Asia and the
Gulf,” slotting people into particular types of work and so creating a workforce “deeply patterned
by ethnicity and nationality.”72 Longva elaborates on the pattern found in Kuwait:
The post-oil boom labor market was divided into an ‘Arab’ and an ‘Asian’ sector,
with the Iranians in a category of their own. …the allocation of the various ethnic
groups in this market had been clear from the beginning, Arabs were found in all
types of occupation, except that of domestic servant, and usually at a level
superior to Asians. The latter were concentrated mainly in low-paid jobs in the
private sector. Straddling the two groups, ethnically speaking, the Iranians
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worked mostly as merchants and laborers, but never in the government and the
domestic spheres.73
The hierarchy described by Longva is very similar to what is found in the UAE. However,
we can elaborate on this a bit. In the UAE hierarchy, Filipinos occupy a position towards the top
of the ‘Asian’ sector. With the “Asian” group, Japanese and Koreans would occupy a higher
position while Pakistanis, Indonesians, Sri Lankans, Nepalis and other Southeast Asians would
fall beneath them. One group that is missing from Longva’s account are Indians. Much like
Iranians, Indians in the UAE occupy a unique position. Due to long trade ties with the UAE, there
are Indians embedded in the UAE economy at all levels. This hierarchy is not established in law,
but its practice is a generally recognized social fact.
First, the labor market is segmented, with different types of work loosely corresponding to
specific nationalities. Many cab drivers are Pakistani or Bangladeshi, security guards are
Egyptian. In this context, Filipinos are domestic workers, sales and office assistants, and nurses
(but not doctors). Princess explains: “Usually, if you meet Filipinos here, you will see majority of
them, particularly [in] Abu Dhabi, they were like cashiers and bankers and service related
businesses. That's the thing. For me it's easier to jump [between sectors] because of my job: it's
professional and it's technical. But what if your job is like a call center? It's quite different. I have a
friend who is having a hard time trying to jump from hospitality to another business. That's the
issue there.”74
One result of the segmentation of the labor market is that deskilling is common. No
matter what their level of experience or their position in the Philippines, it is assumed that
Filipinos in the UAE are and will be assistants not managers, nurses not doctors. Maria Joy refers
to this as the “minus-one” phenomenon.75 Cherry states: “I'm a manager there [in the Philippines].
But [in the UAE] I'm always an assistant, always an assistant.”76 Gabriel bemoans the fact that
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Filipino professionals are treated like “common helpers” and asked to do things degrading to their
profession.77
A second effect of labor market segmentation is that pay is differentiated by nationality.
Filipinos, it is generally acknowledged, make less than their Western, Arab, or Indian coworkers.
Zoe notes that employers pay Asians less than Europeans or Arabs. “If you go to a company and
they have a lot of Asian employees, they pay poorly. But if you enter an office with a Western or
Arab receptionist, they pay more. For sure.”78
Cherry makes a very good salary, but it is still, she feels, below the salary she deserves.
She signed a three-year contract with this company shortly after the economic crisis when jobs in
the UAE were scarce and salaries dropped. When she signed her second contract three years
later, and after the economy had recovered considerably, she was disappointed not to receive a
raise. Worse, shortly thereafter she was transferred from one department to another within the
company and her annual bonus was reduced. She feels that racism was a factor in this decision:
“They deduct thousands [of dirhams] … because the owner of the company told me ‘but your
budget is very big.’ Oh my budget is very big? Why? [Because] I am a Filipina, very big.” She
points out that she works longer hours for less pay than her Arab male coworkers.79
Some have rationalized this. Fortunado blames the fact that Filipino architects are paid
less on the fact that there is an excess supply of Filipinos:
Otherwise I’m a normal architect and my salary will not be as… because, you
know, because I’m a Filipino. Of course. I mean, first, we have a lot of supply.
Every year there are a lot of architects. So if you are a normal architect, you think
you will last in the market? I don’t think so. Because wherever you go you will
hire architects. Even in the Philippines, if you’re looking for architect today, after
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one hour we will give you ten. You have to choose. I mean there are a lot of
supplies so you cannot demand.80
Joey also earns less than his “white” colleagues. However he does not view the
discrepancy as discriminatory. Rather, he attributes the difference to the “cost of living”:
Interviewer: Do you think racism is a problem here?
Joey: No, in our company, racism is not allowed.
Interviewer: Do you get paid the same salary as…?
Joey: No, definitely, white people are getting higher. Because it is being based
on the cost of living where you come from, no?81
Joey points out that the cost of purchasing property or other goods is lower in the
Philippines than it is in Great Britain so that he can achieve similar life goals with a smaller
salary.82 Discrimination, he feels, is better understood by the way people treat you. And his
coworkers treat him as an equal: they speak to him respectfully, his bosses shake his hand, and
he is invited to social outings after work. He points out that our conversation is a conversation
between equals.
Emiratization
At the top of this racial/national hierarchy, of course, are the Emiratis. At roughly 10
percent of the population, Emiratis occupy the top economic, political, and social positions. The
country is very publically pursuing “Emiratization,” or localization, of the workforce by targeting
specific sectors (banking, for example) or specific job titles (Public Relations Officer, for example)
that should be occupied by Emiratis. It is generally acknowledged that Emiratization cannot
reduce the number of migrants in the UAE. Rather, the policy aims to achieve full employment for
locals by placing them in key positions. Interviewees I spoke with were aware of the Emiratization
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campaign but were not too worried about it. There was no resentment, and, in fact a few people
expressed their sympathy with the idea of the government taking concrete action to ensure their
citizens are employed.
Interviewer: How do you feel about Emiratization?
Sophia: Emiratization. What to say. Because it's not that much in our
department. We have some locals but they're not that much so it doesn't effect
that much to our work.
Interviewer: Do you think they get treated the same way that you do?
Sophia: Of course not! Of course not. No
Interviewer: But that's not a problem?
Sophia: I think it's a problem, you know. But if you can see their life here, as
compared to life that you are having, I think it's just fair for them to have that
much.83
None of the individuals I talked to had been a victim of Emiratization in the UAE. The
closest was Fortunado, who missed out on the opportunity to go to Qatar. When his boss got a
job with a new company in Qatar, he was going to go as well but at the last minute there was a
problem with his visa:
Problem with my visa. They found out that I am a Filipino and I am not entitled for
that kind of salary. So. So. They told me that they have a problem with my visa.
… Unfortunately the government said this package can be given to a local, to a
Qatari; we can find a lot of architects here in Qatar.84
Most interviewees were not worried about Emiratization, feeling that there are few locals
either willing and/or able to do their job.
Interviewer: What do you think of the Emiratization drive? Do you think it will
work?
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Danielle: I don't think so. No other local would like work in in a gas station, right?
Because Emiratization, ninety percent or a hundred percent locals will be like
having a skilled work here, right? Things like that, right?
Interviewer: Yeah.
Danielle: Correct me if I'm wrong. No, no, I don't think locals would drive a taxi.85
-----Princess: Of course, at the same time we are also wondering ‘what if there is
Emiratization?’ But with the latest project we just dispatched five hours ago, I
don't think so. Because there these projects [with] 2015 deadlines. And they
need the people like us. There's nobody there, no locals that can actually do the
job.86
Nonetheless, the specter of Emiratization did worry some in well-paid professional
positions. I asked Fortunado, the architect who did not go to Qatar, if his well-paid job in the
public sector is secure:
No. Because now I understand. Because we are expats. It so happened that I
have an extraordinary talent for work that some locals don’t have. ... These
people, even though … they are there in government, still they are smart, they
know what to do and they know what they want. They know that they can help
you. But the reason why you are there is because you are going to help them.
Otherwise they will get no one. … And here, in UAE… all in the Middle East, they
impose the localization. … They want all the locals to have work and that is the
problem of the government, everything. So I cannot tell that I was on the safe
side.87
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Danielle (Office Worker), interview with the author, 9/15/2013.
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87

Fortunato (Architect), interview with the author, 3/23/2013.

175

Human Rights Recommendation
Discrimination on the basis of nationality or race is a violation of workers’ human rights. In
this case, discrimination has led to a highly segmented market that constrains Filipino’s ability to
advance in their career. This segmented labor market is characterized by wage discrimination on
the basis of nationality. The end result is that migrants form an “underclass”: a stratum of
relatively poor workers segmented by nationality into relatively rigid economic and social
structures that reify and ossify their low position.
Conclusion
The issues presented in this chapter – illegal recruitment practices, contract bait and
switch and other contract-related offenses, extremely low wages, debt, and discrimination – are
some of the most high-profile human rights violations affecting migrant workers today. The Gulf
Cooperation Countries are notorious for these issues in particular. And, indeed, they have the
potential to inflict the most significant impact on the lived experience of individuals affected.
At the least calculation, illegal recruitment affects millions of migrant workers globally,
placing them at a disadvantage from the beginning of their experience working abroad. As was
demonstrated here, charging illegal recruitment fees to Filipinos headed to the UAE is relatively
common. Charging fees beyond those legally allowed allows recruiters to take advantage of their
position as middlemen in order to extract fees disproportionate to the value of their service and
disproportionate to the value of the future income of the worker. Other, less common violations
include forging necessary documents or deploying a worker to a job that she is not qualified for.
These practices strip workers of protections and place them in situations in which they are likely
to face further, more serious difficulties.
Contract bait and switch is relatively rare, but its consequences are likely to be very
severe. Workers who have experienced bait and switch are likely to end up in the worst
employment situations, below the minimum standards set by the home country, and below what
they would have agreed to themselves. Contract bait and switch robs workers of their agency.
And, as recruiters and employers complicit in bait and switch are inevitably aware that they are
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engaging in illegal and unscrupulous behavior, they are often willing to take further unscrupulous
actions to prevent workers from reporting, or even exiting, these labor situations.
Extremely low wages not only makes life difficult on a day to day basis for wage earners,
it also threatens their ability to fulfill the original goals motivating their migration in the first place.
Workers struggle to support families and to pay back debts, let alone to save any money for their
own futures. The result is often spiraling debt. Many workers take on debt to pay initial
recruitment fees; if they are unable to support themselves or their families, they may take on
more debt. Again, this places strain on the worker and defeats the original purpose of labor
migration.
Any of these issues is serious in its own right. But it is as an interrelated set that they
pose the most serious threat. Each one makes the individual more vulnerable to experiencing the
next, as well as compounding the severity of the effects on the individual’s lived experience.
Taken together, illegal recruitment, contract bait and switch, low wages, and debt potentially
constitute a situation of unfree labor. In the worst situations, these conditions may constitute
human trafficking, bonded labor, and/or modern day slavery. It is this toxic mix that has caught
the attention of the US State Department’s Trafficking in Person’s (TIP) Report, Human Rights
Watch, and various other interested groups.
I do not mean to diminish the seriousness of these violations when they do occur. But,
when considering how significant these problems are, we also must take two further issues into
consideration. First, the worst outcomes are experienced by a relatively small percentage of
individuals. Second, the existing legal structures in the UAE are capable of dealing with the worst
situations.
The UAE does have anti-trafficking laws and specialized police and other institutions to
address the issue. These institutions are not as effective as they could be and there is
considerable room for improvement, but they are improving. The US State Department’s TIP
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Report considers the UAE to be a Tier Two country.88 Tier Two is defined as: “Countries whose
governments do not fully comply with the TVPA’s minimum standards but are making significant
efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards.”89 The TIP report notes
“sustained, but uneven, progress” in addressing these issues, with trafficking (particularly sex
trafficking) receiving more attention than forced labor. The major problem is that forced labor
violations tend to be dealt with through the regular labor law rather than through the antitrafficking statues. That means that, although workers may be released form these situations and
possibly compensated, offending recruiters and employers are not penalized to the fullest extent
of the (criminal) law.
More needs to be done, certainly, to address debt bondage and human trafficking in the
UAE. And the UAE is working with international partners to strengthen its systems and implement
reforms. The pace of reform remains unnecessarily sluggish. Mercifully, few workers find
themselves caught in these worst situations, though many are vulnerable.
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In 2008 the TIP report placed the UAE on the Tier Two Watch List, an embarrassment for the UAE; since
then it has remained on the Tier Two list.
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Trafficking in Persons Report, United States Department of State, 2014, p. 43, accessed March 1, 2015,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/226844.pdf.
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CHAPTER SIX: IM/MOBILITY
Introduction
The international migrant as we understand that category today – generally defined as an
individual who resides in a different country than their country of birth or their country of
nationality – is a product of the international state system. The idea that the individual needs
permission to cross international borders and/or authorization to reside in a particular locale is
relatively new to human history. For example, passports only came into general use following
WWI, as a means of ensuring national security in the post-war era. Since that time migrants have
faced the growing challenge of movement in a world order in which states are increasingly
concerned about migration as both a potential boon to national economies as well as a potential
danger to social and political cohesiveness and national security.
But concerns about migrants’ mobility does not end after they cross an international
border and enter the destination country. Migrants’ freedom of movement may be directed and
constrained throughout the migration process, from departure through return and reintegration.
Temporary contract workers are particularly prone to constraints on mobility. TCWs are brought in
to a destination country for a specific time period to do a specific job; constraints on the ability to
change employers are built into most TCW programs. This tends to coincide with other
constraints as well, such as restrictions on residence.
This chapter looks at how Filipino workers in the UAE experience mobility and immobility.
From the time an individual decides to leave the Philippines in search of work abroad their
options, decisions, and outcomes are shaped by their ability to negotiate mobility. In this sense,
mobility goes hand in hand with migrants’ agency, enabling and constraining the individual’s
capacity to make decisions and have those decisions affect important goals in their lives.
Immobility, alternatively, robs agency of its substantive content by removing voluntariness from
decisions to stay or go.
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Migration and Choice
We usually view labor migration as a choice. But choices are never entirely
unconstrained. What are the outlines of this choice? How do we know if there are genuine options
available? At what point do the constraints – which we all inevitably face – make the choices that
migrants face so narrow as to rob migration of it voluntary nature?
The Decision to Leave the Philippines
The first decision in the migration process is the initial decision to try to find work abroad.
Ambassador Grace Relucio Princesa argues that the Philippines is enmeshed in the global
system and that migration is inherently part of this system; the goal she argues, should not be to
end migration from the Philippines, but rather to ensure that it is “migration by choice.”1 The
Ambassador’s, and the Philippine government’s, goal is to ensure such conditions both in the
Philippines and abroad as to give Filipino workers a viable choice to work in the Philippines or to
seek better opportunities abroad. This does happen for some Filipinos. Victoria had a good job in
Manila as a senior financial planning analyst making 43,000 PHP ($958 USD); her first job in Abu
Dhabi paid a similar salary, but she wanted an “opportunity to grow more in other place,” to
explore the world, so she went to work abroad.2 But Victoria’s story is not the norm. Most Filipino
workers in Abu Dhabi were pushed out of the Philippines by poverty, unemployment and
underemployment, low wages, and family pressures.
Poverty
In 2012, 25 percent of the population of the Philippines was below the national poverty
line; roughly 42 percent of the population earned less than $2 USD per day.3 Nearly 20 percent of
families were below the poverty line in 2012.4 These numbers would be even higher if migration
did not serve as an escape valve, allowing a growing number of poor Filipinos to find work

1

Ambassador Grace Relucio Princesa, interview with the author, 10/30/2013.

2

Victoria (Accountant), interview with the author, 9/28/2013.
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"World Development Indicators".

4

See the Philippines Statistics Authority: http://www.nscb.gov.ph/secstat/d_income.asp.

180

abroad. As it is, poverty is an important factor pushing millions of Filipinos into labor migration as
a personal or family survival strategy.
Ellie was employed, but had little choice but to migrate in search of work. When her
husband, working in Saudi Arabia, separated from her and stopped sending money to support
their three children, her job selling Avon products door to door was not enough to support the
family.
Because I spent all my money for my husband to go there in Saudi Arabia, that
time I don't have anything for me [or] for my kids. Because that time I have a
business there, this buy and sell. Maybe you know this, Avon products? I'm
selling that. … After all of my money finished and [my husband] is not supporting
my kids. My kids they will stop their studies because [I had] nothing, I don't have
money. I don't want to tell my parents. … I don't want anybody will be affected
because of my problem. … Then when they come to know, I'm almost done. My
kids almost they stopped to go to school. … So sometimes my kids, I told them
not to go to school because we don't have money. We don't have rice. We don't
have food to eat. So that time my mother, she will come to know; my father will
come to know; all my family they come to know. Then my co-mother in the
school, she referred me [to] my recruiter.5
Unemployment and Underemployment
For some Filipinos it is not absolute poverty, but the inability to find regular employment
that pushes them to consider employment abroad. Justin, an engineer, could only find short-term
contract work. While this was usually enough to support his young family, it was not a comfortable
existence and he decided to search for stable employment abroad.6
Most often, though, the inability to find work and poverty go hand in hand. Alexandra is a
sweet, quiet, very intelligent woman. After completing a degree in business administration from a

5

Ella (Food Service), interview with the author, 3/20/2013.

6

Justin (Engineer), interview with the author, 9/13/2013.
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provincial university, she went to Manila to find work. After months of searching, however,
Alexandra was unable to find steady employment. During this time Alexandra lived with her
sister’s family who provided for her food and shelter. But her sister was also unemployed and the
family’s meagre resources stretched. Alexandra sewed old t-shirts into sanitary pads which she
used during her monthly period, then washed and reused; her dream of owning a cell phone
seemed out of reach. Alexandra interviewed for many jobs in Manila but these positions required
her to pass a medical exam, which she failed. Alexandra has a hereditary condition; despite the
fact that her condition is not contagious and manageable with minimal medical oversight, it placed
her at a disadvantage in the competitive Manila job market. Desperate for work so that she would
not be a burden on her sister and her family, Alexandra took short-term contract work in a factory.
After her five-month contract was up, she faced the same dismal job prospects. When a friend
offered to help her get a visa to work abroad, Alexandra took her chances.7
Wage/Opportunity
Even when the individual is not in a situation of absolute poverty, the opportunities
abroad often offer substantially greater rewards. Maria Joy worked for the government of the
Philippines in a professional position and, while her job paid enough to support her life, there was
not much left over; her salary at a bank in the UAE allows her to save money for her future.8
Grace worked as a nurse in the Philippines and her salary of Php 13,000 ($291 USD) was barely
enough to pay the bills. As a hotel receptionist in Abu Dhabi she is able not only to support
herself, but also to support her family in the Philippines and pay for her brother’s education; if she
is able to get her nursing license in the UAE, she has the potential to earn even more. Sophia
worked in the Philippines as a nurse for three years but the salary offered for nurses abroad was
much higher: “If you would convert this 9300 [AED, $2,532 USD; her current salary], it's like
almost 100,000 [pesos] in the Philippines. But unlike if you were working there, 15,000 or 20,000
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Alexandra (Food Service), interview with the author, 2/23/2013.
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Maria Joy (Manager), interview with the author, 3/16/2013.
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[pesos; $334 or $445 USD]. [What you earn in the UAE] Is way, way far from what you are getting
[in the Philippines].”9
Even if an individual does not initially intend to seek work abroad, the wage differentials
between the Filipino and foreign employers convinces many to migrate. When faced with the
opportunity to provide a comfortable living for themselves and their families, sufficient pay for
important life goals like a family house, the college education of siblings and children, to build a
business and/or provide retirement savings, many Filipinos understandably choose labor
migration.
Family
It is important to remember that the decision to work abroad is rarely made in isolation.
The Filipino culture places great importance on tightly-knit extended family structures. The impact
of labor migration on the family is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight. It is important to
note here, though, that family considerations often motivate labor migration decisions. Migration
and remittances are often integral to securing financial stability not just for the migrant’s
immediate family, but for a wide circle of relations. Often as the migrant’s earnings increase, his
family responsibilities do as well. Arianna explains:
[Filipinos] only leave because they don't have anything in the Philippines. That's
it. But, given a choice, they will stay in the Philippines. Because poverty in
Philippines is too much. And, you know, it's difficult, especially [for] Filipinos.
They have this close family relationships. So if your family is doing OK, you have
to reach out to your aunt so that they will be OK; you have to reach to all your
relatives so they will be OK. So I think there is a pressure for them to earn more
so that everybody will be OK. … That's why I think they are migrating.10
For most, these drivers – poverty, unemployment, low wages, and family pressures –
work together to push the individual to migrate to work abroad, as Adrian explains:
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Sophia (Nurse), interview with the author, 9/15/2013.
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Arianna (Nurse), interview with the author, 8/3/2013.
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Broadly speaking, Philippines is a good country. But we have a lack of job. We
have a lack of employment. And if you have employment, if you are in the
government or in private, you have a small salary. You cannot fit everything you
want to fit in. And you cannot give what everyone [needs]. So even you want to
help somebody you cannot help. You have a tiny amount of money. That's the
one I decided to go abroad.11
Human Rights Implications
It is important for us to ask what the reasons motivating an individual to seek work abroad
are in order to interpret their subsequent decisions regarding employment and life abroad. The
decision to seek work abroad may be so constrained as to be a non-decision. If the migrant has
no viable alternative in the Philippines to support themselves and their families, the idea that they
consent to their working situation abroad is questionable.
This is particularly important because the conditions in the Philippines that led up to the
decision to migrate often stand in the mind of the migrant as a proxy for the conditions to expect
upon repatriation. Without repatriation as a viable exit strategy, the decision to continue working
abroad is similarly robbed of substantive content. If an individual struggled to survive before
leaving, they may be more likely to accept a worse position and more likely to continue working
despite inadequate working conditions in order to avoid repatriating.
In this way the conditions motivating migration decisions may indicate constraints on
migrants’ mobility, on their substantive ability to choose to stay in place in, or to return to, their
home country.
Constraints on Departure
Once the decision to migrate has been made, the prospective Filipino migrant worker
faces additional restrictions on her mobility. The Philippine government, in its sincere effort to
protect its citizens from human rights abuses, restricts the ability of workers to exit the
Philippines. The Philippine government must verify and approve working situations before it will
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Adrian (Engineer), interview with the author, 9/10/2013.
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allow Filipinos to leave the Philippines to take up positions abroad, and it actively tries to identify
and stop workers from misusing non-work eligible visas as a means of entering a destination
country in order to search for work.
POEA Processing Requirements
Philippine law requires Filipinos departing for work overseas to have an acceptable
employment contract in hand specifying a wage that meets or exceeds the minimum wage
requirements, a valid work visa arranged, a medical clearance, technical training or skills testing
completed, social security and welfare fees paid, etc. To police these requirements, all departing
workers are monitored by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Once all
requirements have been met, the POEA will issue an Overseas Employment Certificate (OEC).
The worker must then produce this certificate at a POEA center at Manila International Airport
before being allowed to exit the country. The Philippine government refers to this process as
verification: the POEA is not just verifying that the employment offer exists and an appropriate
work visa issued, but is also verifying that the offered terms meet the minimum conditions
required by the Philippine government. In effect, the individual must have permission from the
federal government of the Philippines in order to exit the country to take up employment abroad.
Migrants do not like the OEC requirement for several reasons. Many object to the time
and expense it takes to meet all the requirements. The process usually takes a week or more and
multiple trips to various government offices as well as visits to an approved medical center and
Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar (PDOS) training center. Moses expresses this common
sentiment:
We have this like POEA fee, the OWWA fee, all the fees, the PDOS fee, the
overseas employment certificate fee. We have all this kinds of fees. It boils down
to getting an OEC. Because the Overseas Employment Certificate, this will
exempt you from travel tax and airport tax. So if you don’t have this, they can
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screw you in the airport. So you have to pay all this fees, attend all their seminars
supposedly to ‘help’ you.12
Visit Visa as a Means of Departure
Those prospective migrants that do not have a job offer in hand or who are unable to
meet the POEA’s minimum requirements for any reason (such as a contracted wage below the
minimum wage) may try to enter the UAE on a visit visa and then later change their status and
obtain an employment visa.
While not explicitly allowed, the practice is not forbidden by the UAE government and is
generally acknowledged to be widespread. The UAE government does nothing to discourage
visitors from job hunting. The only hindrance is that in order for Filipinos to change their visa
status from visitor to resident, they must exit the UAE - usually by taking a short trip to the Iranian
island of Kish, as it is the cheapest flight to an international destination from the UAE. By exiting,
the original visitor visa is ended and the new residence visa can be processed (this is not
required for individuals from countries eligible for visit visa on arrival who may work in the UAE
while processing of the residence visa is ongoing).13 Processing usually takes a few days but may
take weeks or even months if there is a problem with the visa for any reason, during which time
the individual is stuck in Kish. Once the residence visa is ready, the individual reenters the UAE
as a resident.
When Enzo transferred from his first sponsor to a new sponsor, he had to exit the UAE in
order for the paperwork to be processed. Enzo went to Kish. He flew there on a small plane and
got a fourteen-day (renewable) Iranian visa on arrival. Hotel rooms cost about 40 AED ($11 USD)
per day and food another 30 to 40 AED ($9 to $11 USD). His company gave him a daily
allowance that covered his expenses for the eight days it took for them to transfer him under their
sponsorship. But many are not so fortunate. While he was waiting for his visa, Enzo found it
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Keren Bobker, "UAE Employer Is Responsible for Costs of Hiring an Employee,” The National, 12 July 2014.
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heartbreaking to see stranded Filipinos turning to odd jobs, begging, or even prostitution in order
to make enough to survive.14
If there is a problem getting the new visa in the UAE processed people can be stuck in
Kish for a very long time. Angelica came to the UAE on a visit visa, found a job after one month
and was asked to exit to Kish so that her employment visa could be arranged. Once she was in
Kish, however, there was a problem processing her employment visa: it seemed that there was a
conflict in the immigration system between the visa application submitted by her new employer
and one previously submitted by her sister for a renewed visit visa. Angelica ended up waiting in
Kish for three months while the issue was sorted out. Even Angelica is lucky, though. If her
employer had decided it was not worth the effort to struggle through the immigration bureaucracy
and had given up, Angelica would have stuck in Kish until she was able to pay for her own
repatriation flight back to the Philippines. 15 Those that do not have sufficient resources to pay for
a flight are stuck in Kish. It is estimated that there are about 2,000 Filipinos on Kish Island, some
waiting for visas to be processed, others stuck with insufficient means to repatriate.16
It seems fair to say, therefore, that job searching on a visit visa is legal and allowed under
current UAE policy. The country benefits from the practice, as it ensures the presence of a
flexible pool of available workers. The fact that the visit visa sponsor, usually a close relative,
must put down a 1,000 AED ($272 USD) deposit, refundable when the visitor exits the country
(either to repatriate or to go to Kish to await residence visa processing), ensures that most visitors
who are not successful in finding a job do exit, thus reducing potential negative side effects.17
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While I did not interview any individuals who failed to find employment within the visa period, those I spoke
with came to the UAE on a visit visa and had difficulties in finding employment talked about the pressure to find work or
else repatriate; some took jobs they were not happy with in order to meet the deadline. None mentioned the idea of
overstaying their visa. This is not entirely convincing but, given that several people freely admitted to other types of illegal
work situations (working on a visit visa, obtaining part time employment, even buying a black market visa), it is
persuasive.
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From the perspective of the government of the Philippines, those who leave the
Philippines with the intent to seek employment but without the authorization of the POEA do so
illegally until they register with the Embassy and regularize their status.18 This means that job
seekers on visit visas in the UAE are illegal as far as the Philippines is concerned, even if the
UAE does not view them as such. If an individual does find a job, exits the UAE and successfully
transfers from a visit visa to a residence visa, he may then register his contract with the
Philippines government. If the contract meets the minimum POEA standards, he can regularize
his status this way – a necessary step in order for the individual to obtain an OEC and thus be
allowed to make return trips to the Philippines – for annual vacation leave, for example – without
hindrance. If the contract does not meet POEA minimum standards, especially the minimum
wage requirement, the situation is unclear. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the minimum wage
requirement is not usually enforced, except for domestic workers. The OFW may be able to
obtain the OEC, or may not. If he cannot get the OEC, he faces the choice between repatriating
(if the worker quits without cause in the first two years of employment, he faces a six-month labor
ban), or not returning to visit his family in the Philippines during his years of employment abroad.
When the Philippine government first passed the Migrant Workers Act or 1995, illegal
migrants composed as much as 50 percent of Filipino migrants.19 To clamp down on illegal
departures, the Philippines government polices departures through Manila International Airport.
Immigration officials are on the lookout for those departing without the correct documentation,
with fraudulent documents, or those they suspect to be misusing tourist visas.
Jasmine was caught up in one of these checks by Immigration officials at Manila
International Airport. She and a friend had intended to go to the UAE to look for jobs as nurses.
That is really funny story. Because … the one who sponsor for the both of us is
[my best friend’s] friend, way back high school. So obviously we don't have the
same family names. So when we go to the airport through Immigration in the
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Philippines, [my friend] passed the immigration officer but I wasn't able to go
through with her. But I already have the tourist visa. So I was delayed for two
weeks and took another flight. Because in the Philippines, actually they are very
strict with regards to immigration passes. …
So I was very depressed that time because the officer was really strict. ... They
going to question you everything: ‘Why you go there? Why you going to spend
one month? What are you going to do there?’ Like that. So I don't have any
choice; I need to go back. And then I need to prepare all the papers from my
[existing Philippine] employer, because at that time I'm still working [in the
Philippines]. ... So they just want a proof that I'm coming back and I will not go to
the other countries and just do the ‘hiding and everywhere.’ 20 So I provided them
the papers that you needed. … And then I passed. Then after two weeks I was
here. And then I start searching.21
Jasmine knows that the migration path she chose is illegal. She understands why the
Philippine government prohibits the abuse of tourist visas for job searching. But she is not
convinced that prohibiting workers from exiting the country is the right strategy.
Jasmine: Because mostly in the Philippines, Filipinos go out of the country
through a tourist visa. … You know they call it ‘TNT’22 in the Philippines: they are
living in other countries without papers. … Philippine government wants to avoid
it. That's why they are very strict when it comes to immigration policies.
Interviewer: Do you think that's a good thing for them to do?
Jasmine: For us, maybe it's a good thing because when Filipinas go out of the
country and they are not under any insurance, maybe they have an accident.
Whatever happen to them, the government will not cover them. So it's a sad part
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Reference to the Tagalog phrase tago ng tago, literally translated as “hiding and hiding,” commonly used to
signify an illegal migrant.
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of the story if it will happen to them. But the good thing is if they can able to go
out of the country, they can [be] able to feed their families.23
Human Rights Implications
The government of the Philippines is restricting the human rights of its citizens to freedom
of movement and to exit the country. Article 13(2) of the UDHR specifies that “Everyone has the
right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”24 Under the convention,
this right can only be limited to ensure the human rights of others or in the interests of public
order and welfare:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the
just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.25
The OEC requirement and efforts to police the misuse of visit visas do infringe upon this
human right.
The government of the Philippines, as with the governments of other major sending
countries, offers two justifications for this infringement. First, the government points to the
practical concern that when workers enter these precarious working situations and predictably fall
victim to abuse, they then turn to their government for support. The Philippines government,
however, has limited resources to aid OFWs. While there is an emergency repatriation fund
established by the Philippines government, priority must be given to those in the worst conditions,
such as those waiting to be repatriated from war zones. In recent years repatriations from Iraq,
Libya, Syria and other conflict zones have stretched the resources of the Philippine government.26
Nonetheless, the Philippine Embassies struggle to provide the most support possible to OFWs in
trouble. For example, the Embassy of the Philippines in Abu Dhabi is given an annual budget for
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legal support for workers in distress which is not nearly sufficient to aid all OFWs who request
support; the Embassy also runs a facility for absconding workers or others who find themselves in
need of emergency shelter; and there is a backlog of individuals awaiting repatriation who cannot
afford airfare without financial support from the government.
The Embassy’s resources are already stretched and so minimizing the number of cases,
it can be argued, is in the interests of “the general welfare in a democratic society.”27 This is
unconvincing. While the argument may hold for prohibiting the deployment of workers into conflict
zones, this logic is unpersuasive in the context of the UAE today – a peaceful and prosperous
country with a functioning government. Further, as was shown in Chapter Five, the outcomes in
terms of a favorable working situation (as determined by the worker herself) are no worse for
those who entered the UAE on visit visas than for those who entered utilizing the services of a
recruitment agency. If there is no convincing case for invoking the general welfare, then this
argument cannot be held to justify the infringement on the human right to exit.
This is a contentious claim so it should be specified clearly. There are circumstances
when the Philippine government might appropriately issue a travel ban to a country, for instance
in cases of ongoing war or conflict. There are also circumstances when the Philippine
government might appropriately issue a deployment ban for a specific country or for a specific
type of employment, for instance in the case of the deployment bans to Jordan and Saudi Arabia
discussed in Chapter Four. However, if there is no deployment ban nor travel ban in place for a
country, attempting to police minimum overseas employment conditions (largely the minimum
wage requirement and the state’s preference that workers deploy through an agency) by denying
individuals with valid tourist visas the ability to exit the country is unwarranted. The Philippine
state is denying people their human right to exit for fear that they individual might use that tourist
visa to look for a job, they might actually obtain a job, that the job obtained might be below the
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minimum standard (in terms of wage or other contract guarantees) set by the Philippines
government, and the worker might then turn to the Embassy for support.
Let’s look at each step in this chain of possibilities. First, the worker might job hunt on a
tourist visa. Yes, there is a pattern of Filipinos using tourist visas to job hunt in the UAE. The
Philippines has no objection to the activity of job hunting in general; they are not claiming
extraterritorial jurisdiction over actions committed by their citizens abroad which the home state
deems heinous crimes.28 They are objecting to the misuse of tourist visas. But this use is not
illegal in the UAE. And, while recruitment agencies are a preferred means of deployment, they
are not required under Philippine law. 29 So exactly what misuse are they objecting to? Second,
they might obtain a job. As the Philippine state is unable to ensure that all citizens can find work
domestically, it actively encourages its citizens to seek employment abroad as a means of
reducing domestic unemployment and encouraging development and remittances. The
Philippines has become a labor exporting state, so it can hardly complain about this. Third, that
job might be below the minimum standards set by the Philippine state. Yes, it might be, in which
case the Philippine state may refuse to issue the OEC. But the job might not be below the
standard. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that the outcome of jobs obtained via tourist
visa job hunts are any worse (or any better) than those obtained through a recruiter. Finally, the
worker may turn to the Embassy for support if she finds herself in a situation where she is being
treated unfairly. Yes, they might; and if they do the Embassy would be obligated to respond to
any violations of its citizens rights. That is true. However, this happens in relatively few cases, is
better correlated with job type than with deployment type, and so is better addressed through
sector-specific deployment bans if warranted. In summary, positively denying individuals’ human
right to exit on the basis of this chain of possible actions, and without any clear evidence of a
pattern of resulting human rights violations, is unwarranted.
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Second, the Philippines government argues that infringement of the right to exit is
necessary in order to ensure the respect for – and their ability to protect – other, more significant
rights. Angel Borja, the Labor Attaché at the Embassy of the Philippines in the UAE, is aware of
the tension between the human right to exit and these measures which the Philippine government
takes to prevent Filipinos from leaving at will, but argues it is necessary in order to protect
Filipinos’ human rights.30 There is a need to balance the individual’s human right to exit and the
state’s obligation to ensure that the full set of human rights of its citizens are protected and
fulfilled, such as the prohibition of slavery, the right to choice of employment, to a healthy working
environment, and to a living wage.
The UN and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights consider human
rights to be “interdependent and indivisible,”31 making it difficult to deal with situations where one
human right is knowingly infringed upon for the express purpose of preserving another. The fact
that the right to exit seems to conflict with other rights can be resolved at the theoretical level by
assessing where the obligation to protect and fulfill these rights lies within a system on split
responsibility for the rights of migrants. None of these rights are the sole responsibility of the
government of the Philippines. It is by taking unilateral action that the government of the
Philippines has created this conflict. In a cooperative environment, increasing freedom of
movement and the ability to exit should only strengthen the worker’s ability to ensure freedom
from slavery and the choice of employment. Our first choice for addressing the problem should be
in cooperative solutions, not unilateral ones. If a Filipino has a valid entry visa for the UAE, the
Philippine state should not impede her right to exit the Philippines.
Residence
First we should note that there are legal restrictions on the ownership of property by
foreigners in the UAE. Outside of a few small enclaves, ownership is largely prohibited. Within
these enclaves, the price of property is high, mortgages for foreigners have recently been capped
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at 50 percent of home value, and very few foreigners in the UAE can afford the purchase price.32
Most people rent housing or live in housing provided by their employer.
There are four distinct categories of legal residences that are common in the UAE:
houses or villas, single-family apartments, labor camp accommodations, or accommodation
within the employer’s residence. The rental market in the UAE is astronomically high. Although
rental prices are lower than they were before the global market crash in 2008/9, which affected
the UAE housing market particularly strongly, in 2013 the average rental price of a three bedroom
home was higher in Dubai than in Manhattan.33 Prices in Abu Dhabi are similar, with the $325
USD average price per square foot only slightly below Dubai’s ($333 USD).34 High prices push
most Filipinos out of the rental market for single-family residences in houses, villas, or
apartments. Labor camp and residence in the employer’s household – which have their own
issues, discussed below – are at the employer’s discretion and are not offered to most workers.
That leaves most Filipinos in the uncomfortable position of seeking illegal rental housing
by subletting rooms or even bed space in apartments managed by friends or other intermediaries.
Most Filipinos I spoke with rent a “bed space.” Bed space is exactly what it sounds like:
individuals rent just enough space for a bed (usually a bunk bed) and perhaps a cabinet in a room
shared with others, usually between four and six people per room. The bed and mattress are
often provided, sometimes a locking cabinet is as well. Theft is a significant concern. Friends or
families usually try to rent a room together so that all of the individuals in the room know each
other and trust each other, which is useful when leaving precious belongings in a shared room.
Usually the door to each individual room locks as well, so that only the occupants have access to
the room. Overcrowding is a problem. In an apartment that is illegally sublet for bed space, the
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living room and dining room are usually rented out as well, so that a typical three bedroom
apartment may have four or five occupied rooms and from sixteen to thirty people living there.
The kitchen is typically shared. Rent is usually calculated by taking the total rent of the apartment
plus a fee for the actual renter or the person managing the apartment,35 and dividing it equally
between the rooms; very large rooms that can accommodate more people (such as a large living
room), or rooms with an attached bath may cost extra. The price per room is then divided equally
between the individuals renting bed space in the room; the more people per room, the lower the
rent per person. Rent for a bed space starts at about 500 AED ($136 USD) per month and ranges
up from there.
Families in slightly more affluent circumstances may rent illegally subdivided villas in
order to obtain affordable family housing. Villas, stand-alone buildings that were originally built to
house a single family, are often divided up into several units by the owners and rented at low
rates. A one bedroom apartment in a subdivided villa may rent for half of what a legal villa goes
for.36 Dividing a villa without municipal approval is illegal, and tenants living in these
accommodations are subject to denial of services such as water and electricity, and to possible
eviction by the municipality. Subdividing is especially common with older villas after the original
Emirati family moves out. As such, these villas are often in established Emirati family
neighborhoods and so attract negative attention from the authorities.
Illegally sublet villas and apartments are usually in older buildings and so subject to a
host of other problems as well. Older buildings, villa or apartment, were not built to house the
density of residents that they are currently maintaining. Rarely are any updates to electricity or
water made during these conversions, and basic maintenance is neglected. Tragically, structure
fires due to electrical overload, kitchen fires, or other fire hazards are relatively common and
cause hundreds of injuries and deaths each year. In 2011 there were 3,274 were building fires
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reported nationwide; ninety five people died and 1,817 were injured.37 Fire codes have not kept
up and in 2012, when tougher new rules were put in place, it was estimated that as much as 70
percent of the buildings in the UAE had “some form of facade cladding that has a combustible
thermo-plastic core between two sheets of aluminum.”38 Other than fire, mold problems and
cockroach infestations are common. When I interviewed her at her home, Maxine joked that the
“cockroach also has visa for roaming around here.”
In short, rent in the UAE is high for often crowded, dirty, and insecure residences. For
example, Jasmine lives in an illegally sublet apartment; there are seven accommodation rooms in
the apartment and around twenty five people living there; she shares a room with five other
people. For this, Jasmine pays 750 AED ($204 USD) – more than average for a six-person room.
She stays because she likes and trusts the other people in the room: “I think I need to pay that
much for security and friends.”39
Soon, however, renting bed space may no longer be an option. The municipal
governments of Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been progressively implementing a “one villa, one
family” policy, starting in 2008 in Dubai and in 2011 in Abu Dhabi. At various times tenants of
illegally subdivided villas or apartments with multiple, unrelated tenants have received eviction
notices, and/or had their power and water turned off. The rules have been unclear, changeable,
and unevenly enforced until this time. What is clear, though, is that illegally subdivided villas in
Emirati family neighborhoods have been targeted first in most major municipalities;40 Sharjah’s
campaign has been particularly brutal.41 Abu Dhabi also established a cap on the number of
people that can legally share an apartment (capped at three unrelated individuals per bedroom or
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one family) or villa (capped at six unrelated individuals or one family).42 Sophia is one of the lucky
ones: she and her family (her husband and their three daughters) had rented an inexpensive unit
in an illegally subdivided villa. Fearing increased enforcement by the municipality, they decided to
take accommodation provided by her employer.43 Most individuals, however, do not have this
option. They are faced with the challenge of finding new, legal accommodations on their own.
In 2012 the UAE federal Ministry of the Interior got involved, requiring an attested
tenancy contract issued in the individual’s name before issuing residency visas. Migrant workers
renting bed space or rooms in shared apartments would be unable to obtain or renew their
residency visa. Panic ensued as low-wage workers wondered how in the world they would be
able to afford to rent an apartment independently. In the next few months the rules changed
several times, first limiting the rule only to family visas sponsored by expatriates, then cancelling it
altogether in Abu Dhabi, before again requiring the attested contract for family residence visas.44
As of 12 August 2014, the website of the Abu Dhabi General Directorate of Residency and
Foreigners Affairs only lists the attested rental contract as a requirement for family visa issuance.
The general picture that emerges is that the major municipalities and the federal government wish
to limit the number of unrelated people living communally in villas or apartments. The idea that
this type of policy will again be enforced without regard to the ability of the average worker to
afford an independent residence concerns many people. Without affordable housing in most
urban areas, Filipinos fear that they could be pushed out of the cities, into labor camps, or forced
to repatriate.
Pushing low income workers to repatriate would, of course, leave vacant thousands of
low-skill, low-wage jobs that are nonetheless essential to the basic functioning of the UAE
economy. This is clearly not in the interests of the UAE government and is not, in my estimation,
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the intended end goal. Abu Dhabi’s Urban Structure Framework Plan gives us a better picture of
what that desired end goal may be.45 The Plan clearly establishes the idea of “Emirati
neighborhoods,” many of which are designed to be low-density residential housing.46 Emirati
neighborhoods are to be scattered throughout the best areas of the city “such that there is no part
of the city that Emiratis would not wish to live in.”47 “Expatriate worker housing,”48 on the other
hand, is primarily envisioned as “worker settlements,” a euphemism for labor camps, placed near
“long term job sites or transportation routes,” in other words outside of the city or in industrial
areas that are not inhabited by Emiratis; smaller, temporary settlements/camps may be
established on major construction sites.49
In short, the UAE authorities would like to shift low-wage workers into camps or
designated neighborhoods, distinct from the privileged Emirati neighborhoods. While such
housing might form part of a national strategy, it is not a comprehensive solution. Migrants have
clearly indicated their distaste for life in labor camps, as discussed below. Pushing low-wage
workers into marginal areas also serves to intensify their disadvantages, from decreasing
available services to increasing their daily commutes. The implied segregation along class lines is
worrying from a social justice perspective as well.
The conditions of workers who live in labor camps and employer-provided housing may
be significantly worse than those who currently live in independently rented accommodations.
Camps are relatively self-contained, fenced compounds providing at least minimal sleeping,
eating, and recreational space for residents. Entrance and exit is regulated by guards and the
level of control over residents’ mobility may vary. Camps do not function on the basis of tenancy
agreements with residents. Rather, a company builds or leases a camp (or a specified portion
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thereof) for the accommodation of the bulk of their workforce. The lack of tenancy has two
common implications for workers. First, laborers in the UAE tend to be stuck in labor camps. On
one hand, their wages reflect the fact that the company is providing cheap room and board.50 On
the other, alternative living arrangements are difficult to arrange because rents in Abu Dhabi and
Dubai are sky-high. Second, the lack of individual tenancy tends to discourage the provision and
maintenance of even basic services. Depending on the camp management, this may make living
conditions in a camp unbearable. Camps tend to be constructed outside of urban areas and so
are often cut off from services that might normally be provided by the city, such as sewers and
public transportation. At the same time, the camp owners have limited incentives to provide
alternative services at their own expense. Employers provide busses between the camp and the
worksite but nowhere else, isolating camp residents and highlighting the asymmetrical power
relationship between employer and employee. Sewage is handled through septic tanks. However,
tanks are not always properly maintained and, in the worst cases, are left to overflow with
predictable consequences. 51 Conditions like this might upset the residents, but the residents are
not the ones that have contracted with the camp. Residents are stuck and, because they do not
have individual leases or options to go elsewhere, they have little to no leverage over camp
management. If the camp management and/or the employer are primarily concerned with
providing housing as cheaply as possible, this may lead them to overlook even significant
deficiencies in the facilities.
After a series of high profile exposés – including a report by Human Rights Watch52, a
Panorama documentary by the BBC53 and another by Al Jazeera54, reports by ABC’s 20/2055 and
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by Frontline56, and documentaries by International Trade Union Confederation57 – the
government of the UAE has begun to improve the situation in labor camps, putting further health
and safety regulations in place and increasing enforcement, and even establishing its own model
camps for high profile construction projects on Al Saadiyat Island. More could be done, however.
Enforcement remains lax, and, even where enforced, penalties for even the most egregious
violations are minimal.58 Angelo, who works for one major construction company in Abu Dhabi
notorious for the poor conditions in its labor camps, says that living conditions are improving but
still lag behind. Although as a professional he did not live in a labor camp, he had frequently
visited such camps. He compared conditions in the UAE unfavorably to labor camps that he had
seen while working in Saudi Arabia. The older facilities often found in the Musaffah neighborhood
of Abu Dhabi and the Sonapur neighborhood of Dubai, he feels, are particularly bad.59
I have visited five labor camps and have found that conditions vary widely. At none of the
camps were conditions as bad as those reported in the international press and by interested
human rights groups. The first camp I visited was a small purpose-built compound that housed
women who worked for a local cleaning company. Conditions were crowded with most small
rooms holding six women; the shared kitchen and bathroom blocs (each serving about ten rooms)
were basic but relatively clean; the recreation room was the only place with air conditioning. This
camp was in Abu Dhabi’s Musaffah neighborhood, both an advantage and a disadvantage.
Musaffah is a busy neighborhood, primarily composed of low-wage workers and predominantly
male. The neighborhood is considered one of the only areas of Abu Dhabi that is unsafe for
women, especially after dark, due to the high incidence of sexual harassment. Because of this,
the camp I visited had a curfew. The stated policy was that the women could leave at any point.
However, if they left after curfew, they would have to explain where they were going and why to
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one of the women in charge of the camp. And, in whatever case, the curfew would be enforced
upon their return and latecomers would not be allowed back in for the night. On the positive side,
however, unlike many camps, the camps in Musaffah are in close proximity to a bustling
neighborhood with shops, restaurants, and easy access to public transportation.
In contrast, I also visited a small labor camp for male construction workers on the
worksite of a new skyscraper. The labor camp was clean and ordered, workers were housed in
converted shipping containers, each with air conditioning. Shared bathing facilities were in good
condition and cafeterias provided ethnically-appropriate cooked meals. Some trees had been
planted along the temporary streets to provide shade. In contrast to Musaffah, however, this
camp was on the newly developed Al Reem Island with no neighborhood and no public transport.
Residents are basically stuck at the camp.
It is those workers who live in the homes of their employers that face the most uncertain
living conditions. Maxine trained as a nurse in the Philippines and took a job in home healthcare
in the UAE. Her first posting was with a local family in the city of Abu Dhabi and paid 3,000 AED
($817 USD) with room and board included. However, room and board turned out not to be as
Maxine had expected. She was shocked to learn that she was expected to share a small room in
the garage with another female nurse and to sleep on the floor. When she voiced her dismay, the
other nurse told her she shouldn’t be so “choosy.” In a small act of rebellion, Maxine took some
blankets and slept on a couch in the house without asking permission. She kept this up for two
months because her wages were initially withheld. When she was paid, Maxine used her own
salary to buy a mattress, blankets, pillows and other basic items. Maxine worked in this
household until the family changed healthcare providers. Maxine’s second position was no better.
She was posted in a rural household. The home was remote with nothing within walking distance,
no public transportation, and few taxis. Maxine felt very isolated. Although she wanted to change,
the home health agency would not give her an alternative posting. In the end, Maxine fell ill and it
was the family of the woman she was caring for who requested that she be removed – they did
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not want a sick nurse in the household. Fortunately for Maxine, her third posting was in a
hospital.60
Maxine’s story highlights the fact that it is not the nature of work performed by domestic
workers that places maids and nannies at risk. After all, Maxine was not a maid engaged in
‘women’s work,’ but a skilled, professional nurse. Residence inside the employer’s home places
any worker in a precarious situation by isolating them and giving the head of household an
extraordinary degree of control over the movements and actions of the worker.
Nellie, a domestic worker, faced the worst case scenario: her employers locked her into
their home. Nellie worked as a housemaid for a local family. While her situation was unhappy for
the first year, it became unbearable when after a year the family suddenly refused to pay her
wages. After her wages had been withheld for four months, Nellie decided to flee. One problem,
however, was that the door to the apartment was usually locked and Nellie did not have a key.
One day providence intervened: on his way to school one of the sons of the family asked her to
carry his backpack down from the apartment for him; she did so and, after sending him off, she
realized:
Oh my God! I am here outside. I am alone. They go already school’ And then that
is already my chance to go. My Madame is sleeping, the door's not locked. ‘I'll
go.’ And then I did that, yeah. I did not want to miss this opportunity.61
Nellie left with only the clothes on her back and the money in her pocket.
Human Rights Implications
These housing conditions raise several human rights concerns. The high cost of legal
rental units calls into question the ability of TCWs in the UAE to earn a living wage. Unsafe
conditions and the failure of many illegal residences to meet building code raise issues about
health and basic safety. Crowded and unsanitary conditions in rentals and labor camps raise
concerns about the human rights to health and a basic standard of living.
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Residential concerns also raise the issue of limitations on mobility and the freedom of
movement. The UDHR specifies that “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.”62 For those renting accommodations, the lack of
affordable, legal housing pushes low and middle-income workers, including most Filipinos in the
UAE into substandard, and often illegal, housing. Targeted enforcement of housing regulations
are designed to keep low income workers out of Emirati neighborhoods. The result is the
formation of ethnic neighborhoods63 that are socially, economically, and legally enforced. For
those living in labor camps, movement is regulated in a more regimented way through control
over entrance to and exit from the camps, but is also restricted by the isolated nature of many
camps, especially the larger camps, in outlying areas that are not served by public transport.
Workers, especially domestic workers, living in their employer’s homes face the greatest
restrictions. Employers, often with the support of recruitment agencies,64 may not provide
appropriate accommodations or allow household workers to leave the house unaccompanied.
At their worst, as in Nellie’s situation, the restrictions tied to residence may raise the
specter of forced labor. When a worker is denied the ability to physically exit an undesirable work
situation, when they are locked in a residence and not allowed to leave, there can be no doubt
that their continued labor is not a freely made choice.
Passport Withholding
There two reasons commonly given as to why employers routinely withhold passports in
the UAE. First, many employers maintain that they hold their employees’ passports for the
employee’s benefit, to keep the passport safe from loss or theft.65 As most workers in the UAE
live in shared accommodations, either in employer-provided labor camps or in rented “bed space”
accommodations, they maintain that important documents are safer if kept by the company under
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lock and key. Second, there are often appeals to the fact that this is just part of the standard
business culture in the UAE; businesses have always done this and so continue to do it. Of
course, this practice has been illegal for more than a decade, outlawed by official decree in 2002.
Neither of these provides a convincing explanation for the vehemence with which employers cling
to the practice despite it being outlawed by the UAE government and unpopular among workers.
There is another explanation, a far more convincing one, which you will rarely hear
employers admitting to on record. Employers pay a price to hire foreign workers, sometimes to
the recruitment agency in the form of fees for service and always to the UAE government in the
form of fees for visas, health checks, etc. Employers consider this as one part of the cost to the
company of the worker during their initial contract period; other costs include wages and health
insurance, for example. The problem is that once paid, an employer may feel that they are
entitled to the full two years of service under any circumstances and that the worker has no right
to quit. If the worker does not complete the full term of their contract, losing out on the processing
fees is not seen as merely a cost of doing business in the UAE; employers may feel that the
worker has cheated them out of the corresponding proportion of the visa and processing fees. Yet
employers are not legally entitled to demand repayment of those fees, either from the government
or from the worker. Instead, they may attempt to make it more difficult for the worker to quit, such
as by requesting a labor ban be placed on a worker who quits before the end of the contracted
term even if they resign and honor the contracted notice period. But stopping an employee from
quitting early who is prepared to accept a ban is more difficult. Passport withholding is a means of
ensuring that workers do not “abscond,” or run away without notice. An anonymous employer
speaking to a local newspaper explains: “I paid big money as bank guarantee and visa charges.
Two of my workers absconded within three months of their recruitment. Now, they will use this
amnesty to get away from here. How can I compensate my loss?”66
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Ellie’s company withholds the passport of its workers as a matter of company policy.
Moreover, they have explicitly linked this policy to the costs paid by the employer in initial
recruiting and visa processing. For Ella to get her passport in order to return to the Philippines on
a brief trip to attend her grandmother’s funeral, she had to find someone willing to post a
“guarantee” for her: “if you're under contract you need to deposit money or otherwise you have to
look for somebody to guarantee you that you will come back. And if you don't come back they are
the one who will pay because you didn't come back.” This is tied to the initial hiring process and
so after the worker completes the full term of the first contract, her employer no longer requires
this guarantee, though it still withholds passports.67
There is a general acceptance of the practice among Filipinos workers. Cherry, for
example, accepts that her passport will be withheld as a matter of course:
Of course I know there is a law. I know. I know that there is a law that the
passport should not be kept by the employer. I think it was two to three years
ago. But some of the employers are keeping it for their, you know, for their
safety. Especially if you are handing cash, if you are handing money, like that.68
Some insist that they agree with the system. Nina, who shares a room with four of her
friends, argues:
I think to keep [your passport] in the company will be more safer than to keep
[your passport] in your home because, you know, even you know the people
around you, but still you don't know what they can do to you in the future. So,
that's what I believe. So at least in in the company, they keep [passports] in the
safe, so nothing will happen to that.69
Others do object or attempt to get their passports back through some subterfuge:
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Gabriel: Well, the situation in our company is that they keep our passport. But, I
was clever at that time to ask for my passport because I said I would go to the
embassy to process something. And then I did not return my passport to them
because I feel a passport is something like a bank passbook, it's a personal
property. So, I don't feel like returning it to them because it's property.
Interviewer: Do you know it's illegal for them to take it?
Gabriel: Yeah, I know. But sometimes they just twist the regulations or the
policies. So since I know my rights, I know how to go around these things.70
Passport withholding is not reserved to low-wage or domestic workers. Medical doctor
Gloria, accountant Dominic, engineer Angelo – all well-paid professionals – were all subject to
passport withholding. Jasmine is a nurse. Her first employer withheld the passports of its workers
as a matter of course. Employees handed over their passports in exchange for their labor cards; if
for any reason they needed to get their passport back, they were required to request it in
advance, then exchange their labor card for the passport. Jasmine signed a two-year contract
with this company. After she had completed her first year, she was eligible for annual vacation.
She picked the dates, obtained approval from her manager, then purchased her airline tickets.
Two weeks before she was set to leave, Jasmine requested her passport. The manager refused
to give it to her. It transpired that the doctor that Jasmine usually worked with (and whom few
other nurses could manage to work with, given the doctor’s abrasive personality) would be taking
vacation in another month and her manager wanted her to delay her trip to coincide. Jasmine,
with plans made and tickets already in hand, did not agree. When the manager continued to
refuse to give her the passport, though, she had no choice but to reschedule.71
At the end of her two-year contract Jasmine had no intention of continuing to work for this
employer. She lined up another job and gave her two months’ notice as required in her contract.
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At the end of the contract, however, her employer again refused to return her passport, insisting
that she continue working with the abrasive doctor. When Jasmine maintained that she wanted to
quit, they told her that they would not issue her the necessary release document allowing her to
transfer her nursing license to another sponsor. Jasmine consulted the UAE Ministry of Labour
who informed her that, while the passport withholding is illegal, the employer was within their
rights to refuse to transfer her license. Jasmine negotiated with her employer, agreeing to work
another week in exchange for the passport and release of her license. Then another week. Then
another. It is likely that her employer delayed hoping that the new job Jasmine had lined up would
fall through so that Jasmine would be forced to continue working for them or face repatriation to
the Philippines. Fortunately for Jasmine, her new employer was patient. After a month, Jasmine
gave up. She demanded her passport back and canceled her existing license with the Health
Authority of Abu Dhabi, and then began the licensing process anew under the sponsorship of her
new employer.72
Stories like Jasmine’s, although not the norm, are common enough that many in the
wider Filipino community are aware of the dangers associated with passport withholding.
However, given their perceived risk versus reward, most do not feel free to speak out. A
conversation I had with Dominic, an accountant at a local company, is illustrative. First, Dominic
listed three reasons why passport withholding might not be so bad:
1. “Actually, yeah, it belongs to you, but basically you have to comply on the, you know,
management policy.”
2. “I view it as one way of protecting the interests of the company, also. Imagine if you're a
company with lots of accountabilities. If you're if you're an accountant here with so huge
responsibility and accountabilities and then if you can just get out of country, I don't think
it would be good.”
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3. “So the way we [Filipinos] are living in this place is we're living with other people. We
don't have our [own] room. So imagine if your passport is just there, we're just leaving it
inside the room, imagine what will happen.”73
But Dominic was clearly unhappy about these excuses even as he listed them off. When
pressed, he admits that he would prefer to keep his own passport:
Dominic: What is it? I cannot do anything. Because, you know, the last time I
went to the Philippines …, after I came back here, I have to give it back. Because
at that time they ask for that, yeah. So you cannot do anything, you know. It's
kind of difficult for us now. Maybe if the Labour Department will do some
inspection maybe we can get our passport back. Yeah.
Interviewer: If you had the choice, would you want your passport back?
Dominic: Absolutely. Yeah.74
Human Rights Implications
At its most basic, passport withholding is theft. Systematic passport withholding
undermines the right to property. But a passport is not just any property. It is systematically
withheld because a passport is a specific type of identity document which represents and
embodies two important principles: nationality and freedom of movement across international
boundaries.
A passport proves citizenship. And with citizenship come certain prerogatives. For
temporary contract workers, the right as a national to claim representation and/or aid from one’s
country of citizenship, particularly from the embassy as the nearest competent representative.
The second, related, prerogative is the right to enter one’s country of citizenship. The ability of a
TCW to repatriate in case of extreme need is a strategy that most would consider a last resort.
Yet it is exactly this right that employers are attempting to block by withholding the passport.
Without their passports, the freedom of movement of TCWs is extremely limited.
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Exiting a Working Situation
In the UAE termination of a working situation is governed not only by contract and labor
law, but also by immigration law due to the coupling of employment and residence. When, where,
why and how an individual exits her job has consequences for her continuing labor and residence
rights in the UAE.
The way that the UAE government processes permissions to reside and work in the
country is currently evolving rapidly. The Emirates ID card aims to create a single electronic
database of the population of the UAE, linking all government services and functions to a single
source. Registration for the card was opened in 2005 and completed in 2012. Since then many
government services have in fact been tied to the card. As part of this restructuring, the Ministry
of Labour and the Ministry of the Interior have both integrated their services with the Emirates
Identity Authority (the authority in charge of the Emirates ID) and are attempting to streamline
their procedures, reducing redundancies and inefficiencies in the system. Currently there is still
confusion regarding the exact requirements regarding the issuance and termination of contracts,
work permits, and residence visas. A primary example is that the Labour Card, formerly a crucial
identity document as well as proof of employment, is being phased out and replaced with an
online work permit system linked to the Emirates ID.
Many of my interviewees were not familiar with the ways in which the system is changing.
In the midst of this shifting landscape, many are basing their decisions on previous experiences,
either their own or their friends’ and families’. While many of the changes promise to benefit
workers, unfamiliarity with the law and its changes have led some individuals astray or frozen
others in uncertainty. My own attempts to record this are also liable to the same weakness. While
I will attempt to note where the laws have changed and how this change might affect migrants’
decisions and actions in the future, it is likely that continuing changes in the law will render some
of this analysis obsolete rather quickly.
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Most contracts in the UAE are for a limited term, generally for two years.75 A worker may
quit at any time, however there are severe penalties for quitting early. If the employee finishes her
contract term, she may give notice and quit her employment with few restrictions. She will be
eligible for the full end of service gratuity. The employee is free to look for a new job and to
transfer sponsorship to her new employer or to repatriate with expenses paid by her employer.
The major restriction that she faces is that she has only thirty days to either transfer under
another employer’s sponsorship or exit the country.
If, however, the worker quits before finishing her contract, she may be required to
compensate her employer for the loss of labor (half a month’s pay for each month remaining in
the contract up to a maximum of 1.5 month’s salary), forfeits her right to repatriation paid for by
the employer, and is subject to a labor ban. A labor ban prevents the worker from taking up any
employment in the UAE for the duration of the ban, usually six months.76 Bans usually mean the
worker has little choice but to repatriate. Workers will thus go to great lengths to avoid having a
labor ban placed on them.
In the UAE the concept of “unfair dismissal” is extremely limited: while the dismissal must
be for a reason related to employment, the employee may simply be made “redundant” for any
reason; the same position may immediately be refilled with a new hire. Princess was subject to
this type of “redundancy”:
[During the global market crash in 2009] the boss failed to get some clients he
was expecting so he had to let the whole team go, … the studio manager (me),
the graphic designer assistant, the marketing assistant, and the programmer and
the assistant programmer. All five went out. Our salaries at least like 5,000 to
7,000 [AED / $1,362 – 1,907 USD]. And now they hired people to come in at a
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An “unlimited term” contract is also possible. While most workers greatly prefer unlimited contracts as they do
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lower salary. The graphic designer starting at 2,500 [AED / $681 USD]. The
assistant designer starting at 2,000 [AED / $545 USD]. They are trying to budget,
we understand.77
Employees that are made redundant do not face a labor ban and the employer is
required to either give notice or cash in lieu and to pay end of service benefits. However, this is
often a struggle. Zoe complains: “Here there is no such thing as thirty days’ notice like we have in
the Philippines.” If you go to the Department of Labour, she complains, they may ask the
company to pay you the benefits that are owed, “but you are still out.”78 The worker made
redundant then has thirty days either to find a new employer and transfer under their sponsorship,
or to exit the country.
If the employee quits while under contract, however, there are increased restrictions. If
the employee quits within the first year of employment, he is subject to an automatic six-month
labor ban which will be upheld even if the employer provides the employee with a No Objection
Certificate (NOC) stating that they do not object to the worker leaving their employ or going to
work for a different employer. Dominic, an accountant with ten years’ experience in the
Philippines, got a job as an accountant through a recruitment agency in the Philippines. Unaware
of the typical salary in the UAE, he accepted an offer with a salary similar to the one he received
in the Philippines. When he arrived in the UAE, he discovered that the going rate for entry-level
accountants was double what he was making. He started looking for another job fairly quickly
and, after nine months, he got an excellent offer from a different company. However, Dominic
was still within the first year of his initial labor contract and so faced an automatic labor ban,
preventing him from accepting the new job: “The company didn't let me go and I don't have the
power to, you know, cancel my contract in order to go. There was automatic ban at that time.”79
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If the employee quits after one year but within the first two years80 of employment the
employee still faces the automatic six-month labor ban; however the ban can be lifted if the first
employer issues an NOC or if the worker is able to find a new job which meets the minimum
salary requirements set forth by the Ministry of Labour. The best case scenario is for the first
employer to release the worker with a NOC. Some people are lucky. Rachelle worked in a
department store for two years then left; got a job as a telephone operator for six months, then as
a secretary for a year and a half, before coming to her current employer as a secretary: “And the
good thing is: there is ban, but I am so blessed that those company who get didn't give me
bans.”81
Many workers will work just the minimum required time, one year, with an employer for
the express purpose of avoiding a labor ban. Enzo had a job that he liked, but the pay was low
and he was often paid late. When a woman offered him a job with greater responsibilities and
higher pay in a new restaurant she was opening, Enzo resigned to accept the new position with
his old employer’s permission. When he went to sign the new contract, however, he found that
the terms were substantially different from the terms they had verbally agreed to. Having already
resigned his old position, Enzo signed the new contract anyway. He worked for just over one year
in order to avoid the automatic labor ban and is now looking for a new job. He is aware that it is
possible that he will still be banned if his employer requests it, but has faith that “God will help
me.”82
However employers, aware that the NOC is the quickest, easiest, and most reliable
means to avoid a labor ban, may take advantage of this situation. Employers have been known to
barter the NOC against a longer notice period, reduced end of service benefits, or just an outright
payment. Juliana quit her first job after one year in order to take a new job. As part of the transfer,
her first employer agreed to release her with a NOC when the second employer agreed to
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Two years has been the duration of validity for the Labour Card; as the Labour Card is being phased out it is
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reimburse the company for expenses related to her recruitment and initial migration.83 This type
of reimbursement is not unusual and is a legal grey area. In cases like Juliana’s, where the new
employer paid, the deal is likely legal. If Juliana was asked to pay herself this would seem to
contradict UAE Labor Law, which specifies that the employer pays all recruitment costs; however
the courts have allowed employers to request reimbursement from employees leaving early if
such reimbursement is stipulated in the labor contract.
There are three ways in which a worker may be entirely exempted from a labor ban: if the
worker can prove significant abuse on the part of the employer, if the worker’s profession is on a
list of highly desirable professions which are explicitly exempted from bans, or if the worker is
employed in a free zone.
Abuse of labor law: Some violations of labor law on the part of the employer are
considered significant enough to release the employee from her contract obligations without a
ban. The most common of these offenses is wage withholding. If wages are left unpaid for two
months or longer, the worker can petition the Ministry of Labor. In the past, proving unpaid wages
was difficult.
Danielle’s employer withheld her passport but gave her a labor card. While she was not
too concerned about having her passport withheld, she wanted a photocopy of her the residence
visa (which should have been in her passport) in case she should ever be asked by the
authorities to produce it. She repeatedly asked about the residence visa and was told not to worry
about it and that she did not really need a copy of it. When a year had passed and she still had
not seen evidence of the residence visa, she checked herself with the General Directorate of
Residency and Foreigners Affairs through their online system. She learned that she did not in fact
have a residence visa; she had unknowingly become an illegal immigrant. Coupled with the fact
that the company perpetually withheld several month’s pay, Danielle decided to quit her job. It
turned out this was not easy. Her employer refused to release her and, as she was only one year
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in to a three-year contract, she faced a labor ban if her employer did not agree to give her an
NOC. Danielle decided to file a case with the UAE Ministry of Labour over the unpaid wages,
hoping to win a court decision releasing her from her employer. While the case was being
investigated, she no longer worked, and so no longer received a wage; this was a difficult period
for Danielle during which she barely scrapped by. Fortunately, Danielle found a new job. And,
even more fortunate, her new employer was a semi-governmental organization. In the UAE
governmental and semi-governmental employers are not subject to UAE labor law and are able to
circumvent many regulations on hiring and firing. Her prospective employer was confident that
they would be able to resolve her situation and hired her despite the pending labor case. She
began working immediately, but it took another five months before her case could be settled. In
the end an agreement was reached between the Public Relations Officer at her new company
and her former employer. Danielle agreed to drop the case she had filed with the Ministry of
Labor and her claims to two months back pay, about 7,000 AED ($1,900 USD). In exchange, her
former employer agreed to release her from her employment contract and pay all fines related to
her illegal stay, about 20,000 AED ($5,445 USD). Despite losing out on wages due her, Danielle
is satisfied with the outcome. Moreover, she is confident that it is only because her new employer
was a semi-governmental company that her former employer was willing to negotiate at all. And,
indeed, most companies would be neither willing nor able to hire her without an NOC, without a
valid visa, with significant fines outstanding, and with a case pending with the Ministry of Labour.
Unable to work to support herself yet unable to repatriate due to the fines outstanding, her
prospects would have been dismal indeed.84
Today, however, the implementation of the Wages Protection System (WPS) has made
proving wage withholding much easier. WPS requires that all employees be paid electronically
into compliant bank accounts so that the Central Bank and the Ministry of Labour can evaluate
payment history. WPS launched in 2009 and employer enrolment was completed in 2010; all
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interviewees except domestic workers were paid electronically and none of those reported current
wage withholding (though a few reported minor delays in payment of a few days or a week).
Exempt professions: Some professions are not subject to labor bans. Ministerial Decision
No. (360) of 1997 establishes several professions – including engineers, doctors, pharmacists,
nurses, accountants and auditors – that are exempted from automatic labor bans.85 Though the
exact professions on the list seem to be flexible and open to interpretation by the Ministry of the
Interior, these six professions seem stable. The fact that individuals in these professions can
change employers benefits them significantly. When employment conditions are unsatisfactory or
fail to live up to the contracted agreement, these professionals will exercise their ability to change
employers. Gloria’s first employer in the UAE was less than ideal. While her salary was paid
promptly, Gloria was unhappy with certain other policies at the hospital, particularly the fact that
they did not provide maternity benefits (she was pregnant at the time) and expected her to work
longer hours than contracted without paying her overtime. Most workers in her position would
have had little option but to continue in this job for at least one year, and more likely for two years,
or face a mandatory labor ban. But Gloria is a medical doctor. After less than one year, Gloria
was able to successfully change employers.86
Free zones: Free zones are designated areas in the UAE where the UAE Labor Law is
not enforced. Free zones benefit foreign businessmen as they are able to bypass national laws
on local ownership of companies, capital repatriation, and other restrictions. Free zones also
benefit workers as free zones issue their own employment permits (not the Federal Ministry of
Labour) and the legal sponsor is not the employer but the free zone itself.87 As the Ministry of
Labour is not involved in issuing the employment visa, any labor ban registered with the Ministry
need not be enforced within the free zone, meaning that even a banned worker may obtain a job
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in a free zone. Free zone workers do not need the consent of their employers in order to change
jobs within the free zone because the employer is not the sponsor of their residence visa, the free
zone is; though the free zone may choose to impose a ban at its own discretion or at the request
of an employer, this is uncommon. Further, any ban that is issued by the free zone against
workers need not be enforced outside of the free zone (though it appears that the two-year
requirement is honored by the Ministry of Labor even in these cases). Workers rightly feel that
free zones offer them significant advantages in terms of mobility and choice of employment.
Interviewer: But if they didn't want you to go, had you completed your contract?
Did they release you from your contract? Or you just left anyway?
Princess: They gave me a hard time. But the advantage is I was in Dubai Media
City, it's a free zone. So, the moment that my new employer paid my guarantee
and then the lady from Dubai Media City office smile and tell me 'OK, you show
them this. And if they don't want to give you your passport, call the police. Just
give them a very sweet smile because right now you belong to us. This is free
zone. So if this Jordanian former boss of yours gives you a hard time and would
not let go of your fricking passport show them this and they'll do. “If you don't give
right now we will call the police and the police will put you in jail.”’ Halas,88 that's
how I got my passport. They gave me a hard time. And a lot of Filipinos will be
tricked into this because they are trying to let you not get the [end of service]
gratuity. So that's what they are after.
Interviewer: Were you able to get the gratuity?
Princess: Oh, yes! I scared them off of their wits!89
Absconding
Workers who exit an employment situation without giving notice are considered to have
absconded. Absconding is a violation of Labour Law in the UAE and therefore illegal. Absconders
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are subject to arrest, a fine (which is accrued per day of illegal residence), deportation, and a
lifetime ban on employment in the UAE.
Nellie had been working as a housemaid in the UAE for a year making 900 AED ($245
USD) per month plus an extra 300 ($82 USD) during the school months for tutoring. But then one
month her employer told her there was a problem at the bank:
My employer did not give me my four months’ salary and I've been here long
time. When the first month, they told ‘Sorry we did not,’ because they have a
problem from the bank. And then, because of I have heart, and I feel that they
don't have money, okay. First offense. And then, ‘Another month, again?’ They
told me that the two months already that passed, it is a fund for ticket if I want to
go home in the Philippines. So I'm thinking that ‘Why do you want to take that two
months from me?’ And then I told ‘Okay, buy ticket.’ I told to my madam, ‘Oh
come, Madam. I have already two months. Buy ticket. I will go. But I do not want
to stay here. I do not want work [for] nothing. What I have to do? I have kids! I
have family. My kids is taking some milk; they want food. What I have to do?90
Her family in the Philippines suggested that she look for new work, a cousin in the UAE
suggested that she go to the Embassy for help. So Nellie absconded.91 She ran to the Embassy
and the Embassy tried to help. But the Embassy prioritizes settlement out of court. If both sides
cooperate, it is the easiest and fastest way to resolve these cases. The employer can cancel the
worker’s visa and return her passport thus allowing her to leave, the agency is liable for the return
airfare, and the worker will relinquish claims to back pay. But pursuing mediation for out of court
settlement is risky. If the employer refuses to cooperate, they can file case against the worker for
absconding. Whichever side files first tends to have an advantage in the court system as they set
the terms of the initial legal battle. So if the Embassy delays filing in order to pursue mediation,
the employer gains the opportunity to take the lead.
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In Nellie’s case, the Embassy went to the immigration officials at the General Directorate
of Residence and Foreigners Affairs for mediation, but her employer did not cooperate; the
Embassy then went to her UAE placement agency, but the agency refused to pay the withheld
wages. In the meantime her employers filed an absconding case against her. Nellie now needs to
decide if she will plead guilty to absconding, in which case she will have to go through the legal
process of conviction including a short (a few days) detention in Shahama jail and deportation
(the UAE government will pay for her return airfare), or whether to stay and fight the charge and
demand her back pay, a process that the Embassy estimates will take about four months. She
has not yet decided but is clearly leaning towards pleading guilty, she just wants to make sure
that she will only be banned from the UAE afterwards, not all work abroad. 92
Cumulative Effect
The issues surrounding residence, passport withholding, and absconding when
considered together can compound with disastrous results for the worker. Lissa was a driver for a
local family in Abu Dhabi for more than four years; the family she worked for routinely withheld
the passports of their domestic workers. Lissa signed and worked two successive two-year
contracts with them. When negotiating her third contract, Lissa took advantage of the fact that her
services were badly needed at the moment the negotiations were happening to secure a
substantial raise. After the period of great need passed, however, her employer began to express
discontent with her new, higher salary. Lissa feared that her employer might turn to underhanded
tricks to terminate her employment without having to pay her end of contract benefits. One day
Lissa had to take her passport with her to run an errand, when she returned to the house and her
employer asked for the passport back, Lissa refused to turn it over to him:
But I just don't know. I just cannot hand over it. I just cannot hand it over. So I
told my Baba, ‘I cannot give you my passport. If the immigration tell me to give
you the passport, OK, I will give. But I need an assurance that you will not breach

92

Ibid.

218

my contract because that is the very thing I am fighting for. I am fearing you use
me for four years and then you'll just throw me out like that.’93
Her employer insisted she relinquish her passport and a battle of wills ensued. In the end,
Lissa decided to take her case to the UAE Immigration (the General Directorate of Residence and
Foreigners’ Affairs), hoping that they could mediate a solution: “But unfortunately, even though I
was taught that that was the right thing to do, you have a conflict with your sponsor that you
cannot handle in their home, go to the Immigration where there is a mediator. But that didn't
happen.” Meanwhile, her employer, angry that Lissa had filed a complaint against him with the
Immigration officials, filed a complaint with the Abu Dhabi police claiming that Lissa had
absconded. When I met Lissa, she was resident in a facility run by the Embassy of the Philippines
in Abu Dhabi, waiting for a court resolution to her situation.
Human Rights Implications
The ability to end a working situation without undue hardship is crucial to maintaining a
substantive right to choice of employment and therefore to the prohibition of slavery. Even if a job
is freely entered into initially, if a worker cannot quit they can no longer be said to be working of
their own free choice.
Further, restrictions on terminating quitting are a major contributing factor to other human
rights violations and to the impunity with which employers commit violations. Without this basic
capacity, workers have little choice but to endure unfair and exploitative labor practices that would
otherwise be unacceptable to them. This fact appeared time and again in interviews with Filipinos
in the UAE: fear of a labor ban affects the decision making of migrants, pushing them to accept
violations of their rights as human beings and as workers for the duration of time in which they
are subject a labor ban.
There is also an issue of equal access to legal protection. While employees cannot quit
without significant civil penalties including labor bans, as well as possible sanctions for
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absconding, employers are not similarly constrained. A worker may be made redundant for any
purpose and failure to comply with end of service terms is not treated as a criminal offence.
Permanent Temporariness: Nationality, Passports and Family Books
In the UAE there is no category that corresponds to permanent residency as it is
generally understood in the West: the right to reside, study, and work in the country of residence
for an indefinite period, to travel freely in and out of that country, and to enjoy all those rights and
privileges available under the law except those reserved for citizens as a matter of human rights,
national security, or the public good. As was discussed in Chapter One, the closest concept to
permanent residency in the UAE is actually Emirati citizenship. Citizenship is difficult to attain
other than by birth. Though there is no official stated policy for nationalization, Sayed Ali explains
what are thought to be the informal requirements:
The requirements to be considered for citizenship are often thought to include
thirty years’ residence, being Muslim, Arab and an Arabic speaker, and having a
clean police record, ‘proper’ academic qualifications and a ‘healthy’ bank balance
– though it is at the government’s discretion to give citizenship after a screening
process, at which point personal influence (wasta) comes into play.94
However, even where an individual gains citizenship they are not necessarily considered
a “true” Emirati national. There are two basic forms of identity documents issued by the UAE:
passports and Kholasat Qaid.95 The passport identifies you as a citizen of the UAE; but only the
Kholasat Qaid, or Family Book, identifies you as an Emirati national. The UAE passport
guarantees the holder the right to remain in the country without a visa but little more. Emirati
nationality is associated with the Kholasat Qaid.96 Many of the privileges accompanying Emirati
nationality are reserved for those holding a Kholasat Qaid, from college scholarships to interest-
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free housing or business loans.97 And the Kholasat Qaid is virtually impossible to attain except by
decent or marriage to an Emirati male.
For the vast majority of workers in the UAE, then, residence is conditional on agreement
to a limited term of stay. Residency is tied to employment and is limited to a two- to three-year
horizon. This is an explicit national policy, codified in Labor Law, and well understood by
migrants. There is no regular path to permanent status or citizenship. When a migrant agrees to
participate in a temporary worker program it is with the explicitly stated condition of temporary
admission to the country. This should serve to temper feelings of belonging and identity and there
is some evidence that it does do so.98 For example, when the recession hit Dubai in 2008/2009,
the architectural firm that Fortunado worked for underwent massive layoffs, going from over four
hundred people down to about sixty. He kept his job but the experience was meaningful for him,
suggesting that he should not rely too heavily on his position in the UAE: “I’m not sure if it a lucky
thing. But, of course, when you see your friends leaving you’re going to think twice. Wow. So that
is the reason why we decided to start with our own business in the Philippines. It’s a good thing.
So from then it’s an eye-opener that we have to do something that we have an option. What
happens if we found out that I have no job one day? So you have to do something.”99 His wife
and son went back to the Philippines and started a restaurant that he hopes will eventually
support his day to day needs in retirement. He remains in the UAE without his family. “My focus is
more on work, work, work. Because my wife is not working. This is not permanent; this is
temporary. I have to save in the future for my wife and me.”100
Nonetheless, migrant workers in the UAE often stay for prolonged periods of time by
arranging successive employment contracts and continually renewing their residence visa. James
anticipates staying in the UAE for the foreseeable future:
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James: I'm gonna stay here.
Interviewer: You're gonna stay here?
James: Yeah. I love here. I want to go back again and again and again here. I
spent two years in the Philippines. Then I [came] back here. I don't like in
Philippines. We don't have money in Philippines. It's hard to find a job in
Philippines.101
But eventually, everyone must face the reality that they cannot stay for the long term. It is
well understood among workers that residence is tied to employment. This is reinforced in myriad
ways: an individual must have a work permit before they can initially apply for a residence visa
and in order to renew the residency visa every two years; evidence of employment and sufficient
wages are required to sponsor relatives’ residency; part of the process of quitting a job is to
cancel the residency visa. It is also generally known that employment in the UAE cannot go on
forever; there is a mandatory retirement age of sixty five in the UAE.
Adrian: But in my age right now, maybe two to three years I can stay. Then after
that I can be for good. … OK, for good … [with] my family. Because I cannot stay
longer here abroad, you know.
Interviewer: Why not?
Adrian: This is not my place.102
Compounding the problem, many temporary contract migrants would understandably
choose to bring their families with them to the host country. In the most complex cases, migrant
children are born and raised in the host country. These children are likely to form a greater sense
of belonging in the host country than in their country of citizenship, which often remains basically
unknown. In the UAE it is not unheard of for multiple generations of a family to spend their entire
lives, from cradle to grave, in the UAE without ever gaining permanent status, much less the full
complement of citizens’ rights. Arianna and her husband have been in the UAE for over a
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decade. All three of their children were born and raised in the UAE. While Arianna and her
husband hope to retire in the Philippines to start a small farm “and we'll just enjoy whatever we
had worked for,” the future is more complicated for her children:
To go back to the Philippines? I don't think so. We have a house in Philippines,
we are building a house in Philippines, but I don't [think] my children would like to
stay there for good. They like the lifestyle here. They don't want to [go back to the
Philippines] because it's, you know, it's different. Here, they have things they
enjoy that they cannot enjoy there. The only thing my eldest daughter likes there
is because she can have a dog in our own house. Here it's difficult to have a dog
in an apartment. Other than that, she doesn't like the climate, she doesn't like
that not all of the houses have AC, she doesn't like the small roads, and there's
always traffic. But she's not used [to life] there. She's used to the life here. So
maybe if she is old enough for college, then we'll see where she will go. But for
now we'll stay here, yeah.103
Arianna, however, does worry that her kids have no emotional attachment to the
Philippines:
That's why now - we are just building the house [in the Philippine]. It's not yet
finished. I am telling my children ‘This will be our house, you know, if ever we
need to go there. What design you want? What color you want?’ Because they
are kids, they are excited. ‘Oh you put a swimming pool!’ ‘You can have a dog!’
And [my daughter] said, ‘Mommy, we'll have air con?’ ‘Yes. We'll have air con in
all the rooms!’ And ‘oh we'll have our back-up generator, we'll have solar panels
so we'll not have any other electricity.’ And my husband is laughing, and I'm: ‘oh
my God! We're spending more on the house!’ But I am telling [my daughter] and
also I'm showing her because we have friends who, you know, have college kids
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and they all go home to Philippines. ‘When you're big enough, when you finish
high school, you go to Philippines. Where do you want to go?’ And [my daughter]
said, ‘OK, but Mommy I want to have a flat in Manila.’ ‘OK, we'll buy a flat in
Manila!’ So I we are preparing. … We are preparing her that, if the time comes
that we need to leave here, then we have to go back to Philippines. … But they
know that this is not forever here. We have to go somewhere else after this.104
Nonetheless, almost all Filipinos that I spoke with expressed a desire to return to the
Philippines one day.105 While some expressed envy at the perks associated with being a “true”
Emirati, all identified themselves as Filipino, Cabayan, Pinoy.
Interviewer: If you could get residency, permanent residency here, would you
want that?
Arianna: Sure! I'll have a Land Cruiser, I’ll have a villa, I'll have monthly supply of
rice and sugar and flour. Yes, of course!
Interviewer: Would you want to retire here? Because, you know, there's a
difference here between family book and passport, right?
Arianna: Yes.
Interviewer: So, even if you get the passport, you don't necessarily get the Land
Cruiser.
Arianna: You don't, no. [A friend] has a passport but he doesn't get the benefits.
Yeah. For here, because it's Middle East, I don't know if this is stable country
after few years. So I think it's really better to go home in the Philippines. Because
I at least there, even if we have war, I know that it's my country, but here I'm not
so sure. … I it's better, I think, to retire in your home country, in the Philippines.106
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Expressing a true desire to retire in the UAE, to stay until death is rare. Ava is one of the
few. She has been in the UAE for over twenty years. She met and married her second husband,
a non-Gulf Arab from a family that had been in the UAE for even longer, in the UAE. She
converted to Islam and learned Arabic in order to marry him and get along with his family. As her
two daughters from her first marriage grew up, she brought them over to the UAE on visit visas
and helped them find jobs (her son has remained in the Philippines). She has made friends and
established her professional life there. Her network and personal ties are stronger in the UAE
than in the Philippines. But Ava is approaching retirement age and facing the harsh reality that
she cannot stay in the UAE, her home, for much longer. The sincerity in her voice is
heartbreaking:
Why doesn’t the UAE give people a chance to do like in the USA? Why they
don’t give people that we working very long time [a] chance to stay here
permanently like the US system? Why they can’t? That’s the problem. … If I
could stay here for a lifetime, I would stay. The problem is, if no work, I cannot.107
Human Rights Implications
Imposing restrictions on entry is not a human rights violation – there is no right to entry.
Reaffirming those restrictions with every new visa period is similarly not a violation. Ruhs rightly
argues that “residence and employment on the basis of a temporary work permit alone does not
create an entitlement to stay permanently in the host country."108 The host country may choose to
grant permanent residency on other merits (economic, marriage, etc.), however, no legal right to
stay is acquired through participation in a temporary migration scheme. Ruhs points to Singapore
and the GCC states as cases where “there is effectively no possibility for migrants employed on
temporary work permits to acquire permanent residence.”109 While there is no “permanent
residence” status in the UAE, there are some mechanisms through which migrant status with
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greater permanence can be achieved (primarily through property or business ownership in the
country) and the prospect of achieving citizenship (passport) remains rare but possible. However,
for the majority of TCWs in the UAE, permanent settlement in the country is not an option,
migrants know that it is not an option, and they have accepted the terms of residence offered to
them.
A more complex question is to ask if the integration into society of long term migrants
such as Ava, or of young people that have lived their entire lives in the country such as Ariana’s
children is so complete as to create an obligation, a right. In the case of long term residents, I
would argue that it does not. Again, the migrant, as a capable agent of her own future, has
accepted these terms not once, but every two years. The argument for children born and raised in
the UAE is much stronger. These minors are in the UAE through no action of their own, they
know no other home, and being forced to settle somewhere new for the first time at retirement
age sixty five would certainly be painful and jarring. Perhaps the UAE does have an obligation to
these individuals. But it is not an obligation tied to a human right. This would be tantamount to
arguing for a human right to jus soli citizenship, something that is not generally accepted. Few
countries outside of the Americas accept the principle of jus soli unconditionally, many Western
and Middle Eastern nations place significant restrictions on jus soli citizenship,110 and most of the
world simply does not recognize it. So long as the child is not made stateless by the UAE’s
decision not to grant citizenship, the human rights of the child are not violated. It would be a
positive step if the UAE opened an opportunity for citizenship to children born on its soil, but not
all good things are human rights.
Conclusion
The issues of im/mobility presented here may at first glance appear less significant than
the high profile, high impact issues discussed in the previous chapter. However, I argue that this
set of factors which creates immobility is actually the very crux of the problem. Each one of these
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factors –policies constraining the means of departure from the Philippines, constraints on
residence, passport withholding, constraints on quitting, and policies tying residency to
employment – shuts off significant, even crucial, alternate opportunities. As viable alternatives are
closed down, the worker becomes increasingly constrained to continue working in their existing
position even when conditions are exploitative.
Immobility constrains migrants’ agency, their ability to make choices deciding the course
of course of their lives. In particular passport withholding and constraints on quitting reduce
agency to such an extent that the worker becomes reliant on state regulation and enforcement.
However, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, these mechanisms often do not work or
provide sufficient protection to migrant workers.
There are limits to the abuses that employers can get away with set by the limits of what
migrant workers will tolerate. The most obvious is wage withholding. When wages are withheld,
workers will try most any mechanism possible to address the situation. It is perhaps not
surprising, therefore, that this is one area in which UAE government regulation works well on
behalf of workers: the Wages Protection System provides a mechanism to both encourage wage
payment and provide evidence should wages be withheld.
The second limit, however, is not an issue but a time limit. Workers in the UAE will
tolerate almost any abuse (short of wage withholding) for the one or two years necessary to avoid
receiving a labor ban. However, once this threat is passed, the worker regains a significant
element of mobility and she is likely to exercise the option to change employers. This
demonstrates just how crucial mobility truly is in reducing the incidence of human rights violations
among migrant workers.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SAFETY, SECURITY, AND THE LAW
Introduction
When we think about migration and security, we usually think about the possible negative
impact that migration, especially large-scale migration, can have on national security. After the
September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001 there was a flood of literature, academic and
popular, assessing the security threats that migration posed. While the flood seems to be
receding, this “securitization” of migration remains a persistent framing mechanism in political and
popular discourse internationally. We have seen increased restrictions and more elaborate
processes of control over migration arise in tandem with efforts to police borders against illegal
immigration. Headlines about migrants’ access to courts tend to focus on deportation proceedings
or the prosecution of migrant criminal offenders. The UAE is no exception to this trend.
For obvious reasons, this is not how migrant workers in the UAE tend to view the
situation. They are more worried about their individual interactions with the police, courts, and
other legal structures and their ability to secure safety and security for themselves and their
families. Security in this chapter is understood broadly to include not only personal safety but also
human security and issues around the legal structure that mediates migrants’ access to redress
and voice.
Illegal Immigration and Deportation
There are a significant number of illegal immigrants in the UAE; there are “about 65,000
unauthorized migrants – including those who entered the country illegally, visa over-stayers,
migrants working on tourist visas, and others.”1 There are no public figures regarding the various
mechanisms through which migrants entered illegal status. Although it is possible to enter the
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UAE illegally – one could walk over the border with Oman or cross the Arabian Gulf from Iran via
small boat, or enter on forged documents – this is unusual in general and practically unheard of
for Filipinos. Such “infiltration,” as it is known in the UAE, is usually the result of human smuggling
in which migrants from across South Asia (especially Pakistan) are taken by foot to Iran and then
by small boat across the Arabian Gulf.2 In contrast, most illegal Filipino migrants in the UAE are
either visa over-stayers or working on a tourist visa.
Illegal migrants are in a precarious position in the UAE and the Gulf as exiting the region
is particularly difficult. The fine for overstaying is 125 AED ($34.03 USD) per day. This quickly
adds up and many illegal immigrants literally cannot afford to leave the country through regular
channels. Illegal exit is also difficult and unlikely given the geography of the GCC.3 Periodic
amnesties offer illegal migrants the opportunity to exit the UAE without paying fines for
overstaying, though the migrant usually needs to find the funds to cover his own airfare. In the
most recent amnesty, from December 2012 to February 2013, 61,826 illegal migrants were
granted exit permits allowing them to leave the UAE; in the previous amnesty (2007), 246,699
illegal immigrants were given exit passes and another 95,259 were able to regularize their status
and remain in the UAE.4
This dissertation does not deal with the topic of illegal immigration in depth. Only one
interviewee was in an illegal situation. After a series of disappointing contracts, Nicole, a domestic
worker, decided to try going freelance – working for multiple families at an hourly rate. To do this,
rather than being sponsored by and working solely for a single person, Nicole illegally purchased
a visa. Her visa shows that she works for a local company in a menial position; this is a fiction.
Nicole’s situation is not the norm, neither for Filipinos nor for illegal migrants in the UAE. Not
many domestic workers pursue this option as it is both high risk and high cost. Nicole herself
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does not think she will buy another visa when this one expires after two years and instead is
considering looking for a new sponsor, though she hopes to work freelance on the side.5
Nonetheless, illegal immigration is an unavoidable undercurrent in any discussion with
migrants in the UAE for two reasons. First, it is relatively easy to fall into an illegal immigration
situation. As discussed in Chapter Six, UAE law greatly restricts the ways in which a worker can
exit a working situation; if a worker quits without legally acceptable cause, they must compensate
the employer. If the worker cannot pay the required compensation, or if she simply runs away
without giving notice (absconding), she has broken UAE law and becomes an illegal migrant.
Even if the worker quits in an approved fashion or pays the compensation, employment and
residence are tied together in such a way that the worker has thirty days to either find a new
employer/sponsor or exit the country. If she fails to meet this deadline, she becomes an illegal
migrant.
Second, visa cancellation and deportation is the default mechanism through which the
UAE authorities deal with problematic migrants. If a migrant is found guilty of a crime, any crime,
deportation is a possible penalty. Workers have been deported for crimes as minor as begging6
and public obscenity.7 Immigration violations and labor unrest (striking is explicitly illegal under
UAE Labour Law) are almost always met with deportation. As such, the fear of deportation, of
losing one’s job and one’s adopted home, is always a consideration mediating a workers’
decisions regarding her employment and personal behavior. This fragility, therefore, is a constant
backdrop in the conversations I had with Filipinos migrants in the UAE about their experiences
and plans for the future.
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Crime and Personal Safety
Most interviewees report that they feel that the UAE is a “safe” place. When questioned
about this a bit deeper, it is clear that different interpretations of “safety” influence this answer.
Freedom from petty crime, robberies and assaults is what most interviewees initially commented
on. Bliss marvels that she can leave her wallet on the table at a restaurant and it will not be
stolen.8 The only time Mary Grace ever called the police is when she found an expensive phone
in a taxi. It turned into a big deal: the police kept her and the taxi while the owner was contacted,
the police gave the alleged owner a lineup of phones.9 Few people are afraid of violent crime. In
fact, the fact that people feel safe walking on the streets in most neighborhoods, even after dark,
is often mentioned as one of the best things about living in the UAE.
However, this feeling of safety is somewhat illusory. The US State Department’s
Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) classifies the crime rates in both Abu Dhabi and
Dubai as medium threat. In its 2014 report on Dubai, the OSAC notes:
While the reported crime rate is low, actual crime rates may be higher due to
underreporting. The host nation is sensitive to maintaining a very safe and
secure public image which may discourage individuals from reporting crime. The
host government takes measurable steps to nurture an image of safety and
security. The resulting feeling of relative safety may cause Western expatriates to
take fewer precautions than they would in other major cities. Complacency and
poor security practices have resulted in Westerners occasionally being the
victims of residential, commercial, and vehicle burglary.10
The truth is that, while the vast majority of migrants in the UAE would not risk arrest, loss
of employment, and deportation for the sake of petty crime, such crime does exist. Though the
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UAE government does not release detailed crime data, it is estimated that scams, petty theft, and
sexual harassment continue to occur on a regular basis. Concerns about the general safety of life
in the UAE linger for many people.
Scams and Petty Theft
One area that is ripe for exploitation is real estate. As described in Chapter Six,
apartments in the UAE, and especially in the cities of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, are expensive and
difficult to find. Because of this, when someone does find a good deal on an apartment, they need
to move fast to secure the rental unit. A full year’s rent is normally paid in one initial payment.
This is the perfect mix for scamming: potential targets are motivated, must move quickly without
sufficient time to fully vet a deal, and large amounts of money are in play. One of Cherry’s friends
referred her to a housing agent. The agent showed her a very nice apartment that was available
for 135,000 AED ($36,752 USD). It looked like a legitimate deal, the agent was able to show her
the appropriate documents from the Municipality and had copies of the owner’s ID documents.
Cherry agreed to an unusual payment scheme, though: she would pay in two installments; after
her first check for 63,000 AED ($17,151 USD) cleared, the agent would give her the keys in
exchange for the remainder of the money. Cherry gave the agent the first check and waited. And
waited. She started calling the agent to check the progress of the deal but soon the mobile
number was disconnected. Cherry went to the apartment and found the woman who owned the
unit. The owner claimed that, while the agent had worked for the woman in the past, the agent
had recently absconded. Dubious, Cherry asked why the agent had had the documents and the
copy of the owner’s ID; the owner claimed the agent had stolen them. Cherry and the owner
approached the police. Eventually the agent was found and arrested. But the finale was not
exactly what Cherry had hoped for. The Red Crescent stepped in, offering to repay 40,000 AED
($10,889 USD) if Cherry would forgive the remainder of the debt, allowing the agent to be
released from prison and deported. Cherry refused: “That's my hard earned money because that
money is my [housing] allowance. And the company is cutting it from [my salary]. So for one year
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I didn't use that allowance... So I need to get it back to me.”11 Cherry then went on break for the
Ramadan holiday, expecting to discuss the matter further when she returned. Instead, the agent
was pardoned by the Ruler of Abu Dhabi as part of the Ramadan celebrations. Cherry received
no compensation whatsoever.12
Recruiting is also an area well-known to be rife with scams. Such scams do not only
happen in the country of origin. Prospective workers in the UAE are also vulnerable. The
recruiting scam that Maria Joy and her husband fell victim to, described in Chapter Five, is a
variation on a common scam. After arriving on visit visas to look for employment, Maria Joy and
her husband struggled to find well-paying jobs. With their savings dwindling, they were feeling
more and more pressured to find work. When a man called them posing as a headhunter, they
were interested. For a fee of 600 AED ($163 USD) each, the man promised to find them good
jobs in the northern Emirate of Ajman. They paid the fee but never heard from the man again.13
The position of relative weakness that job seekers in Abu Dhabi face makes them vulnerable to
this type of scam. The deadline that job seekers face when in the country on a limited term visit
places additional pressures on job seekers. There are unscrupulous persons that take advantage
of these weaknesses. Maria Joy did not report this scam to the police because she feared she
and her husband would be deported for job seeking while on a tourist visa: “We did not complain.
Why? Because we are on visit visa. We both knew that it is prohibited for a tourist to look for a job
here.”14 The government of the Philippines does prohibit its citizens from leaving the country to
look for work on a tourist visa and is very active in its attempts to prevent this practice; the
misconception that this practice is illegal under UAE law as well is common. But the UAE
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government does not, in fact, forbid job-seeking while on a tourist visa and Maria Joy could have
sought help from the UAE police.
Joey fell victim to another common scam, this one involving petty theft. He left the office
one day with a bunch of stuff in his hands. When he got in his car, Joey put all the stuff down on
the passenger seat. It was a hot day, so he opened the car windows. As he started the car, a
man appeared at the passenger window; the man told him there was a problem with his car,
pointing on the ground on the passenger side. Joey got out of the car and walked over to see a
puddle of some oil or fluid on the ground. He bent down to inspect it closer and determined that it
was not actually leaking from his car. For a while, the stranger was encouraging him to keep
looking for the mystery leak, but then suddenly walked away. “He just walked away. Then, when I
go back in my car, oh wow, all my things are gone - the two perfumes that I just recently bought
from online shopping and my new S3 [smartphone] is gone.” Joey did not report the incident to
the police.15
It is important to note that two of these three interviewees did not report the crimes that
they fell victim to to the UAE authorities, supporting the likelihood mentioned above that crime in
the UAE is underreported.
Sexual Harassment
Alexandra feels safe in the UAE. In fact, she lists physical safety as one of the best parts
about living in the UAE. Yet Alexandra would never leave home without her cell phone: “Don’t
leave your cell phone, especially if you are outside. Because somebody is following you there or
somebody will grab you and put you inside the car. At least if you have cell phone, you can call
the police.”16
This fear may seem a bit melodramatic, but Alexandra has cause to be worried. Stories
of rape frequently make the news and she herself has been subject to harassment such as men
exposing their genitals or masturbating in front of her in public on several occasions. She laughed
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when she told me the story of how one evening as she and some colleagues left work by the
back door after closing only to find a man masturbating by the door. When they screamed in
shock, he only stared at them and continued masturbating. The women retreated back into the
restaurant while a manager called the police. She laughed, but confessed, “it’s awful; it’s very
scary.”17
Many women in the UAE have their stories about sexual harassment or even assault; it is
pervasive but underreported. Of the twenty seven women interviewed for this project, twenty
three reported some type of sex crime (including sexual harassment) or persistent fear of sexual
crime that affected their behavior. The most common are incidents of sexual harassment, such as
where men in vehicles cruise alongside women walking in order to make comments, ask how
much a woman would charge for sex, shout a phone number at her, and/or ask her to get in the
car. Even women who feel that sexual harassment is not a problem for them report these types of
incidents:
Nina: I feel that this country is peaceful. It's a peaceful country, even though
there are some incidents that bothers me, especially those things, the rape, and
the blah blah blah. But really, if you will compare to other countries, still those
type of incidents here is lesser than to the other country. Yeah.
Interviewer: Pretty much every woman I have talked to here has had some form
of sexual harassment or some problem like that. And you're a beautiful girl. And
especially if you're walking around, late at night, after work.
Nina: Yeah. No, I haven't [had a problem].
Interviewer: Guys shouting phone numbers at you?
Nina: Oh, that one? Yes.
Interviewer: Yes. See.
Nina: Yes. But no…
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Interviewer: Cars slowing down and following you when you're walking on the
street?
Nina: I think once. But I'm not too worried.
It is common for men to shout “how much” at women; a barely disguised euphemism
asking for sexual favors in exchange for money, otherwise known as soliciting prostitution. This is
so common that the phrase “how much” has entered the vernacular. Mia explains:
Yeah, because one time also when I am working in Sharjah, somebody asked
me ‘how much.’ Before I didn't know what is ‘how much.’ Yes, I know the
meaning of ‘how much,’ but I don't know ‘how much’ of what, of what? Then,
when I went to my sister, I told my sister, ‘One guy says to me ‘how much.’ What
does that mean?’ And she, she's laughing at me. Because I don't know. And [she
says]: ‘Sister, he's asking how much for you. You, you! Not anything!’ ME!18
This and other bad experiences early in her stay in the UAE left a lasting impression on
Mia. As a result of persistent sexual harassment in public, Mia changed her behavior.
Before I was, I think, not weak, but I am new here, so I don't know the tradition. I
don't know anything. I thought: ‘if he smiles, I'll smile; that's okay.’ But, no, if he
smiles, don't smile. Because if you're smiling, it means you like him. It's not okay.
So now if I am walking, I'm not looking at the face.19
Worse, Mia has internalized some of the ethic and it has affected her behavior in subtle
ways:
I think it's from ourselves. If you are going out there and you're wearing
sleeveless or mini skirt, then everybody will be looking at you. But if you are
wearing decent dress, then it's a different thing.20
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Groping is also fairly common, particularly in crowded public areas such as bus stations.
Ella had an incident at a bus stop in Dubai. There were separate queues for men and women and
the women got on the bus first; as she was getting on the bus a man grabbed her buttocks:
Before I get in the bus, one man touch my ass. I'm very, very angry! My bag, I
throw my bag there [on the ground]. I beat him, boxed him left and right. And him
going only like this {holds hands in front of her face}. Like that only. I very, very
angry that time! Because, you know, I thought: why you only do like that only to
the Filipino ladies? Why don't you do your same nationality like that? Or the
Arabic ladies? Why only Filipino? Then the bus driver he heard that I am
shouting, he saw also that I'm boxing that guy. … And then the bus driver told
me…, ‘Cabayan, just get in and relax.’ I tell him, ‘You are Filipino. You are telling
me that just get in and relax? You will not say anything about this guy? You didn't
see what he did to me?’ I told him. He told me, ‘Please Cabayan, because you
know there is a police outside.’ ‘I am not afraid of the police. If I know that I am
right I am not afraid of the police.’ I told him that. Then another guy he brought
my bag inside on the seat. And he told me, "OK Cabayan. Just sit, calm down
and relax. Because after a while the police will [come] around and otherwise our
bus will have delay.’ That time I'm thinking also for my accommodation. Because
for accommodation they will close [the entrance] at eleven o'clock; after eleven
o'clock I cannot get inside. So nothing to do! … If I don't think that I will be
sleeping outside, otherwise that guy will be in jail! I will call the police. … I can do
it! I’m not afraid!21
Coco admits to this type of harassment as well but feels that this sort of thing is the same
everywhere in the world: she once went on a trip to Europe with some of the students of the
school she works at and it was “the same there, too.”22 I am unconvinced. Personally, I have
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travelled extensively and have never before been stopped by a strange man in public and asked
for sex. In three years in the UAE it has happened to me on at least five occasions – once outside
the Embassy of the Philippines, still on Embassy property!23 And my obvious whiteness should
protect me in the UAE’s race and nationality-conscious hierarchy. Like Mia and Coco, many
women become accustomed to this behavior, make conscious or unconscious changes to their
behavior or clothing, and learn to laugh it off. But the first time a complete stranger, in broad
daylight, in a public place asks you “how much,” it is a jarring and insulting experience. And when
a complete stranger in a vehicle starts stalking you on your walk home, perhaps even opening the
door to the car and demanding that you get in with him, it is frightening no matter how many times
you have had to deal with it. Mia again:
When I first came here I don't even think about that, but my first month here, it
was, how can I say, nightmare. It was just a lot of guys just come near you and
ask your number and harass you. And then, [one time] I cried in the center island
in the road because I was so afraid because one guy with his Toyota Land
Cruiser stopped on my side and opened his door and said, ‘Come with me!’ I was
shouting and I run in the center island so he cannot approach me. Already I was
crying.24
One of the most difficult things about sex crimes in the UAE is that women find it difficult
to turn to the police for help. There is often an assumption that non-Arab women, particularly
Asian women, in Abu Dhabi are promiscuous or of loose moral values. In “he said, she said”
situations, the woman will find herself at a disadvantage. Even should the police take a woman’s
complaint seriously, a conviction for sexual assault, including in cases of rape, is difficult to
achieve in the UAE. Sharia law in the UAE devalues the testimony of women. In order to get a
conviction, either the attacker must confess or the attack must have been witnessed by four adult
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males. Sometimes medical evidence can be introduced if the woman reports the crime
immediately and submits to an exam by a doctor at a government hospital. Such evidence,
though, is not usually conclusive. And without a sexual assault conviction, the woman reporting
the crime is likely to become the subject of a criminal investigation for sex outside of wedlock (a
crime in the UAE); her testimony becomes evidence against her. Several high-profile cases
where female victims of rape have been arrested and jailed reinforce the message that women
should not report this type of crime to the UAE authorities.25 Needless to say, this serves as a
significant deterrent to women wishing to report sexual crimes to the UAE authorities: in a 2009
survey, more than half of women said they would not report rape to the police.26
Women are aware of this official ambivalence and it affects their actions. On her way
home from a New Year’s Eve party, Cassandra was subject to a check of her immigration
documents by a CID officer who assumed she was a prostitute.27 When Lissa ran away from an
abusive labor situation, she intentionally avoided going to stay with a male cousin for fear the
police would assume she had absconded due to an illicit romance (a common story-line), rather
than due to a labor dispute, and so dismiss her case. 28
But Maxine has a particularly jarring story. She was with friends waiting to be served at a
restaurant one evening when a man she identified as a “local Indian” (a man wearing the
traditional gulf Arab dress, a kandura, but who appeared ethnically Indian) attempted to queue
jump. Maxine was not entirely polite when she pointed out to the man that “the queue is there,”
pointing to the end of the line. The man challenged her, asking what her name was. Maxine
refused to tell the man her name. When she was seated, eating her meal, the man was still
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staring at her. When she left the restaurant, she found the police waiting to detain her. The man
came out of the restaurant and told her that he had lodged a complaint against her. She tried to
ask the police why they were detaining her, but the officers did not speak sufficient English or
Tagalog to communicate with her.29 When she was taken to the police station, Maxine told her
story to several different police officers, still confused as to why she had been detained only for
telling a man not to cut in line. When she was released at three o’clock the next morning, she still
did not know why. Tired and upset, she went home. She did not go to work the next day and so it
was not until the following day that she found out that the police had visited her employer to
enquire about her. Her employer was the one who finally explained the situation to her: the man
at the restaurant had reported her to the police as a prostitute. Apparently, the man claimed that
he had been a customer of hers and had refused to pay so that when she saw him again at the
restaurant she had gotten upset and insulted him. She had been detained and questioned on
suspicion of prostitution. Her employer vouched for her good character and the matter was
allowed to drop. Her employer did warn her in future to be more careful:
He said how [people] can make stories. And then they can just put you to jail.
And my employer says ‘be very careful; these ladies have different look.’ And
from then on I’m told not to go out late and if there’s anybody who is like that, my
employer said just don’t mind them. Just go. Just go away. And that’s how it is.
Sometimes I hate to be here.30
There are several thought-provoking aspects to this story. First, it is interesting to note
that the man in the restaurant felt no qualms about admitting to the police about using, and not
paying for, the services of a prostitute. Second, the police did not, in fact, detain him but rather
focused on the woman. Third is the level of acceptance shown by her (Western male) employer in
dealing with the situation and in the advice he gave Maxine. Given this appalling show by males
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in positions of authority, it is of little surprise that Maxine was ready to let the matter drop and now
feels a “phobia” towards the police and towards non-locals wearing local dress, a habit she feels
signifies arrogance or self-importance: “The pure locals are not like that. There are also other
nationalities who wear kandura just to make them my superiors. And from then on, I don't like to,
if they are in the restaurant or like this, I don't like even to look at them.”31
In fact, of the twenty three individuals that discussed their stories of sexual crimes with
me, only two were reported to the police: the masturbation incident discussed above which was
witnessed by a group of people, and the single case of attempted rape. I meet Scarlet at the
facility that the Embassy of the Philippines maintains to support workers in distress. Scarlet was a
victim of contract bait and switch as discussed in Chapter Five. When she arrived in the UAE she
expected to work as a clerk but instead was forced to work as a housemaid in the house of her
employer. She was promised a minimal salary, worked long hours, was constantly being shouted
at, and confined to her employer’s house. She was given a bed space in the family’s laundry
room; as the family occasionally had reason to enter the laundry room, she was not given a key
to the room and so could not lock her door. When, after five months her employer stopped paying
her wages, Scarlet was getting desperate. The last straw was a rape attempt. Scarlet prefers not
to talk about the assault. But she clearly recounts the aftermath. Scarlet absconded; she ran to
the Embassy of the Philippines where Embassy officials helped her to file a complaint with the
police; the process took several weeks because the Embassy first sought to reach a mediated
solution with the Public Relations Officer of the company involved. Unfortunately, her employer
had already filed a complaint with the police alleging that she not only had absconded, but that
she had stolen personal items from the household where she had worked.32 In the end three
issues were raised with the UAE authorities: an immigration issue regarding her visa status (her
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visas was for employment as a clerk but she had been put to work as a domestic worker, an
entirely different visa category under UAE law); a labor issue regarding the withheld wages; and
criminal cases regarding the conflicting allegations of rape lodged by Scarlet against her
employer versus the theft accusation lodged by her employer. The employer admitted to the
police that he had forced Scarlet to work as a housemaid and had withheld her wages, though he
denied the rape; Scarlet denied the theft. Nonetheless, Scarlet was arrested and her employer
was not. She spent five days in detention before her court date. She was frightened and horrified
to find herself being viewed by others around her, from the guards to the other (especially the
Filipino) inmates, as a criminal: “It's so hard there. I am thinking ‘I didn't do anything, then why I
am here?’” The final indignity was being marched from her cell in shackles:
Then some of the police, I don't know, because they want me to walk fast and
how could I walk fast when they put like that? But I try my best. And then there's
scars there on my feet because it's so hard with the bracelet, it's so hard to step.
Then they go, ‘Quickly quickly, yala yala.’ But I'm just praying that I will be
released that time when we go to court.33
When she finally had her day in court, Scarlett got a firsthand look at the courts’ official
priorities:
When I left [my employer’s house] he attempted me to rape, that's why it's a big
deal. When I [was] put in the court … the prosecutor said that there's a bigger
problem, because ‘you put this girl into the house that absolutely not to be in the
house.’34
Of all the issues in play, the immigration violation was considered the most significant by the
court. In the end, her employer was required to cancel her visa, allowing her to repatriate without
penalty. The labor case was left unresolved and Scarlet will have to go to the Ministry of Labour
to pursue the lost wages or settle out of court. Both Scarlet and her employer were persuaded to
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drop the criminal cases against the other. While it is terrible to see a case of sexual assault go
unaddressed by the courts, this was probably in Scarlet’s best interest as she could produce no
evidence of the assault that would have been accepted by the court and would have risked
further jail time; she had only her own testimony.
Regional Instability and War
Finally, we should note that the possibility of regional conflict also worries some migrants.
Most respondents feel that there is little chance of war or violent conflict within the UAE itself.
Adrian, for example, attributes this to the fact that “American and United Nations here; they are
protecting Abu Dhabi.”35 But there is also a general awareness that the Arab Spring might have
consequences for the UAE and that the Muslim Brotherhood has some presence – though to
what extent is unclear – in the country. Angelo, a member of his local professional association,
when discussing the new requirement in the Emirate of Dubai for groups such as his to register
with the UAE government, he attributed the rule change to growing political tensions and the
possibility that “there's some problem with the [Muslim] Brotherhood.”36 Angelo did not fear falling
foul of these rules, though, “because our group is not related to politics; it's a community group so
we don't worry. And we really have got the embassy [to] help us.”37
However, some are not so sure and so take basic precautions, just in case conflict in the
Middle East heats up or looks to spill over to the UAE: they do not leave their money in Emirati
banks. Maria Joy and her husband withdraw their entire salaries as soon as they are paid. They
use the bulk of the money to pay for their life in the UAE and most of the rest is remitted.
However, any extra money that they have they keep in cash in their wallets. Maria Joy and her
husband do not trust the banks in Abu Dhabi “because if some things happen here it will be
difficult for us to withdraw our money.”38
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And some people are a bit concerned that conflicts heating up in neighboring countries
could spill over to the UAE. There was some concern about what would happen in the West
decides to become involved militarily in Iran or Syria.39 If the region were to be seriously
threatened by violence, some Filipinos plan to leave. One concern that they do have concerns
their access to passports withheld by employers:
Dominic: The political stability in the neighboring countries.
Interviewer: Does that concern you?
Dominic: Yeah. Especially what happened the last time because US is starting
for Syria. … And then there's also some problem with the Iran. … That's the only
thing that concerns me. Yeah.
Interviewer: What would you do if there was a hot war in the region?
Dominic: I have to get my passport first!40
-----Interviewer: Does it worry you not to have your passport?
Cherry: Yeah, I worry what happens. What if there is a war? … I need to go back
home. I have ticket. But where's my passport? So I know what to do. I have the
number of the acting manager. Given my passport, I will go back home
immediately if there is a war or any problem here.41
But the possibility of violent conflict coming to the UAE seemed remote. Most
interviewees were not concerned. These interviews were conducted in 2013; since then the
region has further destabilized. In 2014 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Jabhat alNusra were recognized as significant threats and the United States-led coalition (of which the
UAE was an active member) began airstrikes against these groups in Iraq (August 2014) and
Syria (September 2014). In 2014 the UAE and Egypt also began airstrikes against Islamist militia
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forces in Libya. In December 2014 the UAE suffered its first domestic terrorist attack in the recent
era: an Emirati woman, Alaa Bader Abdullah, motivated by Al Qaeda ideology murdered an
American teacher at a mall then planted a bomb outside the residence of an American doctor in
Abu Dhabi.42 It is possible that assessments of security due to regional instability are changing.
Human Rights Implications
A most basic human right, physical safety, is at issue here. The UAE authorities do a
good job of protecting the populace against most violent crime as well as scams and petty thefts.
But physical safety is not restricted to protection against murder, assault, and robbery. Two
significant human rights concerns remain. First, women regularly face sexual harassment in
public and routinely fear sexual assault. Harassment of women goes unaddressed by the police
and, when a woman does report a crime her testimony is systematically devalued. The result is
that sexual harassment remains pervasive and sexual assault a very real fear for women in the
UAE today.
Second, there are important human rights issues regarding the way crime is handled by
the UAE government. The underreporting of crime is a problem. The UAE legal system does not
encourage migrants to approach the police or seek legal support even if they are victims of crime.
It is not fear of the police that drives underreporting; most interviewees do not report feeling afraid
of the police nor do they feel that the authorities are corrupt. In fact, most interviewees report that
they have respect for the police and feel that the police would help them should they report a
problem. The general sentiment is that it is better to go unnoticed by the UAE authorities if
possible. There are several potential elements contributing to this sentiment. Probably the
strongest motivating factor is fear of drawing negative legal repercussions, especially jail time
and/or deportation. Many scams, such as the recruiting scam discussed above, target vulnerable
populations, relying on the victim’s fear to prevent them from approaching the police. This fear
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also discourages women from reporting sexual crimes. This prevents migrants from fulfilling their
human right to effective remedy of violations by a competent legal tribunal.43
Working Conditions
Most workers in the UAE have reasonably good working conditions. There are several
areas of particular concern in the UAE, however: working conditions of domestic workers residing
in the employer’s home; physical safety on construction sites; and the health and safety of
outdoor workers during the UAE summer.
Concerns about working conditions are strongest for domestic workers. Without legal
guarantees regarding working hours and rest and leisure, domestic workers often work very long
hours with no day off. Their isolation in the house of the employer makes them both more likely to
be taken advantage of and less able to seek help from the UAE authorities. All of the housemaids
I spoke with had had problems with long hours and poor working conditions. Rika reported that
she started her workday when she got up at 5 AM and was expected to work until all the work
was done, perhaps as late as 1 or 2 AM.44 Nellie also worked long hours, she was fed only eggs
and noodles, and her employer would not only yell but she also had to put up with the children
throwing things at her.45 Scarlet was also expected to get up at 5:30 AM to get the family’s
children ready for school and then work all day, was not given a day off, and was subject to
verbal abuse.46 Scarlet felt that her working conditions were largely due to her residence in her
employer’s house:
Because very different between when you work inside the house and then
outside. Because outside – even if you work ten hours, you can you can still
sleep. After that [time], you can sleep, you can [do] everything that you want. But
inside the house there's a difference. Because even if they say that you have just
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to work ten hours, you have to work. Because you're there, you're in the house,
you have to work. Even the ten hours turns [into] twenty four hours.47
Poor working conditions are inextricably linked to the isolation domestic workers
experienced in the house. The first family Ava worked for worked her “like a robot” and did not
provide her with adequate food; the family she works with now treats her much better, but she
also does not live with them (she rents a bed space).48 Similarly, Nicole spent one “miserable”
year working for a family that expected her to work from 6:30 AM until past 7:00 in the evening
and fed her primarily rice and tuna; she quit and now rents an apartment with her sister and
works illegally as a freelance housemaid, where she sets her own hours and is free to leave if an
employer does not treat her with respect.49 Two women I spoke with who worked as drivers for
local families, also considered domestic workers, experienced significantly better conditions.
Drivers are considered to have a more valuable skill than housemaids (qualified female drivers
are more difficult to find), they are paid better than housemaids, and, crucially, the nature of their
profession means that they cannot be confined to the house. It is therefore unsurprising that they
did not experience problems to the same degree.
Worksite safety on construction sites in the UAE does not receive enough attention. Most
attention is focused on recruiting, passport withholding, pay withholding, and labor camp
problems. But there is less information about the actual physical working conditions. It is difficult
to say how prevalent the issue is, as each Emirate keeps its own statistics, these statistics may
not be complete, and are not made public.50 However, we can assume that the problem is
considerable. Local news media reports that construction accidents are the UAE’s “second most
common cause of emergency cases after road trauma.”51 And we can safely say that this is not
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the full extent of the problem: the ILO reports that “in practice, work-related injuries are greatly
under reported, while the occupational diseases are never reported.”52 Construction workers in
the UAE suffer serious injuries and fatalities due to falling from height or being hit by falling
objects. Car and bus accidents are another significant cause of work-related accidents: labor
camps are located up to two hours’ drive from the construction sites they serve and workers are
bussed back and forth, usually in old vehicles that lack air conditioning. There have been several
high-profile accidents that have been blamed on driver error, most recently a crash in May 2014
due to driver error (speeding) that killed thirteen people and seriously harmed another fourteen.53
Also crucial in the UAE is the midday break. Average summer temperatures in the UAE
are over 100 degrees; high temperatures can reach 122 degrees or higher. The UAE government
has instituted a mid-day break rule: during the height of summer, from 15 June to 15 September,
all outdoor work must stop from 12:30PM to 3PM. If at any time the temperature is above 50
degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit), all outdoor work must cease. Companies may seek a
waiver if continuous work is necessary for technical or safety reasons, but then must provide
workers with adequate safety measures.
Worksite safety and midday heat received few comments in my interviews. One major
factor behind this is that relatively few Filipinos work as construction laborers or in positions which
require them to work outdoors. Among my interviewees, the only workers who worked outdoors
were engineers in the construction industry who oversaw work onsite. These six men all reported
reasonable safety measures and that their companies respected the legally mandated midday
break during the summer.
Instead, the most common complaint is long hours, often without overtime pay. By UAE
law, workers can work eight hours a day or forty eight hours a week (officially the UAE has a sixday work week; Friday is the day of rest), plus at most two hours of overtime per day. Overtime is
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paid at 125 percent of the worker’s normal rate. However, many workers reported working ten or
more hours a day without overtime pay. Angelo considers this “normal” for the UAE:
Angelo: The only difference is in [my employment] contract it is eight hours per
day. But the norms here in UAE is ten hours a day. … In the beginning I thought,
‘oh, there's something wrong.’ Because in Saudi Arabia I work eight hours; after
eight hours it's an overtime. But here, no. There's no overtime pay, especially for
the [salaried] staff.
Interviewer: So do you work on average ten hours a day, then?
Angelo: Yes, from the start.54
Human Rights Implications
Unsafe conditions at work threaten the physical and mental health of workers, impinging
on the basic human rights to life and security. In addition, poor working conditions undermine the
right to “just and favorable conditions of work.”55 Where long hours and the failure to provide a
day of rest are at issue, the rights to rest, limited working hours, and holidays with pay are also
infringed upon.
Access to Legal Redress
Access to legal redress is about the ability of an individual to find a means of resolving
intractable legal disputes through the state’s apparatus of justice. For this to happen three basic
elements must be in place: 1) the individual needs to be able to make, and the state needs to be
able to receive, complaints or petitions for redress; 2) the state needs to consider these cases in
full and without discrimination, the individual needs to be able to act as a legal person before the
law (police, courts, etc.) and to be allowed to defend herself should the need arise; and 3)
wronged parties must receive equitable and effective relief from, or compensation for, harm and
damages. In effect, individuals, whether citizen or migrant, need full and fair access the legal
system.
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Filing a Complaint
Regular criminal issues such as scams, thefts, and sexual harassment should be
reported to the police. Each Emirate maintains its own independent police force. While higherranking police officers are usually UAE nationals, police officers below the rank of lieutenant tend
to be Arabic-speaking foreign nationals. Many of these lower ranking officers do not speak
English and “are often reluctant to make independent decisions.”56 Difficulties in communication
between the police on the street and non-Arab migrants are common and the resolution of even
minor problems may take substantial amounts of time and the involvement of several layers of
police bureaucracy.
When discussing the police, most interviewees expressed respect for the institution.
Twenty six interviewees felt that they would approach the police in case of need and another
seven felt that they could do so as a last resort; only five felt that they should avoid the police at
all costs. None feared physical mistreatment at the hands of the police. Coming from the
Philippines where corruption among the police is rampant, there was a general sense of relief that
the UAE police are professional and relatively corruption-free.57
There are a limited set of situations in which a worker might conceivably approach
immigration officials at the General Directorates of Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs (GDRFA;
emirate-specific divisions of the Ministry of the Interior). It is possible that a worker might
approach the GDRFA if an employer, for example, were to fail to provide the necessary residence
visa. However, this is unlikely. Instead, immigration issues are generally taken to either the police
or the Ministry of Labour (as residence is tied to employment, this is not as far-fetched as it might
at first appear). Interviewees talked about the possibility of approaching the police or the Ministry
of Labour, but did not envision circumstances in which they would go to the GDRFA to resolve a
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dispute.58 However, if a dispute is significant enough to involve either the police and/or the courts,
it is likely to have implications for the worker’s immigration status.
The Ministry of Labour is also generally respected as an institution, but considered a
drastic option for dispute resolution. Most interviewees would prefer to avoid bringing the Ministry
in on labor disputes if possible. All told, many interviewees who had reason to bring complaints to
the police, Ministry of Labour, or immigration officials did not do so. The most common complaint
that workers had was the fact that employers required workers to work long hours without paying
overtime, illegal under UAE Labour Law. Yet most workers shrugged this off as just part of the
working culture of the UAE and not something to approach the authorities about.
Similarly, twenty two interviewees reported that they had been subject to passport
withholding; only eleven reported that they retained their passports.59 All but one of these
interviewees were aware that passport holding is illegal in the UAE. While all but one of those
whose passports were withheld would have preferred to keep their own passports, none were
willing to go to the police or the Ministry of Labour. They tended to feel that it was simply the norm
for UAE employees and that it would not be worth reporting infractions to the authorities.
If workers tend to view the police and Ministry of Labour as relatively fair, unbiased, and
competent, what constrains workers from approaching the UAE authorities with viable
complaints? Interviewees expressed three fears that help to explain this conundrum.
1. Employer Retaliation
The primary reservation that interviewees expressed about approaching the UAE
authorities does not actually have to do with the efficacy of those institutions. Instead, workers
fear that going to the police or the Department of Labour will anger their employer, leading to
retaliation. The greatest fear is that the Ministry of Labour will ask the employer to remedy
whatever is the immediate problem (withheld wages, unpaid overtime, etc.) but will stop short of
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releasing the employee from their employment contract and waiving any applicable labor ban.
Many fear that the employer will meet the letter of such a mediated solution, but will then find an
excuse to fire the worker as retaliation for their having initiated a complaint with the Ministry of
Labour. Maria Joy’s husband, also working in the UAE, took a job in finance and received his first
two monthly salary payments, but on the third month the company told him that he would not be
paid unless he met a quota; he was never subsequently paid. The next month the company
decided that he would be paid entirely on a commission basis for the remainder of his contract.
None of this is stipulated in the contract but Maria Joy and her husband do not dare report the
violation: “If we go to the police, then the company will pay for him and then they will cancel his
visa [immediately fire him]. I think that's the normal procedure here.” Her husband is looking for a
new job and only when he has secured a different job will the couple consider going to the police.
Maria Joy is afraid that either of them is fired now that person will be banned60 or, if not, have
trouble finding other jobs within the exit grace period, forcing them both to leave the country and
begin the difficult and expensive process of international migration over again. Given that it took
them two months to find a job when they first arrived, she is skeptical whether a two week grace
period would be sufficient.61
Even if an individual is willing to take the risk themselves, they may be afraid that an
employer may take revenge on a family member. Gabriel’s employer expects him to work more
than the eight hours a day or forty eight hours per week stipulated in his contract and without
paying legally required overtime. Gabriel, far better informed on the subject than many workers,
understands that this is a violation of his contract and of UAE Labour Law. He knows that if her
reports these violations to the Ministry of Labour, they would likely support him in his rights:
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I went to the Ministry of Labor [for advice] … and they were really
accommodating. Like, for example, if you have a problem with your company,
you explain that to the Ministry of Labor and then at that very moment, they will
call the company. They will check. If the company's doing this but it's against the
labor policies, so they will call, right away, the HR. ‘This particular employee is
complaining that you are doing this to him or to her. Can you explain? Is this true
or not? And why are you doing this?’62
Nonetheless, Gabriel is reluctant to involve Ministry of Labour officials in his current
predicament:
I am weighing the consequences of my actions since my wife is working in the
same company and then I'm trying to bring my child over here. So I think I just,
hmm, keep silent for the meantime. Because it is undeniable that the employer
will threaten you to be terminated if you go to the Labor or something like that. If
you go against the company or if the company feels you as a threat to them, then
they will make some stories just to justify their accusation and then eventually
terminate you. So I don't want to make that problem.63
2. Fear of Deportation
Second, the fear of deportation (esp. those in vulnerable situations and women) prevents
people from making complaints. As employers can fire complaining workers with impunity, and
because employment and residence are tied together, workers are concerned that they might be
not only fired by a vindictive employer, but kicked out of the country as a result. Even Cassandra,
whose story will be discussed below as an example of a migrant successfully securing the help
and support of the Ministry of Labour in the resolution of a dispute, had considered the possible
implications her actions might have on her residence. It is significant that Cassandra worked
under objectionable conditions that violated her rights for two years before approaching the
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Ministry of Labour. Under UAE Labour Law, after two years of employment she would no longer
be subject to a labor ban if she ended up having to quit as a result of her complaint. In effect,
after two years of employment, the cost benefit analysis of reporting to the Ministry changed,
emboldening her to make her complaints public.
3. Fear of Discrimination
Finally, while Filipino workers were confident in the police’s impartiality in disputes
between non-nationals, they were much more hesitant if the case involved UAE citizens. There is
a general feeling that the enforcement of laws is flexible. Interviewee Moses puts it this way:
“Actually in in UAE, everything here is legal until you get caught. It's all legal until the police get
involved.”64 This attitude affects the willingness of migrants to approach the police.
Discussing likely scenarios in which he might need to call the police, Angleo advised his
wife that she should call the police if any “Pakistani” man should harass her on the street, but is
concerned that he might not get a fair hearing if he happens to get into a traffic accident with an
Emirati driver.65 Similarly, in a dispute with a foreign employer Mia sought help from the Ministry
of Labour, but expressed hesitation in doing so if her complaint were against an Emirati:
Interviewer: You wouldn't be afraid to go to the police?
Mia: No, no, no. Because he is Palestinian, so we are both foreign in this
country. He's not a local, so it's okay with me. Fight until the end.
Interviewer: But would it be different if it was a local?
Mia: I think so. Because they can do anything, everything, I think.66
Thus interviewees expressed respect for the UAE authorities at the same time they
expressed great hesitation in approaching them in case of need. The prevailing sentiment is that
the police and Ministry of Labour are best reserved as an option of last resort, to be turned to only
if conditions become unbearable and, if at all possible, only after working for an employer long
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enough to avoid an employment ban.67 Instead, interviewees sought to avoid “trouble” and to
leave bad employers in a “nice” way.
Interviewer: Well, have you ever had to go to [the Ministry of] Labour for
anything? Or to the police?
Victoria: No no no. Not in the least. So far.
Interviewer: Because you would have been owed overtime.
Victoria: Yes, I know.
Interviewer: You didn't go to Labour about that?
Victoria: I didn't want any dispute. I just want to leave the company in a nice
way. 68
Mediation
But, if approached, interviewees report that the Ministry of Labour acts in a fair and
unbiased manner. For example, Cassandra worked at a coffee shop. The job had a very low
salary and her employer consistently demanded that she work long hours without overtime pay.
After two years (of a three-year contract) she approached the Ministry of Labour to ask about “my
rights;” she was informed that her employer owed her for past overtime and that Ministry officials
would attempt to negotiate a settlement if she made a formal complaint. Her only criticism about
the process was the complicated nature of the process for filing the complaint: “Of course if you
looked at the [Ministry of] Labour you had a lot of things to do.” First she had to go to a legal
typing shop to get the complaint formally typed up in Arabic. Then she had to go to the Ministry of
Labour building to submit the paperwork, and wait there for her initial interview with a Labour
official. During this initial interview the official will hear the petitioner’s complaint and decide if it
may have merit; if they feel there is grounds for complaint, the official will the immediately call the
employer to get their initial response and, if necessary, set up a mediation session. In
Cassandra’s case, the Labour official told her boss over the phone that he would probably be
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required to pay past overtime and set a date for the mediation session. So Cassandra went
home. Her employer called her that evening, very angry that she had gone to the Ministry of
Labour. She told him that she had tried to talk to him many times but “you don’t mind me,” so she
went to the Ministry of Labour for help. The employer did not wait for the mediation session, but
asked what she wanted:
I said ‘at least the paper what I want. You give me my release paper or pay me
what I want. What you get from me, you have to pay.’ I said this. He said ‘ok.’ He
make everything and then he pay me back. He gave me my release paper and
said, ‘ok cancelled. You can go find work.69
Cassandra was able to arrive at an acceptable compromise with her employer through
mediation with the help of the Ministry of Labour. The legal system in the UAE offers two
opportunities for mediation in most labor disputes.70 The first is through the Ministry of Labour:
when a complaint is received by the Ministry, an official will make an immediate attempt to
determine the facts of the case and arrive at a mediated settlement. Should that fail and the case
be brought to the court system, a second round of mediation through the courts’ Reconciliation
and Settlement Committees follows.71 Successful mediation is the fastest and least expensive
means for a worker to receive compensation that he finds acceptable.
However mediation as a means of ensuring fair compensation suffers from several
weaknesses as well. First, mediation in the UAE is not actually very effective. In 2012 only 27
percent of new cases brought to Reconciliation and Settlement Committees were settled
amicably; in 63 percent of cases a party (or parties) were unwilling to reconcile and further legal
action was necessary.72
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Second, workers who accept mediated settlements may settle for far less compensation
than they would have been legally entitled to receive. The primary aim that most complainants
are looking to guarantee is the right to change jobs without a labor ban; they are willing to
sacrifice other objectives in order to secure this freedom of employment. Danielle’s story was
addressed in Chapter Six; to summarize: her employer only paid her sporadically, her passport
was withheld, and she had never seen her employment visa; though her employer assured her all
the paperwork was in order, when she checked a Ministry of Labour online database she
discovered that, while she did have a work permit, her employer had not processed the
paperwork to obtain the required residence visa for her and as a result she was residing illegally
in the UAE. But the legal implications of Danielle’s story deserve further examination here.
Danielle tried to quit her job, asking her employer for a Non-Objection Certificate which would
allow her to find a new job; her employer refused. So Danielle went to the Ministry of Labour and
filed a complaint. While the Ministry of Labour was investigating her case, Danielle was fortunate
to find an office position with a semi-governmental company. While this new semi-governmental
employer was legally able to hire Danielle without the NOC, they preferred to attempt to find a
negotiated settlement. The negotiations that followed were largely held between the Ministry of
Labour representative and both employers’ Public Relations Officers (PROs). Danielle was
represented by her new employer’s PRO and did not take part in the negotiations. After five
months of negotiations Danielle was presented with a deal: the first employer would pay all fines
related to her year-long illegal residence and would issue the NOC, in exchange, Danielle agreed
to forfeit two months’ withheld wages or about 7,000 AED ($1906 USD). The new employer’s
PRO advised her to accept the deal: “And it was good that they [the new employer] backed me up
when all the other … court cases. But that time I didn't push to win a court case because they
said they said they'll lose something about it.”73 Danielle was satisfied with the outcome. But by
UAE Law she was entitled to everything she received as well as the lost wages: it is the
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employer’s responsibility to secure both the work permit and the residence visa, they illegally
withheld her passport, and if wages are withheld for two months or longer the Ministry of Labour
will waive the labor ban In addition, it is significant that Danielle was in a near ideal position to
negotiate: she had already secured a position with a company capable of ignoring a labor ban,
making the obtaining of the NOC a convenience but not a necessity. Nonetheless, she agreed to
forgo what she agrees is quite a bit of money.74
Third, should the employer prove intractable and mediation fail, the Ministry of Labour
has a fairly limited range of administrative measures that it can take for remediation. Instead,
when mediation fails a legal case must proceed through the court system, a lengthy process that
places a heavy burden on the worker. And the results are uncertain. So, for those seeking to
remain employed by their current employer, mediation by the Ministry of Labour or the courts is
not viewed as a viable option unless one is intending to – or at least prepared to – either go
through with a court case against their employer or leave the UAE.
Going to Court
The legal system in the UAE is complicated and constantly evolving. First, it is important
to recognize that there are two sources of law in the UAE. Laws may either be made through the
legislative process or by decree (issued jointly by the President and the Council of Ministers).75
As a result, the legislative process is opaque. Interestingly, while there are federal-level legislative
bodies and federal-level laws and regulations, there are three relatively separate judicial systems
in the UAE: the federal court system adjudicates in the emirates of Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajman,
Fujairah, and Um Al Quwain while Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah have their own, independent court
systems with jurisdiction over the application of federal laws in those Emirates; to make matters
even more complicated, free zones are also independent jurisdictions and may have independent
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judiciaries as well or may rely on the judicial system of the Emirate in which they are located.76
Within each Emirate there is a three-tiered court system consisting of courts of first instance,
appeals courts, and the court of cassation. The courts of first instance are divided into three
sections: criminal (misdemeanor or felony), personal status (both criminal and personal status
laws are to be in accordance with Sharia religious rules, though Sharia is posed as a more central
concern in personal status cases77), and civil cases. In the Federal and Dubai systems, civil
courts are further divided into separate courts to hear civil, commercial, administrative,
immigration and naturalization,78 and labor cases.79
For an individual to file a civil case directly with the UAE Federal or Dubai courts, the
issue must first be brought to a Reconciliation and Settlement Committee. If no amicable
settlement is possible a case can then be registered with the clerk of court at the correct court of
first instance. The claimant must submit a detailed claim, including the names and addresses of
parties, typed in Arabic (licensed legal translation companies often prepare these documents for
a fee), submit any supporting documentary evidence, and pay a court fee if applicable.80 The
defendant is then served with a summons and a copy of the claim and supporting documents; the
defendant may then file a written response to the claim at the first trial period. The trial is thus
conduced in stages, meeting and adjourning in order to allow parties to prepare written
memoranda and documentary evidence until the court decides it is satisfied. Cases are decided
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on the basis of these written documents; oral arguments are rarely allowed. This process may
take months, or even years, to conduct.81
Labor disputes - such as non-payment of wages, end of service compensation, workrelated injury, etc. – are governed by Federal Law No. (8) of 1980 (the “Labour Law”). Contract
issues are generally considered a civil matter. However, some labor and contract issues also
have criminal implications. Criminal cases may only be initiated by the state; they are filed,
investigated and pursued by the public prosecutor’s office. Trials are conducted and decided by
judges and there is no set standard for the burden of proof. Only those accused of a felony have
a right to an attorney at trial, though the defendant may be represented by a lawyer at his own
expense for lesser crimes should he choose. Proceedings are in Arabic, though interpreters are
usually available. Penalties may include fines, jail time, deportation, and corporal punishment; the
death penalty is possible for serious crimes.82
While migrant workers have equal ability to bring cases under UAE law, this complicated,
uncertain, expensive, and lengthy structure discourages most from attempting to initiate legal
action. Most cannot afford lawyers. The Embassy of the Philippines in Abu Dhabi will provide
basic legal assistance through the Assistance to Nationals (ATN) section including orientation to
the process, advice, and transportation. This allows the individual to show up at court and gives
them at least the basics needed to represent themselves. The Embassy will pay lawyers’ fees for
nationals in significant need, such as victims of sex crimes or other serious crimes. The ATN
section is perpetually short on personnel, cars, and funds for legal fees, however, and so full
assistance cannot be provided to every Filipino in need.
Once involved in a proceeding, criminal or civil, migrant workers have equal standing in
the courts alongside UAE nationals. However, there is a gendered difference. The testimony of
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women, both citizen and foreign, is devalued under Sharia law, and women have difficulty
successfully presenting their side of a dispute. This is particularly relevant in cases that involve
sex acts. Sex outside of wedlock is illegal in the UAE and a woman engaged in extramarital sex is
likely to be convicted and jailed. However, in determining whether a sex act was consensual,
coerced, or forced, the testimony of the woman will only carry one third the weight of that of the
man, as discussed in Scarlet’s case above. Women are not equal persons under UAE law.
The cost of pursuing a labor case through the court system is beyond many migrant
workers. Besides the court fees associated with filing a civil claim, individuals involved in a court
case, civil or criminal, must continue to support themselves living in the UAE while the case is
ongoing. In addition, parties to an ongoing civil case are not exempted from the laws tying
residence to employment or from labor bans. Thus, if an individual is attempting to pursue a case
against his employer, he may find himself in a very difficult position. If he quits his job he may be
subject to a labor ban and forced to leave the country after thirty days. If he is fired by the
employer he must be given notice as specified in his contract, typically thirty days. Then he has a
thirty day exit period; he may search for another job (and thus residency sponsor) but if
unsuccessful must exit the country. In these circumstances, it is possible for the employer to act
to delay the court proceedings, failing to appear at trial or requesting adjournments to file
additional memoranda, in hopes that the worker might be forced to exit the country and thus the
case would not be heard in full.
The chronological order in which cases are recorded with the UAE court authorities can
be significant in determining the way in which the cases are considered by the courts. This is
particularly an issue in cases where workers “abscond” (leave suddenly and without notice, run
away; absconding is illegal under UAE law) from employers who are violating labor law or
contract terms. When a worker absconds it is fairly clear to the employer that she is intending to
report the abuse in order to seek help from the authorities. If the employer, however, is able to go
to the authorities first to report the crime of absconding committed by the worker, the courts will
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consider the absconding charge first or at least simultaneously with other charges.83 If the worker
is found guilty of absconding, she may well be deported before the labor or civil/contract case is
decided. Alternatively, if the worker files the labor complaint or lawsuit first, then no absconding
charge can be registered against her until those complaints are settled.84 The result is a race
between the worker and the employer to be the first to file a complaint with the relevant
authorities. Should the migrant worker lose this race, her case may not be heard in full.
Let’s return to the story of Scarlet, discussed above, the woman who had been given a
contract as a clerk but arrived in Abu Dhabi only to be put to work as a housemaid at a lower
salary. After seven months working as a housemaid, she ran away from her employer to the
Embassy of the Philippines. As her visa had been issued for a company in Dubai, however, the
Embassy in Abu Dhabi sent her back to the Consulate in Dubai. The Consulate then proceeded
to try to help her negotiate a settlement with her employer. The Consulate tried to contact her
boss but was unable to reach him. They then called the PRO for her company to set up a meeting
with him, but had to wait for weeks because the PRO was out of office due to an injury. By the
time consular officials finally took her to the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners
Affairs85 (often referred to as “Immigration”) to lodge a complaint, her boss had already filed a
criminal case against her for theft (which Scarlet maintains is baseless).86 Scarlet ended up with
three simultaneous legal cases: an immigration issue regarding her visa status; a labor issue
regarding her withheld wages; and a criminal case regarding the conflicting allegations of rape
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lodged by Scarlet against her employer versus the theft accusation lodged by her employer. In a
sense, the court did find in Scarlet’s favor, ruling that putting someone with a work visa to work as
a domestic worker was a significant violation of immigration rules, but the result was
disappointing. The employer was required to cancel her visa, releasing her from sponsorship and
the theft charges were dropped; this means she will not be arrested and allows her to legally exit
the country which, as she is now unemployed, she will be required to do. But the court did not
compensate Scarlet or impose any significant penalty on the employer. Scarlet will have to
continue her case with the Ministry of Labour if she wants to get paid the back wages due to her.
She is hoping that the Ministry of Labour can mediate a solution because a further court case
would require time and resources that she does not have. “If he will pay me, I will close the case.
But even if he refuse, I can go home.”87
Domestic workers face additional hurdles when attempting to pursue court cases. First
and foremost, they are not under the jurisdiction of UAE labor law and so have far fewer
protections under the law. Contract violations and pay disputes, which would normally be
violations of labor law, must instead be pursued through other means. Second, domestic workers
are more likely than other workers to have extremely low wages, wages withheld (they are not
covered by the Wages Protection System), minimal savings, passport withheld, and to be
dependent on their employer for their housing. The cumulative weight of these burdens makes it
particularly difficult for domestic workers to pursue lengthy and expensive court proceedings.
Finally, and perhaps most worrying, there is a fear that the UAE legal system, from the police
receiving initial complaints to the courts making final adjudications, are simply more hostile to
claims made by domestic workers than to other types of workers in the UAE.88 Domestic workers,
more than any other type of worker, seek out help and support from the Embassy of the
Philippines to navigate these difficult legal waters.
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Finally, even after a court decision has been handed down, it cannot be considered final.
Beyond the regular court appeals process, court rulings may be reviewed, revised, or even
overturned by the country’s political leadership. In the case of Sarah Balabagan for example (her
trial for the killing of her employer is discussed in detail in Chapter Four), Sheik Zayed, the ruler of
Abu Dhabi at the time, intervened at least three times: first to overturn her initial limited conviction
and relatively light sentence and order a retrial, second to overturn the death penalty she
received after conviction in her retrial, and finally to grant her early release from prison after she
had received relatively light corporal punishment and served nine months in prison.
The Role of the Philippine State
The Philippine state has a role to play in ensuring its citizens abroad have access to legal
redress. First, as migrants maintain substantive ties to their home country they may occasionally
find themselves involved in legal proceedings under the jurisdiction of their home country legal
system. In the case of Filipino migrants, such ties often involve the maintenance of immediate
family members (spouse, children, and parents), banking or financial transactions, property, and
businesses, among others. Some actions can be taken by migrants abroad through consular
offices, from entries in the civil registry (registering births, deaths, marriages, etc.) to
authentication of documents, to renewing Philippine driver’s licenses. The state encourages
migrants to establish powers of attorney to allow trusted family members or friends to act on their
behalf in other matters; a generic “Special Power of Attorney” template is available from the
Foreign Service of the Philippines and can be legalized by Embassies.
Alternately, migrants may find themselves involved in legal proceedings in the host
country. In this case, the Embassy of the Philippines may still play an important role. The
Philippine Embassies consider “assistance to nationals” to be a primary function. The Embassy of
the Philippines in Abu Dhabi provides legal advice and assistance, including access to
transportation, translation, and legal representation if necessary, to Filipinos in distress; funds
may be available for bail bonds and court fees through a nationally administered legal defense
fund. However, the Embassy’s resources are extremely limited.
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When one enters the Embassy of the Philippines in Abu Dhabi, you are immediately
aware of the press of people and activity. There are long lines at each counter of people seeking
to conduct all sorts of business. Despite a growing trend towards e-services in many countries,
most business at the Embassy of the Philippines still needs to be conducted in person and may
well require multiple visits to the Embassy. This can be quite frustrating, especially for Filipinos
that live outside of Abu Dhabi or Dubai89 and so need to take a day off of work and arrange
transportation in order to come to the Embassy or consulate. And, at some point in their stay in
the UAE, pretty much every Filipino will have at least one issue arise that will require them to go
to the Embassy - from renewing passports to registering to vote to applying for Overseas
Employment Certificates. The inefficiency and long lines are a particular nuisance that several
interviewees commented on:
The only remembrance we can have of the bad life we had in the Philippines is
when you go to the Embassy. And you see those forms, those messy queues.
That's typical Philippines. Welcome to the Philippines, the Philippines in Abu
Dhabi.90
But the real concern is corruption. Corruption is endemic in Philippine politics. In 2014
Transparency International ranked the Philippines eighty fifth out of 175 countries in their
Corruption Perceptions Index and remarked: “Since the country’s independence in 1946, the
Philippines’ history has been marked by a legacy of deeply entrenched patronage and clientelist
systems, state capture by the ruling elite, and widespread high-level corruption.”91 High hopes for
the current President Aquino, elected on an anti-corruption pledge, are fading as his regime is
now enmeshed in a corruption scandal.92 Interviewees feel that that the Embassy is not immune

89

There is a large consulate in Dubai that can serve most of the same functions as the Embassy in Abu Dhabi.

90

Princess (Office Professional), interview with the author, 3/16/2013.

91
Maxime Agator, Marie Chêne and Maira Martini, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in the Philippines,
Transparency International, 2013, accessed May 8, 2015,
http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Country_profile_Philippines_2013.pdf.
92

“Over a Barrel,” The Economist, 28 June 2014, accessed March 1, 2015,
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21605958-government-accused-bias-fighting-corruption-over-barrel.

265

from this disease. A recent scandal involving the illegal sale of the “affidavit of support and
guarantee” by Embassy personnel to UAE tourist agencies reinforced the impression within the
Filipino community that the Embassy is rife with corruption.93 Nicole, for example, is dismissive of
the Embassy: they are “rubbish,” selfish and corrupt: “You can tell. They are very rich. All of
them.” Yet she admits that if she did have trouble she would go to the Embassy first to ask what
to do.
The Embassy remains the last best ally that a Filipino worker in significant distress can
turn to in the UAE. The Embassy runs welfare programs through the Overseas Workers’ Welfare
Administration office, including a facility for workers who have fled abusive labor situations. The
Assistance to Nationals (ATN) section offers advice, transportation and translation services to
workers in distress and has some funds that may be used to pay bail, lawyer’s and court fees.
These services provide a – minimal – safety net for Filipino workers in the UAE.
When asked to identify good things about the Embassy, many interviewees pointed to the
OWWA facility in particular. Interviews with five residents of this facility drive home its importance.
These women, all domestic workers, reported suffering from physical (including sexual) and
mental abuse, the withholding of wages, passport and cell phone confiscation, extremely long
work hours, the denial of holidays or adequate rest periods, insufficient food, insufficient living
quarters, and being locked into the employer’s residence. They fled abuse with little or no money
or other resources and turned to the Embassy for help. For example Nellie, who was usually
locked into her employer’s apartment, one day found herself alone outside one day after helping
her employer’s son carry his book bag to the school bus. Instead of returning to the apartment as
she was supposed to, Nellie ran. She had no money in her pockets, no passport, and only the
clothes on her back: “So I decided to go here so that I will be safe. Wherever I go, wherever I am,

93
This affidavit allows individuals in the UAE to sponsor tourist visas. There are allegations that Embassy
officials certified blank affidavits which they then sold to tourist agencies, allowing the agencies to bring individuals to the
UAE without going through the proper oversight. Ramona Ruiz, "UAE Rights Group Call for Probe into Document 'Sale' by
Philippine Officials,” The National, 18 August 2013.
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no one will hurt me because I am already at the Embassy. My Philippines Embassy! The one who
cares us, yeah?”94
But the Embassy’s ability to intervene in the legal process of the UAE is minimal. Even
the Embassy’s facility for abused workers occupies a legal grey area: the UAE government
tolerates it but the Embassy prefers to keep a low profile for fear of causing a political issue. And
while Embassy personnel can offer advice, they cannot represent Filipinos in UAE courts.95 The
Embassy’s ability to act as a representative of harmed individuals is also compromised by its role
as the representative of the Philippine state and the Filipino people as a whole. However bad
conditions may be for any specific worker, the Gulf region – and the UAE in particular – is an
important labor market for Filipino workers. The Philippine state engages in what Guevarra calls
“labor diplomacy”:
whereby Filipino workers become the state's resources to be harnessed and
commodities to be traded supports the ways the state attempts to manage labor
migration… As a result, the state envisions this strategy as a bargaining point for
negotiating mechanisms that ensure the protection of overseas Filipino workers
through formal or informal bilateral agreements with labor-receiving countries.96
This stance, while of debatable benefit to Filipinos in general,97 may make the Philippine
state and its Embassy personnel reluctant to rock the boat on behalf of any one person. All
Embassy personnel I spoke with emphasized the fact that “significant” harm to workers is largely
confined to domestic workers and, even then, is rare; they would hate to see the majority of
workers who benefit from employment in the UAE barred from this market because of the abuse
of a small minority.
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Nellie (HSW), interview with the author, 10/7/2013.

95

Only Emirati nationals and certain other privileged, Arabic speaking individuals, can serve as trial lawyers.
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Guevarra, Marketing Dreams, Manufacturing Heroes.

97
Recent work by rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch questions how rare such abuse really is,
for domestic workers and construction workers, and recent academic work has called into question conditions faced by
other types of workers. C.f.: "I Already Bought You" Abuse and Exploitation of Female Migrant Domestic Workers in the
United Arab Emirates. Building Towers, Cheating Workers: Exploitation of Migrant Construction Workers in the United
Arab Emirates, Human Rights Watch, 2006, accessed May 8, 2015,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/uae1106/uae1106web.pdf. "The Island of Happiness Revisited." Pardis Mahdavi,
Gridlock: Labor, Migration, and Human Trafficking in Dubai (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
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Perhaps because of this, the Embassy of the Philippines in Abu Dhabi also supports
mediation as the best strategy for many of its nationals in distress.98 The Embassy will attempt to
serve as a mediator in some cases, serving as an alternative to approaching the Ministry of
Labour; this is particularly important for domestic workers who, as they are under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of the Interior and no the Ministry of Labour, cannot avail themselves of Labour
mediation. The Embassy prioritizes settlement out of court. Vice Consul Norman, in charge of the
ATN section, stresses that court cases take a very long time to be resolved, often lasting for
months, and that the result is uncertain.99 If both sides cooperate, mediation is the easiest and
fastest way to resolve cases. The employer can cancel the worker’s visa, return her passport, and
possibly give an NOC thus allowing her to leave or find new work, often the employer will pay for
repatriation or the UAE state may deport the individual; the worker usually relinquishes claims to
back pay in these cases.
But pursuing mediation through the Embassy is risky. If the employer does not want to
cooperate, they can file case against the worker for absconding. As described above, whichever
side files their complaint first tends to have an advantage in the UAE court system as they set the
terms of the first legal battle (whether the court will consider the absconding charge or the labor
case first). So if the Embassy delays filing in order to pursue mediation, the employer gains the
opportunity to take the lead. While workers who have reported to the police or the Ministry of
Labour have stopped this particular clock, workers who avail themselves of Embassy mediation
have not. Filing a complaint with the Embassy does not constitute filing a complaint with the UAE
government and so if the employer should file an absconding charge while Embassy negotiations
are ongoing, the worker has no recourse.
Finally, specifically in the case of its citizens working abroad, the Philippine state has
attempted to devise mechanisms that allow them to extend their reach beyond the territorial

98
The Embassy suggests that most labor and contract disputes be settled through mediation; allegations of
trafficking, sex crimes, physical abuse, or other serious crimes are directly referred to the police and immediate legal
action.
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Vice Consul Vice Consul Norman E. Padalhin, interview with the author, 10/22/2013.
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borders of the Philippines and give the state leverage to ensure some form of redress or
compensation is offered to Filipinos harmed while working abroad. The primary example is the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 which defines “illegal recruitment” and
makes the Philippine recruitment agency jointly liable with the foreign employer for monetary
claims, including damages and unjust termination, arising from employment abroad.100 So should
a worker return to the Philippines without having been able to secure legal redress in the UAE
courts, they may still have the option to pursue the recruitment agency through the Philippine
courts. Holding the recruitment agencies jointly liable is a good idea, but it has not worked out in
practice. As in the UAE, successful prosecution of recruitment agencies in the Philippines is a
long and drawn out process which places a significant burden on the migrant alleging having
been harmed. Successful prosecution is extremely rare.
Human Rights Implications
Legal redress puts the judicial system to work in the service of human rights. It is a key
mechanism through which human rights are protected from abuse, from the state itself or from
third parties; it is how the state holds violators to account. If the legal system does not function to
allow migrant workers to have their cases heard in full and without discrimination, and to offer
relief and fair compensation, employers have little to check them from engaging in abusive
practices. And, indeed, we find that abusive practices are common and that the legal system
does not function to check these practices. The failures of the UAE legal system to adequately
protect the legal rights of migrant workers infringes on the workers’ human rights to equal
protection, nondiscrimination, and effective remedy.
Equal Protection and Nondiscrimination
There is a lot of ignorance about the law in the UAE. There are many misconceptions
about what is legal or illegal and about how to register complaints. Laws and regulations in areas
crucial to people’s lives, especially visa issues, change frequently and often without advance
notice. It is often felt that some legal processes, such as obtaining the required labor permits for
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See Ch. 4 Fig. 2 for an overview. "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act."
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new workers, are easier for some companies than for others due to the wasta, or influence, of the
company’s owner.101 The right to equal protection fails on several levels in the UAE.
UAE national versus migrant: It is beyond the scope of this project to attempt to answer
whether there is, in fact, a bias in favor of UAE citizens or employers in the UAE court system.
What we can say with confidence, however, is that interviewees perceived that such a bias exists
in the UAE government and courts. This perception makes interviewees hesitate to take legal
action against an Emirati in any but the worst cases.
Employer/sponsor versus worker: One of the primary aims of this section has been to
demonstrate the many ways in which employers operate from a position of legal privilege,
especially given the fact that residence is tied to employment. Negotiating the complex,
expensive, and drawn-out legal system is beyond the means of most workers, but not beyond
their employers. The particular law that prevents workers from changing employers without the
consent of their sponsor (their current legal employer) is of special relevance in this respect,
giving employers particular leverage over labor.
Men versus women: Women’s testimony in criminal cases is systematically devalued.
Women are simply not equally represented or protected by the law.
Domestic workers: Work conducted in the domestic sphere occupies a shadowed niche
in the UAE. The privacy of the home is respected above the rights of those paid to work in the
domestic sphere. Domestic workers are not equal to other workers in the eyes of the UAE law:
UAE Labour Law protections do not extend to domestic workers.
Effective Remedy
Article 8 of the UDHR establishes that: “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by
the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law.”102 This right is compromised in the UAE.

101
The actual role that wasta plays in commerce and government interactions is beyond the scope of this work.
Here I only wish to address the perception of Filipino interviewees about the ability of informal power structures to
influence government action in law enforcement and the judicial process.
102

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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Some violations of the law are treated as important by the police, mediators, and the
courts, such as wages withholding and failure to obtain the necessary documents (work permit
and visa). But there is official apathy on common (illegal) practices such as passport withholding
and unpaid overtime which are often considered part of the local business culture. These
practices however, jeopardize fundamental human rights. Passport withholding compromises the
individual’s right to identity and to freedom of movement. Unpaid overtime compromises the right
to just and favorable remuneration.
Fear of employer retaliation and deportation also erodes the guarantee of effective
remedy. First, fear of employer retaliation discourages migrant workers from seeking legal
remedy in many cases. Migrants do not report labor violations except as a last recourse, when
they are willing to walk away from their current employer. Second, fear of long, expensive, and
uncertain court cases strongly pushes migrants to accept whatever mediated solution would be
offered, no matter if it is significantly less then what they are legally entitled to. Employers gain
leverage in such mediations and migrants loose it.
The fact that “absconding” is a crime also favors employer/sponsors over workers.
Prosecution for absconding may short-circuit other pending court cases. Employers may file
absconding charges as a means of escaping their legal obligation to workers.
Conclusion
Every country has crime; the UAE is no exception.103 It does not seem worse than other,
Western countries. In fact, violent crime and corruption are lower than average. The UAE state is
efficient in addressing most types of crime, including violent crimes such as assault and robbery
as well as non-violent scams when they are reported. The state is making a serious and effective
attempt to protect the rights of the population in this respect.
However, there is one group within the population whose safety and security UAE law
systematically fails to protect: women. Sexual harassment is not only pervasive, it is largely

103
There is another area in which the UAE response falls short which is not addressed in this discussion: due
process guarantees for crimes related to public order and terrorism; this will be addressed in greater detail in the next
chapter.
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unaddressed by the UAE authorities. Sex crimes globally are underreported, but the problem is
particularly profound in the UAE. When sex crimes, from harassment to rape, are reported to the
UAE police, female victims are likely to find their own behavior and thoughts called into question;
she may find herself facing criminal charges. As a result, women are hesitant to approach the
police, offenders often go unpunished, and the cycle of pervasive sexual harassment and sex
crimes is allowed to continue. For most women this environment is annoying but bearable. Low
but persistent levels of harassment become a normal part of the background, uncomfortable at
times but manageable. Women manage the situation by subtle changes in their behavior, from
changing the clothes they wear to avoiding eye contact with men or making sure not to smile at a
stranger. But for some women, the situation has profound impact. Women victims of rape, at a
moment when they have been subject to massive harm, face the prospect of further unfair
treatment at the hands of the authorities if they report the crime. The UAE state fails to protect the
human right to safety and security of women against sex crimes.
The second major challenge is the constraints on legal redress. Even when existing laws
have clearly been violated, migrants may avoid coming the police and seeking legal solutions as
the legal process is stacked against them. Though formally equal under the law, the process of
arguing a case in the UAE is complicated, expensive, lengthy, and uncertain, disadvantaging
temporary migrant workers relative to employers. Migrants tend to have less experience with the
legal system, fewer monetary resources with which to prepare and present their case (or to pay
any resulting penalty), less time remaining in the country (remembering that cases can stretch out
for months or even years), which all results in migrants being less tolerant of the uncertain
outcome of the legal process. This problem affects all migrants; is it the unstable foundation upon
which their access to justice in the UAE is based. Without effective legal redress, effective
protection and provision of human rights is impossible. The UAE state has the potential to fix this,
it is mainly about enforcing existing laws and increasing capacity of existing institutional
structures that are currently functional but lacking adequate resources. The question is one of
willingness.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: ORGANIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND THE FAMILY
Introduction
Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects the right to freedom of
assembly and association. While the UDHR is written with reference to the individual, many of the
rights enumerated protect the right of the individual to form and participate in specific types of
groups: national (Art. 15), familial (Art. 16), religious (Art. 18), cultural (Art. 27), and economic
groups (Art. 17) including labor unions (Art. 23).
It is understood that the full flowering of the human condition requires the individual to act
in society with others. All realms of human life are affected by the ability of the individual to form
groups: civil, political, economic, and private. Group formation and inclusion is more difficult for
international migrants whose lives span geographic and political spaces. This span may prevent
them from fully engaging in relevant, established groups, while simultaneously creating new
groups for engagement across borders. This chapter will look at issues affecting the organization
of Filipino migrants in the UAE, identifying aspects that facilitate or impede group formation and
collective action.
Filipino Community Groups
As discussed in Chapter Seven, the law in the UAE changes quickly and there may be
significant differences between the de facto law and the way it is enforced – or ignored – in
practice. Laws governing the formation and actions of civic and religious groups fall into this
category. While law restricts the formation of such groups, the general practice is to tolerate civic
and religious groups so long as they act with discretion.
Religious Groups
It might be thought that non-Muslim religious groups would face significant repression in
the UAE, a Muslim monarchy. While the UAE constitution establishes Islam as the official religion,
it also guarantees the freedom of religious worship: “Freedom to exercise religious worship shall
273

be guaranteed in accordance with established customs, provided that it does not conflict with
public policy or violate public morals.”1 The UAE has the reputation for being the most liberal
country in the Gulf with regard to religious liberty and a surprising degree of tolerance is shown to
most religions. In fact, it may be that the greatest control over religious belief is exercised against
Muslims: the UAE state controls the content of prayers and sermons in (majority) Sunni mosques
and monitors content in (minority) Shia mosques.
Given the large migrant population in the country, a wide number of religions are also
present. The majority of the population is Muslim (76 percent), but a significant percent are
Christian (9 percent), Hindu and Buddhist, with small numbers of Arsis, Baha’is, Druze2, Sikhs,
Ahmadis, Ismailis, and Jews present.3 The UAE state collects data on the religious affiliation of
individuals requesting a residence visa, but it is reported that individuals from faiths that face
hostility from the UAE authorities, such as Jews or Shia Muslims, intentionally misrepresent their
religious affiliation for fear of discrimination.4
Christian churches are allowed to function in the UAE. The rulers of each Emirate are at
liberty to make land grants to religious groups, allowing them to build churches. Religious groups
are not required to register with the UAE government, but the system of land grants requires the
larger congregations to engage with the ruling families. There are over thirty five Christian
churches in the UAE.5 But not all Christian denominations, nor all non-Christian groups, have
dedicated facilities and so may share the facilities of other denominations or may hold their
religious ceremonies in rented facilities such as clubs or hotels or in private residences; this
practice is tolerated by the UAE authorities.

1
“United Arab Emirates Constitution of 1971 with Amendments through 2004,” United Arab Emirates, 1971
(2004), accessed May 9, 2015, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_Arab_Emirates_2004.pdf.
2
Official UAE data considers Baha’is and Druze as Muslim. “UAE Religion,” Global Security, 2014, accessed
November 3, 2014, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/uae-religion.htm.
3
United Arab Emirates 2013 International Religious Freedom Report (United States: United States Department
of State, 2013), accessed November 1, 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222529.pdf.
4

United Arab Emirates 2013 International Religious Freedom Report: p. 6.

5

Christian churches include Catholic churches and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; there are
also dedicated Hindu temples and a Sikh Temple. United Arab Emirates 2013 International Religious Freedom Report: p.
7.
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Most Filipino migrants are Christian, though some (primarily those from the poorer
Southern province of Mindanao) are Muslim. For many Filipinos, religion is an important part of
their personal identity and social life in the UAE. When interviewees were asked what they do
with their free time, the most common answers were internet use and church. Women in
particular are likely to attend church services regularly. The largest Catholic church in Abu Dhabi,
Saint Joseph’s, has a Filipino priest in residence and offers two weekly Catholic masses in
Tagalog. The services are overcrowded.
Enzo was a lay pastor in the Philippines. While in the Philippines he found that many of
the people that sought his support and advice were part of transnational families. Issues of
infidelity between spouses in different countries were particularly difficult for him to understand:
Married people coming in my office and asking me about their husband or wife in
another country. … And they say to me, ‘What happened, Pastor?’ … I say ‘I
don't know what's happening in another country; I don't know what is there.’ …
It's happening in the other country where married people get separated. But most
important [reason why] husband and wife go in another country is to earn money
for their families. … That's why I said to the Lord, ‘Lord give me a chance to go in
another country.’6
In hopes of understanding better the problems that migration posed for transnational
couples, Enzo looked for an opportunity to work abroad himself. He was offered a low-wage food
service position in the UAE and accepted. Nonetheless, he was concerned at the prospect of
going to the UAE: “Then how can I go in another country, most especially this country? How can I
teach biblical [studies] here in this, a Muslim country? Maybe not allowed the bible because they
are Muslim. I pray to God.”7 But Enzo persevered and came to the UAE. He has been relieved to
find that he can practice his faith openly. He is active in his church in the UAE and continues to
give advice and support to his fellow migrants.

6

Enzo (Chef), interview with the author, 9/12/2013.
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Ibid.
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Certain behaviors are not tolerated by the UAE authorities, however. First and foremost,
non-Muslims are strictly prohibited from proselytizing and may be fined, jailed and/or deported if
convicted of proselytizing to Muslims. Online activities are included in this prohibition. While nonMuslims are allowed to convert to Islam, Muslims are not allowed to change religions. And while
non-Muslim women may marry Muslim men, a Muslim woman may not marry a non-Muslim man.
Fund raising activities are restricted but not prohibited. All charitable giving in the UAE is
legally required to go through organizations recognized by the federal government or the
government of the Emirate in which it is operating. Most of the authorized groups are either semigovernmental aid agencies (such as the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development), local branches of
major international charities (such as the UAE Red Crescent Authority), or charitable outreach on
the part of major corporations (such as the Emirates Airlines Foundation). Churches do not
appear on the listings of authorized charitable organizations published by the UAE or Emiratelevel governments.8 Nonetheless, they do engage in fund raising and charitable activities and this
appears to be tolerated by the relevant authorities. Donations baskets are openly passed around
during masses at St. Joseph’s Cathedral.
Civic and Cultural groups
Federal Law No. (2) of 2008 on the National Societies and Associations of Public Welfare
governs the activities of such groups. The law requires that in order for a society9 to be
incorporated, its founding members and staff must have Emirati citizenship; any expatriates
joining the society may only be considered “Associate Members”.10 Once incorporated, groups
are subject to strict oversight by the Ministry of Social Affairs which must approve its activities and

8
It may be that churches are authorized to collect funds even though this information is not made public; it is
also possible that churches obtain individual authorization for specific fund raising drives rather than seek blanket
authorization.
9
“Any assembly (group) having a regulation valid for a limited or unlimited period, comprising natural or artificial
persons, for the purpose of achieving a social, religious, cultural, scientific, educational, professional, feminine, innovative,
or an artistic activity, or provision of humanitarian services, or for serving a charity or consolidation purpose…” “Federal
Law No. (2) of 2008 in Respect of the National Societies and Associations of Public Welfare,” United Arab Emirates, 2008:
Ch.1, Art. 2.
10

“Federal Law No. (2) of 2008 in Respect of the National Societies and Associations of Public Welfare”: Ch. 1,

Art. 3.
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audit its finances. Only incorporated groups may collect funds (membership fees, returns on
investments, or receive donations or gifts, etc.).11 Further, no unincorporated group may compete
with the activities of an incorporated group; and there are incorporated groups for everything from
aid to trafficking victims to sports clubs.12 The upshot of this law is that, while community groups
can form, they cannot generally collect funds (neither for their own operating expenses nor for
charitable activities) and the scope of their activities is limited.
There are nonetheless a large number of Filipino community groups active in the UAE,
from hometown associations to a ballroom dancing club. They operate informally and adhere to a
set of informal rules of operation. Although not acknowledged by the UAE government, these
groups are usually registered with the Embassy of the Philippines. The Embassy requests that
registered groups keep the Embassy informed of all group activities and that they send a
representative to a monthly meeting of the Bayanihan council (an umbrella group in which all
registered groups and the Embassy have representatives in order to facilitate communication and
cooperation within the Filipino community in Abu Dhabi and the UAE). This relationship has
mutual benefits. Groups gain Embassy insight into what actions may or may not be tolerated by
the UAE authorities and, by extension, some political cover for their actions; by the same coin,
the Embassy gains the ability to monitor group actions and the opportunity to discourage actions
it views as inappropriate. Bayanihan also serves as a forum for the Embassy to inform Filipino
groups of any significant changes to UAE or Philippine law and to gain their support in
disseminating important information to the Filipino community in the UAE.
While this system appears quite constraining, group leaders and members did not feel
constrained either by the UAE government or by Embassy oversight. Two areas emerged as
possible areas of constraint: political orientation and the collection of funds.
Some interviewees expressed the idea that political groups are not be tolerated in the
UAE. Angelo is an officer in his professional association. He is aware of these informal rules
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Ibid., Ch. 3, Art. 43.
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Ibid., Ch. 6, Art. 54.
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regarding how non-incorporated groups operate. His group reports activities to the Embassy but
he does not worry that either the Embassy or the UAE government might constrain the group’s
non-political activities.
Angelo: I heard that during the time there's some problem with the Brotherhood.
The Embassy advised us that we must inform [them about] whatever activities
we have. In case of any problem with the local authorities, they can help us.
Interviewer: Do you feel like that is a problem? Does that worry you at all, that
the local authorities might see your group?
Angelo: No, because our group is not related to the political.13
The second area of constraint is in the collection of funds to support informal groups and
engage in charitable activities.14 UAE law prohibits unincorporated groups from collecting funds
and these groups cannot open a UAE bank account.15 This hinders group activities. Most groups
do nonetheless collect money from their members, often in the form of membership dues to pay
for group operating expenses but also regularly through fund raising events or through purposespecific drives (for example to collect money for flood relief after a hurricane hits the Philippines).
Groups deal with the inability to get a bank account in three primary ways. First, much can be
accomplished with cash. The UAE is a cash-friendly society and vendors and venues can often
be paid for in cash. Second, a group’s treasurer may deposit the group’s money in her personal
bank account, but keep track of the funds through her own accounting. Third, money for specific
charitable purposes is usually channeled through a major Philippine charitable organization,
usually the Red Cross of the Philippines. In this case, the group may collect cash but then
immediately donate it to the Red Cross.

13

Angelo (Engineer), interview with the author, 10/21/2013.
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This is not to imply that the UAE discourages charitable giving. The UAE government is one of the most
generous donors to international humanitarian relief and its citizens regularly give zakat (charitable giving prescribed in
Islam). There is even a federal Zakat Fund that collects tens of millions of dollars in donations annually and accepts
payments online, via mobile, and via kiosks in public areas, and provides a hotline with access to a mufti who can help
you calculate the proper amount of payment. C.f. Alice Haine, "Zakat Is Not Just Charity, but a Divine Duty,” The National,
18 August 2012.
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It is important to stress that all of these avenues are illegal and open the group up to
intervention by the UAE authorities. In fact, the police have occasionally stepped in to halt
fundraisers by informal groups in order to enforce this rule: fund raisers are halted and organizers
are asked to either submit for approval from the relevant authority (the UAE Ministry of Social
Affairs or the Islamic affairs and Charitable Activities Department of the Government of Dubai) or
partner with the Red Crescent Authority.16 Occasionally stronger punishments have emerged:
when thirty members of the Islamist group al-Islah group were arrested by the UAE authorities,
illegal fund raising was among the charges laid against them.17 Most Filipino groups are not
worried, however, and continue to collect cash from members.
One interviewee was the President of her hometown association, Pag-Iribang Bicolnon
sa Abu Dhabi.18 The group’s focus in on supporting people from her region in the Philippines,
often helping them find employment or helping them navigate life in the UAE. While the group
must keep the Embassy informed of its activities and seek approval for any project that involves
soliciting funds, she does not feel constrained in the group’s activities. Despite needing to obtain
approval, the group is able to raise donations to support her region and the Philippines in the
event of a disaster. The group is not eligible to have a bank account, however, and so donations
are channeled through the Philippine Red Cross. Despite being in a Muslim country, the group
hosts an annual Saint’s day celebration. Funds for this event (for venue rental and food, for
example) are collected from members in cash and, if needed, run through her bank account, as
the group’s treasurer.
This rather lassie faire approach to community group regulation may be changing,
however. Recently Dubai’s Community Development Authority instituted new rules for the
registration and licensing of non-profit social clubs.19 Registration will have benefits and
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C.f.: Ramona Ruiz, "Philippine Flood Effort Delayed by Red Tape,” The National, 20 October 2011.
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“UAE Jails 30 over 'Muslim Brotherhood' Ties,” BBC News Middle East, 21 January 2014, accessed
November 5, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25824395.
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This interviewee and her group will remain unnamed to protect her anonymity.
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Ramona Ruiz, "Dubai Government to License Social Clubs for Filipinos,” The National, 03 June 2013.
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drawbacks. On the positive side, licensed clubs will be able to open bank accounts, to employ
staff and apply for visas and labor cards.20 On the other hand, licensing will cost 2,000 AED ($544
USD) which may be beyond the means of small clubs. There have also been rumors that the
Community Development Authority will require clubs to have a dedicated office; the cost of
renting office space is far beyond what most Filipino groups can afford. Even large and active
groups such as Migrante, use role in the UAE will be explored in greater detail below, worry that
they could not afford this. Another worry is that licensing approval is dependent on the content of
the group; the CDA freely admits that it will reject applications of groups that it feels are not
competent, redundant, or do not “add value for the community.”21 So far licensing is only required
in Dubai. However, policies implemented in one of the Abu Dhabi or Dubai emirate, the dominant
political emirates, are often copied by the others.
Human Rights Implications
Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects the right to freedom of
assembly and association; Article 27 protects the individual’s right to “participate in the cultural life
of the community.”22 Assembly and association, the ability to form groups, is basic to the
manifestation of culture. Culture is a collective endeavor based not only on shared
understandings but also on human interaction and collective action. Migrant workers are
physically removed from their homeland. The ability to form cultural groups is an important means
of acknowledging their cultural differences and constructing their social and cultural identity in
both home and host countries.
In the UAE such cultural groups occupy a legal grey area. So long as they do not
compete with officially recognized groups and do not contravene laws against insulting Islam or
the royal families, they are largely tolerated. However, routine operations tend to violate existing
laws, as with the collection of money (whether in membership fees, fund drives, or other), making

20

Ibid.

21

Janice Ponce de Leon, "Social Club Licensing for Community's Benefit,” Gulf News, 05 May 2014.

22

Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

280

them at best liable to intervention or, at worst, subject to arbitrary shut down with organizers open
to fines, jail time and/or deportation. At the very least, the legal precariousness of social groups is
worrying.
Registration would end legal uncertainty. But the way in which registration is currently
being implemented in Dubai, the first Emirate to require it of social clubs, opens up concern
regarding the criteria used to approve or deny registration applications. By giving the UAE
authorities the ability to approve or deny on the basis of the content of the group, these
authorities become the gatekeepers of what is or is not acceptable in migrant culture. Groups
rejected for registration in Dubai feel that their rights have been violated:
Wendell Castro, head of the group [whose application for registration was
rejected by Dubai authorities], told Gulf News: ‘We want to follow the rules. But
it’s so disappointing because we weren’t doing it for ourselves. We feel we have
been deprived of a right, of a human need to gather and organize.’23
Political Groups and Participation
The human right to political participation is guaranteed in the UDHR. In the most
straightforward sense, Article 21 guarantees the individual the right to choose (or become a)
political representatives, engage in public service, and to participate in elections in the country of
his citizenship. In the case of temporary contract migrants, who temporarily reside outside of their
country of citizenship, the human right to political participation is more complicated. What level of
political participation is open to them in host countries given that their residence is of limited
duration? Alternatively, what, if any restrictions, can their country of citizenship impose on them
on the basis of their temporary absence?
Voice in the UAE
Under Federal Law No. (2) of 2008 on the National Societies and Associations of Public
Welfare, registered groups cannot be political in nature and cannot go beyond their mandates
and engage in political action:
The society may not deviate from the objectives stipulated under its articles of
association. The Society and its members are prohibited to interfere in politics or
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in the matters that impair the State security and its ruling regime, nor to arouse
sectarian, racial, or religious disputes.24
This prohibition is enforced and groups that have publicly taken overly political stances have been
subject to takeover by the government or dismantled.25
The groups that the UAE has cracked down on in recent years are primarily pro-reform
political movements that emerged during the Arab Spring – such as the Hewar online forum or
the pro-democratic petition movement26 – and/or associated with religious ideologies that the
UAE views as extremist, such as the Islamist political group al-Islah.27 These groups’ members
are mainly Emirati and Arab and their aims would undermine the ruling bargain of the state. The
arrest and trial of theses groups’ members (especially the high-profile arrests of Emirati lawyer
Mohammed al-Mansoori and blogger and human rights activist Ahmed Mansour) has been visible
in the UAE press and interviewees were usually aware of at least the basic outline of the issue.
Given this context, it would not be surprising to find that other groups of expatriates
advocating politically sensitive issues might face similar crackdowns. However, there are Filipino
groups in the UAE that publicly take up politically provocative issues. For example, the group
Migrante focuses on migrant labor issues; the group Gabriella fights for women’s issues and
raises concerns about violence against women and the plight of domestic workers in the UAE.
Both of these groups are vocal in the UAE press and openly critical of UAE policy and of the
Embassy of the Philippines. As the topics they raise are politically sensitive, it might be expected
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that their actions would not be tolerated. Surprisingly, neither group reported problems. It is
unclear where the line between acceptable and unacceptable political activism lies.
There are some activities that are clearly not tolerated. First, migrants cannot vote in the
UAE. This is hardly surprising: the human right to political representation belongs only to citizens
and yet even Emirati citizens have extremely restricted voting rights. All of the Gulf States remain
hereditary monarchies and the UAE is no exception. The President of the UAE is the ruler of Abu
Dhabi, the Vice President is the ruler of Dubai, and all positions that exercise significant political
power are filled by decree. The only political positions that are filled by election are within the
Federal National Council, a body that is half elected and half appointed but, even there, the
“electorate” is restricted to an electoral college with 129,000 Emirati members chosen by the
rulers of the seven emirates. In addition, the Federal National Council is primarily an advisory
body with no legislative power and little regulatory authority; it has no real power. While this is
deeply problematic for Emirati citizens, who have the right to genuine participation and
representation in their government, it is less problematic for migrants who do not have a human
right to vote in the UAE as they are not citizens of that state.
Similarly, political parties are outlawed in the UAE. Neither Emirati citizens nor migrants
can organize a group whose primary intent is to acquire and exercise political power. The
exercise of political power remains the sole prerogative of the ruling families and their directly
selected agents. Again, this poses a greater challenge for the human rights of Emirati citizens
than for migrants, as the right to direct participation as envisioned in the UDHR is confined to
citizens.
Of greater concern, those exercises of political voice to which migrants do have a human
right on the basis of their presence (not their citizenship) in the host country are also significantly
constrained. Public meetings or demonstrations are not necessarily illegal but they do require a
government permit. Such permits are exceedingly rare. In effect, citizens and migrants alike are
not able to organize public demonstrations in order to voice their political concerns.
Nonetheless, some political pressure can be brought to bear through the national and
international media. The UAE authorities are sensitive to their global reputation in the press.
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Wearing argues that the abuse of migrant laborers directly impacts on the valuable international
image and prestige of the Gulf regimes and uses Qatar as an example:
Qatar did not go to great lengths to secure the World Cup so that football fans
around the globe would associate the country with a tournament where 4,000
construction workers may die before a ball is even kicked. However, on the other
hand, the exploitation of armies of insecure migrant workers is a key component
of the Gulf monarchies’ domestic strategy for survival. These regimes may now
have to choose between their image abroad and the security of their class
privileges at home.28
Similarly, negative press regarding labor camp conditions in the UAE forced the UAE to
address the issue. 29 There are now new rules regarding labor camp operations and there are
model labor camps operating in several locations, including the Saadiyat Island Construction
Village designed by the Tourism Development & Investment Company (100 percent owned by the
government of Abu Dhabi). This same impulse that drives the authorities to address issues that
have come to the spotlight, however, also pushes them to strictly regulate the local media.
While the UAE constitution formally guarantees freedom of opinion and expression, that
protection is illusory. Speech, political or otherwise, is limited by prohibitions on insulting the UAE
state or its rulers (UAE penal code, Articles 176 and 178); blasphemy laws (Federal Law No. 3 of
1987); restrictive media laws (1980 Press and Publications Act; a new draft law was published in
2009 that would have banned the jailing of journalists but was never passed); stringent antidefamation laws (a criminal offense in the UAE: Federal Law No. 3 of 1987); a cybercrime law
(Federal Decree-Law no. (5) of 2012); and laws against contravening public morality. Access to
the internet is censored. Of particular concern is the fact that any statement, true or not, that
damages a public figure’s reputation is considered libelous and that libel is considered a criminal
offense.30 Defamation laws have been used to target the press as well as individuals. Cybercrime
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laws have been used to target individuals using social media, including Twitter, as a means of
sharing information and expressing controversial opinions.
The result is pervasive self-censorship that effects all levels of society, including the local
press. For example, the press is hesitant to report on stories that present a negative image of the
country’s royal family or that might encourage economic pessimism.31 Issues that might tarnish
the country’s international reputation, such as violent crime or human rights violations, tend to be
downplayed in the local press. Individuals, too, feel the pressure to self-censor, especially
regarding content that they publish in online forums. Recently the issue that has compelled the
greatest show of force by the UAE authorities is the call for political reforms by Emiratis in the
wake of the Arab Spring uprisings. Hundreds of arrests have been made and defamation and
cybercrimes have been among the charges laid against the dissenters. But the fear of speaking
out extends beyond the press and beyond these hot button issues. The RAND Corporation,
Gallup Polls and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung were all forced to close their UAE operations in
2012. Other than those publicly critical of the GCC governments,32 academics working on diverse
issues such as press freedom33 and the conditions of migrant workers34 allege that they have
been forced to leave the UAE because of the content of their research. It is inevitable that this
environment would have a chilling effect on political speech among the UAE community at large,
including its migrant worker community.
There remain some outspoken groups, but they are not high profile groups internationally
and the space allowed to them is narrowing. Migrante International is perhaps the most significant
migrant rights NGO operating from within the UAE. It operates informally – without UAE
government licensure – and on a minimal budget. They utilize the UAE media as a means of
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distributing their message and the group’s Middle East country coordinator, Nhel Morona,
frequently gives interviews criticizing UAE and Philippine state policies on issues of relevance to
Filipino migrant workers. Of particular concern for the group are the failings of the Philippine state
and the Embassy of the Philippines in the UAE. They are vocal critics of perceived official failings,
from the increasing complexity and cost of migration-related paperwork35 to the potentially corrupt
sale of documents by Abu Dhabi Embassy staffers.36 UAE policies also come in for their fair
share of criticism, particularly with reference to the plight of domestic workers and the increasing
incidence of violence against women.37 But where Migrante’s criticism of Philippine policy directly
criticizes the Philippine state, its policies and its officials, the group’s comments with regard to
problems in the UAE are more carefully phrased to avoid such direct criticism of the UAE state or
its officials, criticisms which would be illegal under UAE law. Nonetheless, Migrante activists walk
a fine line. To be politically active in the UAE, one must accept the fact that the line between what
is an acceptable level and style of criticism and what is not is unclear, and that the price for
overstepping the boundary is possible arrest and imprisonment and, most likely, deportation.
Political Participation in the Philippines
In contrast to their position in the UAE as a host country, Filipinos living abroad remain an
important political constituency in their home country. With language labeling overseas workers
as “national heroes,” the Philippine government stresses the idea that overseas workers continue
to be part of the Philippine nation despite their physical absence. The continued reliance of the
Philippine economy on overseas workers would make them politically significant in any case:
migrants and their families (in the Philippines or abroad) form a large and comparatively well-todo constituency. These new heroes of the Philippines become “a particular kind of citizen,”
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expected to leave the Philippines but to remain always Filipino.38 And by stressing the continuing
identity of OFWs as Filipino nationals, the state “has become subject to demands by this very
population that citizenship rights must also be extended to them while they are abroad.”39
The case of Filipino temporary contract workers is particularly useful in showing the
weaknesses of the arguments against the full incorporation of migrants into the political system of
the home country. Some argue that migrants are no longer subject to the laws of the Philippine
state, do not pay taxes, and so should no longer have a say in creating those laws; regulating the
lives of people within the state should be made by those citizens residing in the state and so
subject to its laws on a daily basis. However, Filipino OFWs do remain subject to a wide variety of
laws that regulate important aspects of their lives; the Philippine state has made a point of
ensuring that the POEA and other state agencies are involved in every stage of the migration
cycle, from pre-deployment to return and reintegration, and they pay a variety of fees for these
privileges. Many also remain engaged through immediate family members – such as spouses,
children, and elderly parents – and through property ownership. To deny them the right to
participation would be deny them the ability to influence the laws and policies regulating these
important life aspects.
In 2007 there were 115 states and territories that allowed external voting and 100 that did
not.40 In 2003 the Philippines enacted the Overseas Absentee Voting Law (Republic Act no.
9189) allowing citizens over age eighteen to vote in federal (presidential and legislative) elections
through Philippine diplomatic missions abroad, and in 2004 absentee voters were allowed to vote
for the first time. Registration of overseas voters for the 2004 presidential elections was a
complicated process requiring potential registrants to go to a diplomatic post (embassy,
consulate, or diplomatic mission) in person to prove their identity and submit biometric data which

38
Robyn Magalit Rodriguez, "Migrant Heroes: Nationalism, Citizenship and the Politics of Filipino Migrant
Labor,” Citizenship Studies 6, no. 3 (2002).
39

Rodriguez, "Migrant Heroes”: p. 347.

40

Andrew Ellis et al., Voting from Abroad: The International Idea Handbook (Stockholm, Sweden: International
IDEA, 2007).

287

would be used to produce a registry of overseas voters and to issue voter ids.41 The authorities
allowed only two months for the registration period, creating a bottleneck at the overseas posts
that collected and processed applicants. In total, COEMLEC, the Philippine voting authority,
approved and registered 359,297 voters, only about 5 percent of the total stock of OFWs42 and
about one third of the total applications; only 233,092 of those registered actually cast a ballot in
the 2004 election.43 Beyond the difficulty in registering, the “killer clause” was the need for nontemporary migrants (about half of overseas Filipinos) to submit an “affidavit of intent to return”
stating that they will return to the Philippines in the next three years (failure to do so would have
been punishable by imprisonment; this requirement was scrapped in 2013).44 Since then,
absentee voting has grown in importance in Philippine elections. By mid-2014 there were over
one million Filipinos registered to vote overseas and COMELEC hopes that over two million will
be registered before the 2016 presidential elections.
In the UAE alone, 47,720 Filipinos were registered to vote before the 2010 presidential
election, though only 7,917 (16.6 percent) actually voted.45 And in 2013, a midterm election year,
of the 77,487 eligible voters, only 6,888 actually cast their ballots.46 Voter turnout in the
Philippines as a whole was much higher: 75 percent and 61 percent of registered voters cast
ballots in 2010 and 2013 respectively.47 Only ten interviewees had actually voted from overseas.
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practical difficulties in getting registered and voting overseas; there is an additional hassle. The
process requires the prospective voter to show up in person at a diplomatic post (the Embassy in
Abu Dhabi, the consulate in Dubai, or a special field post established for the purpose of voter
registration and voting) on two occasions, first to register and then to vote. For most Filipinos, this
requires taking time off from work on two occasions which is not always practical. This is
particularly difficult for individuals who do not live in Abu Dhabi or Dubai and so must travel some
distance in order to register and vote.
Second, not all Filipinos are convinced that politics in Manila impacts them in Abu Dhabi.
Interviewer: Would you register with the embassy to vote? Or do you think do
you think that's important?
Sebastian: Actually I don't want to exercise my right anymore.
Interviewer: Why not?
Sebastian: Because nothing happens, really, so. Actually I don't want to be
registered. I don't want to vote.49
In fact, interviewees were split on whether politics in Philippines affects overseas Filipino
workers. Some say it does not affect them; most say it does. Interviewees give two reasons: 1)
the policies in place affect migrants through their continuing family and/or economic ties; 2)
corruption leads to a waste of the fees paid by migrant workers and undermines the programs in
place to support them. Mia sums up the response of many overseas Filipinos about the politics of
their home country:
Interviewer: Do you think that the politics or the politicians in the Philippines, do
you think they affect your life here?
Mia: Yeah, of course.
Interviewer: In what ways?
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Mia: … Because of corruption, you know. Like, maybe, you know now the
situation of the Philippines: they are taking the money from the tax of the people
and just living a luxurious life. … I thought that was just an exaggeration but it's
not. It's true. I just now realized that, oh my, why are we working here and we
have a lot of money in the Philippines? No, I like to vote, but no like this. It's too
late to realize I should have done something.
Interviewer: But there's always next time. Do you think you'll vote next time?
Mia: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yes, of course. And I vote [for] the poor ones.50
The third reason many interviewees gave for not voting is precisely this pervasive disgust
with corruption. While desire to end corruption may spur some to vote, the seeming
ubiquitousness of corruption in Philippine politics discourages more. For example, Edward feels
that his vote “doesn’t count, anyway,” despite the fact that he acknowledges that politics in the
Philippines affects his life in tangible ways such as exchange rates and the Embassy and social
security programs available to him:
Edward: Actually before I leave my country I registered myself. But the last
election I did not vote.
Interviewer: Why not?
Edward: I don't know. It's not because I didn't want to. Maybe because of
sometimes I didn't have the feeling of, you know, urging myself to go here and
vote. I feel like, you know, it doesn't really make sense a lot to me.
Interviewer: Why?
Edward: I don't know. I it doesn't mean that I just don't care about my country.
But maybe I just don't have this much trust to … to this kind of … election thing.
Because, anyhow, money people are going to win it in the end.51
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Cherry goes one step further, linking corruption in the Philippines to the national reliance
on migration as an economic strategy:
If you can hear the news, … you know most of our taxes were got by some of the
big people there, corrupt politicians. You can see it affects our lives. …
But when I see the economy of the Philippines, when I see all the politician/s,
they are all corrupt. So in my mind, what is the use of my vote? … Then I'm not a
registered voter there at the Embassy because I don't like vote because for me
all of them are corrupt. … That's why we are all we are here. How many
populations here? Too many, too many Filipinos here.52
Filipinos in the UAE face other difficulties in exercising their political voice in home
country politics. It is complicated for overseas workers to form groups, such as political parties,
that are able to compete on the national stage. While the major political parties have certainly
courted the support of overseas Filipinos, especially since migrants played a notable role in the
ouster of President Estrada,53 their representation in the party structure remains truncated.
The single biggest political group representing overseas Filipinos is Migrante
International, a left-leaning human rights advocacy group. Migrante has 200 member
organizations in twenty three countries; Migrante Middle East has a chapter that is active in the
UAE.54 The group was founded in response to the death of Flor Contemplacion, a domestic
worker hanged in Singapore in 1996 for murder, and since then has made it their mission to
advertise the failing of the Philippine state in representing the interests of its migrant citizens.
Migrante is active in assisting individual migrants in need, but their larger mission is as “an active
defender of the rights and welfare of OFWs by raising public awareness on their plight and
providing a critical analysis of the Philippine government’s labor export policy program as the
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main factor responsible for the commodification of Filipino workers.”55 But Migrante’s mission is
critical, not constructive: they serve as a necessary critique of the policy omissions and failures of
the Philippine state but their proactive political agenda is limited.
Human Rights Implications
The larger human rights issue that this raises is the fact that migrants have limited
political voice, both in their country of citizenship and in their country of residence. Political voice
in the home country is often limited by restrictions on voting while overseas and by the practical
hurdles is forming political groups that are able to represent migrants on the home country
political stage. In the host country, temporary status usually disqualifies migrants from access to
political representation. This double elimination means that migrants have little chance to affect
the rules and laws that regulate their lives.
Political participation in the UDHR is restricted to “the right to take part in the government
of his country…”56 The fact that migrants are excluded from voting or holding office in the UAE is
not a human rights violation. But their right to hold and express political ideas in the host country
is nonetheless protected in human rights: freedom of thought,57 freedom of opinion and
expression,58 freedom of assembly and association,59 are all specifically protected by the UDHR.
The exercise of these rights, in turn, is harnessed to migrants’ political agendas in order to
advocate for change. Restrictions on political thought and speech by the host country is a
violation of migrants’ human rights. Such restrictions are systematic in the UAE. Political influence
in the UAE is not exercised through public mechanisms such as voting, forming political parties,
or holding public demonstrations, and the exercise of public speech is risky.
From the perspective of the sending country, guarantees of political participation must be
stronger yet. Citizens have a human right to participate in the politics of their own country, the
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country of citizenship. The fact that they are not physically present does not obviate this right:
migrants must be given a genuine opportunity to run for office, engage in public service, and to
vote in elections. Filipinos abroad gained the right to vote in federal-level elections in 2004. While
the process of voting overseas still has procedural difficulties that need to be smoothed, the
extension of the franchise to Filipinos abroad is a major human rights accomplishment. Difficulties
remain, however, in the guise of low voter turnout and the lack of groups dedicated to migrants as
political actors. Filipinos abroad still face significant constraints on their activities as political
actors in the Philippines.
Economic Organization
While the UAE may allow some space for migrant workers and their families to organize
civic and religious groups, and tolerates some political activity so long as it does not threaten to
undermine the ruing bargain of the Emirati state, it does not brook the formation of economic
interest groups. Unionization of migrant workers would necessarily undermine the political
equilibrium. As argued in Chapter Three, ensuring the powerlessness of labor/migrants as
opposed to owners/Emiratis is one of the foundations of state legitimacy. Migrants are a carefully
constrained population of “others” as contrasted against the privileged Emirati population.
Management of this balance is used by the government as a means of securing Emirati privilege
and thus shoring up regime legitimacy through the distribution of rents; weighing in favor of
labor/migrants, labor organization would undermine the current political balance and so is not
tolerated.
Labor and Collective Action
The standard argument in favor of unions - that they allow labor to have sufficient
bargaining power to compete on equal terms with employers – clearly falls into this category of
measures that would upset the current balance. Unions would also offer to workers to ability to
seek safety in numbers. Grievances could be advanced by the union on behalf of without any
individual having to out himself as a troublemaker. Because workers fear employer retaliation, the
ability to advance grievances anonymously or as part of a group of like parties would offer
valuable protection.
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Interviewer: If you could give one recommendation about how the policy could
be changed so that employees would not be afraid?
Gabriel: Well definitely establishing union, labor union. That's really helpful to the
employees here. Because in my country, in the Philippines, labor union is
allowed. But here it's not allowed. So basically, you can't raise your voice to your
HR because it's threaten you to terminate you if you complain. So basically, just
can't complain. And then if you have labor union, they will be someone who
would represent you in a much higher degree and sometimes they would come
up with an agreement. So, it's very helpful.60
But, while unions would help migrant workers, they would not help (Emirati) employers.
The formation of unions is forbidden by law.
Without unions, some professional associations registered by the UAE government
began to agitate for the rights of their members.61 In particular, the Jurist Association and the
Teacher’s Association supported a 2011 petition calling for political reform and increased
democratic representation in the UAE. This was deemed illegal political action, outlawed by
Article 16 of the National Societies and Associations of Public Welfare law.62 In response, the
Ministry of Labour exercised its ability to replace the Associations’ boards with members
appointed by the state.63 Professional associations were essentially shut down as a possible
means of advancing claims.
Without the ability to form official organizations, union or otherwise, laborers have been
forced to turn to unorganized strikes as a means of making their most serious grievances public.
In one of the most well-known cases, construction workers on the building site of the Burj Khalifa
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(then known as the Burj Dubai) staged a series of illegal protests from 2004 through 2007. The
workers were repeatedly threatened with mass deportations but the actions did lead Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, who became ruler of Dubai in 2006, to order better
conditions for workers.64 In general, however, those thought to have instigated or organized a
strike are deported65 and face a lifetime labor ban, making striking a risky strategy for migrant
workers. Strikes in the UAE tend to have one of three root causes: wages being withheld for
several months, extremely low wages, or extremely bad living conditions. The grievance must be
severe in order for the worker to jeopardize not only his job with the company but his residence
and any potential for obtaining future employment in the UAE.
In some sense, mediation through the Ministry of Labour and the UAE courts is intended
to take the place of independent labor organization. Mediators are to deal with all disputes
between employers and workers regarding issues such as wages, rates of pay, hours, or other
terms or conditions of employment. If workers wish to file a collective grievance, they are legally
obliged to do so through the Ministry of Labour, which will first attempt to reach settlement
through mediation.66 But, as discussed in detail in Chapter Seven, mediation is often not an
attractive proposition for migrant workers; it is of dubious effectiveness in representing and
protecting the rights of migrant workers.
Social Security
If the Filipino migrant worker in the UAE cannot rely on collective action to ensure his
welfare, neither can he rely on state-run social security systems in either country. In some tightlyknit regional systems such as the European Union social security systems do function across
borders, and the idea of securing social security “portability” through bilateral and multilateral
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agreement is growing in importance internationally.67 However, in the UAE migrants are largely
excluded from social security programs and in the Philippines the social security system is
underfunded and inadequate, leaving the individual to manage her own social security.
If you're getting old, the government [of the United States] still they giving, right?
… Yeah. But in the Philippines if you don't have those kind of uh like SS [social
security] benefits, you cannot get anything. So you're getting old without
anything.68
As residence in the UAE is explicitly temporary, the provision of social welfare such as
employment and unemployment, sickness and disability, education, and pension benefits is also
limited. Where the benefits are directly tied to the working life of the individual, the state takes
some steps to guarantee employer provision for workers’ welfare. However, the basic assumption
is that, as migrant workers have no right to stay and no right to employment in the UAE, the state
does not assume an obligation to provide social welfare benefits to migrant workers. The
assumption is that the home country retains primary obligation in this respect. Yet it is precisely
the failure of the Philippine state to provide adequate unemployment, sickness and disability, and
retirement benefits that is a major factor pushing Filipinos to migrate in search of better wages to
support themselves and their families. It is a vicious cycle for migrants. One interviewee, Moses,
had an interesting observation. Moses works as a financial adviser, specializing in Filipino
families’ needs; he stresses the need for migrants in the UAE to take responsibility for their own
financial security:
The reason why you don’t pay tax [in the UAE] is because the government here
doesn’t have social responsibility to you. If you get sick, you are on your own; if
you grow old, you’re on your own; even if you die, you’re on your own. If you
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have kids sent to school, you’re on your own. No one will take care of it for you
but yourself.69
The problem is that state social security schemes in general rely on three principles that
do not function well across international boundaries unless explicit accommodation is made to
facilitate the portability of contributions and benefits: risk pooling (fundamental to all insurance
programs), pre-funding, and redistribution.70 Unless portability regimes are established, the
temporary migrant will face the risks and pay into (or otherwise contribute to) the receiving
country system while working abroad, but be unable to receive the benefits once she has
repatriated. There are some efforts made by sending countries to ensure that migrants pay in to
national social security schemes while abroad; the Philippines, for example, requires OFWs to
pay in to the national Social Security System (SSS) program. But making these payments across
borders is difficult and costly to the OFW; many Filipinos abroad allow their membership to lapse.
Employment: The UAE government offers strong support for the employment of its
citizens. Most Emiratis are employed on generous terms in the public sector. As the public sector
is reaching saturation, the government has an active campaign of “emiratisation” for the private
sector as well. To encourage the hiring of locals companies must meet quotas of Emiratis
employed and certain job titles are reserved for Emirati citizens, for example. The logic of
emiratisation is to ensure full employment of the Emirati population and to decrease reliance on
foreign labor, particularly in supervisory and management positions. The flip side of this, of
course, is that the UAE government has little interest in ensuring the employment of its migrant
population. Instead, residency is tied to employment so that should a migrant job seeker fail to
find employment they will be forced to leave the country. The failure of sending countries such as
the Philippines to effectively ensure the domestic employment of their citizens is one of the
primary reasons why they support temporary labor migration programs.
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Healthcare and sickness: The Philippines attempts to extend healthcare to all of its
citizens through the National Health Insurance Program, known as PhilHealth. 71 PhilHealth is
primarily funded through income taxes of all employed persons (mandatory enrolment) and
employer contributions; migrants are not exempted and must pay the P 1,200 annual subscription
fee before they can obtain an Overseas Employment Certificate. In return, PhilHealth reimburses
the cost of migrant members’ hospitalization overseas and provides coverage for immediate
family members in the Philippines. PhilHealth is minimal but adequate coverage. Cassandra, a
driver for an Emirati family, has PhilHealth coverage and has used it several times:
Yes, I have PhilHealth. I pay for that. And I need that because I have son, you
know? They cover in PhilHealth my son, my mother and father, and including
myself. So it's better. I use it already and I have good health[care] for how many
times. … You know dengue? My son had dengue. … He used to have long time.
Thanks God is ok now. My father before he died, he was confined at the hospital.
But, thanks God, I use it. Really good use. Was a bill for 50,000 pesos and it
went down [to] 2,000, something like that. They refund me back the things that
we use in the hospital. So it's OK.72
The Philippines has made membership in PhilHealth mandatory for OFWs because
adequate provisions are not always available in the host country for migrant workers and rarely
cover their families in the home country. In the UAE, while the country has a modern healthcare
infrastructure, including a growing medical tourism industry, the provision of health insurance
varies by Emirate: only Abu Dhabi and Dubai73 require employers to provide health insurance for
all employees, including domestic workers. Justin, a low-wage worker who could not afford to pay
insurance premiums on his own, is happy to have basic coverage through his employer: “We
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have health insurance here in the company. We have an [insurance] card. If we have problem
with our body we can go to direct to the hospital.”74
The quality of healthcare varies between Emiratis and expatriates however. First, the
UAE federal government provides generous insurance coverage to all Emiratis through is Thiqa
plan, while the Abu Dhabi (Basic) Plan – offered by the same insurance company, Daman, but
targeting expatriates – offers a far lower standard of coverage.75 In October 2014, a new concern
arose regarding the bifurcation of care when one of the biggest and best hospitals in Abu Dhabi,
the Sheikh Khalifa Medical City (SKMC) run by the Cleveland Clinic, began to treat only UAE
nationals, turning away all expatriates, even those who were receiving continuing care or followup care for conditions originally treated at SKMC.76 Emergency rooms will treat urgent cases
irrespective of insurance status.
Employment injury and disability: The Philippines offers minimal security against disability
arising from workplace injury or other sources. OWWA provides disability and dismemberment
benefits (coverage ranges from Php 2,000 to Php 50,000 ($45 – 1,119 USD) for partial disability
and Php 100,000 ($2,238 USD), in case of total permanent disability) for OFWs77 and SSS offers
a “disability pension” (between Php 1,000 and Php 2,400 / $22 - 54 USD depending on length of
membership; minimum membership to be eligible is three years).78 These pensions are
inadequate as a means of primary support. As with health insurance, these programs are in place
because protections are often lacking in host countries. In the UAE the employer is liable for
treatment of illnesses or disability as prescribed in the Labour Law. However, workplace deaths
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regularly go unreported to the UAE authorities. The injury and death of construction workers in
particular remains an area of significant human rights abuse for migrant workers in the UAE.
Human Rights Watch shows that, while official Dubai statistics recorded thirty four workplace
deaths of construction workers in 2004, estimates using data from private sources show that
there were closer to eighty work-related deaths of Indian nationals alone.79 It is freely rumored
that employers will use whatever means necessary to get rid of injured workers and avoid paying
the legally-required benefit:
And as an expat in Dubai, no matter where you came from, we are only as good
as we are healthy. The moment that we are damaged goods, they will find a way
… to ship you back to wherever you came from and after you are out they wash
their hands, you are on your own.80
Maternity: The Philippines government offers maternity benefits to SSS members equal
to sixty-days salary (seventy eight-days in the event of delivery by caesarian section).81 Again,
the Philippines offers this as protections in host countries are often lacking. However, the UAE
does offer reasonable benefits to legally employed mothers. UAE Labour Law entitles all working
women to leave with full pay for forty five days and allows for an additional one hundred days of
unpaid leave if medically necessary.82 This provision of the law is generally obeyed. The problem
with maternity in the UAE is that unmarried women giving birth will be detained by the UAE
authorities for the crimes of sex outside of wedlock and having children outside of wedlock, and
will be jailed with their infants until they can be deported. Hospitals will request to see the
marriage certificate of any pregnant woman that arrives for care. Most unwed mothers in the
UAE, therefore, avoid hospitals and forgo prenatal care; they take their annual leave to coincide
with the expected birth of their child and return to their home country for the delivery.
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Indigence: Migration is many Filipinos’ response to indigence in the Philippines and the
failure of the state to provide a sufficient safety net for its poor citizens. Nor does the UAE offer
support to its poor migrant workforce. There is no minimum wage in the UAE and poor migrants
who get into debt are liable to arrest and imprisonment. There are various charitable programs
set up by both private and semi-governmental groups to help workers but support is neither
comprehensive nor continuous. Charitable giving is at its height during the Ramadan holiday
when large iftar83 tents are set up in public areas to feed the hungry; one of the largest, the iftar
meal at the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque fed between 22,000 and 25,000 people each day
during the 2014 Ramadan.84 But such giving is not sustained throughout the year and is not
motivated by any sense that the recipients of such aid have a right to such support.
Unemployment: As with most (though not all) major migrant sending countries, Philippine
state social security does not offer unemployment benefits.85 Individuals may purchase
unemployment insurance on the private market, but few Filipinos do so. Instead, workers are
encouraged to engage with the global labor market in order to find employment. The
unemployment rate in the Philippines was 7.2 percent in 201386; if the estimated 5,563,831
temporary and irregular Filipinos migrants working overseas returned to their homeland, the
unemployment rate would nearly triple to roughly 21.4 percent. Labor migration is a means for the
Philippines to deal with a lack of employment at home, essentially exporting the problem.
Alternatively, temporary contract migration in the UAE – as elsewhere in the world – is specifically
designed to disallow migrant unemployment: at the end of her employment, whether at the end of
a contract or in case of termination or if the migrant resigns her job, residence in the host country
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also ends. Unemployment benefits in the UAE take the form of an end of service gratuity and a
one-way air ticket for the purposes of repatriation provided by the employer and guaranteed by
the Labor Law.
Old age and pensions: The UAE government has pensions and social security schemes
set up for UAE nationals established in Pensions & Social Securities Law, Federal Law No. (7) of
1999; there is no similar scheme set up for migrant workers. The Philippine Social Security
System (SSS) provides pensions for all workers, including OFWs, who pay in to the system
during their working life. The basic plan, mandatory for all OFWs, provides at least Php 1,200
($28 USD) per month.87 This is inadequate as a primary means of support. The optional FlexiFund Program acts as a savings account and pension plan on top of SSS. Participating SSS
members may make additional contributions which are automatically invested in government
securities.88 Flexi-Fund contributions plus earnings are paid out at retirement or in case of
disability either as a lump sum or as an additional pension. SSS is the one program that many
Filipinos seem to have confidence in and some have even availed themselves of the Flexi-Fund
option. For example, Edward has voluntarily paid only into SSS because “it's the kind of agencies
that you know you can really lean on so when you get old. It's not like the other agencies that,
after ten to twenty years, then they will announce that they're going to shut down the company.”89
Others are not convinced that it is worth the effort of paying into the system. Angelo is no longer
paying:
SSS. I did not continue anymore because there's less privilege I can get from
that SSS. … But SSS, it is for retirement only. So I believe I already save
[enough each month] for my retirement. So I don't need this SSS. And it's very
small amount you can get from that.90
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Death benefits: Adequate provision for surviving family members in the event of a death
is an important aspect of social security, particularly if the deceased was the primary breadwinner
for a family or if there are dependent children in need of continuing care. If a migrant worker dies,
the UAE does not offer death benefits to his family.91 The UAE is not alone in this; although ILO
treaties aim for equality of treatment with regard to social security provisions including death
benefits, few countries provide for the family after the death of a migrant.92 More problematic, the
deceased’s bank accounts in the UAE are immediately frozen until the estate can be probated93
and their residence visa – and therefore also the visa of any dependent family members – is
cancelled, leaving dependent family members in a difficult position. Any money kept in the UAE,
including money owed as wages or end of service gratuity, will be distributed to the workers’ heirs
according to Sharia guidelines as established in the Labour Law unless there is valid will in the
UAE, attested by the Embassy of the individual’s country of citizenship.94 Without a will in place,
the UAE courts may also award custody of minor children according to Sharia, which privileges
the blood relatives of the man over his wife. Having such a will drawn up can be an expensive
prospect. Burying or repatriating human remains can also be expensive and involves a large
amount of paperwork.
In the Philippines OWWA does offer a death benefit to migrant workers. OWWA
membership includes life insurance (Php 100,000.00 / $23,000 USD for natural death and Php
200,000.00 / $46,000 USD for accidental death) for the duration of the employment contract
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abroad and a burial benefit (Php 20,000 / $4,600 USD).95 SSS offers a “death pension” to the
primary beneficiary (widowed spouse or dependent child, no less than Php 1,000 / $23 USD per
month) and a “dependent pension” to dependent children (10 percent of the primary death
pension but no less than Php 250 / $5.75 USD for up to five children).96
The End of Service “Gratuity”
Typically temporary migrant workers, given the limited timeframe of their residence, are
not eligible to receive pension benefits in the host country. At the same time, while working
abroad many migrant workers either do not pay into their home country pensions systems or do
so on a voluntary basis and often sporadically or at a reduced level. There is an increasing
concern for creating internationally “portable” pensions systems in order to ensure that migrant
workers are not left without a safety net in their old age. However, today only a small fraction of
the 105 million migrant workers globally have access to such systems.97 The UAE is among those
states that limits its pension system to nationals.
However, UAE Labor Law requires employers to pay an end of service gratuity. Although
there are some subtleties in the law, the basic premise is that the worker receives the equivalent
of one month’s basic salary for each year worked upon the conclusion of her employment
situation.98 Gratuities are, in effect, a form of enforced savings for the end of the individual’s
working term. It is not entirely clear what the purpose of these gratuity payments is under the
UAE Labour Law, but the law gives us a hint by establishing that the end of service gratuity can
be forfeited if the employer is paying in to an equivalent pension fund for the employee during
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their term of employment.99 It is probable that the UAE government sees them as a form of
pension or security against retirement.100 Some Filipinos view it this way as well. Coco, who has
no savings after spending almost fifteen years in the UAE and thirteen years with her current
employer, is planning to fall back on her gratuity: “It is something, right? At least at the end there
will be something.”101 This is risky because the end of service benefit may be withheld under
certain circumstances: if the worker is fired with cause, if she resigns before completing five years
of service, or if she leaves at any point without giving notice.102
In addition, few Filipinos stay employed by a single company for the duration of their
working lives. Often they change jobs after two to five years in search of career advancement or
wage growth. The gratuity is paid out each time the individual leaves a given employer. So rather
than getting one large lump sum at retirement, the individual may get several smaller sums paid
out throughout their working life. These smaller sums are rarely rolled over into retirement
savings or formal pension plans. Instead, they commonly fund transportation and living expenses
while the individual obtains a new job, leaving the individual with little or no retirement savings.
Cherry, for example, is now at her third place of employment in the UAE.103 Her first two jobs did
pay end of service benefits when she resigned her position. Cherry sent quite a bit of her end of
service money to the Philippines to support her sister who was bedridden due to multiple
scoliosis; she was cheated out of another hefty sum in a real estate scam, and the remainder she
lost in unlucky stock market speculation. The money she received that should have funded her
retirement is gone and Cherry has little savings left.
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Furthermore, employers often try to shortchange employees on the end of service
gratuities. There are several ways this can happen. One is by paying a small basic salary and
supplementing that salary with allowances and bonuses. As the gratuity is calculated on basic
salary alone, this reduces the amount that the employer will need to pay in gratuity. Marjorie is in
this position. Her basic salary as a massage therapist is 4,000 AED (about $1,090 USD), though
on average she earns another 4,000 AED in tips each month. Her end of service gratuity will be
calculated only on the 4,000 AED basic salary. As she has been employed with the same
company for seven years, the difference is 22,000 AED (about $5,990 USD) and growing.104
Another strategy employers use to reduce gratuity payments is to pay out the gratuity at
the end of every contract rather than at the end of employment, as is required by law. By law the
amount of the gratuity is based on the last salary paid. So if an employee works two years at a
low wage then receives a raise, at the end of employment the entire gratuity payment should be
based on the new, higher wage. As most raises are negotiated at the end of a contract term and
promotions usually involve signing a new employment contract, paying out at the end of the
contract is likely to reduce the total amount paid in the long run. This is illegal unless the
employee consents; the problem is that disagreement runs the risk of angering employers who
may, in turn, fire workers without cause. Mary Grace came to the UAE in 1981 and worked her
way up in her company; today she is a manger and makes a relatively high salary. However, after
she had been with the company fifteen years, in 1996, her employer calculated and paid out her
end of service benefits as of that point.105 Mary Grace did not disagree, she took the money and
put it in the bank.
Zoe’s company shorted her on her gratuity by failing to include commissions as part of
her wages. Her first contract was a three-year contract. When it ended, the company paid out her
end of service benefits. These benefits were based on her basic salary, not including
commission. She found out only a month ago that commissions should be included in the
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calculation of end of service benefits for employees who regularly work on a commission basis.
She wants to do something about that. She has decided to try to calculate what her commissions
were during that period and add it up (she has an accountant friend who can help her with this),
give the information to her company, and request that they pay her the remaining gratuity. She is
not sure that they will pay it but feels that asking is worth a try; she does not intend to approach
the Ministry of Labour if they refuse.106
In short, gratuities are paid out throughout the life of the employee and are often
insufficient to cover retirement needs. If the end of service gratuity is intended in some part to
replace formal pension schemes, as is the most likely explanation, it falls far short of this goal.
Instead, workers tend to utilize this money throughout their career to pay for life transitions or
family emergencies. Essentially the gratuity is used by Filipinos to make up earlier shortfalls in the
social security system for healthcare, maternity, unemployment and indigence and rarely lasts to
support a migrant in their old age, the ostensible reason for its existence. The result is that many
Filipinos are unable to support themselves in their old age and do not receive sufficient state
support; they must either continue working or fall back on their families.
The Family as Social Security System
Without state support for workers or sufficient social security guarantees, the migrant
worker needs to find independent means of ensuring his economic and social security. The core
insight of the “new economics of labor migration” theory is that individual migrants are not
independent actors; rather migration decisions are made by larger units, typically families or
households, in order to both maximize expected income but also to reduce economic risks
through income diversification. In less developed economies in particular, the desire to reduce
risk through diversification of employment and labor strategies becomes more important. Having
at least one member of a household employed abroad in a labor market that is relatively
independent of the local economy means that during times of local economic stress the
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household can rely on the remittances from the worker abroad.107 One important result of this
theoretical framework (as opposed to neoclassical economic theories) is that it predicts return
migration: as a member of a household, the worker abroad should remain engaged with the
household in her home country and will return once the household’s target has been achieved.
The new economics of labor migration offers us insight into why Filipinos choose to go abroad as
temporary migrants in the UAE, how they understand their economic security, and what their
goals are.
In effect, employment abroad is a means to diversify a family’s earnings and may serve
as a privatized, internationalized social security system. Remittances from abroad commonly pay
for everything from children’s education, to young couples’ home building, to elderly parents’
health care. Most remittance-receiving households rely on the money to purchase food and pay
school and medical fees.
Table 13: Remittance Expenditure
Expenditure Category

Food and other household needs
Education
Medical Expenses
Debt Payments
Savings
Purchase of appliances or consumer durables
Purchase of house
Investment
Purchase of car or motor vehicle
Other

Percentage of RemittanceReceiving Households Using
Remittances for This Purpose in
Q2 2014
96.1 percent
69.5 percent
64.6 percent
48.9 percent
46.6 percent
28.4 percent
12.5 percent
9.1 percent
7.3 percent
0.0 percent

SOURCE: Consumer Expectations Survey Second Quarter 2014. Manila, Philippines: Banhko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, 2014.
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In this way, workers abroad often serve as social security for their extended families.
Cherry makes a very good salary but nevertheless has little savings and is just breaking even,
given her debt payments, expenses, and remittances. This is largely because she is the primary
financial support for her sister who has been struggling with multiple scoliosis.
It's break even because of this. So if you were remove my sister, I will be ok. But
she's my sister. And she is thirty six, she is single, she doesn't have any family.
So I am the eldest, that's why I need to support. That is our culture. If she got
married, OK, she’s husband responsibility. But she did not get married. She is
single, old lady. That's why.108
And, in reverse, many Filipinos are relying on family networks to act as a social security
network, protecting them in case of need. Cassandra does pay quarterly into the voluntary SSS
fund but it will not be enough to support her in her retirement. She is relying on her son who she
feels should be able to help her:
Of course [SSS] will not be enough. But after that time my son is already big. Of
course he will support me. Payback time, right? … My son's always telling me,
‘Mama, I promise you, when I finish [school] I will let you home.’ I said, ‘Ya,
really? Are you sure? But don't get married until you pay me back.’ … I was
joking. But it's good I heard it from them no? It's meaning that you raised this
children in a good way.109
Moses, a financial planner, is very worried that his clients are not prepared for this role as
the social security providers for their families. He fears that migrant workers will spend all of their
money on their and their family’s immediate needs, driving them to rely on their children for their
own retirement and thus perpetuating the cycle:
Moses: I still have to meet somebody that they'll tell me: ‘you know, I stopped
sending money to the Philippines long time ago because my parents told me that
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'son, daughter, never mind sending us money here because we already had
saved so much from the money that you sent us before.’’”
Interviewer: Well but I guess that's kind of the point, isn't it? It's a different type
of retirement saving. You would expect your children to then pay for your
retirement. …
Moses: Yeah, because in my generation we are our parents’ retirement scheme.
That's why I tell them, ‘would you rely on your children for your own retirement?
Or would you want to do it for yourself?’
…
Moses: If you die here in Dubai, what would happen to the loved ones in the
Philippines if you don't have insurance? They also die. If you get sick, would you
say to your loved ones in the Philippines, ‘Mom, Dad, can you send me money
back to Dubai because I'm sick in Dubai?’ So everybody is dependent on the
person that is working in Dubai. So I tell them, ‘you are the goose that lays the
golden egg; you're the ATM of the family."110
This culture of relying on your children to provide for one sickness or old age is beginning
to change. Haley, who until now has remitted about half of her meager salary to support her
family in the Philippines, is second guessing this:
[My partner,] she's always saying like that to me: ‘Don't give everything for them.
Just save for yourself. What if there's problem? What if you cannot work
anymore? Then you don't have any savings, you don't have any business. What
will happen to you?’ She will get the point. I understand but I only…” she pauses,
then continues: “Then I will think, she's right. What will happen if I don't have
anything? What will happen to me? What if she leave me also? What if my
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parents soon die? What if? Really like that. I’m thinking that now. … Because I
don't want to stay here if I don't have anything in the Philippines.111
Starting next year, Haley plans to reduce the amount she remits and start saving money
for her own further education.
Business or Retirement Plans
Nearly all interviewees were currently supporting family members in the Philippines:
sending remittances to pay for day to day expenses, school fees, housing costs, etc. But
interviewees understand that this is unsustainable in the long term: the UAE has set the
retirement age at sixty five. Once an individual reaches the age of sixty five the Ministry of Labour
will no longer issue a work permit; without the work permit, the individual will no longer be eligible
for a residence permit and faces the necessity of repatriating. Most interviewees expressed not
just their expectation, but their willingness to return to the Philippines:
Interviewer: How long do you think you'll work abroad? For all of your life
abroad?
Justin: No, no.
Interviewer: Or do you hope to go back?
Justin: Because I think I if I will work abroad in my whole life, I cannot manage
my family, my daughter or my son. I will not see him grow up. … I will work five
years in abroad. After that I will put a small business in the Philippines. Then I'll
stop my go abroad. And much better in the Philippines because you have your
family and a simple life in the Philippines.112
-----Interviewer: If you had the opportunity, if somebody said that you could stay
here and retire in the UAE, do you think you would want to?
Rachelle: No.
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Interviewer: Why not?
Rachelle: It's not good to, you know, when you got get old here. I could not see
myself retiring here. Though life is easy, but it's still nice to be in the
Philippines.113
-----Interviewer: So do you plan on retiring in the Philippines?
Gabriel: Of course. There's no place like home.114
At one point Filipinos in the UAE will need to return to the Philippines and they need an
economically viable plan for their return and reintegration. Most interviewees hope to save
enough money to start a small business to support themselves (and perhaps their children as
well) after they return. Joey explains:
See [once you return to the Philippines] if you will spend what you have saved
here, maybe after the five years you will have no money. So it's better to start a
business that can accommodate your requirement, your basic necessities without
taking money from what you have saved, no? And from that amount, from that
investment, you should be able to at least gain some profits, no?115
The most common businesses that interviewees aim to open are restaurants (five
interviewees116), property development (three interviewees117), and farms (five interviewees118).
For most interviewees these business plans are rather vague goals. But Princess is an exception.
She is in stage two of a four stage plan for her future:
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1. Buy a property for the family home: achieved;
2. Build a house: construction ongoing;
3. Start a real estate development business: target two years of savings;
4. Retire from work abroad and reintegrate into the Philippines: target age forty five.119
Princess has been relatively successful in saving to achieve her goals. There are several factors
behind this. Most obviously, Princess makes a relatively high salary (14,000 AED per month or
$3,811 USD; sixth out of forty six interviewees who reported their income), making it easier to set
aside a portion of her income. But she also lives a relatively modest lifestyle and is highly
motivated by the idea of retiring early and returning to the Philippines.
Only three interviewees have already managed to start successful businesses. It is not
surprising that all three make above average salaries. Cherry (salary: 14,000 AED / $3,811 USD
per month) built a small store selling office supplies and convenience items in her provincial city.
She owns the land and built the building, already a substantial investment. Her husband lives in
the Philippines, runs the store and lives off of its profits. The shop itself is doing well; it is currently
turning a profit that is about equal to her salary in the UAE. They hope to add a second floor to
the building, expand the store, and add a money exchange and bill payment services. Cherry
estimates that it will take another three to four years of savings to accomplish this but that, once
completed, the revenues from the business will replace her income in the UAE and she will be
able to repatriate.120
Fortunado (salary range: 30,000 to 50,000 AED / $8,167 to $13,612 USD per month) has
several investment properties and a restaurant. His wife and eldest son run the restaurant and
live off of its profits; his mother in law lives off of the profits from one of his investment properties.
With his other investments, he makes enough money that he could retire now and live a simple
life in the Philippines but prefers not to. He chooses to stay working in the UAE:
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That’s why all my friends [in the Philippines] are saying: ‘How long are you going
to staying abroad. I mean, you have your business. Your children, when they are
going to finish college you can stay here. You have apartment. Just live simple
life and you will survive in the Philippines already. What’s the point?’ No I’m not
doing my job, I’m enjoying my life. … As long as still have work, I can have
strong mind, body. Actually, I have a friend here [in the UAE] … who is fifty nine
years old. So I cannot imagine; wow, fifty nine years old.121
Mary Grace (salary: 15,800 AED / $4,301 USD per month) has lived in the UAE for over
thirty years; she has worked for the same company for the entire duration. Over the years her
remittances have paid for the family house, two cars, college educations for her children, and
has provided the seed money for several small businesses:


Two internet cafes, each employing three or four people: of her businesses, these
provide the most reliable income, though the electricity is expensive;



Fish pond, employs one person: a good business but vulnerable to floods and heat;



Live band, performers paid per gig, employs twenty two to twenty four people: she
provides the trucks, cars, and instruments; this is only profitable during the party season.

She has enough saved that she could retire now but she chooses not to. “As long as I am still
strong and they do not cancel me I will stay.” Instead, she wants to open one more business: a
small hospital or clinic for her son, who is currently in medical school. She knows it will be
expensive, but hopes that she will be able to save enough before she is forced to retire.122
While starting a small business to support oneself in one’s old age is the standard goal of
most Filipino workers in Abu Dhabi, this strategy has many pitfalls. In 2014 the World Bank
ranked the Philippines 161st out of 198 countries in ease of starting a business;123 the process is
long, complicated, and riddled with corruption. Once established things do not get easier. The
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Philippines has an abundance of small restaurants and shops and competition is fierce; property
speculation is an inherently risky proposition; and farming is low wage and vulnerable to weather
and natural disasters (to which the Philippines is prone). One difficulty is that such businesses
require someone in the country to run them. Often the migrant worker will go into partnership with
a relative, likely a sibling, who is living in the Philippines and will manage the day to day running
of the business.
Arianna: We don't have yet a business in Philippines. It's difficult to put up a
business in Philippines when you're not there. I don't try it because most of my
friends did it and it just didn't work out.
Interviewer: Why do you think it doesn't work out?
Arianna: Because they put so much trust on the person handling in the
Philippines, the money, they never discuss it. So, by the time they go home and
check, ‘Oh are we getting any profit?’ ‘No, no it's like this, because it's like this,
it's like this.’ But they cannot question it because it's a family, it's a relative who's
handling it. So, for family's sake, they just keep quiet and OK. No need, we'll wait
until we go home.124
And the truth is that many of these businesses do fail. Ava has worked as a seamstress,
a clerk, and a domestic worker in the UAE and has struggled to save money for her future. When
her husband (an Arab man living with her in the UAE) died, he left Ava some money plus she had
some little savings of her own. So Ava decided to return to the Philippines and try to set up a
grocery business. The grocery did not earn enough and she took up basket weaving in addition.
This still did not earn enough to support her and her children, now adults with children of their
own. Eventually her money ran out. After two years Ava decided to come back to Abu Dhabi. “It’s
a bit easier here,” she says, despite the fact that she shares a crowded room and often does not
have enough money to buy groceries at the end of the month. She is getting old and wants to
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retire next year. She does manage to save about 100 AED ($27 USD) a month for herself so that
she can do something, start another small business, when she retires. Sometimes she has to use
that money to eat or help her son when things are tight, but she has some savings in the bank.
But she knows she doesn’t have enough money saved to support both herself and her son’s
family and that this fact is unlikely to change before she is forced to retire from work in the
UAE.125
Despite the high cost of starting a business and the strong possibility of failure, this
remains most migrants’ stated strategy.126 The Philippines government is worried about the
proliferation of and reliance on small businesses: as of 2012, 89.4 percent of Filipino businesses
were micro enterprises and a further 9.74 percent were small businesses; only 0.86 percent were
medium or large enterprises.127 The Philippines would like to encourage investment in larger
enterprises such as cooperative agro businesses. They have attempted to address this, creating
opportunities for investment that are hawked by the network of government agencies that support
OFWs, including its Embassies. But Filipinos by and large do not invest in these programs.
Victoria is the only interviewee who expressed an interest in investing her money directly in a
large-scale business enterprise. There is a tourist development planned near her hometown, an
idyllic seaside location, that she is considering investing in.128 Similarly, few interviewees talk
about investing in the stock market; only four interviewees had done so.
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Human Rights Implications
Debt and low savings (only 46.6 percent of remittance-receiving households in the
Philippines have savings129) drive reliance on home country social security and employers’ end of
service payments. Yet, these earnings abroad are not themselves secure. The migrant is in a
precarious situation.
In the UAE the ability of migrants to form economic groups or to petition the state for
economic support, including social security provisions, is extremely restricted. The right to form
labor unions is specifically enshrined in the UDHR: “Everyone has the right to form and to join
trade unions for the protection of his [sic] interests.”130 The UAE government has not allowed
labor unions to form and groups that have tried to take an unofficial role in advocating workers’
interests collectively have been repressed by the authorities. Strikes are forbidden by UAE law.131
This imposes significant harm and is a serious violation of the rights of migrant workers. Without
political representation or the ability to form unions or strike, migrant workers in the UAE have
little ability to influence the rules and regulations that structure their working lives.
Neither can the migrant worker in the UAE rely on social security systems. Attempts by
the Philippine state to fill this gap are praiseworthy but inadequate, leaving Filipinos to rely on
family as a means of ensuring economic and social security. Again, social security is explicitly
guaranteed in the UDHR:
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled
to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic,
social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development
of his personality.132
As discussed in Chapter Two, social security needs to extend transnationally because
migrant families are transnational. Sending countries often cannot afford to extend a robust social
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security system to citizens within their territorial borders, let alone to citizens abroad. Yet
temporary contract migrants often do not meet the criteria for social security in their destination
country where they pass their productive years, the years in which they would normally be
contributing to their home country social security systems. The UAE is no exception to this rule
and most forms of social security are not provided to migrant workers. The Philippine government
has attempted to step up and fill these gaps. But the same structural and economic weaknesses
that push migrants to leave the Philippines in the first place also impede its ability to provide an
adequate social security safety net. The Philippines does not offer support for employment,
unemployment or indigence; its resources are insufficient to adequately provide for the one in five
Filipinos that fall below the national poverty line, let alone the roughly half of the population that
fall below the World Bank’s $2.00 USD a day global standard.133
Family Reunification
When asked why they went to work abroad, most interviewees spoke of family
obligations. That is the official line, as well: the fact that migrants endure the hardship of overseas
life and work in order to send remittances support their families in the Philippines makes them the
“new heroes” of the Philippines. Few interviewees want to be separate from their families; this is a
sacrifice. Moreover, this particular sacrifice is riddled with moral ambiguities, for the individuals
involved as well as for the sending and receiving states that encourage – and in some cases
mandate – the separation.
Some but not all migrant workers in the UAE may sponsor the residence visas of their
immediate family dependents (spouse, dependent children, and dependent parents). Rules
regarding visa issuance are set by federal law. To sponsor a wife or child, the male worker must
earn at least 4,000 AED ($1090 USD) per month (or 3,000 AED / $817 USD if accommodation is
provided by the employer)134 and provide evidence that their dwelling is adequate (show an

133

Ofreneo, "Growth and Employment in De-Industrializing Philippines": p. 123 – 125.

134

Investors are also eligible to sponsor immediate family members, though they must pay a hefty 70,000 AED
bank guarantee in order to do so.

318

authenticated rental contract and the latest Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority bill). For a
woman to sponsor her husband or child she must be employed in an accepted profession135 and
earn at least 10,000 AED ($2,725 USD or 8,000 AED / $2,180 USD if the employer provides
accommodations). The worker must show the original marriage contract to sponsor a spouse or
original birth certificate to sponsor a child. Unmarried daughters may be sponsored at any age;
sons may only sponsored until the age of eighteen unless they are students at a UAE university.
To sponsor a parent or “relative of the second-degree,” the worker must earn at least 20,000 AED
($5,450USD) per month, have a dwelling with at least two bedrooms, and show evidence that the
parent is a dependent. As they do not hold regular work permits, domestic workers and laborers
are categorically denied the right to sponsor dependents. On the other hand, mosque imams,
teachers, and school bus drivers are exempt from the salary requirements.
Out of fifteen men interviewed, twelve make more than the 4,000AED ($1090 USD)
salary requirement for a man to sponsor his family; of the thirty two women, only eight meet the
10,000AED ($2,725 USD, or 8,000AED / $2,180 USD with accommodation) salary requirement.
This means that over half of interviewees were not eligible to sponsor their families and that there
is a strong gendered dimension to eligibility.136 And so migrant families in this context can be
divided into three groups: those who are able to reunify in the UAE, those that are legally eligible
but choose to remain divided between the UAE and the Philippines, and those families that are
ineligible for family reunification.
Worker Sponsors Family
We think of the migrants who are eligible to sponsor their families as the lucky ones. And
they are: they have choice. Gabriel and his wife, both nurses, had planned to leave their daughter
in the Philippines with his parents. After a year and a half of separation from her, however, they
have changed their minds:
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Gabriel: Because I am planning to bring my child over here then for good,
hopefully for good. Because my wife is really missing my daughter. Because
when we left our daughter, she was only like one month. I left my daughter, she
was two weeks old, because I really need to come back here because of the job.
Interviewer: That's very hard.
Gabriel: It is.
Interviewer: Is that the last time you visited the Philippines, when you left her?
Gabriel: Yes, it was the last time.137
There is nothing comparatively unusual, good or bad, about the arrangement that Gabriel
and his wife have made for their daughter’s care in the Philippines while they live and work
abroad. His parents are living in a decent house and Gabriel is able to remit sufficient funds to
pay for his daughter’s upkeep. This is a situation that thousands of Filipino parents in the UAE are
familiar with. But Gabriel and his wife are pained by the situation and want their daughter with
them. They are fortunate that they are eligible to obtain a visa for their baby and bring her to the
UAE.
But this does not make raising a family in the UAE easy for migrants. The biggest
problem that migrant families face is the sheer expense of raising children in the UAE. While the
cost of living and the cost of child care are higher in the UAE than the Philippines, far and away
the largest cost is education. While education is provided free to citizens, expatriates must pay.
There are some public schools that will accept Arabic-speaking expatriates, but they charge fees.
Most Filipinos place their children in private schools. There is a great variety of private schools in
the UAE that vary in terms of curriculum, quality of instruction, quality of facilities, and, of course,
price. It is generally acknowledged that the best schools follow the American or British curriculum.
But these schools are expensive138 and most have a waiting list for matriculation. Filipino schools
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are easier to get in to and less expensive but have a reputation for a lower quality of instruction
and a lack of discipline:
Interviewer: Is it expensive to pay for school here?
Arianna: Because my child is going to an IS.
Interviewer: What is that?
Arianna: International School. British school. It's a bit expensive. It's really
expensive. We can choose to put her in a Philippine school, which is less
expensive - I think it's 6000 [AED / $1,635 USD] a year.
Interviewer: How much is the British school?
Arianna: … The grade five is around nineteen something [19,000+AED / $5,173
USD] this coming school year. So it's really expensive. But I have seen the
children that are going to Philippine school and I really don't like their manners
and how they act, their attitude. Sometimes I feel shame that I see them, that
they're Filipinos and they're acting like this.
Interviewer: How do they act?
Arianna: It's not what you expect, I mean, coming from a close family culture...
You're not supposed to raise your voice at an adult, you know. Normal Philippine
traditions. Here they're like: ‘ahhh!’ [makes a mock scream and flails hands] I just
don't like them! I see with ten years they have boyfriends. I don't want my child to
be like that. I didn't grow up to be like that. And even their parents, I can see that
they cannot do anything about it. You know, they cannot even tell their children,
‘Stop that. That is not right.’ And it's not what I want for my children.139
There is also the issue of permanent temporariness to be considered. Arianna (whose
story is discussed at greater length in Chapter Six) is worried that her children have grown up in
the UAE and have no emotional attachment to the Philippines. As the children get older she
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would like them to return to the Philippines to attend university there, but her children do not
intend to do so. As she looks forward to eventual retirement in the Philippines, she wonders
where in the world her children will call home.
For many migrants that are legally eligible to sponsor children, the expense of education
often makes this an impossible option. As children get older and school fees increase (most
schools are on a sliding scale with the lower grades costing less and the more advanced grades
costing more), many parents face the necessity of sending their children back to the Philippines.
And if the children repatriate, either a parent must go with them or some other accommodation
must be made for their support and care. Sophia and her husband have three young children, all
living with them in Abu Dhabi. Their eldest child is in school and the second is just reaching
school age now. Sophia and her husband both make good salaries as nurses at a local hospital
and her husband’s package even includes an “education allowance” designed to defray the cost
of paying school fees in Abu Dhabi. However, school fees are high and the education allowance
does not cover all the costs:
Sophia: There's a certain allowance that you can get from [the employer] but not
all.
Interviewer: Does it cover the school?
Sophia: Not covering all, yeah. Like for us, we got only I think 12,000 [AED,
$3267 USD].
Interviewer: And so how much does school cost for your kids?
Sophia: It changes as they [get older]. Now I think for us it's more than 10,000
[AED, $2,723 USD] for each. And we have two [in school], so we're paying extra
for those. That's why I want to go back home now!
Interviewer: I was going to ask because your third child, when she enters
school, will you be able to afford it?
Sophia: I don't think so. I don't think so.
Interviewer: So do you plan on going back to the Philippines?
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Sophia: Yeah, going back. I'm planning to send them back next year, because
my eldest will be going to high school now, so grade seven, something like that.
So, yeah. And the small one is grade one, so, starting grades. So I'm planning to
send them back home for a better education.140
Eligible to Sponsor Family but Chooses Not To
The end result is that many migrants who are eligible to sponsor family members in the
UAE instead choose not to do so. This is a difficult decision to face but it is a choice. Mark is an
engineer with a multinational construction company. Given his position and salary, he is eligible to
sponsor his family in the UAE. He chooses not to do so. Mark is clear that the only reason that he
is in the UAE is for the money. While he feels that the UAE is nicer, more free and open, than
other countries in the Gulf where he has worked, it is still not where he would like to raise his
family.
Interviewer: That's very difficult for you guys to be apart for so many years.
Mark: Not really. Since I started working, I've always been in other places. I
[would] only go home once a week, or sometimes twice a month, so my wife has
gotten used to it. My children have gotten used to it. …
Interviewer: Do you miss them?
Mark: Oh, I do, but I have to work for them.141
The cost of living is lower in the Philippines and there is a familial support network in
place that makes raising the children easier. In fact, one of the children is currently having some
problems in school. Mark has asked his wife to quit her job in order to focus on the children. The
relatively high wage he makes in the UAE coupled with the low cost of living she faces living with
her parents in the Philippines makes it possible for them to forgo her income. Mark returns home
for a visit once a year, in the meantime he keeps in touch with weekly phone calls.
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Not Eligible for Family Reunification
Low-wage men and low- to mid-wage women are not eligible to sponsor family members.
Few interviewees questioned this, given the expense of supporting a family in the UAE and the
fact that the UAE government takes no responsibility for families and offers no social security.
Fortunado explains:
“If you are going to get your son, your wife, it’s not a problem. But, of course, the
visa is restricted for the professional. If you are a laborer, driver of course they
will not allow you to get your family. Financially-wise it’s a big question that how
you going to sustain your lifestyle with your children, sending them to the school?
So that is exclusively for the professional.” 142
Fortunado is a professional and currently is eligible to sponsor family members. But this
was not always the case. He remembers the first time he left the Philippines to work abroad and
left his wife and children behind:
I cannot forget the feelings of leaving your children behind. ... Because during
that time I don’t have my family with me. I cannot forget the feeling of going to the
airport, my son is still young … and my wife is crying and my son is crying. It
seems that I am the most unlucky person in the world. It seems that something in
yourself dies, your heart stops beating, something… Going to the airport, I will
not look back again just to see my wife and my son is crying. I hate that feeling.
… You cannot imagine, I mean, your worst, worst nightmare. Then it’s another
inspiration as well that you have to take: just to avoid that feeling you have to
bring your family. So that’s, maybe, that’s another thing that inspired you to work
more, to bring your family.143
But most workers are not so fortunate. For most workers in low-wage, low-skill positions,
and particularly for women, working their way up to become both eligible to sponsor children and
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able to pay for school fees in the UAE is unlikely. They face an indefinite amount of time
separated from their loved ones.
The Philippine state, which does provide social security to OFW families, is increasingly
concerned about the societal and familial costs associated with transnational families. Of
particular concern is the impact of separation the on children of migrant mothers. Studies are
mixed as to whether the absence of one or both parents is detrimental to the welfare of the child.
It is thought that without appropriate parental supervision and role models, children may have
problems with social adjustment, may not do as well in school, and generally have lower welfare
outcomes. Alternatively, parental migration may encourage children’s agency and
independence.144
Cassandra is so proud of her son, she almost busts with it. The boy is in the Philippines,
living with her sister. He is eight years old, in third grade, and he is doing well in school, top ten in
his class. Unlike many low-wage workers who prefer to pocket the cash in lieu of vacation,
Cassandra goes back to the Philippines every year during her annual vacation period. Last year
when she was home on vacation she saw his grades had gone down. She had a four month
vacation and so she stayed there and focused on him. “I said: ‘I am angry because I feel like I am
working for nothing.’” At the end of the school year his grades were in the top ten.
Of course you're a mom you have to be proud. You have to say ‘oh
congratulations.’ You have to say that because, you know, he will think, ‘my mom
doesn't care of me.’ Of course you have to let them let him feel that ‘oh my mom
she's proud of me.’ Because he's alone, sometimes I feel sad when, you see, if I
go home people ask him, ‘where's your mother?’145

144

Maruja M.B. Asis, "Experiences of Left-Behind Children in the Philippines,” Asian Population Studies 2, no. 1

145

Cassandra (HSW), interview with the author, 3/30/2013.

(2006).

325

She tries very hard to stay involved in his life and be a parent, even from a distance.
When she is not home, she Skypes regularly. But her sister is the one who is there every day and
her son is very attached to the sister.
Cassandra: Mainly he cared more for my sister more than he cared for me,
because this is the first time that he grow up. And I cannot say anything.
Interviewer: Is that good or bad?
Cassandra: I don't know if it's good or bad.146
Human Rights Implications
At issue here is whether there is a human right to family reunification. The UDHR
specifies a right to marry and found a family, and that marriage and the family shall be
protected.147 However, it is generally understood that this right stops short of a human right to
family reunification. In the case of refugees or those separated from their families as a result of a
crisis beyond their control or in the case of an unaccompanied child, humanitarian concerns
demand that family reunification be our goal. But for migrant workers, the case for a right to
reunification is much weaker. The UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families requires that:
States Parties shall take measures that they deem appropriate and that fall within
their competence to facilitate the reunification of migrant workers with their
spouses or persons who have with the migrant worker a relationship that,
according to applicable law, produces effects equivalent to marriage, as well as
with their minor dependent unmarried children.148
But as the Convention has not been ratified by any major receiving country, it seems that those
countries of employment have rejected the right to family reunification.
Family reunification is a stated goal of immigration policy in some countries such as the
United States, but this is viewed as a humanitarian, not a human rights, issue. In the European
Union, where family reunification is recognized as a human right, it is still significantly restricted:
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only migrants with “reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent residence” may
sponsor relatives.149 Temporary migrants are not eligible. EU states “may require the non-EU
national to have adequate accommodation, sufficient resources and health insurance, and may
impose a qualifying period of no more than two years.”150 Moreover, sponsorship is restricted to
spouses and minor children151 (and even children over the age of twelve whose primary
residence is not with the sponsor may be excluded152). The European Court of Human Rights has
further ruled that there is no absolute obligation for the state to admit the relatives of persons
residing there. In the UAE, only workers who are able to financially support their families are
allowed to sponsoring dependents’ residence visas. Their support and upkeep are the
responsibility of the migrant. Those families that cannot afford the relatively high cost of living in
the UAE must leave dependents in the home country. The prohibition of family sponsorship is a
fairly standard restriction in temporary work programs. The UAE is not out of line with human
rights obligations or international practice in this respect.
Conclusion
The issues discussed in this chapter all address the ability of temporary migrants to form
groups to express their identities and interests, familial, cultural, political, and economic.
Deficiencies in these areas are widespread, affecting the majority of Filipino workers in the UAE.
However, they are of varying impact on the lived experience of migrants. In many cases, as with
community groups or family reunification, migrants are largely able to engage in group activity as
a result of official tolerance despite laws that enable undue restraint; tolerance is viewed as an
act of benevolence and the UAE state does not acknowledge a human rights obligation in this
respect. While the situation remains precarious, therefore, its impact on the lived experience of
migrants is muted.
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Of the greatest immediate concern are restrictions on the rights of migrant workers to
form unions or engage in other types of organized labor advocacy, such as protests or strikes.
The right to form unions is clearly expressed in the UDHR: “Everyone has the right to form and to
join trade unions for the protection of his [sic] interests.”153 This right ensures the ability of labor to
engage in negotiations with employers or the government on a fair footing. Given her relatively
weak position relative to governments or corporations, the individual worker is basically unable to
advocate effectively for her rights and interests. Alone she simply lacks sufficient leverage. This is
reflected in the proliferation of exploitative labor practices, as outlined in the preceding chapters.
In the larger picture, however, the greatest concern is what impact these constraints on
the ability of migrants to form groups – familial, cultural, civic, political, and economic – have on
the larger human rights situation. Without political voice and as an atomized individual, the
migrant worker is a dwarf among giant corporations and governments. Without the ability to form
groups, the individual’s social, economic and political voice is muted, nearly silenced. Migrant
workers largely come to the UAE alone, they face restrictions in their ability to create social
groups that might to some extent form a local safety net in case of need, they are justifiably
excluded from exercising political leverage through voting or holding office but also face
illegitimate restrictions on their ability to publically express political opinions about their plight or to
advocate politically for significant changes, and, finally, they are forced to confront powerful
employers as atomized workers without the benefits of labor organization. The sum of these
limitations to form groups at all levels is greater than any one part.
These limitations in the ability to form groups encourage the existing power imbalance
that disadvantages migrants relative to citizens, and workers relative to employers. The fear is
that the lack of group representation will compound other structural weaknesses such as the
migrant underclass discussed in Chapter Five or the legal privileges described in Chapter Seven.
Restrictions on the ability to form groups limits the ability of individual migrants to make their
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voices heard, compounding structural weaknesses in the UAE’s economic, social and political
systems, which in turn reinforces the existing power imbalances, creating and reinforcing
exploitative labor situations in which migrants have no means of seeking remedy, either alone or
in concert with others.
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION
Introduction
The first section of this dissertation established the theoretical basis for this work; the
second section provided the historical background that led to the migration corridor between the
UAE and the Philippines; the third section looked at the current condition of Filipino migrants in
the UAE in detail. Past and present. This final chapter looks to the future, examining possible
policy mechanisms to address human rights deficiencies of temporary migrant workers in the
UAE.
Ideal policy solutions would both fully address the cause and content of systematic
human rights violations and also be practically achievable in the currently existing political and
social context of the UAE. They would be both complete and easy. There is rarely an ideal
solution.
In the UAE context, however, the range of what is possible, as well as the reasons why a
policy is available or unavailable may be unfamiliar to the western reader. The UAE is an
absolute monarchy, ruled by a small royal family and relying on the distribution of rents and
patronage politics to garner popular support. In many ways, the royal families of the Emirates of
the UAE have a large degree of freedom of action. They may rule by decree and are not
constrained by partisan politics, clashing vested interests, or immovable constitutional law. When
the inclination is strong, even far-reaching policies may be made or changed with startling
rapidity.1
Economic imperatives, the UAE’s international political reputation, and the larger
geopolitical interest in maintaining good relationships with allies necessary for international
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security intertwine to pressure for change. The UAE’s economy is currently heavily petroleum
based. However, petroleum is a finite resource and the country’s political leadership recognizes
the need to diversify the economy and reduce reliance on oil and gas. Tourism, alternative
energy, and financial services have been identified as areas for economic growth and expansion.
As the country evolves towards a higher-skilled economy, the need to attract more high-skilled
labor may stimulate concessions: higher skilled workers have greater opportunities in the global
marketplace and so greater leverage in negotiating the conditions of their employment.
Further, bringing in large multinational corporations raises the specter of increased
international attention to labor conditions, threatening the UAE’s image as a modern and tolerant
Muslim country in the international community. Major construction projects – particularly those
that involve a well-known international partner such as the NYU branch campus and the new
Guggenheim museum in Abu Dhabi – have been targets of international protests regarding labor
rights. The increasing dependence on the tourism industry is particularly significant as
development of tourist infrastructure targeted at the international market necessarily also creates
an international audience for human rights and labor concerns. Consumers, especially those from
developed countries, may hesitate before spending their tourism dollars in a country that has a
reputation for human rights violations and unfair labor practices.
The UAE’s international reputation is not merely a matter of pride. In the UAE’s case it is
crucial to both economic diversification and to long-term geopolitical security. Again, as the UAE
prepares itself for a gradual but inevitable transition to a post-oil economy, gaining a reputation
for unfair labor practices, labor unrest, and general human rights violations is detrimental to
attracting the high-skilled labor as well as international tourists necessary for the success of their
economic diversification strategy. These factors keep the UAE open to pressure from outside
groups – including NGOs, government and academic criticism, and, especially, international news
media – regarding human rights reforms.
A negative human rights reputation also damages the UAE’s position with crucial western
allies. The UAE relies on the major western powers, and particularly the United States, to
guarantee its security. In an increasingly volatile region with conflicts that threaten to spill over
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into the UAE, the support of western military powers is crucial to the UAE. To garner international
support, the UAE can offer both its oil wealth and its appeal as a model for a moderate, tolerant,
stable Muslim state. As fear of radical, militant Islamic groups grows globally, this image of UAE
compatibility with Western values is both increasingly important and increasingly difficult to
maintain.
So far the US and other Western allies have largely turned a blind eye to repression in
“moderate” Arab allies such as the UAE. But there is a fear that the need for credible Arab
partners (in order to ensure that attacks on Islamists are not understood as attacks on Islam)
makes the US blind to repressive domestic policies in those countries that actually fuel “the very
extremism they purport to fight.”2 Human rights violations, repression of civil society, and a lack of
opportunity for domestic have-nots are arguably at the root of Islamic extremism. And Islamic
fundamentalism and extremism have persistently bubbled up in the UAE. Overt extremist group
activities, such as those of the al-Islah group discussed in Chapter Eight, have been immediately
and firmly put down. But individual actions are harder to control. Most recently, an Emirati
woman, a mother of three, stabbed to death a Romanian-American kindergarten teacher in a mall
bathroom and attempted to plant a bomb outside the residence of an Egyptian-American doctor,
apparently “in an attempt to create chaos and terrorize the country.”3 The UAE authorities claim
that the woman acted alone and had no links to terrorist organizations, though she had recently
viewed “terrorist websites.”4 Her attack came only one month after the US State Department,
including the US Embassy in the UAE, warned of threats against American and international
schools on a “Jihadist website.”5
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Beyond a loss of crucial Western support, any actual spillover of regional hostilities into
the UAE could cause a flight of migrant workers, with enormous economic repercussions. The
UAE authorities have been quick to condemn domestic violent acts such as the recent stabbing
death, and to stress the basic safety of life in the UAE.6 Certainly there has been no threat of civil
war in the country and to date no signs of such unrest as had rocked Bahrain, sending tremors
through the migrant labor population (the Philippines briefly suspended deployment to Bahrain
due to the protests, for example). However, the expat labor pool is relatively flexible; if security
conditions worsen, many may choose to leave the UAE. Experience in Libya shows that Filipino
workers are reluctant to leave even in the face of significant instability, though there is eventually
a breaking point. The Philippines issued a mandatory evacuation order for its citizens in Libya
when the civil war broke out in 2011, but many workers quickly returned to the country; when
violence again heated up in July of 2014, a second mandatory evacuation order was issued for
the 13,000 Filipinos remaining in Libya.7
The UAE rulers confront opposing constraints. On one hand, they must try to offer
sufficient liberty and opportunity at home (including showpiece reforms) to be credible both to
Western allies and to an increasingly politically aware domestic population. On the other, they
wish to retain their absolute monopoly over political power, which requires sufficient control over
civil society to crush challenges to that authority—whether in the name of extremist Islam or in the
name of liberty and equal opportunity.
Constraining change are concerns about the stability of the domestic political and social
status quo. To understand what is achievable and what is not in the UAE, we must take due
consideration of the unusual ruling bargain that has been struck between the royal families and
the wider population. The ruling bargain was discussed in depth in Chapter Three; here let us
note that the provision of cheap, flexible migrant/labor to Emirati/employers is part of a larger
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system by which the UAE government distributes rents in the form of both economic benefit and
social privilege to its citizens. Policies that would strike at the fundamental basis of this domestic
ruling bargain are extremely unlikely to gain traction. Calling for democratic reforms, an end to
kafala, and the right to strike or unionize would call into question the larger political project, and
so are not only implausible but their promotion may undermine the more limited, but still
desirable, policy reforms that are achievable.
This chapter will look at possible policy reforms in greater depth. I advocate gradual,
phased change in order to allow the Emirati state sufficient room to manage the conflicting
demands of political and social stability, economic diversification, international reputation, as well
as respect for human rights. There remains space for significant reforms that alleviate systematic
and significant human rights abuses, though many of the most egregious and severe abuses
remain problems that only long-term changes to fundamental structures will resolve.
Replacing Vulnerability with Agency
If the UAE is characterized by a high degree of state capacity for change but a general
unwillingness to upset the status quo, the Philippines faces the opposite problem. As discussed in
Chapter Four, the government, beholden to Filipinos working overseas (and their remittances), is
enthusiastic in its support for these worker’s human rights. In contrast to the UAE, domestic
reform in the Philippines is primarily hindered by a failure of state capacity due to limited
resources and the prevalence of corruption. Internationally, the Philippine state actively attempts
to extend the reach of its authority over Filipinos abroad. However, its ability to effect change is
limited by the sovereignty of other states and its need to ensure that important international labor
markets remain open to Filipino workers, especially its skilled workers.
When asked about the long-term role of migration in the Philippine economy, Grace
Relucio Princessa, Philippine Ambassador to the UAE, says that, while she considers labor
migration to be an inescapable part of the modern, globalized economy, “it must be migration by
choice.”8 When workers have a choice between different employment situations, they have the
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necessary space to be selective of jobs, employers, and destination countries for employment
abroad. They are therefore less likely to enter into precarious labor situations and, should they
find themselves in an exploitative situation, more likely to exit that position.
In the long run, the best change that the Philippines can make to improve the human
rights situation of its migrant workers abroad is to address development at home. A lack of stable,
well-paying jobs in the Philippines pushes Filipinos to work abroad. For example, Guevarra
documents how the lack of positions in the Philippines coupled with very low pay pushes nurses,
especially new graduates, to work abroad.9 If the choice between employment situations includes
decent working conditions at home, workers are less likely to migrate into uncertain labor
situations beyond the reach of the Philippine state. Or, if they do choose to migrant, they would
have a relatively secure fallback position should employment abroad not meet their needs. In that
case, concerns such as the fear of being fired or facing a labor ban will have less power to shape
the attitudes and actions of Filipinos in the UAE.
But development is a long-term project. We need to look for other mechanisms which will
increase the choices available for OFWs as well. Filipinos in the UAE today lack agency, the
basic ability to make decisions that will largely direct the course of their lives. Instead, in the
current temporary labor system, the ability to make decisions is hampered by the high cost of
recruitment or job search, an inability to negotiate the legal system, fear of deportation and labor
bans, among other aspects. As with the UAE, we should take a phased approach in order to
address the conditions of current workers to the best of our present-day ability, while paving the
way for more fundamental changes over time.
Policy Implications
If the goal of reform of UAE policy is to find a progressive path towards improving the
human rights of migrant workers, recognition of the lived experience of those workers that can
show us how to prioritize those gradual reforms. Immediate reforms should aim to increase the
agency of migrant workers, to enable them gain more control over their own futures. We are
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looking for reforms that are 1) ambitious but achievable, 2) increase the agency of workers, and
3) provide a path towards the progressive realization of the full set of human rights.
Not all issues that were raised in the preceding chapters will be addressed here. Instead,
this chapter focuses on seven major goals. These goals are conceived of in broad terms, looking
at the elements necessary in order to guarantee migrants a life of dignity. It is difficult to prioritize
these goals. Since they are interrelated, fully addressing one will require advances in other
arenas as well. In addition, we must balance breadth versus depth of impact. As the preceding
chapters have made clear, the most profound violations of human rights, those that have the
most extreme impact on migrants’ lived experience, are fortunately rare. Situations of forced
labor, debt bondage, rape or physical violence are the exceptions, not the rule. Violations such as
passport withholding or pay discrimination may not be as dramatic, but are widespread and have
an insidious influence, undermining the human rights of millions of migrants in the UAE. Based on
the standard of assigning roughly equal weight to the depth versus the breath of impact, the goals
are listed below in order of priority.
1. Protect the ability of migrants to choose their employment;
2. Ensure a living wage;
3. Streamline recruitment, contracting, and deployment;
4. End illegal practices as part of the “business culture”;
5. Support for domestic workers;
6. Allow migrants to form labor organizations;
7. Create a transnational social security net.
For each goal, a series of potential policy reforms is given. Each series of reforms is
designed to start with relatively small and build up to more significant, comprehensive reforms. In
the Philippines the limiting factor is often the lack of resources. The Philippine state is generally
active and supportive of changes to support its OFW citizens, though it does not always have the
practical capacity to implement effective changes. In the UAE, some few policies are readily
achievable because there is existing domestic support for reform (as with bankruptcy laws,
discussed below) and/or because the reform has limited negative impact on entrenched domestic
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actors (as with creating micro-lending opportunities). More ambitious reforms lack these
elements. In order to achieve deeper policy reform greater pressure for change will need to be
brought to bear on the UAE government. A discussion of the potential strategies for increasing
these sources of pressure, or for creating new ones, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the UAE government is vulnerable to international public opinion and
pressure from its western allies for improvements on migrant worker rights. Far-reaching policy
reform is possible, though difficult.
Goal: Protect the Ability of Migrants to Choose their Employment
The greatest bulwark against the violation of migrants’ human rights is the individual’s
ability to choose their employment. The ability to choose entails far more than the formal
acceptance of a position. Instead, it is bound up in the individual’s choice sets: in order for choice
to have substantive content, the individual must have viable alternatives. Ottonelli and Torresi
propose four “necessary and sufficient conditions for migration to be voluntary”: non-coercion,
sufficiency (alternative options would be at least minimally acceptable), exit options, and
information. 10 An individual who has been compelled by overwhelming circumstance or by
coercion from another individual (or the state) in order to migrate or to take a specific job, cannot
be said to have chosen that path; a person who is tricked into taking an unacceptable position or
who, once engaged, has no option to exit their employment situation is not free to choose.
However, choice is not black and white, a power that you either have in its entirety or lack
completely. We are all faced with constraints on our choices for any number of legitimate
reasons. When considering quitting a job we might be constrained by our need for income,
contractual penalties for breaking an employment contract, or other reasons. When do these
normal constraints rise to the level of coercion, robbing individuals of choice? Some constraints,
such as corporeal punishment and imprisonment, are purely coercive and clearly unacceptable
violations of fundamental human rights. Yet there is a vast grey area in which employers and

10

Valeria Ottonelli and Tiziana Torresi, "When Is Migration Voluntary?" International Migration Review 47, no. 4
(2013): p. 801.

337

states act to constrain migrant workers’ mobility to varying degrees, from requiring notice periods
to imposing labor bans, which will need to be assessed in greater detail. Ottonelli and Torresi
argue that “we are coerced into sticking to a plan or contract if the cost of the exit option is
unbearable…”11 They give little guidance, however, in distinguishing the bearable from the
unbearable. Here, a constraint is considered unbearable if it necessarily violates human rights or
intentionally creates a situation in which the alternative is a life in which basic human dignity (the
ultimate goal of human rights and as specified by the UDHR) is rendered impossible.
Increasing the ability to walk away increases the resiliency of migrants as agents to
respond to unbearable conditions. By ensuring choice, not only do we avoid certain inherent
human rights violations (the right to choose employment, for example), but we also reduce
vulnerability to a much wider set of violations by enabling individual migrants to avoid exploitative
situations in the first place or to independently exit them should they become drawn in. Increasing
migrant worker’s ability to choose also decreases employers’ incentives to engage in human
rights violations by reducing the expected return associated with exploitation.
Policy Path
1. End restrictions on the departure of visit visa holders to the UAE;
2. End absconding as a crime;
3. End labor bans;
4. End employer sponsorship.
1. End Restrictions on the Departure of Visit Visa Holders to the UAE
Restrictions on Filipino worker’s ability to choose their employment begin in the
Philippines. While the Philippine economy is unable to support full employment, the state requires
that individuals who seek to work abroad have a contract registered with the POEA before the
individual exits the country. Even where it is legal in the receiving country, as in the UAE, the
Philippine state does not allow its citizens to use tourist visas (or visit visas in the UAE) to seek
employment. My reasons for objecting to this are explained in greater detail in Chapter Six. In
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summary, positively denying individuals’ human right to exit their country in order to avoid
Filipinos possibly taking jobs below the minimum standard set by the Philippines, but without the
Philippine state being able to provide a viable alternative, and without any clear evidence of a
pattern of human rights violations resulting from the use of visit visas for job hunting, is
unwarranted.
In countries where seeking employment while on a tourist visa is illegal, the Philippines
can certainly act as a partner in preventing this. But in countries where it is allowed and where the
Philippines does not otherwise object to its citizens traveling and working, exiting on a valid visa
should not be obstructed.
This need not impose an intolerable strain on the Philippine migration management
system. Additional resources needed to deal with the increase in job-seeking tourists and to help
migrants later change their status from tourist to overseas foreign worker would be offset by
savings in policing visit visa holders. And such a move would be popular with a potentially
powerful constituency: the millions of Filipinos who work abroad and their families, many of whom
prefer not to use recruitment agencies.
2. End Absconding as a Crime
The issue of absconding is one of the component pieces of the larger concept of kafala,
or sponsorship. The idea behind sponsorship is that the employer takes on responsibility for the
worker. This responsibility has two dimensions, inward- and outward-facing. Inwardly, the
employer is responsible for the welfare of the worker, everything from the payment of wages to
their health care. Outwardly, the employer is responsible for ensuring that the worker obeys the
laws and norms of society or, if they do not, reporting breaches immediately. Reporting
absconding is essentially the means by which an employer reports that they can no longer serve
this outward-facing oversight function as they do not know where the worker is physically located,
breaking the sponsorship relationship. Without sponsorship, the individual becomes an illegal

339

immigrant immediately and is subject to administrative action. The worker cannot simply walk
away from his job; if he does so he forfeits the right to employment and residence in the UAE.12
A worker fleeing exploitation and abuse is not, under UAE law, absconding; after all, the
abusive employer has already broken the inward-facing relationship implied by kafala. The
problem is that, once the absconding charges have been filed, it is up to the worker to prove that
he had reason to flee his sponsor. Workers might abscond for many reasons. When confronted
by the authorities, most allege exploitative labor conditions and/or abuse. However, there are also
a significant number of people who believe that the majority of workers who abscond do so
without (legally justifiable) cause. When asked “Why are so many maids absconding?” Judge Ali
Humaid bin Khatam, Head of the Dubai Public Prosecution of Naturalization and Residency
Department, answered:
An increasing number of housemaids are found escaping their sponsors in a bid
to raise their income. In most cases, absconded maids work on an hourly-basis
and earn much more than they ever did when they worked for a sponsor for a
fixed and limited salary.13
It is fairly commonly accepted, however, that working conditions for domestic workers are
harsh, that local standards allow for very long hours, poor living conditions, severe restrictions on
movement and communication, etc; recruitment agencies and employers are quite open in the
local press about their expectations regarding these issues.14 Police in Dubai, for example, have
recommended that employers treat domestic workers better in order to reduce the likelihood of
their absconding.15
It seems that absconding charges should be treated by the UAE authorities with caution.
This research, as well as research conducted by various human rights groups, shows that
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migrant workers in the UAE will tolerate a significant degree of hardship in order to secure their
employment abroad. And, again, exploitative and abusive situations are not uncommon. Yet, at
the moment the presumption is with the employer filing the charges, not with the worker who has
fled; in essence, the worker is presumed guilty. At the very least, the UAE government should
remain agnostic when absconding is initially reported. Police should investigate the labor situation
of absconding workers before determining whether charges should be filed against the worker,
against the employer, or if a mediated solution can be found. This change in enforcement would
represent a step in the right direction.
A more decisive, and necessary step, is to simply end rules against “absconding.” Ending
the prosecution of absconding should be achievable in the current UAE environment. Employers
would remain sponsors and could still be required to cancel their sponsorship when an employee
quits without notice. Absconding should be considered simply a matter of the employee quitting
without notice. As such, employer’s interests would still be represented through rules regarding
breach of contract, penalties as proscribed by law or contract, or through civil proceedings.
However, they would no longer be able to use deportation and a lifetime labor ban as means to
pressure migrants or to avoid alternate legal proceedings.
3. End Labor Bans
Labor bans are popular with employers and business owners as they provide additional
leverage over workers subject to this weighty penalty.16 The greatest objection to ending labor
bans is likely to come from employers who view them as a necessary means of protecting the
investment they made in recruitment fees, transportation, etc. in order to bring a worker to the
UAE in the first place. However, it should be stressed that UAE Labour Law already provides a
mechanism by which employers are compensated for the costs associated with early termination
of a contract:
If the contract has been terminated on part of the employee, for reasons other
than those provided for under Article (121) hereof, the employee becomes liable
for compensating the employer against losses incurred by him in consequence of
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Labor bans are particularly weighty penalties because they represent not just the loss of a job, but also the
worker cannot look for another job, loses her residency in the UAE, and becomes liable to pay for her own repatriation.
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contract termination, provided that the amount of compensation, may not exceed
half a month's pay for a period of three months or for the remaining period of
contract, whichever is shorter, unless the terms of the contract provide
otherwise.17
This is enough of a penalty; it is more than sufficient to cover lost recruitment costs in
most cases. To insist on the labor ban only serves to disempower workers to such an extent as to
make systematic labor abuse basically inevitable.
As the businesses in the UAE that benefit from them are ultimately owned by Emiratis,
there is a powerful constituency behind keeping labor bans. But there is room for hope. Getting
rid of the ban might be possible for two reasons. First, there is a growing recognition that
attracting the best workers, rather than the most desperate, to come to the UAE is not, actually,
very easy. That is the logic behind exempting key professionals from the ban. Engineers,
accountants, doctors and nurses, and specific other professionals are exempted because they
are in particularly high demand and short supply. But employers in the UAE complain of the poor
quality of all types of workers, from healthcare providers to housemaids. The truth is that getting
qualified people of any profession to come to the UAE is not so easy and getting them to stay for
longer than one contract is even more difficult. If the law did not force individuals to stay in
negative employment situations for the length of a full contract, it is possible that more and better
qualified individuals would be willing to take the risk of coming to the UAE and be satisfied to
stay.
Second, getting rid of the ban does not change the incentives of the state. While labor
bans benefit Emirati business owners, they do not help the state. Even should a worker change
jobs, and therefore sponsors, early, the worker would remain tied to specific employers who fulfill
basic immigration and welfare roles in place of the state.
4. End Employer Sponsorship
The ultimate goal must be to do away with sponsorship entirely. Ending sponsorship is
not necessarily the same thing as ending temporary labor migration. The problem with
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sponsorship is not that residence is tied to employment, but that employment is tied to a single
employer who is given extensive control over the mobility of the worker for up to two years. Of the
GCC countries, Bahrain has taken the first steps to dismantle sponsorship by making the Labour
Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA), rather than employers, the official sponsor of all foreign
workers in the country; Kuwait and Qatar have publically pledged to follow suit.18
The UAE, by contrast, has reaffirmed its commitment to kafala sponsorship as a means
of regulating labor and immigration.19 However, weakening of sponsorship can be seen even in
the UAE. The free zones already have a similar arrangement to Bahrain’s, in which the free zone
authority, rather than employers located within the zone, sponsors workers, making it easier for
workers to move to new employers. If Qatar, considered to be one of the strictest kafala states,
follows through on its promise to shift sponsorship to a federal government entity in 2015, it is
likely that the UAE could be brought to follow suit. Ending employer sponsorship would have a
very significant impact: it would mean that employers would no longer need to consent to a
worker changing jobs and would not be able to impose labor bans on quitting workers.20
As with Bahrain, the UAE could transfer sponsorship to the Ministry of Labour (or another
government body). This agency would then have the responsibility of ensuring that workers enter
and exit the country in a regular fashion – a normal government regulatory function. To maintain
temporary labor migration programs but to end the confinement of workers to a single employer,
the UAE could issue visas making migrant workers eligible for only specific types of positions,
either restricting by sector or by eligible positions (to only those positions that cannot be filled
domestically, for example).
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Goal: Ensure a Living Wage
Earning a living wage is not only a human right in itself (Article 23(3)), but also a means
of securing many other human rights. Securing an adequate standard of living, supporting a
family, and obtaining social security, for example, are primarily realized by individuals through
their economic activity; the sending and receiving states primary obligation is to respect and
protect this activity.21 In order to afford these rights, individuals must earn a living wage. Earning a
living wage also protects against debt bondage, a form of modern slavery, and generally
empowers migrants to achieve life goals.
Policy Path
1. Stop imprisonment for debt and establish personal bankruptcy laws in the UAE;
2. Create a UAE minimum wage;
3. Set the minimum wage at a living wage.
1. Stop Imprisonment for Debt and Establish Personal Bankruptcy Laws in the UAE
It is not uncommon for temporary migrants in the UAE to take on substantial amounts of
debt. The debt cycle begins with borrowing to pay recruitment fees and may continue with
borrowing from friends, family, employers, etc. in order to make ends meet during family
emergencies or other periods of hardship or extraordinary need. Occasionally, workers may take
on credit card, bank loan, or other formal debt; this was particularly common during the easy
credit years before the global financial crisis of 2008/9, when even very low-wage workers were
eligible for high-interest credit cards and bank debt in the UAE. Another layer of Filipinos are
involved in debt when they agree to cosign loans for friends or family in less fortunate
circumstances. An even wider circle of individuals in the UAE assumes debt in order to pay for
expensive housing in the UAE.22 If an individual falls behind on payments to UAE creditors there
is no bankruptcy protection, and she may be arrested and imprisoned for debt.
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checks, a form of debt and/or by the renter taking a housing loan from their employer.
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The UAE needs to establish bankruptcy laws and end the practice of imprisoning people
for unpaid debt. Debt should be considered a civil, not a criminal offense, and there should be
means for debtors to restructure their payments. Without this, debtors will fear coming forward to
the UAE authorities in cases where unpaid debt or debt bondage is at issue. Bankruptcy
protection and the end to debtor’s prison would not necessarily change the amount of debt a
migrant may be forced to take on, but it would substantially influence how that debt is treated and
eliminate excessive repercussions, such as debt bondage.
It is not only workers who will benefit, but businesses and the state as well. Imprisoned
debtors cannot work to earn money to pay back the money owed to their creditors; and the state
must pay for their imprisonment. Given those costs, it is not surprising that there is a sizable
demand for legal reform in this area.23 Further, the UAE has recently taken some steps in this
direction. Emirati citizens are already exempt from imprisonment for debt; a 2014 draft law would
also exempt terminally ill patients, pregnant women, seniors and minors.24 This exemption should
be extended to all individuals.
2. Create a UAE Minimum Wage
In its 2008/2009 Global Wage Report the ILO noted that minimum wages “are a nearly
universal policy instrument,” applied in more than 90 percent of ILO member states but with the
“significant exception” of “some Gulf countries, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates.”25 As argued in Chapter Five, a minimum wage requirement must come from side
of the destination country, not the sending country. Attempts by the Philippines to enforce its own
minimum wage laws on OFWs have been mainly ineffective and, in some cases, actually
counterproductive: narrowing the employment options available to migrants, encouraging labor
migration via tourist visas, and inviting contract bait and switch. In the long run this is worse for
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migrants than if no minimum wage had been set, as it takes away the ability to make an informed
decision about employment.
On the other hand, there is potential to establish a minimum wage in the UAE. There is
precedent for a minimum wage in the region: some of the Gulf countries (Kuwait, Oman, Saudi
Arabia, and recently Bahrain) do have a minimum wage, though only Kuwait extends it to
expatriates as well as nationals. The UAE Labour Law also specifies that a minimum wage
“enough for the employee's basic needs and to secure means of living” should be set by Federal
decree; the minimum wage may vary by sector but should cover all employees, not just citizens.26
The Labour Law was passed in 1980 but no minimum wage has yet been set.
Establishing a minimum wage would be unpopular with employers, which is to say with
many UAE citizens, who would be forced to pay the higher wages. However, there is a major
reason why the UAE may nonetheless choose to impose a minimum wage: it can be viewed as
an alternative to tripartite bargaining and labor organization (e.g. unions).27 Unions are discussed
further below; suffice to say that the UAE government is vehemently opposed to independent
labor organization. The state argues that the laws in place are sufficient to protect the welfare of
workers and, as the state offers all necessary protections, unions are unnecessary. This is
patently untrue and, in the face of persistent labor unrest including strikes and riots on worksites
and in labor camps, concrete improvements to the laws protecting workers are clearly warranted.
In a sense, minimum wages serve as a protection for those at the bottom of the socioeconomic
scale who lack leverage relative to employers. But it is a mechanism that remains fully under the
control of the state and, as such, may be an acceptable option.
3. Set the Minimum Wage at a Living Wage
Low wages are most directly resolved through the implementation of a minimum wage,
which the UAE does not currently have. A minimum wage need not guarantee a luxurious
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lifestyle, but it must protect the most basic ability of workers to ensure their and their family’s
subsistence. Currently, there are very few countries in which the minimum wage is equal to a
living wage. Of the 100 countries surveyed by the WageIndicator Foundation, including twenty
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, only seventeen had
a minimum wage set at or above the living wage.28 However, demands to set the minimum wage
at the level of a living wage have reemerged in many developed economies recently. There are
strong living wage movements today in the United Kingdom29 and the United States30 in
particular. In the UAE, a wealthy country that has invited guest workers as a crucial element in its
development and which professes concern for the welfare of its residents, the minimum wage
should go one step further and approach a true living wage.
Goal: Streamline Recruitment, Contracting, and Deployment
The impact of recruitment, contracting, and deployment irregularities can be profound.
Each has the potential to cause significant harm to the human rights of migrant workers; as an
interrelated set they have the potential to lead to some of the worst violations, such as debt
bondage and forced labor. But recruiting and contracting for temporary labor migration is difficult
to regulate appropriately. Recruiters have two constituencies, job seekers and employers, with
nearly diametrically opposed interests in the labor market. In situations where the supply of
workers far exceeds the supply of employment opportunities, the interests of workers are likely to
be considered secondary to those of employers. The Philippine state has tried to insert itself into
this process, regulating minimum conditions that must be guaranteed to workers being deployed
abroad. Enforcing these regulations has been difficult. Recruiters have strong incentives to cheat,
resources for inspection and prosecution are scarce, the legal structure is cumbersome and
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further burdened with corruption. And workers will themselves often abet agents in skirting the
law in an effort to secure a (scarce) job: a worker presented with the choice between a
“reprocessed” contract31 or no job at all will often look the other way from any irregularities in the
paperwork. Filipino recruitment agencies continue to skirt the law with near impunity.
Policy Path
1. Create micro-lending opportunities;
2. Revise recruitment fees: allow migrants to pay, set reasonable fees, and require
evidence of how recruitment fees were paid;
3. Create fewer, larger recruitment agencies eligible to recruit for at-risk positions;
4. Establish a joint contract verification system with contract registration before deployment;
5. Strengthen enforcement of recruitment laws and policies.
1. Create Micro-Lending Opportunities
Ensuring that individuals are able to pay recruitment fees without incurring crippling debt
is a substantial challenge. Many potential Filipino migrants do not have sufficient personal
resources to pay recruitment fees and so must take out loans in order to do so. Most migrants
borrow from friends and family. For those who cannot, there are few options available for formal
loans. If a low-skill, low-wage worker is able to secure a bank loan, the interest rate is likely to be
very high, up to 240 percent.32 This can be the beginning of a spiral of debt that could lead to
imprisonment in the UAE or forced labor situations.
Migrants need a means of obtaining funds before departure, and not at usurious rates.
This is an area where the UAE and the Philippines may be able to work together for a common
advantage. What is needed is a government-sponsored micro-lending program for migrants in the
Philippines-UAE corridor. While the Philippines has some programs through which its citizens can
seek loans, they are insufficient. They require one resource which is in short supply in the
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Philippines and which is abundant in the UAE: capital. With UAE support, alternative borrowing
options could be developed to pay allowable recruitment and travel fees and so reduce reliance
on recruiters, employers, friends, family, and credit cards.
This is not likely to be particularly difficult for either country. The Philippines already has a
nascent structure in place that could be adapted to this purpose. The UAE, in turn, is generous in
offering development support. Currently much of this aid has been directed towards Middle
Eastern or Muslim countries. But if even a relatively small percentage of the UAE’s $5.89 billion
dollar (US) foreign aid budget directed towards this purpose could make a significant difference.33
2. Revise Recruitment Fees: Allow Migrants to Pay, Set Reasonable Fees, and Require Evidence
of How Recruitment Fees Were Paid
First, migrants should be allowed to pay recruitment fees. This is currently not allowed
under UAE law and Philippine law supports this prohibition. In an ideal world, workers would not
be required to pay any fees and a minimum wage law would protect the worker from potential
wage reductions resulting from this cost being passed on to the employee. But requiring
employers to pay all recruiting costs has proved unworkable in practice. Many workers simply end
up paying anyway, either through illegally collected fees, illegal wage withholding, or through
bribes. Because jobs are scarce, banning recruitment fees to workers has simply pushed this
common practice underground. And, by pushing it underground, several negative externalities
also arise, from predatory lending to increased corruption. Where the employer does pay the fee,
he may feel entitled to recoup this cost by extracting excess value from their work (such as
unpaid overtime) or by refusing to allow the worker to quit without a labor ban. Even if no
improper dealings take place, the worker ultimately pays for recruitment in any event, if not
directly, then passed on from the employer in the form of reduced wages. Allowing the migrant to
pay these fees up front makes the payment transparent and increases the ability of the worker to
make an informed choice about migration.
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Second, if the state allows recruitment fees, it also has a say in what those fees are. It
can set reasonable limits. The crucial element is that, whatever the fee, it should be set at the
same level by both countries and should be enforced by both countries. The Philippines normally
allows Philippine agencies to charge migrants up to one month’s salary and places no restrictions
on what may be charged to employers, (though it disallows fee collection from all domestic
workers as well as workers whose destination country prohibits collecting such fees). The UAE
forbids its recruitment agencies from charging any fees to migrants and places no restrictions on
what may be charged to employers. The UAE should allow reasonable fees. The Philippines
policy of a one month’s salary cap on fees charged to workers is appropriate; this fee should be
split between the partner agencies and the migrant should not be charged twice. In addition,
neither country regulates the fees placed on employers. But, again, if the fees charged to
employers are too high, they may try to recoup money from workers. And in the Philippines-UAE
case, in addition to recruitment agency fees, employers have to pay transportation costs as well
as various fees to both the Philippine (OWWA and PhilHealth membership, for example) and
UAE (visa fees, for example) governments. These fees need to top out somewhere; a one
month’s salary cap seems appropriate here as well.
Third, as a deterrent to charging such fees illegally, recruitment agencies and employers
should be required to provide evidence of how recruitment fees were paid. These fees can be
matched up with information from registered contracts as well as the Wages Protection System to
ensure that migrants were charged an appropriate amount and that the fees were not recouped
through wage withholding.
These three elements are discussed together because they are a package of reforms. All
three must be implemented together in order to have a positive impact. As it is, this is by no
means a fool-proof system. It is possible that employers may continue to try to recoup fees
through bribes. But taken together they lower the incentive to cheat, while cutting off common
mechanisms through which cheating occurs.
Allowing migrants to pay reasonable recruitment fees is the natural counterpart to ending
Philippine restrictions on the use of tourist or visitor visas for job hunting (discussed previously).
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In this view the recruitment agency is a service provider with a fee for service model. If the
potential migrant does not require the service, they are free to utilize alternative means to seek
employment, such as legal job hunting on visitor visas in the UAE.
The changes needed for the Philippines to implement this system – setting a cap on the
fees charged to employers and implementing a system for tracking recruitment fees – are not
likely to impose a political strain. However, the Philippines already faces significant strain on its
resources and implementing further documentation processing and inspections, on top of an
already complex and strained process will add difficulties. The UAE is likely to face the opposite
problem. It has the resources needed to implement these changes (allowing migrant workers to
pay reasonable recruitment fees and implementing a system for tracking them) but is likely to
face political difficulties. The domestic population is not likely to object, but human rights groups
active in the region may do so. In order for the UAE to make a credible claim that allowing fees to
be charged to workers actually benefits those workers, these policy changes will have to be
accompanied by serious enforcement measures and a commitment to prosecuting offenders. In
particular, establishing reporting and enforcement mechanisms establishing how fees were paid
is likely to be crucial in this respect.
3. Create Fewer, Larger Recruitment Agencies Eligible to Recruit for At-Risk Positions
Allowing workers to exit the Philippines on tourist visas for the purposes of legal job
hunting (discussed previously) is likely to reduce the number of people seeking deployment
through recruitment agencies. Unfortunately, the workers most likely to be taken advantage of by
recruitment agencies are likely to be among those that continue to require their services: workers
without strong personal networks in the country of destination, who are seeking employment in
unskilled areas or areas in which there is a surplus of qualified workers. There are two specific
professions which are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by recruitment agencies and
employers: domestic workers and construction workers.
Currently the Philippines state attempts to regulate recruitment agencies by setting
stringent standards for becoming and remaining a licensed recruitment agency. As discussed in
Chapter Five, these standards have not been particularly successful at curbing abuses. This is
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partly due to corruption and partly due to the fact that as middlemen, recruitment agencies have
two “clients” in any transaction: the employer and the worker. This can lead to a conflict in which
the interests of one client are prioritized above the other. Especially at the low-skilled end of the
spectrum, as with domestic workers and construction workers, this conflict of interest tends to
disadvantage the worker: low-skilled workers are far more abundant than employers wishing to
hire them. A new approach is needed.
One option would be to limit recruitment to a small number of approved recruitment
agencies. Only contracts brokered by these approved agencies would be processed by the
Philippine POEA and the UAE Ministry of Labour, consolidating recruitment with a few large
companies. This would facilitate oversight and regulation, and also increase the potential impact
of sanctions by either the UAE or Philippine governments: a company that does good business
recruiting for the UAE due to its privileged position should be more vulnerable to losing that
position, reducing the likelihood of their engaging in illegal practices.
There are significant drawbacks to this approach. First is the fact that the success of this
strategy relies of commitment by the relevant governments to effective oversight, a willingness to
intervene on behalf of the workers, and to impose effective penalties. This has been lacking in the
past in both the Philippines and the UAE. Second, this system entails the loss of competition and
options that might otherwise drive improvement; this would essentially create an oligopoly.
Ethical, innovative, small agencies would be shut out of the process. For mid- and high-wage
workers, these disadvantages outweigh the potential benefit and so such a system need not be
extended to all contracts. The lack of any other realistic option coupled with the sheer enormity of
the problem makes this a worthwhile option for specific low-wage workers, particularly domestic
workers and construction workers.
4. Establish a Joint Contract Verification System with Contract Registration Before Deployment
Recruiting and contracting are areas where neither the Philippines nor the UAE can
adequately address the problem unilaterally. In particular, independent regulations regarding
contracting have directly contributed to the contract bait and switch phenomenon. Right now both
the UAE and the Philippines require that a contract be issued and registered with the relevant
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authority, and each has a mechanism for ensuring that this is done. However, the two systems
are entirely independent. The Philippines requires that the contract be verified by the POEA and
withholds the Overseas Employment Certificate, required for the migrant worker to exit the
Philippines, until this has been done. The UAE requires that contracts be registered with the
Ministry of Labour and will not issue the labor permit and residence visa without it. But at no point
do the two authorities check to see if it is the same contract that has been registered in both
places, opening the door for contract bait and switch. And, while the Philippines government may
suspend the license of any Philippine agency involved and blacklist the UAE agency, “neither is
liable for contractual breaches under UAE law.”34 In both countries complaints rarely make it to
the relevant authorities. Migrants may be unaware of the laws and the resources available to help
them (especially in the destination country) or may be complicit in avoiding regulations in order to
secure a job that does not meet government standards for whatever reason.
Contract bait and switch, with or without the migrant’s knowledge, is often the first step
towards unfree labor conditions and modern slavery. Once the worker arrives in the destination
country, he really has no idea what job and what terms of employment await him. He is relying on
the word of a recruitment agent who has already proven willing to engage in fraud against the
relevant government/s; what faith can a worker place in the chances that he will not be scammed
as well? And once in the destination country, his ability to renegotiate terms or reject the contract
entirely are significantly limited.
A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Philippines and the UAE on labor
was signed in 2007. This agreement establishes certain requirements for contracts – specifically,
that contracts should state the required qualifications, conditions of employment, salary,
accommodation, and transportation terms of employment. It also ensures a role for both
governments in regulating, verifying, and authenticating contracts (though priority is given to the
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UAE Ministry of Labour in this matter) and requires that a standard model contract35 be drafted.
The MOU lapsed in 2012 and the Philippines government has been active in trying to negotiate a
new agreement. As of April 2015, they felt that they were close to agreement but no official
document had been signed.
In 2008 a pilot project was announced that aimed to coordinate actions between the
government of the UAE, India, and the Philippines in order to identify and implement best
practices in contractual labor migration, the aptly named Pilot Project on the Administration of
Temporary Contractual Employment Cycle from India and the Philippines to the United Arab
Emirates.36 The first phase of the project deals with recruitment and contracting and calls for “an
understood and enforceable contract that is available in the language of the worker and which
corresponds to the English-language of Arabic-language contract issued by the employer.”37
Further, the project established “‘one-stop-shop’ centers in India and in the Philippines for
receiving and processing applications for work.”38 The problem is that this approach maintains the
current problems of country-specific silos. What is needed is not two “corresponding” contracts,
but one single contract recognized by both governments.
Instead, the UEA seems to have signaled its willingness to continue to try to deal with
contracts independently. In 2014 the UAE created a standard employment contract for domestic
workers, an advance that the Philippines and other destination countries had advocated. The new
standard contract, however, fails to offer some basic protections that sending countries had
hoped for, such as a minimum wage or set working hours.39 The Philippine response was muted,
praising the contract as a step forward but reserving judgment. The UAE then, in a circular
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released by the Ministry of Labour on 26 May 2014, instructed recruitment agencies to “rely on
the new standard contract, removing the need to have the contracts of domestic workers ratified
by the embassies of their countries of origin,”40 and instructing agencies that they should not
require employers to deal with sending country embassies. The Philippines responded quickly,
halting all contract processing for domestic workers in the UAE.41 Rosalinda Baldoz, Philippine
Secretary of Labor, expressed her concern that without verification, domestic workers would be
vulnerable to human trafficking.42 Baldoz blamed the halt on the fact that the new UAE
regulations make it impossible for the Philippine government to carry out contract verification
before approving deployment, required under Philippine law; the UAE government responded that
contracts in the UAE are the responsibility of the UAE authorities, not embassies.43
This type of tit for tat is not helpful. It strains good relations between the Philippines and
UAE governments, alienates Emirati employers, and pushes desperate Filipino workers towards
illegal migration. The solution is to establish a single, binding contract registered with both
governments before the migrant leaves the Philippines on a UAE employment visa. This would
establish a single process for contract verification that involves both governments directly: the
contract verified by the first government would be passed directly to the second government for
verification; only after both governments approve would the Philippine Overseas Employment
Certificate (OEC) and the UAE work permit be issued. There is no a priori reason why the
Philippines government should be the first to verify a contract; if the UAE is more comfortable
having the initial say, as it seems to have indicated,44 this can reasonably be accommodated. The
important aspect is simply that the verification should be speedy, as deployment will be delayed

40

Shireena Al Nowais, "UAE Employers Frustrated with Inability to Get Filipino Maids,” The National, 25 June

41

Nowais, "UAE Employers Frustrated with Inability to Get Filipino Maids."

42

Ramona Ruiz, "Philippines Trying to Stop Women Travelling to the UAE to Work as Maids,” The National, 24

2014.

June 2014.
43
Janice Ponce de Leon and Nada Al Taher, "UAE Clarifies Housemaid Contract Rules with Embassies,” The
National, 24 June 2014.
44
“The ministry reaffirmed its complete willingness and is ready to provide the embassy of the Philippines and
any other embassies with the new contract after being attested by relevant bodies as per the prescribed procedures.” in:
Ponce de Leon and Taher. "UAE Clarifies Housemaid Contract Rules with Embassies."

355

until both governments have approved. This should be done not only for domestic workers, but
for all contracts offered to workers in the Philippines.45
We know that this type of program is possible, both technologically and politically. The
Philippines and other major sending countries advocate contract verification as a means of
protecting against trafficking and forced labor. The Philippines is likely to support serious joint
efforts. The UAE, in turn, has already established a similar project with India in 2011 using an
online contract registration system; Indian officials report that it has reduced contract fraud and
helped to protect workers.46
The difficulty is in arriving at a common set of standards that both countries agree should
be applied. Wage expectations are likely to be a sticking point. There is an often expressed
sentiment in the UAE that Filipino workers are expensive and that the minimum wage that the
Philippine state has set is unreasonable, particularly for domestic workers.47 The UAE, however,
has no real interest in enforcing a lower wage than the Philippines would choose to set. If it is true
that Filipino workers are expensive relative to their contemporaries, then employers need not hire
them; if, on the other hand, the employer values Filipinos’ generally good English language skills
and solid educational background, they may choose to recruit in the Philippines at a higher wage.
The UAE state may push for a lower wage guarantee but should ultimately defer to any
reasonable amount set by the Philippines. The Philippines, after all, shares the UAE interest in
avoiding a minimum wage that prices its workers out of the market.
5. Strengthen Enforcement of Recruitment Laws and Policies
The overwhelming need for both the UAE and the Philippines, however, is to strengthen
enforcement of recruitment laws and policies. Simply enforcing exiting laws effectively would

45

This would not apply to workers exiting the Philippines on UAE tourist visas.

46
“India, UAE Take Measures to Save Indian Workers from Fraud,” United News of India, 14 September 2011,
accessed December 15, 2014 from ProQuest Central.
47

Ramona Ruiz, "Filipino Maids Shunned in UAE over Minimum Wage Demands,” The National, 13 February

2013.

356

already do much to improve the situation of workers; and putting new laws on the books will do
little in practice it they are not enforced. Unfortunately, it is also the most difficult.
The Philippine Republic act of 1995 defines illegal recruitment widely to include charging
excessive fees, altering the terms after a contract has been approved by the Department of
Labor, withholding travel documents, and providing false information, among others.48 Agunias
shows that in 2008, 23 percent of the 290 cases filed against recruiters by workers deployed to
the UAE were for excessive fees and another thirty percent were for misrepresentation.49 The
government has proven itself unable to deal with the volume of complaints, allowing cases to
drag on for years, despite the fact that POEA Rules and Regulations (Part VI, Rule III)
establishes that legal proceedings should be resolved in ninety days with a further fifteen days to
initiate an appeal if needed, and that illegal recruitment has a prescription period (statute of
limitations) of five years. Of those 290 cases filed by OFWs from the UAE, only ninety six (33
percent) were resolved in the first six months; 121 cases (42 percent) were still pending at the
end of the year.50 Corruption is also a problem as recruiters pay off officials, migrants, and
migrants’ families. When an agency does actually come up for legal action, witnesses are
routinely paid off or that agency simply dissolves (forfeiting the Php 1,100,000 ($24,682 USD) in
escrow and surety bonds that law requires them to post51) and a new one re-forms. Rosalinda
Baldoz, Undersecretary of the Philippine Department of Labour and Employment, explains that
the criminal prosecution for illegal recruitment “does not instill fear among illegal recruiters
because they can pay not only the officials who will handle the case but the victims and the
family, who are in need of money. Without a witness, the case falls flat on the government’s face.
It is very difficult to build up to the level of prosecution.”52
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The Philippines needs to drastically reduce the time it takes to prosecute illegal
immigration offenses. The Philippine government has established a special task force to pursue
cases and established courts to hear them. However, the process still takes too long and results
in too few convictions. This is mainly a question of resources: more are needed. Then the
penalties need to be made both more proportionate and more likely to be realized. Bonds should
increase so that forfeiture is more of a deterrent.53 Closure orders are allowed in cases where a
preliminary POEA or DOEL examination has determined that illegal recruitment activities are
ongoing and pose a risk of future exploitation;54 more use should be made of this power. Legal
penalties are appropriately harsh:
Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than twelve (12) years and one (1) day but not more
than twenty (20) years and a fine of not less than One Million Pesos
(Php1,000,000.00) [$230,000 USD] nor more than Two Million Pesos
(Php2,000,000.00) [$460,000 USD].55
But the five-year prescription period should be extended to ten years. A crucial piece of the
puzzle, as Agunias rightly points out, is that more needs to be done to encourage migrants to
report offenses and pursue complaints through legal channels through their conclusion. That
means making legal action practical for migrants by speeding up prosecution and ensuring that
the material settlement they are eligible to receive is proportionate to the crime.
The UAE, on the other hand, has sufficient resources to prosecute illegal recruitment and
has few issues with corruption in this regard. However, the will to fully pursue illegal recruitment
and contracting violations is lacking. The UAE government balances the welfare of migrant
workers against a host of other interests and is liable to find other those interests to be more
pressing, particularly citizen welfare and economic progress. It should be stressed that these
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issues can also be addressed under a system that respects the UAE rule of law and workers’
rights under that law. Undermining the rule of law is not in the long-term interests of the UAE.
One concrete change that needs to be made is to separate civil responsibility for redressing harm
done to workers from corporate liability under criminal law. Today the UAE prioritizes mediated
solutions to labor violations. While this may be an adequate response to the civil complaint, it
should not absolve criminal liability and the UAE should continue to prosecute offending
recruitment agencies and employers.
It is one thing to simply state that corruption needs to be addressed and sufficient
resources expended, that receiving countries should prioritize migrant worker welfare. It is quite
another thing to actually do it. The failure of enforcement is the seemingly overwhelming issue
always to be reckoned with. This is a long-term, perhaps unending, process for both the
Philippines and the UAE.
Goal: End Illegal Practices as Part of the UAE “Business Culture”
It is important to remember that the kafala system is not reducible to legal sponsorship; it
is not a single, static, codified legal principle. It is better understood as the underlying logic of
employer responsibility for employees through which some basic principles of both labor and
immigration law are derived (see Chapter One). Gardner makes this argument in relation to
Bahrain. Writing at roughly the same time that Bahrain officially changed its sponsorship laws,
Gardner reminds us that kafala is only “partially codified in law” and is primarily a cultural
practice.56 Changing the law does not equate to changing the practice. Similar to what Gardner
describes in Bahrain, there is a business culture in place in the UAE based on kafala sponsorship
that is generally accepted but that has little to do with UAE Labour law. In particular, passport
withholding, unpaid overtime, and wage discrimination are widespread; most workers are affected
by at least one of these violations. This needs to be addressed.
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Policy Path
1. Provide comprehensive, accessible information regarding labor and immigration law
online;
2. Allow anonymous complaints to the UAE Ministry of Labour;
3. Improve labor inspection, with special attention to passport withholding, unpaid overtime,
and wage discrimination;
4. Enforce equal pay laws.
1. Provide Comprehensive, Accessible Information Regarding Labor and Immigration Law Online
The reason these three (passport withholding, unpaid overtime, wage discrimination) are
so difficult to address is because they are generally accepted as the routine course of business in
the UAE. They are normalized: employers do not think twice about engaging in them, workers
tend not to object to them, and the UAE government does not seriously enforce laws against
these practices. For those interested in the rights of migrant workers in the UAE, we need to look
for ways to destabilize this process.
A promising avenue would include utilizing the sending country governments and the
international media to try to break the normalization among migrant workers of specific rights
violations. All of these issues are violations of the UAE labor law for which migrants, if they
proactively seek help, may reasonably expect to be upheld by the UAE Ministry of Labour. As
was discussed in Chapter Seven, the Ministry of Labour is generally willing to intervene on
workers’ behalf if its help is sought. The Philippines has implemented some programs designed to
reach all workers and inform them of their rights. The centerpiece of this information campaign
has been the Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar (PDOS) required of all workers before
deployment abroad. This is a good program and could usefully be extended. However,
interviewees who discussed the PDOS with me usually reported that they were not focused on
information about their rights or what to do in case of problems, or that they had forgotten
whatever they learned. Information on important topics needs to be made readily available to
OFWs on a continuing basis. Fortunately, there are cheap, and nearly ubiquitous mechanisms
available. Better use needs to be made of the internet and social media as means of distributing
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information by the sending country, as well as interested human rights organization. Information
should be easy to understand, in Tagalog as well as English, and frequently updated.
The UAE has made positive strides in making information available to workers. For
example, workers today can access online databases that show them their labor status, visa
status, or the labor contract that the Ministry of Labour has on file for them. However, there is little
information about passport withholding, overtime violations, or wage discrimination to be found on
the Ministry’s website. While most information is available in Arabic and English, very little is
available in other languages. In addition, the quality of the English language translations of
information on UAE government websites is notoriously poor, though standards seem to be
improving as the relevant websites mature. More information needs to be provided on the most
common violations. That information should be simple to understand, preferably with quality
translations in English and Tagalog, and readily accessible from the Ministry’s website.
2. Allow Anonymous Complaints to the UAE Ministry of Labour
Since 2008 the Ministry of Labour has had a twenty four-hour, toll-free number that
workers can call to report labor violations. Hotlines make it easier for any worker to report
violations, but are especially crucial for workers living and working in isolated areas such as
construction workers. Hotline operators speak several languages common among low-skilled
workers in the UAE, including Tagalog. While complaints are confidential, they are not
anonymous. The UAE views the hotline as a means of expediting and simplifying the process for
workers to lodge official complaints which will result in the Ministry taking official action to address
the issue. But workers may be hesitant to put their names forward for fear of employer retaliation.
Anonymous complaints are crucial to making hotlines work for workers. This is relatively easy to
achieve as the hotline structure is already in place.
3. Improve Labor Inspection, with Special Attention to Passport Withholding, Unpaid Overtime,
and Wage Discrimination
The laws are in place; should an individual approach the police or Ministry of Labour
complaining of passport withholding the authorities generally act in his favor to resolve the
situation; the courts generally enforce relevant laws when a case is brought to them. The next
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step to take in enforcement is to improve labor inspection. Currently the UAE’s Ministry of Labour
has an Inspection Affairs Sector that conducts inspections regarding compliance with the UAE
Labour Law, occupational safety, and the payment of wages. 57 However, labor inspection in the
UAE is not well-focused to address labor exploitation or the concerns regarding the human rights
of migrant workers.
In 2014 the Ministry of Labour reported that it conducted over 288,670 visits of inspection
bringing 17,217 illegal practices to light.58 However, only 479 facilities were referred to the public
prosecutor for legal action. This discrepancy can largely be accounted for by looking at what
types of violations the Inspection Affairs Sector deems serious. Maher Al Obed, Assistant
Undersecretary for Inspectional Affairs: “Some of the measures taken against violating practices
were just warnings as the offence was not considered serious, such as misleading overtime
calculations.”59 Indeed, many of the violations that were recommended for prosecution are
serious violations: withholding wages for over two months and failure to provide signed contracts
accounted for about half of the cases. However, it is important to remember that unpaid overtime
is one of the most persistent violations of workers’ rights in the UAE precisely because it is not
considered a serious crime and is not pursued by the UAE authorities. Passport withholding and
wage discrimination are not even mentioned by the Inspection Affairs Sector.
To some extent, the Inspection Affairs Sector is lacking sufficient resources. There are
367 field inspectors, each one responsible for the annual inspection of 857 facilities and
monitoring the situation of 11,760 workers.60 Clearly more inspectors are needed. However, there
is also a failure in the utilization of existing resources. The ILO reports that most time and
resources are allocated towards inspections targeting illegal workers “during which the inspectors
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are usually accompanied by policemen, who detain such workers on the spot, and keep them in
custody until they are deported;” very few inspections target the improvement of labor conditions
and labor rights.61 Finally, most inspection visits are routine and are announced. If the employer
objects to the visit or requests extra time to prepare, the visit is usually delayed for a few days.62
More inspections need to be triggered by worker complaints, target worker rights, and annual
inspections should be unannounced.
This is largely a matter of prioritization. Currently the UAE prioritizes immigration control
and economic growth and its labor inspection practices reflect this. As with other issues, changing
priorities requires a long-term shift in the view of the UAE government. This is possible: there is a
growing domestic sentiment that labor unrest needs to be addressed; enforcing existing laws and
contract guarantees helps to mitigate worker dissatisfaction that is at the bottom of such unrest.
Continuing international pressure on the UAE regarding labor rights may also help to push
progress in the right direction.
4. Enforce Equal Pay Laws
It is relatively well understood that there are wage differentials between the public and the
private sectors, and between national and foreign workers due to the segmented nature of the
UAE labor market.63 But public/private and national/foreign are not the only segments in the UAE
labor market. Within the foreign labor segment, further subdivisions can be seen between
nationalities.64 These national segments then map loosely on further vertical segmentation by
class and skill level such that workers of specific nationalities are pushed towards certain types of
jobs and are compensated on differing scales. Within this categorization, for example, American
workers are assumed to be high-skilled and difficult to replace, and are generally well paid; while
Filipinos are assumed to be mid- to low-skilled and easy to replace and are not well paid. Even
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within the same company and for the same position, then, Americans and Filipinos may be paid
differently.
Equal pay for equal work is a fundamental human right. When companies are inspected
or audited by the Ministry of Labour, one element that should be looked for is evidence of unequal
pay. But there is very little that the UAE government is willing to do about unequal pay because it
is one of the biggest offenders. Even government organizations will quite openly maintain two
separate pay scales, one for nationals and one for expatriates. And, of course, there is the
Emiratization drive, an explicit government initiative to replace expatriates workers with nationals
in key arenas of the workforce. The UAE government does this in order to encourage its citizens
to seek employment, but there is no denying that this violates the right to equal pay enshrined in
the UDHR: “Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.”65
Writ large, a national government exists to protect the interests of its citizens. There is
nothing unusual or intrinsically inimical to human rights in a country desiring to maintain citizens
in top positions in government and the economy. In the same vein, Emiratization as a goal is not
objectionable, it may even be laudable for a government to seek the best possible employment
situation for its citizens – surely the Philippine government would agree with that sentiment! As
long as the government does not violate the rights of non-citizens, there is no particular problem
with this. But in the UAE, support for the citizen population has crossed this line, infringing on
guarantees against discrimination and for equal pay for equal work.
The first step to addressing this is to relocate many of the privileges that are currently
associated with employment in the public sector to more straightforward government subsidies
instead. This could be accomplished either through direct payments, something like the US state
of Alaska’s oil royalty fund which issues annual payouts to state residents, or through increased
social programs to support working Emiratis. By beginning the equal pay drive with public sector
employment, the UAE government would be sending a powerful signal. This would not be an
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easy or a fast process, but there is hope: the UAE government is vocal about its desire to
increase Emirati participation in the private sector. Forstenlechner has argued for this move from
an economic perspective,66 but I would like to add an ethical perspective: privileging nationals in
public sector employment entrenches discrimination in the workforce at large.
Goal: Support for Domestic Workers
The situation of domestic workers in the UAE, as well as other Gulf countries, has
received a lot of attention from human rights organizations. And for good reason. A constellation
of circumstances has created a particularly perilous working situation for domestic workers in
these countries. Similar to the violations described above, there is a specific set of expectations
for domestic workers in the UAE, a kind of “business culture” for domestic labor. These
circumstances are structured by a commonly-held perception that domestic workers occupy a
liminal position between public and private, paid labor and familial responsibility. Domestic
workers occupy the space of the home, privy to the life and affairs of their employers, yet they are
not family members and (despite protestations to the contrary67) are not treated like family
members. They are paid employees of the family but, because they work and live in the home,
they are expected to work under a different set of rules than all other workers in the UAE. The
UAE Labour Law does not apply to domestic workers, the rules established by the Ministry of the
Interior for their treatment are inadequate, and even those rules are regularly ignored by
employers. Despite their vulnerable position and the many abuses, domestic workers have few
options for legal redress.
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Policy Path
1. Revise minimum contract requirements;
2. Include domestic workers under the Wages Protection System;
3. Increase the number of female labor inspectors; institute initial site visits and phone
checks;
4. Include domestic workers under the Labour Law.
1. Revise Minimum Contract Requirements
In 2014 the UAE issued a new, standard Unified Contract for Domestic Workers. The
new contract was supposed to cut down on the abuse of domestic workers as well as reduce
contract bait and switch by guaranteeing viable minimum standards of work. The new standard
contract specifies that domestic workers must be guaranteed eight continuous hours of sleep
each day, one day off per week (or compensation), thirty days paid vacation annually, and health
insurance; however, it does not address limits on working hours (other than the eight hours rest),
overtime pay, or workers compensation.68 Further, the contract allows employers to deduct from
workers’ salaries to pay for damage to goods or property with few restrictions.69 Finally, the
standard contract is the only contract that will be recognized by the UAE authorities, regardless of
whether the worker agreed to other terms or signed a different contract while in the sending
country. When the new Unified Contract for Domestic Workers was made public, it was met with
criticism from sending countries such as the Philippines, which is now refusing to issue contract
verifications (needed for the OEC) for domestic workers headed for the UAE,70 as well as from
human rights organizations.71
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Reforms are needed in order to bring the contract in line with human rights standards.
Setting clear limits on allowable working hours along with guidelines regarding overtime pay are
crucial first steps. While the new standard contract specifies eight hours of rest, it does not limit
how many hours can be worked in a day, nor in a week, nor how many of those hours should be
considered overtime. Eight hours of rest per day is necessary; but if the worker is working the
remaining sixteen hours per day, six days a week, they are nonetheless being dramatically
overworked and abused.
Contracts for domestic workers should specify not only working conditions, but living
conditions as well. While domestic workers are often required to live in their employers’ homes,
they are rarely told what those conditions will look like ahead of time. Abu Dhabi municipal
regulations do require that rooms for domestic workers be at least 2.1 meters square, but even
that minimal requirement is often ignored.72 Moving this requirement to the standard employment
contract would make both employers and workers more aware; this would also facilitate worker
complaints.
Finally, domestic workers should be guaranteed a cell phone with local SIM. Currently it
is not uncommon for employers, or even recruitment agencies, to confiscate domestic workers’
phones, further isolating them within the realm of the employer’s home.73 As well as ensuring that
domestic workers have a means of communicating with their families, providing a phone and SIM
enables domestic workers to contact their agencies or the UAE authorities in case of need. SIM
cards with prepaid calling plans are readily available in the UAE. Employers could be required to
provide the SIM number as part of the application process for a domestic worker’s visa.
The UAE already has the new standard contract; further revisions are likely to be slow in
coming. A few elements are pushing in the right direction, though. First, in 2012 the UAE
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authorities claimed to have prepared a draft law regulating domestic workers.74 Though this law
has still not been finalized, it is one indication that the UAE is moving in the direction of increased
regulation, though at a glacial pace. The UAE has also agreed in principle to a stricter Gulf
Cooperation Council standard contract for domestic workers. This is a promising sign, but
implementation of this GCC standard in domestic law and policy may similarly be a long time
coming.75 Perhaps more encouraging is the level of international pressure that is being put on the
UAE by sending countries and human rights groups. Of particular note is the move by the
Philippines to reject the UAE’s new standard contract. While the Philippines acknowledges the
UAE’s right to draw that contract as it sees fit, the Philippine state reserves to itself the right to
refuse to verify that contract; without contract verification, domestic workers destined for the UAE
cannot receive an OEC and so cannot exit the Philippines legally. This refusal on the part of the
Philippines government has caused some anger and frustration among potential employers of
Filipino maids, but it has also driven up the wages and it has certainly highlighted the importance
of Filipino domestic workers in UAE households.
2. Include Domestic Workers Under the WPS
The practice of wage withholding used to be common in the UAE, as it is in other Gulf
countries. The UAE took a massive step to address this issue with the Wages Protection System
(WPS). The UAE government now requires that all employers under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Labour pay wages electronically through the WPS system with UAE Central Bank and
Ministry of Labour oversight.76 This means that there is easily available information for every
worker on the payment, or non-payment, of wages. As soon as WPS was implemented, wage
withholding in the UAE decreased. Interviewees paid through the system reported no current
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problems with the payment of their regular salary. But WPS does not extend to everyone in the
UAE. Domestic workers are excluded as they do not fall under the Ministry of Labour’s
jurisdiction, but under the Ministry of the Interior. Even so, there is no need to exclude these
workers from WPS. A bank account in the worker’s name can as easily be set up for a housemaid
as for a construction worker and family employers can transfer wages electronically. The only real
change that would have to be made is in coordination between the Central Bank and the Ministry
of the Interior for enforcement purposes.
3. Increase the Number of Female Labor Inspectors; Institute Initial Site Visits and Phone Checks
Domestic workers are not covered by the UAE Labour Law, nor under the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Labour. One important reason for this deficiency is the fact that worksite checks
within the home are not considered a viable option given the prevalent cultural and religious
norms protecting the absolute privacy of the home and of women’s space.
Currently, the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs has a hotline that
domestic workers can call to report violations. This is far from an ideal solution. The only way to
make sure that regulations are followed in practice is to institute spot checks. But having
inspectors enter local homes is culturally problematic. The home is supposed to be a protected,
private space. Domestic workers occupy a liminal space between the private/family and
public/social spaces: they live in the home yet are not family. Often domestic workers’ access to
public spaces, either through time off or through access to means of communication such as cell
phones, is restricted by the employer as a means of ensuring that family matters remain private.
Yet domestic workers are workers, under contract to perform labor in exchange for a wage. In the
end, the idea that allowing a stranger to enter the home is culturally unacceptable does not hold
water as an excuse for avoiding inspections: if you cannot let a stranger into the home, you
should not have a domestic worker in the first place. There should be an initial site visit to inspect
accommodations if the worker lives in the home and, thereafter, periodic phone calls to the
domestic worker’s local SIM card from a representative of the Ministry of the Interior to check on
conditions. This type of assessment is common in au pair and live-in care worker programs in the
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developed world and a similar framework could be instituted in the UAE. Home inspectors in the
UAE should be female, however, in order to decrease cultural friction.
4. Include Domestic Workers Under the Labour Law
Finally, domestic workers should be brought under the UAE Labour Law. They are
workers and should be afforded the full protection of the Labour Law without prejudice regarding
the site of their labor. They deserve full respect under the law, full access to the rights and
protections that it offers, and full access to mechanisms for complaint and redress.
Goal: Allow Migrants to Form Labor Organizations
In the UAE any type of group – social, political, or economic – must have permission from
the government in order to function legally. The UAE authorities, however, do not permit all types
of groups to form. Labor organization in particular is outlawed and strikes are illegal.77 All
migrants are affected by the lack of labor organization in the UAE and the impact of this
prohibition is higher than it might first appear. In many developed economies today we tend to
forget that labor organization had its roots in fighting for basic labor guarantees such as a livable
wage, limited working hours, and basic worksite health and safety guarantees. These issues
remain very much alive in the UAE today and preventing migrant workers, roughly 85 percent of
the national workforce, from organizing prevents them from effectively advocating for change.
Migrants in the UAE lack the ability to make their interests heard politically, they lack leverage in
dealing with their employers. As a result, exploitation remains very much a part of normal
business in the UAE.
Unfortunately, allowing for the formation of organized labor groups is one of the most
intractable issues that migrant workers in the UAE face. This is largely due to the demographic
composition of the population. Migrants make up roughly 85 percent of the workforce. Organized
labor would control a potentially overwhelming demographic force, and one foreign to the state.
This would have the potential to over set the UAE’s existing ruling bargain based on the
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exchange of political power for economic privileging of Emirati citizens (see Chapter Three).
Options for reform in this area are extremely limited.
Policy Path
1. Create an ombudsman office to represent migrant labor issues within the UAE political
system;
2. Allow strikes of non-essential industries and organized labor protests;
3. Continue with planned institution of a government labor union, with intent to slowly
increase its independence.
1. Create an Ombudsman Office to Represent Migrant Labor Issues within the UAE Political
System
While an ombuds office would not be a labor organization per se, it can be seen as the
embryo of collective representation: vesting one individual with the responsibility of representing
the rights of workers as a whole within the UAE political and economic system. As an appointed
official representing the interests of workers, an ombudsman would be charged with addressing
rights violations and bringing light to systemic problems.
An ombudsman should be an achievable step for the UAE. This role fits in well with the
existing preference for mediation and working with public authority. As such it has the potential to
demonstrate that the representation of labor interests can be accommodated within the UAE
system. But this is also its greatest weakness. The effectiveness of an ombudsman depends on
the effectiveness of the individual chosen, the authority vested in the office and, finally, the
willingness of other offices to work with them. Each of these is questionable in the UAE,
particularly the final element. The creation of such an ombudsman in the UAE may be achievable
as a first step towards the political representation of labor in the UAE political system, but the
office is unlikely to be particularly effective in bringing change.
2. Allow Strikes of Non-Essential Industries and Organized Labor Protests
Currently strikes and group labor protests are illegal in the UAE. There is a defined legal
process for pursuing collective labor disputes through binding mediation by the Ministry of
Labour. Protests outside of this process are not tolerated by the UAE authorities. Publically
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protesting workers face arrest and deportation. Whether unionized or not, without the ability to
protest, without the ability to make their grievances public and impact the daily routine of
employers and workplaces, workers are hamstrung and lack sufficient leverage against their
employers to effect change.
This is a difficult reform to urge on the UAE. From the current UAE government
perspective, worker protests allow foreign elements to destabilize the domestic social order and
undermine the citizenry’s economic privilege upon which the existing domestic political bargain is
based. Further, the number of workers who are actively engaged in protests is such a small
percentage of the workforce that they are eminently replaceable: there are far more potential
migrants eager for jobs in the UAE than there are available positions. Simply replacing protesting
workers supports the political status quo without imposing any particular strain on the economic
system. In fact, one of the major factors supporting the possibility of other reforms, such as the
introduction of a minimum wage, is the fact that these can serve as alternatives, reducing the
number and severity of politically unacceptable labor protests. So long as “worker” is synonymous
with the eminently replaceable, politically marginalized migrant, allowing protests is a distant
ambition.
Legalizing strikes is a reform whose time has not yet come in the UAE. Allowing
organized labor protests such as strikes calls into question the larger political project in the UAE.
This reform is not only implausible in the foreseeable future, but its promotion may undermine the
more limited, but still desirable, policy reforms that are achievable.
3. Continue with Planned Institution of a Government Labor Union, with Intent to Slowly Increase
its Independence
Labor unions have played a crucial role in organization for labor rights in many developed
economies. And the truth is that labor unions in many countries, including the United States, have
struggled with how to incorporate migrants in their organizations, fearing that migrant labor would
drive down wages and working conditions in the receiving country.78 In the end, though,
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increased membership in the labor union increases the union’s political clout and so immigration
and migrant workers by and large have been accepted by unions in the United States and other
western economies. The UAE faces a different problem. This is not an attempt to include
migrants into existing union structures; the UAE does not have labor unions at all.
Under most conditions, the individual workers is relatively powerless compared to
employers and states. In the UAE this condition is exacerbated by the alignment between political
and economic cleavages – citizens are employers, migrants are workers. This alignment places
migrant workers in a particularly weak position, benefiting citizen employers. There is obviously a
significant domestic constituency supporting the suppression of labor organization. Unions
everywhere serve to increase the leverage of workers relative to employers and the state; in the
UAE unions would give migrant workers, as workers, a strengthened voice in the political and
economic structure of the country, allowing them to more effectively advocate for their rights and
protect their interests. Allowing unions to form would necessarily give political clout to migrants,
something the UAE has been loath to do. And, as roughly 85 percent of the labor force is
composed of migrants, it would give those migrants substantial power, possibly revolutionary
power, over the UAE economy. If allowing workers to strike is has the potential to undermine the
ruling bargain of the UAE, allowing the formation of independent unions would almost certainly
overset that bargain.
But the UAE has long intended to form a single, government-sponsored labor union
representing the rights and interests of workers.79 There is no clear evidence of why the initiative
has been stalled at the upper reaches of the UAE government; concerns regarding the
consequences of increasing workers’ leverage relative to employers, as well as citizen reaction to
such a policy – are likely causes. A better question is why the UAE would consider allowing such
an organization in the first place, given these potential consequences. In order for the union to be
a credible representative for workers, it would need to gain independence from the UAE
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government. Without independence a state-run union would be, at best, a propaganda tool and,
at worst, a tool of the state designed to discipline workers rather than help them.
As with the legalization of strikes, unionization is a desirable reform but one whose time
has not yet come in the UAE. Its promotion may undermine those more limited, but still desirable,
policy reforms that are achievable.
Goal: Create a Transnational Social Security Net
Basic social security guarantees are a fundamental human right. The existence of a
functioning social security net also underlies the ability of the individual to make choices
regarding their employment by ensuring that the fallback position is minimally secure, thus
bolstering the full complement of human rights. Providing an adequate social security system is
difficult for poor and developing countries, including the Philippines and most major migrant
sending countries. The position of temporary emigrants from those countries is particularly
precarious as they often do not fully contribute to state-sponsored systems and so rely
disproportionately on private savings, the benefits that they hope will accrue from migration.
When those resources are insufficient or when they fail to emerge as expected, many Filipinos
rely on family networks for their social security, straining the larger social system. When all else
fails, indigent individuals become the responsibility of the home country, despite the fact that that
country may not have benefited from either their productive labor or from any material
contribution to the relevant social security system.
Major receiving countries such as the UAE tend to be relatively better off. The UAE has a
generous social security system in place for its citizens. However migrant workers have extremely
limited access to this system. Despite the fact that they are passing their primary productive years
in the UAE, migrants are not eligible for programs subsidizing the indigent, education, or
unemployment, for example. Their healthcare and pension provision has been privatized, the
responsibility transferred to the employer. Employers, however, often try to minimize or entirely
avoid this expensive responsibility and workers as temporary members of the host society are not
well-placed to advocate for their rights.
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If sending and receiving countries cooperate, however, a social security system where
costs and benefits are shared between sending and receiving countries can be designed and
maintained.
Policy Path
1. Extend employer obligation to provide healthcare to all seven Emirates;
2. Reform membership fee structures for PhilHealth, OWWA and SSS;
3. Do not allow end of service gratuity to be withheld under any circumstances;
4. Repatriate indigent migrants at no cost;
5. Replace end of service gratuities with international pension fund contributions.
1. Extend Employer Obligation to Provide Healthcare to all Emirates
The Philippines provides all OFWs and their immediate families access to affordable
health care through the PhilHealth system. However, PhilHealth coverage only applies within the
Philippines. While living abroad, OFWs need to arrange alternate coverage. Currently Abu Dhabi
and Dubai require employers to provide health care to all employees. Abu Dhabi’s standard plan,
for example, is basic but adequate. However, there is no such requirement in the five remaining
emirates. It should be fairly easy to extend this requirement to all seven emirates in order to
guarantee the basic right to health to all migrant workers in the UAE.
2. Reform Membership Fee Structures for PhilHealth, OWWA and SSS
The three major social security programs that the Philippines extends to its citizens
abroad – SSS (pensions and retirement), PhilHelath (health insurance), and OWWA (OFWspecific welfare programs, from education loans to emergency repatriation funds) – are largely
funded by member contributions. As OFWs tend to complain both that the fees are too high and
that coverage is inadequate, the Philippine state has a dilemma on its hands. To some extent
matters could be improved by cutting out corruption and bureaucratic waste, but the fundamental
balance between these two priorities – cost versus coverage – still must be addressed. The state
has tried to relieve the burden on workers by shifting the cost on to employers, requiring them to
pay OWWA fees, for example. There are two additional options for addressing this balance. First,
PhilHealth and OWWA could adopt the SSS model requiring membership in a basic, low cost
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program but offering more robust coverage for an optional additional fee. Second, programs
could scale membership fees according to the member’s salary, subsidizing the membership fees
of low-wage workers.80
SSS functions relatively well and most migrants trust that it will continue to do so.
However, the current minimum contributions are insufficient to find workers’ retirement. Without
adequate savings, workers are pushed to continue relying on precarious small businesses and/or
family support structures to fund retirement. The Philippines needs to consider reforming
contribution schemes, increasing the minimum contribution for most workers.
3. Do Not Allow End of Service Gratuity to be Withheld Under Any Circumstances
In the UAE the end of service gratuity payment (roughly equal to one months’ salary per
year worked) is typically viewed as a replacement for employer contributions to a dedicated
pension or retirement scheme. One problem with relying on the end of service payments to help
fund a pension or retirement is that the worker does not always actually receive this payment. In
contrast to a system where the employer contributes monthly, payment at the end means that the
employer may be able to deduct from or withhold entirely the end of service gratuity for legally
allowable reasons: if the worker is fired with cause, if she resigns before completing five years of
service, or if she leaves without giving notice.81 This means that the worker may be deprived,
possibly without notice, of what is essentially her pension fund. This should not be allowed; the
end of service gratuity should not be withheld under any circumstances.
4. Repatriate Indigent Migrants at No Cost
In most cases the employer pays for the repatriation of workers at the end of their term of
employment. Either there should be no circumstances under which employers can be divested of
this responsibility (not even firing for gross negligence or if the worker ends up jailed for debt –
when they are released, their return airfare should be paid), or the relevant states’ authorities
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should assume responsibility for the repatriation of stranded migrants. This already happens in an
informal manner. The Philippines government helps workers who have fallen into substantial
distress and the UAE government may pay for the return flight of migrants being deported. This
should be formalized and it should not take deportation to trigger this obligation. An indigent
migrant should have a mechanism for petitioning for repatriation support from the UAE
government. As the Philippine state will assume the duty of supporting indigent citizens once they
repatriate, the UAE should take on the responsibility of seeing that they repatriate safely. This
repatriation should happen at no cost to the indigent worker.
This is in the interest of the UAE in particular. Indigent migrants with insufficient means to
repatriate are one of the primary sources of illegal migrants in the country. The fact that fines for
illegal residence accrue at a rate of 100 AED ($27 USD) per day means that once a migrant falls
into an illegal situation the fines quickly mount beyond the ability of the migrant to pay even if she
was able to find a legitimate job. The UAE has periodically issued amnesties waiving these fines.
The success of these amnesties shows that many illegal migrants do wish to repatriate; however,
one element that may be constraining workers from taking advantage of amnesty programs is the
continued inability to pay for repatriation flights. As the UAE does profess a strong preference for
controlling illegal immigration and already does pay for repatriation of a significant number of
migrant workers (either through deportations or through charitable programs), formalizing this
obligation is a reasonable extension.
5. Replace End of Service Gratuities with International Pension Fund Contributions
The end of service gratuity is a peculiar institution in the Gulf countries. The Labour Law
provides us with an indication of what purpose these payments are intended to serve when it
establishes that the gratuity may be superseded by “pension or security schemes” offered by the
employers if these are more favorable to the worker. In essence, the gratuity replaces a formal
pension or social security system. Filipino temporary workers in the UAE need these savings, as
they are excluded from UAE state pensions and other social security systems. As specifically
temporary residents, they neither pay in to the UAE system, nor are eligible to receive any
benefit.
377

However, the end of service gratuity is a poor replacement for social security coverage in
old age. First of all, few workers actually save this money to support them in their old age; instead
many use it to fund immediate needs such as bridging a period of unemployment. This leaves
their retirement unfunded. Second, even if they did save the gratuity for retirement, the gratuity is
unlikely to be sufficient to provide a decent retirement income.82 Finally, gratuity payments are not
guaranteed; they may be withheld in certain circumstances (see Chapter Eight). The UAE should
encourage employers to offer pension systems to their employees instead of relying on the end of
service gratuity. Pensions funded throughout the duration of the worker’s employment allow for a
more transparent accumulation of funds for both employee and employer. Pensions would also
remain with the employee regardless of when or why the worker exited a specific job.
Encouraging pensions could be achieved by identifying acceptable public (sending country) or
private pension schemes that operate internationally that the UAE government accepts as a
viable replacement for end of service gratuities. The UAE state could even collect such pension
contributions and hold them until the migrant repatriates at which point they would be transferred
to the country of citizenship’s corresponding social security system, as an additional incentive for
return migration and to discourage illegal immigration.83
This is an area where cooperation between the UAE and its major sending country
partners is necessary. Portable pension schemes are a growing trend internationally and are
increasingly established along major migration corridors via bilateral or multilateral treaty,
allowing social security contributions and benefits accrued in one state-sponsored system to be
maintained and transferred with the worker when she moves to another country or repatriates. In
general, this applies to both withholding schemes (social security taxes) as well as governmentsponsored savings (tax-free retirement accounts such as 401Ks in the United States); the
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Philippines already has portability arrangements with several European countries and Canada.
Portability is more difficult in the UAE and other Gulf countries where state social security
systems are not funded by employer and employee contributions but rather through alternative
state revenues. There is no income tax or social security withholding in the UAE, so there are no
funds accumulated by a worker, foreign or domestic, in a state coffer; there is no preexisting fund
to transfer when the migrant worker repatriates. This would have to be built. The most likely
candidate would be to take the existing sending country systems and facilitate contributions by
both workers and their employers.
The Philippine state has tried to extend some social security coverage to overseas
Filipino workers, making contributions to the state-sponsored Social Security System (SSS)
mandatory. Workers are covered in case of retirement, maternity, sickness, disability, and
death.84 However, payouts tend to be small. The average basic monthly pension in 2014 was
3,157 Php ($72 USD)85; that is not enough to live on. In addition, many Filipinos, finding it
cumbersome to make SSS payments from abroad, allow their membership to lapse. Again,
working to facilitate portability schemes between the UAE and the Philippines would help to
alleviate this problem.
Conclusion
The UN estimates that there were 213,943,812 migrants in the world in 2012, over 3
percent of the global population. Migration today is a global phenomenon that both relies on the
infrastructure (economic, technological, and socio-cultural) of globalization and reinforces
globalization by facilitating the flow of people, languages, ideas, and culture. Migration networks
connect every corner of the globe through trade and investment patterns but also through
communications, transportation, and the flow of people. But migrants are not just units of
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autonomous labor; they are men and women. With people come not just bodies of labor, but all of
the messy, human aspects as well: hopes, expectations, habits of behavior, grievances, etc. And
it is because of these messy aspects that migration is often viewed by the receiving country as a
possible threat – it is not the economic challenge, but the perceived threats to governance,
security, cultural identity and social values that migrants pose that are most difficult to manage
globally. And the more migrants a country accepts, the greater this challenge.
One common response is to either limit the number of migrants that are allowed into a
country and/or to integrate them as fully into the native population as possible. This is the
challenge that most developed countries are currently engaged in. But this strategy has
disadvantages for both sending and receiving countries. For sending countries and migrants the
disadvantages are obvious: this strategy limits access to international labor markets and the
development, personal or national, that might come with it. For receiving countries, limiting the
number of migrants limits the economic benefits that could be derived from migration. Many
countries try to compensate for these disadvantages by putting in place selection procedures to
get the “right” migrants based on needed skills and desired cultural traits such as language.
However this usually biases migrant selection towards skilled workers and individuals from
developed countries. The cumulative effect is to reduce access to global labor markets to those
who would derive the most benefit from it, thus limiting the potential global redistributive effects of
international migration.
Alternatively, the migrant receiving state can allow high levels of migration but limit the
ability of migrants to integrate into society and require that they repatriate after some specified
period of time. This is the experiment that the Gulf countries are currently engaged in. The World
Bank estimates that in 2010 the six GCC countries had over fifteen million migrants, roughly 7
percent of the global total.86 A comparative advantage in oil and gas extraction (which requires a
labor force on site) coupled with a small native population made importing migrant labor on a
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large scale a practical necessity. Faced with the very real possibility of being overwhelmed by a
rising tide of migrant labor, the Gulf countries protect the native population and their sense of
national identity by restricting the ability of migrants to integrate. The chosen strategy: temporary
contract migration under sponsorship. Temporary contract migration has reemerged on the global
agenda as a possible means of mediating between the interests of sending countries, receiving
countries, and migrant workers.
Temporary contract migration programs are often seen by states as a means of
mitigating challenges associated with managing this global flow. By encouraging circulation and
return migration it is hoped that a virtuous cycle of opportunities for the global poor, flexible and
inexpensive labor for receiving states, and increased development for receiving states can be
established. Most nations today have some variation of a temporary labor migration scheme in
place.
The bulk of this dissertation has focused on a comprehensive identification of the human
rights challenges facing Filipino temporary contract migrants in the UAE. This case study has
been particularly useful in illuminating the challenges and opportunities inherent in temporary
contract migration. The sheer enormity of the economic and demographic situation that faces
these countries brings temporary contract migration starkly to light. However, the categories of
responsibility and the comprehensive identification of problems lend themselves to a broader
comparative project. The problems are widespread. This is not just a problem of the GCC, though
its particular economic and demographic situation make the problem so uniquely evident there.
An in-depth comparison is beyond the scope of this project, though it is certainly an area for
future research. Consider some of the issues and policy proposals addressed in this chapter:
Choice of employment: Canada’s Live-In Caregiver program, which relies heavily on
temporary Filipino workers, ties workers to a single employer – similar to the situation of workers
under the sponsorship system in the UAE.
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Recruitment: Israel has a complex system of state policy support for private brokers that
“fuels trafficking practices and forced labor of legal labor migrants.”87
Domestic workers: A 2014 report by Human Rights Watch documented abuse, forced
confinement, excessive working hours, low salaries, non-payment of wages, passport
confiscation, and denial of means of communication (cell phones) in the UK.88 As of 2012,
domestic workers in the UK receive “tied visas” and unable to change employers. This is a similar
pattern of abuse as is seen in the UAE.
Labor organization: Amid growing violence targeting migrants, migrant workers
threatening to strike in the Maldives (whose luxury tourism industry relies on migrant workers)
were threatened with deportation by the Ministry of Economic Development who viewed the
protests as “a premeditated attempt to undermine [the] Maldivian economy and businesses.”89
Labor unions in western European countries, Belgium and the UK for example, are struggling with
how to incorporate migrant workers.
Social security: Roughly half of Mexican migrants working in the United States are
employed in positions that contribute to social security. But, without a totalization agreement
between the two countries, they will not be eligible to receive those benefits should they repatriate
to Mexico.90
Understanding the gap in provision of rights as well as migrant strategies for coping with
their precarious situation is a prerequisite for designing ethical and effective policies. The
answers that we arrive at have immediate, significant implications for the lived experience of
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millions of temporary migrants around the world today. This dissertation has contributed to both
theoretical and practical aspects of the human rights of temporary contract migrants. I have
proposed a theoretical framework for allocating obligation for the protection and fulfillment of
temporary migrant workers between both sending and receiving countries, specifying citizenship
obligations, presence obligations and involvement obligations. These categories are used to first
identify problems, illuminate the duty to address the problem, and propose possible avenues for
reform.
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